Former Yugoslavia Overview

Former Yugoslavia Overview

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Background

This page is part of Former Yugoslavia’s Country Profile.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) intermittently pursued both a nuclear energy and weapons program throughout the Tito regime. However, none of Yugoslavia’s successor states currently has an active nuclear weapons program.

Historically, the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) produced chemical weapons, and pursued both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. However, none of the Former Yugoslavia’s successor states have weapons of mass destruction or programs for their development. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (FRY), formed in 1992 by Serbia and Montenegro after the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, was the legal successor state of the SFRY. The FRY was renamed Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. In 2006, Montenegro seceded from the union, and the Republic of Serbia became the legal successor state of Serbia and Montenegro. Among all of the Former Yugoslavia’s successor states, the Republic of Serbia is the only one to maintain missile programs.

There were allegations of chemical weapons use in the Former Yugoslavia during the wars of the 1990s, 1 but there is no evidence of a biological warfare program in the SFRY or any of its successor states. In the late 1980s, the SFRY acquired and developed short-range tactical rockets, consisting predominantly of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRSs). Before and after Desert Storm, under then-President Slobodan Milosevic, the FRY cooperated with the Iraqi military on the manufacture of rockets, improvement of ballistic missiles and other military projects, possibly including the joint development of chemical munitions. 2 The Republic of Serbia extensively employs Soviet/Russian air-defense missile systems.

Nuclear

The regime of Josip Broz Tito, driven by a desire for international status and security and concerns about a potential Soviet attack, initiated a nuclear weapons program in the late 1940s. Yugoslavia collaborated with Norway, which had an advanced nuclear research program, until Tito deactivated the weapons program in the early 1960s. 3 In 1970, the SFRY joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. After India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, the Former Yugoslavia restarted its nuclear weapons program. Limited financial resources, inter-republic disagreements, and indifferent nuclear scientists brought the program to an end in 1987 without ever producing a functioning weapon. 4 With funding from the United States and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the last of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) left over from the nuclear program was transferred to Russia on 22 December 2010. 5

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) between 1992 and 1995. The Union of Serbia and Montenegro acceded to the NPT in 2003. After the Union’s disintegration in 2006, the Republic of Serbia remained a treaty member as a successor state. Montenegro acceded in June 2006. All of the successor states have signed Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency, though the Republic of Serbia is still in the process of ratification.

In 2000, Slovenia joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Serbia followed, joining the NSG in 2013. 6

In June 2017, Montenegro officially became a NATO member state, extending the alliance’s deterrence umbrella. Montenegro, Croatia, and Slovenia are the only former-Yugoslavian states to have joined the alliance. Russia has actively opposed NATO expansion in the region. 7

Biological

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia signed the Geneva Protocol in 1929, and its successor, the SFRY, ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) on 25 October 1973. 8 Following the breakup of the SFRY in 1991, the various successor states independently acceded to the Convention: Slovenia on 7 April 1992, Croatia on 28 April 1993, Bosnia Herzegovina on 15 August 1994, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on 24 December 1996. Although the FRY may have conducted some research on defense against biological warfare, 9 no evidence of offensive BW-related research or production activity has ever surfaced.

Missile

Though the SFRY’s indigenous missile capabilities were relatively limited, the country (and its successor the FRY) at times raised significant missile proliferation concerns because of its cooperation with Libya and Iraq. The majority of SFRY and FRY missile capabilities consisted of non-strategic Soviet systems, including the P-15 Termit (NATO: SS-N-2 Styx) anti-ship missile; the R-70 Luna-M (GRAU: 9K52; NATO: FROG-7B) artillery rocket; the S-75 Dvina (NATO: SA-2 Guideline); the S-125 Pechora (NATO: SA-3 Goa); and Kub (GRAU: 2K12; NATO: SA-6 Gainful) surface-to-air missiles (SAM). 10 In addition to these Soviet weapons, Yugoslavia imported the RBS-15 anti-ship/land-attack missile from Sweden. 11 The Croatian navy currently deploys the RBS-15 on navy vessels. During the Balkan conflicts, the FRY displayed the K-15 Krajina SAM, which was likely a modified version of the SA-2, and which reportedly had a range of 150 km. 12

Over the years, the SFRY and the FRY allegedly supported a number of Iraqi missile projects. Prior to Operation Desert Storm, Yugoslavia worked cooperatively with Iraq in the latter’s efforts to manufacture the Yugoslavian M-87 Orkan multiple rocket launcher. 13 Later, companies contracted through Yugoimport-SDPR provided maintenance and adaptation for Iraq’s SA-2 and SA-6 systems. 14 In 2002, acting off of tips from U.S. intelligence, Croatian authorities intercepted a ship called the Boka Star en route from the FRY to Iraq, and confiscated 14 containers of solid-propellant rocket fuel pellets. 15 The U.S. Embassy’s 2002 non-paper claimed that the FRY assisted both Libya and Iraq with their “long range” cruise missile programs, citing the presence of FRY missile specialists in Iraq throughout 2001. 16 Belgrade developed dual-use technologies suitable for a “poor-man’s” cruise missile, and was rumored to have helped Iraqi scientists attempt to convert Iraqi MiG-21 and L-29 training vehicles into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 17 Iraq also transferred production plans for the Al-Taw’han medium-range air-to-air missile to the FRY, and the FRY reportedly assisted with Iraq’s Al-Samoud ballistic missile. 18

None of the former republics of Yugoslavia is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This being the case, the Republic of Serbia has developed strong ties to the UAE defense industry, with Serbian company Yugoimport SDPR and Emirati company EARTH recently signing a EUR 200 million ($257 million) contract for developing a new long range cruise missile, the ALAS. 19

Chemical

Prior to its breakup in 1991, the SFRY produced a variety of chemical weapons (CW), including the nerve agent sarin, the blister agent mustard, the psychotropic agent BZ, and tear gas, 20 and developed a wide range of delivery systems including artillery shells, bombs, rockets, and mines. 21 Rocket systems developed with assistance from Iraq raised proliferation concerns in the early 1990s because they could be fitted with both conventional and chemical warheads. 22 Most SFRY CW capabilities that were not destroyed during the breakup were inherited by its successor, the FRY, which operated a number of chemical weapons production facilities, and at the height of its capability possessed large quantities of sarin, soman, VX nerve agents, mustard lewisite, and phosgene. 23 The Bosnian government also retained some limited CW capabilities. 24 In the conflicts following the dissolution of the SFRY, a number of parties alleged the use of chemical weapons by their opponents, but independent observers were unable to verify that chemical weapons other than tear gas were actually used in any of these cases. 25

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia signed the Geneva Protocol in 1929. In April 2000, the FRY acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), becoming the last of the Yugoslav successor states to do so. After the break-up of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the Republic of Serbia remained a CWC member as a successor state, while Montenegro formally acceded in 2006. In September of 2003, all remaining equipment and materials associated with the production of CW agents were destroyed under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) inspectors. 26“Serbia-Montenegro completes destruction of dual-use chemical industry equipment,” Beta News Agency (via BBC Worldwide Monitoring), 17 October 2003.27

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Glossary

Nuclear energy
Nuclear energy: The energy liberated by a nuclear reaction (fission or fusion), or by radioactive decay.
Nuclear weapon
Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
WMD: Typically refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, though there is some debate as to whether chemical weapons qualify as weapons of “mass destruction.”
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Tactical nuclear weapons
Short-range nuclear weapons, such as artillery shells, bombs, and short-range missiles, deployed for use in battlefield operations.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of more than 20% of the isotope U-235. Achieved via the process of enrichment. See entry for enriched uranium.
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. See entry for Information Circular 540.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance that was formed in 1949 to help deter the Soviet Union from attacking Europe. The Alliance is based on the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. The treaty originally created an alliance of 10 European and two North American independent states, but today NATO has 28 members who have committed to maintaining and developing their defense capabilities, to consulting on issues of mutual security concern, and to the principle of collective self-defense. NATO is also engaged in out-of-area security operations, most notably in Afghanistan, where Alliance forces operate alongside other non-NATO countries as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). For additional information, see NATO.
Deterrence
The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict through the credible threat of retaliation. To be effective, a deterrence strategy should demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would outweigh any potential gains. See entries for Extended deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear umbrella
See entry for Extended deterrence 
Geneva Protocol
Geneva Protocol: Formally known as the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, this protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and bans bacteriological warfare. It was opened for signature on 17 June 1925. For additional information, see the Geneva Protocol.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Cruise missile
An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customized flight paths and to evade missile defense systems.
Dual-use item
An item that has both civilian and military applications. For example, many of the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons have legitimate civilian industrial uses, such as the production of pesticides or ink for ballpoint pens.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
UAV: Remotely piloted or self-piloted aircraft that can take on various intelligence or combat roles such as reconnaissance or targeted missiles strikes. The rapid proliferation of UAVs has raised concerns that they might serve as a delivery vehicle for a terrorist strike involving WMD.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.
Nerve agent
A nerve agent is a chemical weapon that attacks the human nervous system, leading to uncontrolled nerve cell excitation and muscle contraction. Specifically, nerve agents block the enzyme cholinesterease, so acetylcholine builds up in the nerve junction and the neuron cannot return to the rest state. Nerve agents include the G-series nerve agents (soman, sarin, tabun, and GF) synthesized by Germany during and after World War II; the more toxic V-series nerve agents (VX, VE, VM, VG, VR) discovered by the United Kingdom during the 1950s; and the reportedly even more toxic Novichok agents, developed by the Soviet Union between 1960 and 1990. The development of both the G-series and V-series nerve agents occurred alongside pesticide development.
Sarin (GB)
Sarin (GB): A nerve agent, sarin causes uncontrollable nerve cell excitation and muscle contraction. Ultimately, sarin victims suffer death by suffocation. As with other nerve agents, sarin can cause death within minutes. Sarin vapor is about ten times less toxic than VX vapor, but 25 times more toxic than hydrogen cyanide. Discovered while attempting to produce more potent pesticides, sarin is the most toxic of the four G-series nerve agents developed by Germany during World War II. Germany never used sarin during the war. However, Iraq may have used sarin during the Iran-Iraq War, and Aum Shinrikyo is known to have used low-quality sarin during its attack on the Tokyo subway system that killed 12 people and injured hundreds.
Blister agent
Blister agents (or vesicants) are chemical agents that cause victims to develop burns or blisters (“vesicles”) on their skin, as well as eyes, lungs, and airway irritation. Blister agents include mustard, lewisite, and phosgene, and are usually dispersed as a liquid or vapor. Although not usually fatal, exposure can result in severe blistering and blindness. Death, if it occurs, results from neurological factors or massive airway debilitation.
Mustard (HD)
Mustard is a blister agent, or vesicant. The term mustard gas typically refers to sulfur mustard (HD), despite HD being neither a mustard nor a gas. Sulfur mustard gained notoriety during World War I for causing more casualties than all of the other chemical agents combined. Victims develop painful blisters on their skin, as well as lung and eye irritation leading to potential pulmonary edema and blindness. However, mustard exposure is usually not fatal. A liquid at room temperature, sulfur mustard has been delivered using artillery shells and aerial bombs. HD is closely related to the nitrogen mustards (HN-1, HN-2, HN—3).
BZ
An incapacitating agent, BZ causes delirium at very low doses. Victims will drift in and out of delirium, during which they will appear to be in a “waking dream” state characterized by staring, muttering, shouting, and hallucinations. BZ is a crystalline solid and can be delivered as a thermal vapor or dissolved into a solvent and delivered as a liquid. Although the United States previously weaponized BZ, its unpredictability led to its diminished role in the American CW program, and all stocks were destroyed by 1990. The Former Yugoslavia and South Africa also reportedly produced BZ and BZ-like agents.
Soman (GD)
Soman (GD): A nerve agent, soman causes uncontrollable nerve excitation and muscle contraction. Ultimately, soman victims suffer death by suffocation. As with other nerve agents, soman can cause death within minutes. One of the G-series nerve agents, soman was developed as an insecticide in Germany in 1944, and may have been used by Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.
VX
VX: The most toxic of the V-series nerve agents, VX was developed after the discovery of VE in the United Kingdom. Like other nerve agents, VX causes uncontrollable nerve excitation and muscle excitation. Ultimately, VX victims suffer death by suffocation. VX is an oily, amber-colored, odorless liquid.
Phosgene (CG)
Phosgene (CG): A choking agent, phosgene gas causes damage to the respiratory system leading to fluid build-up in the lungs. Phosgene also causes coughing, throat and eye irritation, tearing, and blurred vision. A gas at room temperature, phosgene can be delivered as a pressurized liquid that quickly converts to gas. Germany and France used phosgene during World War I; the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia also produced military phosgene. Phosgene caused over 80% of the deaths from chemical gas during World War I.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
The OPCW: Based in The Hague, the Netherlands, the OPCW is responsible for implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). All countries ratifying the CWC become state parties to the CWC, and make up the membership of the OPCW. The OPCW meets annually, and in special sessions when necessary. For additional information, see the OPCW.

Sources

  1. “Chemical Weapons Claims Probed,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 August 1993, p. 5; The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 22, December 1993, p. 19.
  2. “Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection,” International Crisis Group - Balkans Report No. 136 Belgrade/Brussels, 3 December 2002, www.crisisgroup.org.
  3. For an in-depth discussion of Norwegian assistance to Yugoslavia’s nuclear program, refer to: William C. Potter, Djuro Miljanic, and Ivo Slaus, “Tito’s Nuclear Legacy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, www.thebulletin.org.
  4. William C. Potter, Djuro Miljanic, and Ivo Slaus, “Tito’s Nuclear Legacy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, No. 2, March/April 2000, www.thebulletin.org.
  5. Greg Webb, “Massive Operation Safely Secures Serbian Nuclear Fuel in Russia,” IAEA - News Centre, 22 December 2010, www.iaea.org; “Spent Fuel Repatriation from Serbia,” International Conference on Research Reactors Safe Management and Effective Utilization, Presentation, Rabat, November 2011, www-naweb.iaea.org.
  6. “Recent NSG Developments,” Report by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), n.d., www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/en; “Nuclear Suppliers Group,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 31 January 2017, www.nti.org.
  7. Zachary Cohen, “Montenegro officials joins NATO,” CNN Politics, 5 June 2017, CNN.org; “NATO Member Countries,” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 6 February 2017, www.Nato.int; Rikard Jozwiak, “NATO Welcomes Newest Member Montenegro,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 June 2017, rferl.org.
  8. High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Protocol, SIPRI website, accessed 6 October 2009, http://archives.sipri.org; “Status of the Convention,” Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons (OPBW), www.opbw.org.
  9. The Military Medical Academy (VMA - Vojnomedicinska akademija), located in Belgrade, maintained a Department of Biological Warfare Defense within the Institute for Epidemiology into the early 2000s. This department is no longer listed on the VMA website and may have been disbanded. See: website of the Military Medical Academy Epidemiology Institute (in Serbian), 8 October 2009, www.vma.mod.gov.rs. Note that the English version of the MMA website makes no reference to the Epidemiology Institute.
  10. “Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia,” Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Estimate, July 1993, pp. 5-8; Alastair Finlan, The Collapse of Yugoslavia: 1991-99, (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2004) pg. 20.
  11. Norman Friedman, The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), pg. 544.
  12. Duncan Lennox, “K-15 Krajina,” Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems (Offensive Weapons), 23 June 2005; “Ballistic, Cruise Missile, and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, March 1995 - June 1995,” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1995, Vol. 3, No. 1, pg. 155.
  13. “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD,” Central Intelligence Agency, 30 September 2004, www.cia.gov.
  14. “Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection,” International Crisis Group, Balkans Report No. 136, 3 December 2002.
  15. Daniel Williams and Nicholas Wood, “Yugoslavia’s Arms Ties to Iraq Draw U.S. Scrutiny,” The Washington Post, 1 November 2002.
  16. Nicholas Wood, “New Yugoslav-Iraqi Ties Alleged; U.S. Says Defense Firms Developing Cruise Missile for Baghdad,” The Washington Post, 27 October 2002.
  17. “Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection,” International Crisis Group, Balkans Report No. 136, 3 December 2002.
  18. David Nissman, “Iraq Report: 7 May 1999,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 7 May 1999, Vol. 2 No. 18; David C. Isby, “Iraq continues tests of Al Samoud SSM,” Jane’s Missiles and Rockets, 1 August 2000.
  19. “Several Agreements with UAE Signed,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Press Services - Daily Survey, 18 February 2013, www.mfa.gov.rs; “Serbia Signs ‘Major Investment Deals’ with Emirates,” Balkan Insight, 18 February 2013, www.balkaninsight.com; “Serbian and UAE firms to develop missile,” UPI, 20 February 2013, www.upi.com; “The United Arab Emirates Have Started Rescuing Serbia,” Borysfen Intel - Independent Analytical Center for Geopolitical Studies, 21 February 2013, http://bintel.com.ua.
  20. “Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia,” Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Estimate, July 1993, p. 49.
  21. “Chemical Agents in the Former Yugoslavia,” Federation of American Scientists, 23 April 2000.
  22. “Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection,” International Crisis Group, Balkans Report No. 136, 3 December 2002.
  23. “Chemical Agents in the Former Yugoslavia,” Federation of American Scientists, 23 April 2000.
  24. “Clouds of War: Chemical Weapons in the Former Yugoslavia,” Human Rights Watch, March 1997, Vol. 9, No. 5; “Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia,” Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence Estimate, July 1993, p. 49.
  25. “Chemical Warfare in Bosnia? The Strange Experiences of the Srebenica Survivors,” Human Rights Watch November 1998, 10 (9); “Arming Saddam: The Yugoslav Connection,” International Crisis Group, Balkans Report No. 136, 3 December 2002.

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