Statement of Christine Wormuth on U.S-Iran Memorandum of Understanding

The agreement signed between the United States and Iran may bring an end to months of hostilities and keep the Strait of Hormuz open, but it leaves Iran’s nuclear capabilities—one of the threats cited as the rationale for the U.S.-Israeli bombing campaign—for another day. When negotiations do get underway on what remains the most difficult issue of all, success is far from guaranteed.

Iran’s pledge in the memorandum not to build a nuclear weapon—made under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the now-defunct 2015 nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—is meaningless without verifiable restrictions on its program. Tehran’s stated willingness to resolve the disposition of its stockpile of nuclear material and discuss enrichment is welcome but insufficient.

The United States must act with urgency and seriousness over the next 60 days to forge an agreement that closes off all pathways to a nuclear bomb and is backed by the most stringent monitoring and verification regime. That deal must cover enrichment, as well as reprocessing and weaponization. Verification should be anchored in Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol and go beyond those measures, with the International Atomic Energy Agency leading inspections. To get the deal right, the United States should assemble a team of technical experts to inform negotiations and insist on direct, sustained dialogue with their Iranian counterparts.

Securing a strong agreement will be harder now than it was in 2015. Iranian technical capabilities and knowledge have advanced significantly since the United States withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018. With inspectors absent from key sites for nearly a year, the international community now faces major gaps in its understanding of Iran’s program—gaps which will take time, effort, and Iranian cooperation to close.