Former Yugoslavia Chemical Overview

This page is part of the Former Yugoslavia Country Profile.

• View Recent Developments and Current Status

Throughout the 1990s it was generally accepted that the Serbian-dominated state that existed after 1992 possessed a large and advanced offensive chemical weapons (CW) capability. From an early 21st century vantage point, it is apparent that this threat was greatly overstated.

Throughout the 1990s, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was believed to represent one of the world’s most serious chemical warfare threats. Events surrounding the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation fostered the perception that the FRY was a threat to its neighbors and did not support or adhere to international norms. Revelations that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had developed an offensive CW capability in the 1970s and 1980s, combined with multiple accusations of actual CW use by the FRY in battles with Croatian and Bosnian forces, led to the conclusion that the country posed a serious CW threat to the region and NATO forces. Throughout the 1990s it was generally accepted that the Serbian-dominated state that existed after 1992 possessed a large and advanced offensive CW capability. From an early 21st century vantage point, it is apparent that this threat was greatly overstated.

The determination to develop an independent defensive capability has been a consistent theme in the history of Yugoslavian CW-related activity. The pursuit of this capability has spanned basic research on CW agents to the development, testing, and production of defensive systems. Initial efforts in the field of defensive CW capabilities date back to the 1920s, but clear information on such activity is only available from the 1930s onwards. There are good reasons to believe that the development of an offensive CW capability and the production of CW agents were also undertaken at this time. This effort was terminated by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s defeat and occupation in World War II.

Following Yugoslavia’s liberation in 1945, the country was devastated. Most facilities and capabilities related to CW had to be rebuilt from scratch in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the 1950s, the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia received some support in terms of CW defensive equipment and training from the United States. The Yugoslavian leadership appears to have concluded that CW would continue to be an important aspect of modern warfare and devoted considerable efforts to the development and production of defensive capabilities, generally using imported equipment as a starting point. At some point in the mid-1960s, a decision appears to have been made to lay the groundwork for an offensive CW capability. However, the process of turning a defensive CW program into an offensive CW program was rather drawn out, and real progress only began in the 1980s, suggesting that developing this capability was a low priority both for the Yugoslavian government and the scientific establishment tasked with the duty. There are strong indications that by the end of the 1980s the Yugoslavian leadership had decided to deploy chemical weapons in significant quantities with combat forces. However the program was disrupted by the end of the Cold War and the progressive disintegration of the Yugoslavian Federal state, and appears to have been abandoned in 1991. Notably, an effort was made to destroy stockpiles at this time. Ultimately, Yugoslavia’s offensive CW program never got beyond research, basic weaponization trials, and small scale trial production runs following which the facilities were dismantled and the equipment placed into storage. Full industrial production of the chosen CW agents was not instituted prior to the end of the program. A residual capacity for offensive CW activities was retained after 1992 in the form of a cadre of trained personnel and key production equipment salvaged from the Potoci facility near the city of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, no serious effort appears to have been made to resume the offensive program in the 1990s, and the production equipment was destroyed in 2003.

There appears to have been some use of non-lethal CW agents such as tear gas during the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s, but the transient effects of these agents combined with the lack of independent observation make it difficult to determine the extent of their use. The employment of tear gas in combat operations does not appear to have been limited to Serbian forces although there are indications that theirs was the most extensive use. In addition, Bosnian Muslim forces threatened to use of stocks of industrial chlorine as part of their defensive efforts in 1992 and 1993. The Bosnian government seems to have made a significant effort to show that Serbia used chemical weapons from 1992 to 1995. It is likely that this effort, combined with the early 1990s revelations about the SFRY’s CW programs of the 1970s and 1980s, contributed to the exaggerated concerns about Serbian CW capabilities and intentions seen in the late 1990s.

Since 1992, the CW programs of the Yugoslavian successor states have been directed to fulfilling defensive needs. All of the Yugoslavian successor states have now joined the Chemical Weapons Convention. Croatia ratified the CWC on 23 May 1995. ¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina ratified the CWC on 25 February 1997. ² Slovenia ratified the CWC on 11 June 1997. ³ The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) ratified the CWC on 20 June 1997. ⁴ The FRY, which is now the Republic of Serbia, acceded to the CWC on 20 April 2000. ⁵ Montenegro acceded to the CWC on 23 October 2006. ⁶ In addition to maintaining a national protective purposes program recognized by the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Serbia also operates a facility that produces and uses strictly limited quantities of CW agents. ⁷ Croatia, the Bosnian Republika Srpska, The FYROM, Montenegro and Slovenia all maintain dedicated military defensive CW capabilities. There is currently no reason to suspect that the Republic of Serbia or any of the other Yugoslavian successor states possess or seek offensive CW capabilities.

The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
(after 1929, Yugoslavia)

There is limited information available on CW developments in Yugoslavia prior to World War II. However, the information that does exist strongly suggests that initial interest in chemical weapons dates to the early 1920s, shortly after the kingdom’s establishment on 1 December 1918. Such an interest was not unusual for the time, when the general consensus was that chemical weapons were an extremely important part of a modern military establishment and would be extensively used in future wars. As part of its overall campaign of modernization and development, Yugoslavia established the Obilicevo chemical complex in the town of Krusevac. In addition to civilian chemical production, this complex was the site of Yugoslavia’s first CW program.

In developing its CW capabilities, Yugoslavia received assistance from German experts. From 1927 to 1931, Dr. Hugo Stoltzenberg, a German chemist whose Hamburg-based company was associated with the German government’s clandestine CW activities in the early 1920s, was involved in the transfer of technology and equipment related to the production of chemical weapons to the Yugoslavian government. ⁸ Yugoslavia was also able to send a small cadre of military officers for CW training in Belgium, France and Germany. ⁹

By the late 1920s, Yugoslavia appears to have developed the capability to domestically produce and weaponize several classic CW agents, including mustard. ¹⁰ In addition, the kingdom may have possessed a stockpile of imported chemical weapons in the form of French artillery shells and cylinders filled with chlorine, di-phosgene, hydrogen-cyanide, mustard, and phosgene. ¹¹ In the 1920s Yugoslavia equipped its troops with gas-masks imported from France, some of which may have been surplus First World War equipment. ¹² By the 1930s, Yugoslavia was engaged in license-production of protective equipment for its troops, most notably Czechoslovakian gas-mask designs. ¹³ In April 1941, German air-raids destroyed Yugoslavia’s CW production facilities at the Obilicevo chemical complex. ¹⁴ German troops seized Yugoslavia’s stockpiles of CW agents and removed them to Germany. ¹⁵ By the end of World War II Yugoslavia’s domestic base for offensive and defensive CW had been largely eliminated.

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)

Following the expulsion of German forces in 1945, a major concern for the new government of Marshal Tito was reconstructing the devastated social and economic infrastructure. Additional concerns included resisting pressures from the Soviet Union and resolving a border dispute with the United States and the new Italian government in the region surrounding the city of Trieste.

In the early 1950s, Yugoslavia’s relationship with the United States improved significantly. As tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union increased the United States began to provide significant economic and military assistance. In addition to receiving tanks, artillery, and aircraft, Yugoslavia also benefited from exchanges of personnel and the provision of U.S. military training. As part of this program, from 1956 to 1961, Yugoslavian army personnel were able to attend U.S. Army chemical and biological weapons training courses. ¹⁶

The process of reconstructing an independent CW capability began in the early 1950s with the 1952 resumption of production of activated charcoal and gasmasks at the “Miloje Zakić” factory in the town of Obilicevo. ¹⁷ In 1959, Yugoslavia began to modernize its defensive capabilities, introducing a new model of gas mask, the M-1, essentially a copy of the U.S. M-9. ¹⁸ This mask, which was issued in both military and civilian versions, remained the standard defensive mask until a new model was introduced in the 1980s. In addition to producing gas masks for personnel, Yugoslavia also undertook the production of protective suits, detection and decontamination equipment and horse-masks. ¹⁹

In the mid-1950s, new research on the effects of modern CW agents began to appear in open source publications in Yugoslavia, indicating the development of new defensive research and interests and capabilities. At some point prior to 1958, the Military Technical Institute facility for research and production of CW agents was established in the village of Potoci, 10 kilometers north of Mostar. It was also during this period that initial research into the production of mustard agent and sarin was conducted. Initial production of small quantities of CW agents apparently began in 1958. ²⁰ From this time onwards, the Potoci facility was the primary, though not the sole center for CW research in Yugoslavia. Throughout the 1960s, Yugoslavia undertook a program of research into protective devices and medical treatments relevant to the battlefield use of chemical weapons.

Some of this research activity involved the production of CW agents in greater than laboratory quantities. Equipment capable of producing up to 20 kilograms (kg) of phosgene per day was installed at the Potoci facility in 1959. There is no available information describing the operating history of this equipment (eg: whether it was run continuously or on an episodic basis), but up to 1965, it is reported to have produced a total of 15 metric tons of agent. It is not clear what this phosgene was used for, as none of the available sources refer to phosgene being weaponized for deployment by the Yugoslavian National Army (JNA). Equipment for the small-scale batch production of the nerve agent sarin and the blister agent mustard was prepared and installed at the Prva Iskri factory in the town of Baric prior to 1961. ²¹ Sarin was produced using a 120 kg batch process that was subsequently replaced by a 23 kg batch process. ²² Mustard agent was prepared using a 30 kg batch process. Although some of this agent was used to fill 152- and 155-millimeter (mm) artillery shells, it would be overstating matters to refer to this as weaponization. Instead these materials appear to have been used for dissemination and contamination tests at a number of locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1961 and 1969. ²³ Although this research may have contributed to later efforts to develop an offensive capability, it is not out of character with defensive research. It is not entirely clear from available information how much agent was produced during this initial period. In his description of the history of the Yugoslavian CW program, the program’s former head, General Zlatko Binenfeld, refrains from making any claims regarding the total production of mustard or sarin prior to 1967. ²⁴ However another, potentially less reliable, source describes the production of 30 kg of mustard agent and 143 kg of sarin up to 1961; an amount that is suspiciously similar to the size of the batch capability described by Binenfeld. ²⁵

In the late 1960s, Yugoslavian scientists continued their research into the production of CW agents, significantly enhancing their capability to produce mustard and sarin agents. New equipment for the production of sarin and mustard was installed. These production lines had a design output of up to 200 kg per day each, conceivably allowing production of several tens of metric tons of agent per annum. Trial runs of this equipment in the period 1969 to 1970 are reported to have produced 600 kg each of sulfur mustard and sarin agents. An additional production line capable of producing up to 70 or 80 kg of agent per day was used for the production of a further 350 kg of mustard agent over the same period. This secondary mustard agent production line used a different process to the primary line. These facilities do not appear to have been operated extensively thereafter; reportedly Yugoslavia produced slightly more than five metric tons of sarin up to 1988. ²⁶

It is generally believed that Yugoslavian leaders decided to develop an offensive CW program in the 1970s. This decision represented a shift from the previous emphasis on defensive research. The offensive CW research project, named the Jastrebac program, was reportedly initiated in 1976. ²⁷ The initial stages of this program involved identifying suitable agents for weaponization, and then developing and testing production equipment and delivery systems. This preliminary work was largely completed by the end of the 1980s, but without additional information, it is difficult to distinguish between the work conducted prior to 1976 and that conducted afterwards. There does not appear to have been a sense of urgency associated with the program. Yugoslavia did not use its CW agent production facilities to produce and store significant quantities of bulk agent in anticipation of the availability of delivery systems. It appears that at some point in the mid- to late 1980s, a decision was taken, presumably at the level of the General Staff or State Presidency, to deploy an initial offensive capability. This capability would have become available in the early to mid-1990s, and would have consisted primarily of sarin and mustard agents loaded into 122mm artillery shells, 128mm artillery rockets, and BAD 100 aircraft delivered bombs. ²⁸ In the period 1986 to 1987 a filling plant was installed at the Potoci facility, which could fill up to 30 artillery shells or rocket warheads per day, suggesting it was intended to operate as a pilot facility. ²⁹ A trial run of the filling equipment produced 250 sarin filled 122 mm artillery shells. ³⁰ By 1990, all preliminary work was completed and plans were in place for large scale weaponization. Orders were placed for the production of 5,800 special 122mm artillery shells from 1991 through 1995 and up to 3,000 artillery rockets annually. ³¹ These materials were to be delivered to the Potoci facility for filling with agent.

Rockets for the 262 mm Orkan rocket system, which Yugoslavia developed with assistance from Iraq, were fitted with both conventional and chemical warheads, leading to concerns that some of the thousands of these rockets that were shipped to Iraq in 1989-1990 might have been CW-capable. ³²

As part of its offensive CW effort Yugoslavia also investigated non-lethal agents such as tear gas and BZ. Initial research in the early to mid-1970s led to a 200-kilogram-per-day production capability for CS-1, a variety of tear gas, and a 5-kilogram-per-day capability for BZ. ³³ CS production from 1978 onwards may have been as high as 100 metric tons, and there are indications that the use of CS was incorporated into armed forces tactical doctrines and training. Yugoslavian forces were also equipped and trained for the use of BZ, ³⁴ though at least one report claims the use of this agent was abandoned in the mid-1980s. ³⁵ A final element in Yugoslavia’s CW program was laboratory scale production of nerve agents (soman, VX, tabun, armin, DFP); blister agents (nitrogen mustard and lewisite); and the blood agent cyanogen chloride. ³⁶ It is likely that these agents were produced to support defensive research efforts.

Yugoslavia’s increased interest in CW was contemporaneous with the revival of Western concerns about Soviet CW capabilities in the mid- to late 1970s. ³⁷ The capture of Soviet-supplied equipment used by Egyptian and Syrian forces in the October 1973 war with Israel greatly increased such concerns. Captured equipment indicated that Soviet troops were all equipped with protective equipment including gas masks, nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) protection suits, and nerve gas antidote. Furthermore, it became clear that modern Soviet systems such as tanks and armored personnel carriers were equipped with filtration systems. Available intelligence information on Soviet forces indicated that units were provided with specialized teams equipped for CW detection and decontamination. It was concluded that Soviet forces, along with their Warsaw Pact allies, were likely to employ chemical weapons in a war with the West and furthermore that they possessed a significant military advantage over Western armies, which had devoted relatively little attention to CW since the early 1960s. One consequence of this realization was increasing pressure for a revival of the U.S. offensive CW program, which resulted in the development of binary weapons in the 1980s. Other developments were a revitalization of defensive CW programs throughout NATO with the intent of equipping troops with modern equipment suitable for fighting on a CW-contaminated battlefield. Given the expectation that CW might be employed in conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the continuing difficulties in Yugoslavian-Soviet relations, there were clearly strong incentives for Yugoslavia to pursue its own defensive and offensive capabilities. Defensive measures included training courses for territorial defense forces in how to fight in a CW environment. ³⁸

End of the Offensive CW Program

In the early 1990s, as it became apparent that the SFRY was on the road to dissolution, the Serbian-dominated military leadership destroyed existing stocks of agents and weapons, dismantled the Potoci facility, and relocated records and key production equipment to Serbia. As the SFRY dissolved, the Military Technical Institute facility in Potoci became vulnerable. Apart from being located in Bosnia, which threatened to secede from the Federation, it was also very close to the Croatian border. In 1991 the Yugoslav Army destroyed the existing stocks of weaponized CW agents. This included 220 artillery rockets, 15 filled artillery projectiles, and an unspecified quantity of unfilled munitions. ³⁹ Given the scale of the program up to this point, this may have represented the entire stock of weaponized agent. In mid-1991 as fighting between Serbian and Croatian forces intensified, the records of the Potoci CW facility were removed to Belgrade. Finally, in early 1992, the entire facility was dismantled and key production equipment reportedly transferred to the Miloje Blagojevic Factory for Nitrocellulose Gunpowder on the outskirts of the town of Lucani, Serbia. ⁴⁰ The details of this incident are still unclear, as information that has become available since 2002 suggests that the equipment may actually have been moved directly to the Trayal Corporations facilities in the town of Kruševac rather than Lucani, which is approximately 70 miles to the Northwest. ⁴¹ Although an effort appears to have been made to retain the capabilities developed up to 1990, the process was complicated by the dissolution of the multi-ethnic research team, which led to the loss of many experienced personnel as non-Serbians returned to their homes. In the course of the later 1990s some sources alleged that FRY authorities had installed the CW agent production equipment in a newly constructed facility in Lucani and resumed agent production, despite significant difficulties caused in part by a shortage of qualified senior personnel. ⁴²

Following the FRY’s April 2000 accession the CWC it became clear that reports of CW agent production after 1992 were unfounded, as the key production equipment was never removed from its crates after arriving in Serbia from Potoci. ⁴³

Allegations of CW use during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s

The wars that surrounded the breakup of the SFRY saw numerous claims of the use of chemical weapons. The first of these allegations came in September 1991 when the Croatian President of the Yugoslavian Federation, Mr. Stipe Mesic, claimed that Yugoslavian National Army troops had used chemical weapons in attacks on the Croatian towns of Bilje (near Zadar), Petrinja, Vukovar and Vinkovci. ⁴⁴ Mr. Mesic alleged that the attacks had included the use of tabun, sarin, soman and possibly phosgene. ⁴⁵ None of these claims were independently substantiated.

The vast majority of claims of chemical weapons use in the Yugoslav wars arose out of the fighting in Bosnia Herzegovina. These included accusations of use and production, either of chlorine by Bosnian Muslim forces or of incapacitants by Bosnian Serb forces. Bosnian Serb forces may have made frequent use of tear gas, CN or CS, in the course of their operations. Unfortunately, it is difficult to separate genuine cases from cases of misidentification or propaganda. ⁴⁶ Recognizing the international community’s general abhorrence of CW, all parties in the Bosnian conflict made efforts to obtain support by leveling charges that their enemies were using CW against their armies or civilian populations.

In October 1992, as his country found itself under extreme pressure from Serbian forces, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic warned that his troops had access to chemical weapons that they were willing to use against Serbian troops. ⁴⁷ In August 1993, Bosnian Serb forces in the vicinity of Boskovici, near Zvornik, reported that they had been attacked on three occasions by Bosnian Muslim forces using chlorine-filled 120mm mortar rounds. ⁴⁸ In October 1993, Croatian forces operating in central Bosnia claimed that they too had been attacked by Bosnian Muslim forces using chlorine gas. ⁴⁹ Bosnian Muslim forces obtained CW agents from a factory in the city of Tuzla, which may have produced up to 1,500 tons of phosgene and chlorine. ⁵⁰

It appears that during the fighting in Bosnia and Croatia, Serbian forces employed CS gas on many occasions. At the same time, it is clear that many CW allegations were either false or greatly exaggerated to advance the propaganda goals of the forces involved. In one instance in April 1994, Serbian and Bosnian Muslim forces accused each other of mounting an attack using tear gas in the vicinity of Goradze. However, observers from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) present in the area denied that any such attack had taken place or that there had been CW casualties. ⁵¹ High profile allegations of Serbian use of BZ were leveled in 1995 following the destruction of a number of UN-protected enclaves in Bosnia Herzegovina, notably the town of Srebrenica, resulting in investigations by both the United Nations and international human rights organizations. ⁵² Although the Srebrenica allegations were widely reported, there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the claims. Yugoslavian Army tactics and doctrine made provision for the use of incapacitants such as BZ and tear gas; thus it would not be surprising if tear gas were used on occasion by any of the combatant forces, given that all shared the same origin.

Several allegations that chemical weapons were being used in the course of fighting in the Serbian province of Kosovo were reported in 1998 and 1999. ⁵³ Once again it is possible that tear gas agents were used, especially since Serbian paramilitary police forces were often employed in the early stages of suppressing the rebellion rather than regular army troops. However, claims that Serbian forces used nerve agents or BZ against Kosovar rebels have not been supported by independent evidence and should probably be regarded as spurious. ⁵⁴

During the Kosovo war of 1999, NATO’s leadership was concerned that the FRY might still possess, and be willing to use, a significant offensive CW capability. As a consequence, U.S. President Bill Clinton publicly warned FRY leaders of severe consequences should chemical weapons be used against NATO forces. ⁵⁵ Additionally, NATO launched a series of air strikes against the FRY’s chemical industry and facilities believed to be associated with its CW program, causing substantial damage to the civilian chemical industry. There is some evidence to suggest that NATO bombings of CW facilities in Serbia may have been responsible for unexplained civilian deaths in Baric in 1999. ⁵⁶ Postwar reconstruction has since repaired the damage and restored much of the chemical industry. The facilities associated with Serbia’s defensive CW capability have also been restored.

Croatia

Since gaining its independence in 1991, Croatia has maintained an active CW protection program. A number of key figures in the Yugoslavian CW program were of Croatian origin and relocated to Croatia at the time of the SFRY’s breakup. The most prominent example was General Zlatko Binenfeld whose role in Yugoslavian CW activities dated back to the early 1950s. ⁵⁷ These personnel formed the core of a Croatian CW defense program. As a consequence of the presence of these experts, and the ongoing conflict between Croatia as a secessionist state and what remained of Yugoslavia, Croatia became a source for information on the history and capabilities of the Yugoslavian CW program, as it existed until 1991. The value of this information in support of Croatian propaganda goals during its wars with the FRY should not be overlooked. By releasing information on the FRY’s CW programs, Croatia was able to contribute to the image of the country as a rogue state threatening its neighbors with weapons that were generally abhorred.

There is no evidence to suggest that Croatia attempted to develop an offensive CW program following independence. The country did use available personnel and pre-existing facilities to establish a defensive CW program.

Croatia has three agencies involved in research relevant to its CW protection program, all of which are based in Zagreb. The first is the NBC laboratory contained within the Croatian Military Academy, which was established in 1994. ⁵⁸ The second is the Institute for Medical Research and Occupational Health, and the third is the Institute Ruder Boskovic. Since the early 1990s, staff members of these organizations have regularly published their research into the effects of, and means of protecting against, CW agents, particularly nerve and blister agents. ⁵⁹ The number of publications has declined, however, no doubt reflecting the retirement, or redirection of personnel previously involved in CW research activities.

The Croatian Army has maintained an NBC defense capability since the republic’s initial establishment in 1992. Information regarding the size and capabilities of this unit is limited. However, it appears that Colonel Zvonko Orehovec served as Chief of the NBC Defense Department for the Joint Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces through the late 1990s and into the 2000s. The Croatian Army deploys an NBC defense battalion directly responsible to the central command. ⁶⁰

Croatia ratified the CWC on 23 May 1995 and has been an active member of the OPCW since that organization’s creation in 1997. ⁶¹ From May 2001 through May 2003, Croatia served a two-year term on the OPCW Executive Council.

Croatia has sought to play an active role in international efforts to protect against the use of CW by state or non-state actors. In support of this goal, the Croatian government has, in cooperation with the private organization Applied Science and Analysis Inc., hosted several Chemical and Biological Medical Treatments Symposia (CBMTS), in October 1998, April 2001, and September 2003. From 10 to 14 September 2002, Croatia hosted the first OPCW exercise on the delivery of assistance in the town of Zadar. This exercise involved more than 900 participants from 12 states and was aimed at testing the capacity of the international community to respond to the terrorist use of chemical weapons. In early 2004 it was reported that Croatia was negotiating a formal agreement with the OPCW whereby it would formally undertake to provide an NBC decontamination unit in the event that a CWC member state should request assistance in the face of a CW attack. However as of late 2009 no agreement has been signed. ⁶²

Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Including Republika Srpska)

Most of the SFRY’s CW facilities were located in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the Potoci CW research facility, Bosnia and Herzegovina was also the location of a chemical weapons storage facility (CWSF) constructed on the site of the Overhaul and Technical Institute in the town of Hadzici near Sarajevo. This facility was intended to be the primary storage depot once weaponization efforts got underway. ⁶³ It was never used for this purpose due to the collapse of the program in 1990 and 1991. The Hadzici CWSF was reportedly used as a temporary depot during the shipment of CW agents from Mostar to Serbia in 1991, ⁶⁴ but ceased to play any further CW role after early 1992 at the latest. The PRETIS munitions plant, in the Bosnian town of Vogosca near Sarajevo, was tasked with producing the special artillery rounds required for the planned weaponization program of the 1990s. ⁶⁵ However, the anticipated production of up to 5,800 CW shells never took place because of the pressing need for conventional artillery rounds and the prospect of fighting in the area of the PRETIS plant. At most a few hundred shells were produced and delivered to the Potoci facility in 1990 before the collapse of the program, and these shells may have been destroyed along with other equipment in mid-1991. ⁶⁶

Bosnia Herzegovina ratified the CWC on 25 February 1997. ⁶⁷ In its initial declaration to the OPCW, Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed the existence of a single chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) on its territory. Responsibility for this facility was shared with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. ⁶⁸ The CWPF in question is almost certainly the former Military Technical Institute facility in Potoci that was used for research on, and production of, CW agents from 1958 to 1991. The declaration was made jointly with the FRY due to that country’s removal of key production equipment and documentation associated with CW agent production from the facility in early 1992. The former buildings of the Military Technical Institute in Potoci remained intact in the hands of the Bosnian government. Reports from the mid-1990s indicate that significant evidence of the Institute’s use as a CW research facility still existed. ⁶⁹ In its initial declaration to the OPCW, the Bosnian government declared the facility as a former CW production facility. As required by the terms of the CWC, the CWP facility was completely destroyed by March 2004. ⁷⁰

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina may maintain an NBC defense capability. As of October 2006, the Bosnia-Herzogovina armed forces included one battalion and two companies trained to combat CBRN, ⁷¹ and it is likely that this capability remains in place.

The Bosnian Serb Army (also known as the Army of the Republika Srpska) maintained an NBC defense capability after the republic’s establishment in 1992. Information regarding this capability is very limited in nature; however, in 1995, it appears that each of the Republika Srpska’s six Corps had an NBC defense department directly associated with the Corps Headquarters and a smaller version operating at the Brigade level. ⁷² The next clear reference to the existence of a defensive capability dates to July 2002, when Boro Šarčević was identified as the Assistant of the Chief of Staff for NBC Defense of the Army of the Republika Srpska. On 6 June 2006 the Army of the Republika Srpska was fully integrated into the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and ceased to have any independent existence. ⁷³ As such any remaining NBC defense capability will have been added to that of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Montenegro

Montenegro declared independence from the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro on 3 June 2003. Although Montenegro only acceded to the CWC on 23 October 2006, its effective membership date was 3 June 2003. ⁷⁴ Montenegro is not known to have possessed any CW facilities and does not conduct CW research. Its army appears to maintain a single NBC Defense platoon. ⁷⁵ No information is available regarding its level of readiness or equipment, but it is likely equipped in a similar manner to equivalent units in the Serbian army.

Serbia

As is typical of many modern military forces, the Serbian army (VS – Vojska Srbije) has a unit responsible for detecting and responding to the consequences of chemical attacks, as well as biological and nuclear attacks. Personnel receive advanced training at the NBC educational center in the town of Krusevac. ⁷⁶ Since 2003, Serbia has been working to modernize the capabilities of this unit to bring it into line with NATO standards. ⁷⁷ The importance of NBC defense was downgraded as part of a wider set of military reforms in the mid-2000s. Prior to these reforms Serbia maintained a separate branch of the army responsible for all NBC defense and training: the Atomsko-Biolosko-Hemijske Odbrane (ABHO). The reforms eliminated the ABHO and re-designated the 246th NBC Defense Battalion as a unit directly under the control of the Land Forces Command. ⁷⁸ The NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical) Defense Training Center in the town of Krusevac was re-assigned to the Training Command on 29 May 2007. ⁷⁹

The Serbian army possesses a full range of individual and collective protective equipment intended to enable it to continue operations in the event of a CW attack. SFRY designed armored vehicles had a CW protective capability, as do similar vehicles manufactured since the federation’s breakup. The Trayal Corporation-formerly the Miloje Zakic industrial facility based in Krusevac-continues to produce a range of NBC protective equipment for individuals, including masks, filter cartridges, gloves and protective suits, for both domestic and export markets. It also produces filter equipment for military vehicles. ⁸⁰ Other companies are engaged in the production of CW detectors, decontamination materials, and medical response items such as antidotes. Serbia continues to manufacture CS weapons, grenades, rifle grenades, and smoke pots for domestic use and export. These are the same weapons previously deployed by the Yugoslav armed forces, which filled such munitions with BZ.

Serbia continues to possess a significant defensive CW capability. As noted above the Trayal Corporation continues to produce NBC protection equipment. The Military Medical Academy continues research into CW effects and the means of countering them, notably through the staff and activities of the National Poison Control Center. ⁸¹ This research appears to involve the continued production and use of laboratory quantities of CW agents.

The FRY ratified the CWC in April 2000. In its initial declaration to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Belgrade declared a single small scale facility (SSSF) engaged in CW agent production on its territory and took partial responsibility for one other facility in Bosnia Herzegovina, the former Military Technical Institute facility in Potoci and its associated production equipment stored in Krusevac. All additional information regarding the FRY’s initial declaration remains confidential. In 2001, the OPCW conducted one inspection of a Schedule 1 facility, most likely the previously declared SSSF. ⁸²

In December 2001, the FRY declared the existence of a National Protective Program under Article 10 of the CWC. ⁸³ All declarations of such protective programs are confidential, and no information regarding this program is available from the OPCW. In September 2002, the OPCW Executive Council approved a facility agreement with Belgrade, which established guidelines for verification of the facility’s CW-related activities. This facility was part of what was then called the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro’s National Protective Program and is probably closely associated with the work of the Military Medical Academy. ⁸⁴

Destruction of all remaining CW production equipment stored at the Trayal Corporation’s Jasikovac plant in Krusevac was undertaken from 15 to 30 September 2003 under the supervision of OPCW inspectors. ⁸⁵ This production equipment was previously installed at the Military Technical Institute facility in Potoci and after being transported to Serbia in 1992 was relocated to Krusevac at some point between 1992 and 2003.

An indication of the international community’s acceptance of the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro was its election to the Executive Council of the OPCW, which took effect on 12 May 2004. Serbia has committed itself to making a substantive contribution to the CWC and the OPCW, especially in terms of fulfilling its assistance and protection obligations under Article X of the Convention. Serbia and the OPCW have jointly hosted a series of basic and advanced courses on assistance and protection against CW in the town of Krusevac since 2004. ⁸⁶ These courses, which were conducted at the Krusevac NBC Defence Training Center, focused on training participants from CWC member states in how to plan for the protection of civilian populations against CW attack. In addition to these courses the OPCW has also made use of the Serbian facilities to provide live-agent training to its inspectors. ⁸⁷ In November 2009 the Serbian government proposed that the Krusevac facility be made a regional training center to which neighboring countries would send their personnel to receive NBC defense training. ⁸⁸

Slovenia

Following its break from the SFRY in 1991, Slovenia did not retain any residual offensive CW capabilities. Some Slovenian personnel at the University of Ljubljana’s Institute of Pathophysiology appear to have been involved in Yugoslavia’s defensive CW research and development programs from the mid-1980s onwards. Their focus was research into the effects of soman and the development of antidotes and treatments. ⁸⁹

In so far as it was able to retain access to Yugoslav military equipment on its territory at the time of secession, Slovenia possessed a defensive CW capability immediately after independence. As previously noted Yugoslavian military personnel were issued NBC protective gear and armored vehicles were fitted out with NBC protection systems. There are no indications that Slovenia has developed the ability to manufacture its own protective equipment. In the spring of 2001, Slovenia purchased a batch of protective masks sufficient to equip 30,000 soldiers. ⁹⁰ The Slovenian Army maintains a dedicated NBC defence unit, the 18th NBC Protection Battalion. ⁹¹ It is not clear whether this unit has been reequipped with modern detection, decontamination, and protection equipment.

Slovenia ratified the CWC on 11 June 1997 ⁹² and made its initial declaration to the OPCW on 6 November 1997. ⁹³ Slovenia declared the existence of a quantity of old chemical weapons on Slovenian territory. These weapons, predating 1925, were almost certainly leftover from battles conducted on Slovenian territory during World War I. These items were destroyed without OPCW verification. ⁹⁴ In April 2001, Slovenia declared the existence of a National Protective Program under Article 10 of the CWC. ⁹⁵ The details of declarations of such protective programs are generally confidential, and no information regarding this program is publicly available from the OPCW.

The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (F.Y.R.O.M.)

There have been no indications of offensive CW activity in the F.Y.R.O.M. since its break from the SFRY in 1992. The SFRY did not place any CW production, research or storage facilities on Macedonian territory. The Mount Krivolak base and training facility was used for open-air testing of CW agents by the Yugoslavian military in the 1970s and 1980s, but this was never the facility’s main purpose. ^{96 97} The F.Y.R.O.M. ratified the CWC on 20 June 1997. In May 1997, Macedonia hosted a NATO exercise simulating rescue operations following a chemical accident or environmental catastrophe. Participating units included NATO CBW defense troops. ⁹⁸ The F.Y.R.O.M. maintains a limited NBC defense capability in the form of a single NBC-defense company. ⁹⁹

Significant gaps remain in our understanding of the Yugoslavian CW program. The role of the federal government or the military leadership in pressing for the development of an offensive capability remains unclear. Did the scientists and technicians involved in the CW program support or hinder the progress of the effort? Did those involved simply see an offensive program as the logical outgrowth of their defensive work, or was it instead a diversion from their preferred activity? Was the CW arsenal intended for active use in the event of conflict, or was it being developed as a deterrent to the CW arsenals of NATO and the Warsaw Pact? Yugoslavia probably could have made much faster progress on its CW program if it had chosen to, and the development of delivery systems was particularly slow. For example, though the first tests of CW artillery shells were conducted in 1961, production of shells was only begun in 1990. Similarly, by the mid-1970s, Yugoslavia had the capability to produce as much as 73 metric tons each of sarin and mustard per year, but this production capacity was effectively mothballed for much of the period up to 1986, when a short production run of 4.5 metric tons took place. The failure to resume the program after its dispersion in 1991 is also puzzling. Although some key personnel were lost and access to certain facilities was no longer available, these factors would not have prevented a resumption of the program at a new facility. Instead the production equipment and precursors were placed in storage, the personnel turned their hands to other tasks, and the offensive CW program was abandoned. The fact that during the same period the defensive CW program was sustained suggests that there is more to the story than a lack of technical personnel. One question that is perhaps impossible to answer is whether the program would have continued had Yugoslavia not disintegrated in 1991. Further questions revolve around the attitude of Serbia towards the CWC and OPCW. Serbia resolutely refused to adhere to the CWC until 2000, when it suddenly ratified the CWC and declared its facilities. The change in position predates the fall of Milosevic, but significantly postdates its defeat in the Kosovo war. Since joining the CWC Serbia has played an active role in international efforts to enhance CW defense preparedness by leveraging its previous investments in CW defense to provide training to CWC members and OPCW personnel.