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New Paper Reviews Expanded Safeguards

May 22, 2012

Safeguards--the system of accounting, containment, surveillance, and inspections aimed at verifying that states are in compliance with their treaty obligations concerning the supply, manufacture, and use of civil nuclear materials--primarily apply to non-nuclear-weapon states. In this paper, John Carlson explores safeguards for nuclear weapons states.

In the executive summary, he notes, "Currently there is limited application of safeguards in nuclear-weapon states (NWS), other than EURATOM safeguards which apply to all civilian facilities in the UK and France.  Historically the priority for IAEA safeguards has been to address horizontal proliferation, i.e., the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS).  The NWS have voluntary offer agreements under which they may designate material and facilities for safeguards.  The IAEA selects for inspection only a small number of the facilities so designated. As nuclear disarmament progresses further, it will be necessary to extend the application of safeguards – or equivalent verification – in NWS."

Read the executive summary.  Read the paper

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Safeguards--the system of accounting, containment, surveillance, and inspections aimed at verifying that states are in compliance with their treaty obligations concerning the supply, manufacture, and use of civil nuclear materials--primarily apply to non-nuclear-weapon states. In this paper, John Carlson explores safeguards for nuclear weapons states.

Understanding
the Nuclear Threat

Reducing the risk of nuclear use by terrorists and nation-states requires a broad set of complementary strategies targeted at reducing state reliance on nuclear weapons, stemming the demand for nuclear weapons and denying organizations or states access to the essential nuclear materials, technologies and know-how.

In Depth