Former Yugoslavia Nuclear Overview

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Lack of enthusiasm among nuclear scientists and insufficient financial resources are often cited as the reasons for Yugoslavia’s drive toward nuclear weapons was ultimately unsuccessful and finally abandoned in 1987.

In the late 1940s, Yugoslavia’s president Josip Broz Tito ordered the establishment of a nuclear program, most likely viewing the development of nuclear power as key to overall economic development. Yugoslavia’s early research benefited tremendously from collaboration with Norway, particularly on reprocessing, and, to a lesser degree, with the Soviet Union. Concurrent with the civilian research program, Tito initiated a nuclear weapons program. Security concerns and the desire for international status may have played a role in his decision to develop a nuclear deterrent. In the 1960s, President Tito terminated the nuclear weapons program for an unknown reason. However, in 1974, after India, with whom Yugoslavia competed for the leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), tested a nuclear weapon, the weapons program was once again revived under the name Program A, even though Yugoslavia had become a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970. ¹ Lack of enthusiasm among nuclear scientists and insufficient financial resources are often cited as the reasons for Yugoslavia’s drive toward nuclear weapons was ultimately unsuccessful and finally abandoned in 1987.

In the 1970s the focus of Yugoslavia’s civilian nuclear program shifted from research to nuclear power. In 1981, its first and only nuclear power plant, Nuklearna Elektrana Krsko (NEK), became operational. However, the Chernobyl disaster of April 1986 led to a moratorium, adopted first by the Slovenian Parliament and then by the Federal Council, that essentially ended all nuclear power-related research in Yugoslavia. In 1992, following the secessions of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro formed a new state, called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The FRY existed until 2003, when it was replaced by the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro became independent in 2006.

During the mid- to late-1990s, scientists from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, one of Yugoslavia’s main nuclear research facilities, began expressing concern about the safety of almost 50 kilograms of fresh nuclear fuel containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 2.5 tons of spent fuel that were stored at Vinca. ² In August 2002, a multinational team of public, private, and international entities organized a successful operation to transport 48 kg of 80%-enriched uranium from Vinca to the Russian Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dmitrovgrad, Russia. The Government of the Republic of Serbia and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in cooperation with the United States, the European Commission, and other partners, are currently implementing the Vinca Institute Nuclear Decommissioning (VIND) Program. The VIND Program is the IAEA’s largest technical cooperation effort, and involves the removal of spent fuel, improved management of radioactive waste stored at Vinca, and decommissioning of the RA research reactor. The removal of spent fuel and construction of radioactive waste management facilities were completed in 2010. In July 2009, during the IAEA Director General’s visit, Serbia signed an Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement.

In 1947, Yugoslavia’s president Josip Broz Tito made the decision to establish the country’s first nuclear research center at Vinca. In the midst of post-war reconstruction and forecasting high electricity demand, Yugoslavia may have speculated that nuclear energy development would be key to its overall economic growth. ³ The Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, initially named the Institute of Research on the Structure of Matter, was founded in 1948, followed by two other nuclear research centers, the Jozef Stefan Institute in Ljubljana, Slovenia, and the Rudjer Boskovic Institute, near Zagreb, Croatia, founded in 1949 and 1950 respectively.

From the start, the political and security consequences of Yugoslavia’s geographic location and war experience played a role in its decision to pursue nuclear development. Unlike some states in Eastern and Central Europe, who relied heavily on the Soviet Union for their liberation from Nazi Germany, Yugoslavia emerged after the war with a strong and independent communist party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In the years immediately following the war, tensions began to form between the Soviet and Yugoslav governments. The Soviet leader, Josef Stalin, wanted cohesion and subordination within the Communist Bloc, but President Tito sought to rebuild Yugoslavia largely independent of Stalin’s supervision. In June 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) and essentially from the Soviet Bloc, which placed the nation at the core of geographical and ideological divisions in Europe. ⁴ As Nuclear Engineering International editors stated in 1971, “In such a situation [desire for economic and political independence and unfavorable geographic position] the utilization of nuclear energy is almost inevitable providing you do have the resources and industrial know-how to furnish your own fuel.” ⁵

At that time neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to share its nuclear know-how or technology; thus, Yugoslavia was forced to devote a substantial amount of its own material and human resources to the nuclear program. ⁶ As the three nuclear research centers were being built, Yugoslavia commissioned or constructed basic equipment that would enable it to conduct advanced nuclear research: a 1.5 MeV Cockcroft-Walton particle accelerator for the Vinca Institute; a 30 MeV betatron; a 2.5 MeV Van de Graaff electrostatic generator for the Jozef Stefan Institute; and a 16 MeV cyclotron for the Rudjer Boskovic Institute. In the early 1950s, Norway became Yugoslavia’s most important collaborator in the nuclear science field. ⁷ Beginning in 1952, Yugoslav scientists trained and worked at Norway’s Institute for Nuclear Energy Research in Kjeller, particularly in the field of chemical extraction of plutonium; researchers from both countries conducted joint work on plutonium reprocessing. Norway also aided Yugoslavia in the construction of a laboratory-scale reprocessing facility that was equipped with hot cells and employed the Purex reprocessing method.

The research carried out by Yugoslav scientists with their Norwegian counterparts appears to have been consistent with a nuclear weapons program. In addition to plutonium reprocessing, investigations were carried out into uranium enrichment using the electromagnetic isotope separation techniques, employing Vinca’s calutron and Rudjer Boskovic’s cyclotron, as well as other enrichment methods at Vinca. ⁸ According to a Norwegian correspondent, in 1953 Yugoslav scientists working at Kjeller may have also smuggled a quantity of highly enriched uranium back to Vinca. ⁹ Tito’s decision in the late 1940s to develop a nuclear weapon, evident in the founding of the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences, appears to have coincided with Yugoslavia’s break with the Soviet Union. In September 1949, Stevan Dedijer, a former director of the Vinca Institute, was recruited to the weapons program and was told by one of Tito’s closest collaborators, Edvard Kardelj: “We must have the atomic bomb.” ¹⁰ In 1955, the Federal Commission for Nuclear Energy (FCNE) was established to supervise the development of the nuclear program. Aleksandr Rankovic, head of the secret police, became the head of the Commission. ¹¹

Security considerations were probably a factor in Tito’s initial decision to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. Having learned of the Soviet atomic bomb and fearing Stalin’s retribution following the split between the two countries, Tito might have thought that a nuclear deterrent would discourage a Soviet invasion. Security, however, was not the sole reason, and, as some analysts argue, not the most important one. ¹² Considering Yugoslavia’s position at the time, the desire for international status might have been the decisive factor. Yugoslavia collaborated with Norway in the field of plutonium reprocessing, established a spent fuel reprocessing department at Vinca, signed a cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1956 for the 6.5 MW heavy water moderated and cooled RA research reactor, and constructed the RB, a zero power heavy water natural uranium critical assembly. The RA reactor, described by Vinca officials as “essentially a plutonium production reactor,” was fundamental in Tito’s weapons research. ¹³

In the early 1960s, as the nuclear research program was gaining momentum, Tito reportedly de-emphasized the weapons aspect of the program. In 1958, a criticality accident at Vinca’s heavy water RB reactor killed one person and left five more with radiation poisoning. However, Tito’s decision may have been based on the thaw felt in Soviet-Yugoslav relations following Stalin’s death. Other factors may have included the apparent lack of results of the program and the financial strains it was putting on the country’s economy. Additionally, Yugoslavia’s international position was to advocate for nuclear disarmament and to press the nuclear weapon states to dispense with their nuclear arms. ¹⁴ Yugoslavia signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970. There were also signs that the focus of Yugoslavia’s nuclear program was shifting from a research to a nuclear power program. After years of feasibility studies, the U.S. firm Westinghouse was selected to build the country’s first nuclear power plant, a 664MW ¹⁵ pressurized light water reactor at Krsko. ¹⁶

Yugoslavia’s decision to abandon nuclear weapons development was reversed on 18 May 1974 after India, Yugoslavia’s long-time rival for the NAM leadership, carried out its first nuclear test. According to first-hand accounts, immediately after the Indian test Tito called two meetings with the heads of the country’s primary nuclear research facilities, representatives of the armed services, and military intelligence officials. During the meetings, military representatives instructed those present to develop ways to utilize the civilian power program as a cover for a parallel weapons program. ¹⁷

During the 1970s, Yugoslavia became increasingly frustrated with the apparent monopoly by the major nuclear powers of nuclear technology. Yugoslav government officials began demanding easier access to nuclear technology, claiming that the “gigantic world cartel of nuclear powers” refused to share their nuclear know-how with the developing world. ¹⁸ Yugoslavia began implicitly tying the slow pace of nuclear transfers to its security concerns, stating: “It depends the least upon us whether Yugoslavia will be obliged to consider her A-bomb or even to begin her production.” ¹⁹ Perhaps feeling as if the taboo surrounding nuclear weapons was lifted by the nuclear powers’ failure to take steps toward nuclear disarmament, the government announced, through the newspaper Borba, the possibility of building a nuclear weapon: “…[S]hould the use of mass terror be contemplated, or should nuclear or other weapons for mass destruction be used, our country may, in the framework of the general defence concept, reconsider its attitude towards the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.” ²⁰

After Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia continued its nuclear weapons development, led by the new secretary of defense, Admiral Branko Mamula, who was an active supporter of the weapons program. Under Admiral Mamula, scientists worked on two parallel programs that were linked in infrastructure and funding. Program A was designed to develop nuclear weapons, while Program B focused on Yugoslavia’s nuclear power program and concealing Program A. ²¹ The Military Technical Institute (MTI) oversaw operations for both programs. Most of Yugoslavia’s nuclear research facilities were involved in one way or another with either Program A or Program B; however, the majority of the weapons research was undertaken by scientists at Vinca, the University of Belgrade’s Institute of Physics, and at MTI facilities. ²²

On 7 July 1987, during a meeting at MTI, it was announced that Program A would be terminated. ²³ Several reasons influenced Yugoslavia’s decision yet again to abandon the weapons drive. These factors included the declining importance of nuclear power to Yugoslavia’s economic growth, its waning desire for international prestige, and the nuclear program’s heavy financial burden. As a result of these factors, the leadership and scientists lost enthusiasm for the program. ²⁴

Soon after Program A ended, Program B met the same fate. The Chernobyl nuclear accident in April 1986 cast doubt on the safety of nuclear programs in countries around Europe and beyond, and strengthened national anti-nuclear lobbies. The Yugoslav power program was not immune. As a result of the accident, the Croatian Parliament removed what was to become Yugoslavia’s next nuclear power plant, Prevlaka nuclear plant, from the 1986 to 1990 provincial plan. After much deliberation, the upper house of the Yugoslav Parliament adopted a self-imposed moratorium that prohibited the construction of nuclear facilities indefinitely, imposed criminal penalties for planning such facilities (including preparing investment decisions and technical documentation), and forbade federal funding of nuclear energy safety-related and other research activities. This decision brought all nuclear-related activities in Yugoslavia to an indefinite halt.

Although Yugoslavia’s nuclear program came to an end safely and responsibly, the legacy of the program continued. As the country was thrown into the abyss of ethnic violence, secessionism, and overall political unrest during most of the 1990s, scientists at the Vinca Institute began to raise concerns about the security of the facilities storing weapons-grade, 80%-enriched fresh uranium fuel, as well as the inventory of spent fuel from the RA reactor. They feared the fuel might be at risk of criminal, terrorist, or state-sponsored theft, diversion, or seizure. ²⁵ The scientists were also worried about the safety of spent fuel stored on-site in temporary conditions. Beginning in 1995, the IAEA conducted several visits to the Vinca Institute to inspect the safety and security of the fresh and irradiated uranium fuel, and to make some security improvements. ²⁶

The IAEA decided that the safeguards agreement for the RA reactor would continue to be in force after the break-up of Yugoslavia; however, because the United Nations refused to recognize Slobodan Milosevic’s regime as a successor to Yugoslavia, the IAEA inspections to Vinca were limited in duration and scope. Reportedly, Milosevic systematically intimidated Vinca’s scientists, who had voiced concerns about the safety of nuclear material at Vinca. ²⁷ The IAEA was unwilling to take up the case of actively securing the inventory of fissile material at Vinca until Yugoslavia’s diplomatic status was resolved.

In April 2001, having lost the presidential election in October 2000, Milosevic was taken into custody by Yugoslav police and turned over to the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal. Thereafter, U.S. State Department officials saw an opportunity to negotiate the removal of fissile material from Vinca as part of a diplomatic package to engage Yugoslavia’s new leadership. ²⁸ In August 2002, in the culmination of a 15-month negotiation process, a multinational team of government and private entities organized a successful operation to transport 48kg of 80%-enriched uranium from Vinca to the Russian Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dmitrovgrad. ²⁹ In 2003, after the return of Vinca’s HEU fuel to Russia, the Yugoslav government imposed a moratorium on the development of nuclear technology. ³⁰

The removal of Vinca’s HEU was widely regarded as a major nonproliferation success. Although the most dangerous nuclear material was removed, it was too soon to declare Vinca a proliferation irrelevant facility, as a large inventory of spent fuel remained on site. ³¹ In July 2002, the Government of the Republic of Serbia approved the VIND Program, designed to address nuclear and radiation safety issues at Vinca. Since 2003, the program has been implemented with IAEA support and involves three projects: repatriation and reprocessing of spent fuel; radioactive waste management; and decommissioning of the RA heavy water research reactor. ³² The total cost of the program is estimated to be over 60 million Euros. ³³ In October 2006, the IAEA announced it had finalized a multi-million dollar contract to package and ship over two metric tonnes of spent nuclear fuel from Vinca to Russia. The IAEA concluded a $4.3 million contract with a Russian consortium and Serbia to prepare 8,000 old fuel elements for shipping. ³⁴ Repackaging costs were covered by the National Nuclear Security Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), and the European Commission (EC).

In April 2008, the European Commission (EC) agreed to provide $8.63 million for the spent fuel removal project. ³⁵ The EC funds were designated for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) preparation for transport. In September 2009, at the IAEA General Conference in Vienna, Serbia and Russia signed a Foreign Trade Contract (FTC) covering the provisions for spent nuclear fuel transport, reprocessing, storage and disposal. The funding for the FTC implementation—$25 million—was provided by Serbia ($11 million), the United States ($7 million), Russia ($3 million), the IAEA ($2.9 million), the Czech Republic ($1 million), and the Nuclear Threat Initiative ($100,000). ³⁶ In May 2008, representatives from Serbia, the United States, Russia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, and the IAEA met in Vienna to discuss possible routes for fuel transportation, as Ukraine had not given permission for transit through its territory. ³⁷

The radioactive waste management project, which includes the construction of new storage and waste processing facilities, was completed in 2010. For more than 40 years, the Vinca Institute collected radioactive waste from the Former Yugoslavia and subsequently, the Republic of Serbia. Two dilapidated storage facilities held more than 4,000 sealed and unsealed radioactive sources along with transuranic wastes and depleted uranium. ³⁸ Construction of the new storage facility (Hangar 3), cost 2.4 million Euros and was completed in November 2010. Currently 1700m3 of radioactive waste can be stored there. The facility will reportedly store more than 6,000 “disused sealed radioactive sources” and over 40,000 category 5 smoke detectors. ³⁹ A waste processing facility was constructed at this site in the 1980s, but was never commissioned. It was fully upgraded in November 2010 in order to be able to treat low and intermediate level radioactive waste. Improving the waste processing facility required an investment of 1 million Euros, including the equipment costs. ⁴⁰

On 7 April 2010, Serbian officials announced that the last of the spent nuclear fuel (around 8,000 fuel elements), at the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences in Belgrade would be transferred to the Russian Federation. In an operation coordinated by the IAEA, the material left the Vinca Institute on 18 November 2010 and was transported through Serbia, Hungary, and Slovenia under heavy security before arriving at the Slovenian port of Koper on 21 November. There, it was loaded onto a cargo ship and sent to Murmansk, Russia. From Murmansk, the spent fuel was transferred by train to the Mayak reprocessing facility in Ozersk, Russia, where the fuel will be reprocessed and the waste will be stored. ⁴¹ On 22 December 2010, 2.5 tons of spent nuclear fuel arrived at the secure nuclear facility in Ozersk. This event marked both the complete removal of spent nuclear fuel from the Vinca Institute and the largest single shipment of spent nuclear fuel under an international program. No further spent fuel or weapons-grade materials remain on the territories of the states that previously comprised the country of Yugoslavia. ⁴²