Global Security Newswire

The expiration of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in December vastly curtailed U.S. scrutiny of Russian nuclear weapons, a development rarely considered in congressional discussions over whether to ratify the agreement's successor pact, the Washington Post reported (see GSN, Aug. 13).

U.S. inspectors no longer visit Russian nuclear facilities to tally warheads and examine rockets, and Moscow has significantly reduced declarations to Washington detailing common relocations of its nuclear-weapon delivery systems. Gaps in understanding of Russian nuclear forces would continue to widen if a replacement arms control treaty is not soon implemented, according to officials.

"The problem of the breakdown of our verification, which lapsed Dec. 5, is very serious and impacts our national security," Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said at one hearing.

U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in April signed the "New START" agreement, which would obligate both nations to cap their fielded strategic nuclear weapons at 1,550 warheads, down from the maximum of 2,200 allowed each country by 2012 under the 2002 Moscow Treaty. The deal would also limit U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear delivery vehicles to 700, with another 100 platforms allowed in reserve. The pact has been submitted for ratification by Russia's legislature as well as the Senate.

At least eight GOP senators in this Congress must vote in favor of the treaty to achieve its ratification in the United States. As conditions for supporting the pact, Republican lawmakers have sought additional funds for modernizing the nation's nuclear weapons complex as well as clarifications from the Obama administration on the treaty's potential impact on U.S. missile defenses.

"It's not an argument for voting before you know all the facts," Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) said.

Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), though, expressed surprise that the former Cold War rivals no longer observed nuclear monitoring procedures established under the 1991 agreement. "I thought we were just going to continue doing business as usual" as lawmakers considered ratifying the new pact, he said (see GSN, Dec. 4, 2009).

"Without the (new) treaty and its verification measures, the United States would have much less insight into Russian strategic forces, thereby requiring our military to plan based on worst-case assumptions," Principal Deputy Defense Undersecretary James Miller said in July congressional testimony. "This would be an expensive and potentially destabilizing approach."

"One of our dirty little secrets is, when the (Berlin) Wall went down, the United States reoriented a lot of intelligence capacity away from the Soviet Union and Russia. To some fair degree ... the IC (intelligence community) was relying on U.S. inspectors to be on the ground," the official added.

While the United States and Russia can still obtain some knowledge of each other's nuclear forces through satellite imagery and radar, such instruments cannot provide details such as the number of nuclear warheads fitted onto an ICBM in a Russian nuclear silo, according to officials.

"We have 15 years of experience under START, understanding where everything is. We've been through these sites multiple times," said former U.S. Air Force nuclear officer Phil Smith, who traveled to Russian nuclear sites on roughly 20 occasions.

Under the 1991 treaty, the United States routinely informed Russia of upcoming nuclear audits around a day in advance. During such visits, U.S. officials examined missiles using tape measures and added up warheads deployed on a number of delivery vehicles.

"If something is atypical ... I will not be bashful about saying, 'OK, we need to take a closer look at this one.' That's the kind of dynamic you have on the ground that you wouldn't have with a satellite," Smith added.

The United States matched data obtained from inspections against Russian reports to the State Department's Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. The center notified relevant federal offices of future audits as well as planned transfers and dismantlements of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.

"Now we don't get any of that information. We have less and less visibility into their status of forces," said Ned Williams, who heads the center. Moscow and Washington have continued providing notice of missile launch exercises.

An official who served under former President George W. Bush accused the Obama administration of providing a key concession to Russia by agreeing to swap less missile test flight data under New START. Such information helps the United States grasp the number of warheads Russia could place on its missiles (see GSN, Feb. 18).

The new treaty would require Moscow to submit information from just five of the 10-12 yearly ballistic missile tests.

The United States "agreed to gut the monitoring and verification measures and limitations necessary to render it effectively verifiable," former Assistant Secretary of State Paula DeSutter said.

Government sources, though, said a provision in the new pact allowing the direct counting of warheads makes the telemetry change less important. New START would enable more precise verification by permitting the sides to associate identification codes with individual warheads and launchers, they added (Mary Beth Sheridan, Washington Post, Aug. 17).