Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- Members of the scientific community said yesterday that valuable research that bolsters public health could be put in jeopardy if the U.S. government adopts recommendations from an advisory panel for how to reduce the risk of biological terrorism (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2008).

The congressionally mandated Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism late last year said the United States should strengthen security at university, medical research and pharmaceutical laboratories to more effectively prevent terrorists from accessing disease substances that could be used in a weapon.

However, several representatives from these communities this week argued that expanding federal regulations could increase costs for institutions without significantly improving already tight security. Accommodating additional federal inspections, for example, would magnify financial strains facing laboratories in the midst of an international economic downturn, they said.

At a briefing for reporters, laboratory administrators also said the burdens of increased monitoring could stifle research and drive scientific talent away from existing efforts that strengthen national security. Many of these high-security laboratories work to identify pathogen strains, which can help to determine the origins of a disease and contribute to developing vaccines.

The WMD panel, led by former Senators Bob Graham (D-Fla.) and Jim Talent (R-Mo.), in December found that the "government's approach to bioterrorism has placed too little emphasis on prevention." U.S. efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction are largely focused instead on preventing nuclear terrorism by securing fissile materials, they said.

The group determined that a weapon of mass destruction is likely to be used somewhere around the world by 2013, and the risk of biological terrorism is higher than that of a nuclear attack.

The commission's report included a number of steps the nation could take to reinforce biological security, including "review the domestic program to secure dangerous pathogens" and "tighten government oversight of high-containment laboratories."

Additional measures might involve increased camera or human surveillance inside the sites, more security training for research personnel, or an expansion in federal on-site inspections, according to experts.

A trio of laboratory executives -- Thomas Sack of the Kansas City, Mo.-based Midwest Research Institute, Michael St. Clair of Ohio State University and Michael Pentella of University of Iowa -- pushed back on the idea, saying they were concerned that commission findings they do not support were gaining political steam.

Before meeting with reporters, the officials held a briefing on Capitol Hill sponsored by the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The latter organization and the Center for Media and Security co-hosted the subsequent event for reporters.

Midwest -- whose research areas include national defense, health sciences, agriculture and food safety, and biological sciences -- incurs roughly $50,000 in personnel and other costs each time a federal agency like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention inspects one of the company's high-security laboratories, Sack said. He oversees regional operations for the U.S. government contractor.

Federal agencies inspect three Midwest facilities a cumulative six to nine times a year. Based in Florida, Maryland and Missouri, these sites include 15 of the company's most secure laboratories.

Even tighter restrictions on laboratory operations across the nation could harm research, Sack and others suggested.

After the terrorist attacks in 2001, the U.S. government imposed new regulations on pathogen research and shipping, the officials said.

While some of these rules have "increased security," there is evidence that they also "harmed international collaborations between scientists [and] hindered public health, particularly in transferring avian influenza samples from places where we're looking to surveil," according to Gigi Kwik Gronvall of the University of Pittsburgh's biosecurity center, who accompanied the laboratory administrators.

"There is a sense that more security is better," she said. "But that's not the case on the ground. At some point, more security measures leave you less secure."

Gronvall said she and her colleagues would like to see a more nuanced approach to countering the bioterrorism threat that includes increased security through robust research.

"How do you balance our need for the scientific research and more drugs and more diagnostic tests and better vaccines to protect the public in the event of an emergency, with [recommendations for more] cameras and drug testing?" she said.

St. Clair said a brain drain has already begun to affect U.S. pathogen research, with a number of scientists relocating outside the United States because more moderate security restrictions abroad make their work easier.

To perform research with less arduous controls, "they can go to just about any country outside the U.S.," he said.

"A lot of the [WMD commission] report focused on pathogen security," Gronvall said. "They got the overall gist of the threat right -- that biological weapons are something we need to be concerned about and we need to be prepared for. ... But to base all of our efforts to stop that from happening on locking up pathogens is inherently not going to work."

"The commission concluded that insufficient attention had been paid to prevention, and advocated establishing a culture of biosafety and security," Evelyn Farkas, the WMD panel's former executive director, said today in e-mailed comments. "Based on our work, we concluded that most scientists would be willing to accept a higher level of security and to participate in efforts to ensure that pathogens were used responsibility."

In counterpoint to the commission's report, Gronvall recommended that the nation focus more on preparedness, which she argued could also serve as a deterrent.

"Just like any natural outbreak, if you have a [man-made] outbreak of disease and you're able to vaccinate people and treat the ones that are affected, then you're able to limit [the attack]," Gronvall said. "These agents don't kill immediately, so you may have some time and you may be able to prevent spread. So it should be looked at more from a public health perspective and less from a weapons perspective."

"Better preparedness will bolster our deterrence," agreed Farkas. However, she said, stronger preparedness would not preclude a parallel partnership between government agencies and research scientists to boost biological security.

"The report calls on the government to work with academia and industry domestically and internationally to improve biosafety and security -- not for the government to unilaterally impose measures that would have the effect of chasing scientific talent away from U.S. government work or from working in the United States," Farkas said.

Note: This article was updated on 03/17/2009 to clarify data about Midwest Research Institute facilities and event co-sponsors.