Libya Biological Overview

This page is part of the Libya Country Profile.

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Libya signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in December 1971, but declared that if other signatory states threatened Libyan security by violating the protocol, Libya could do the same. ¹ Libya then signed the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) without reservations in 1982. ² Between 1982 and late 2003, and particularly in the 1990s, Libya faced repeated allegations that it was pursuing an offensive biological warfare (BW) capability and had produced limited quantities of proscribed biological agents. In December 2003, Libya renounced its pursuit of all WMD development activities, including BW. ³

Inspections following the 2003 WMD renunciation, however, revealed “no evidence of an expected small scale Libyan biological weapons program has been uncovered.” ⁴ As of 2005, U.S. intelligence reports refused to confirm that Libya ever sought or actively pursued biological weapons. ⁵ Additionally, Libya’s official chemical weapons declarations, confirmed by international inspectors, revealed a much less sophisticated capability than intelligence assessments during the 1990’s had depicted. ⁶ While fewer written accounts of Libya’s biological weapons program exist, a similar overestimation may have occurred. Since the overthrow of the Qadhafi regime in 2011, Libyan authorities have cooperated in full with the international nonproliferation community and have indicated no interest in reconstituting a WMD program. Moreover, since Libya’s historical BW program remains unconfirmed, and given that Libya still lacks the infrastructure and human capital to support advanced dual-use research, near-term Libyan pursuit of biological weapons appears unrealistic. ⁷

Throughout the 1990s, various assessments identified Libya as a probable violator of its BTWC obligations. U. S. Department of State Compliance Reports from 1991 to 2001 consistently cited unspecified evidence that Libya, “[was] seeking to acquire the capability to develop and produce BW agents.” ⁸ In 1993, Russian Foreign Intelligence offered the assessment that “there is information that Libya is engaged in initial testing in the area of biological weapons.” ⁹ Between 1993 and 1995, Dr. Wouter Basson, the architect of South Africa‘s biological weapons project, made numerous trips to Tripoli. ¹⁰ By early 1995, U.S. intelligence sources claimed that Libyan leader Colonel Mu’ammar Qadhafi was attempting to recruit South African scientists previously involved in developing weapons used to assassinate opponents of the apartheid regime for Libya’s own biological weapons program. ¹¹

In 1996, the U.S. Department of Defense alleged that the Libyan BW program “[was] in the early research and development stage.” ¹² Libya’s BW capabilities allegedly included an unconfirmed number of microbial and toxin agents, although Libya reportedly had not yet succeeded in its efforts to develop effective delivery systems. ¹³ Despite lacking any firm information pointing to the locations of the facilities believed to be manufacturing BW agents, experts proceeded to publicly speculate that Libya’s chemical weapons plants at Rabta and Tarhunah, might also contain biological research facilities. ¹⁴ Failing to identify the purpose of 2,000 miles of piping at Rabta and Tarhunah, observers began raising alarms about a potential clandestine biological weapons facility. ¹⁵

However, even if Libya possessed agents, Joshua Sinai notes that its program lacked weaponization capabilities and would have needed several years to develop them. ¹⁶ From a state military perspective, biological agents are useful only insofar as they can survive the processes of being attached to missile warheads or other delivery systems and are subsequently disseminated and dispersed at the proper altitude. ¹⁷ Nevertheless, the possibility that Libya possessed BW agents not only would have represented progress in this direction, but also raised bioterrorism concerns in light of Qadhafi’s record of supporting terrorism. ¹⁸

In 1998, a U.S. congressional task force report alleged that Iraqi-Libyan chemical and biological weapons collaboration dating back to the early 1990s. Specifically, the report claimed that Libya had agreed to sustain and fund the Iraqi nuclear program in exchange for biological weapons technologies. ¹⁹ Additionally, the report alleged that Iraq had sent a dozen scientists to Tripoli to develop General Health Laboratories, reportedly a biological warfare complex disguised as a medical facility, and that Libya was particularly interested in anthrax and botulism. ²⁰ May 2002 allegations that Libya had been seeking to acquire BW technology from Cuba further damaged Libya’s international relations, especially with the United States. ²¹ A November 2003 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report concluded that “evidence suggested that Libya also sought dual-use capabilities that could be used to develop and produce BW agents.” ²² Importantly, although the CIA reported dual-use equipment acquisition, it stopped short of fully alleging that Libya sponsored a BW program. Throughout this time period, from 1993 to 2001, U.S. WMD compliance reports consistently listed Libya as a likely BTWC violator. ²³

In December 2003, after a period of lengthy negotiations with the United States and the United Kingdom, Libya agreed to open its WMD programs to international inspection and accept their elimination in return for a normalization of its international relations.

As part of its announcement on 19 December 2003 that it would dismantle its WMD programs, Tripoli also agreed to adhere to its BTWC commitments. Following this announcement, U.S. and British representatives entered Libya to monitor and verify the destruction of Libya’s WMD. Inspectors did not locate evidence of an advanced BW program, but they did corroborate that Libya possessed a limited BW research and development program. Although U.S. and British inspectors met with many Libyan officials, scientists, and technicians, they were not able to fully clarify the extent of the Libyan BW effort. Their Libyan interlocutors either denied any knowledge of the existence of an offensive BW program, or claimed that such work had not progressed beyond planning before being cancelled at the express order of Libyan leader Colonel Mu’ammar Qadhafi.

However, despite efforts to procure dual-use technologies, Libya did not have the technological capabilities to weaponize biological agents irrespective of any interest in doing so. In return for accepting international inspections, Libya expected the trade sanctions imposed since 1992 to be lifted, and the United States responded by lifting WMD-related sanctions in 2004. ²⁴ In 2006, the U.S. Department of State removed Libya from its list of State Sponsors of Terror, resulting in the lifting of further sanctions. ²⁵ Although the media speculated during the 2011 Libyan uprising that Qadhafi might use biological weapons against rebel forces, Jean Pascal Zanders astutely observed that “Libya is unlikely to use biological weapons because it has none.” ²⁶ A 2012 U.S. Department of State report further supports this conclusion stating that “available information in 2011 did not indicate that…Libya…[was] engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC.” ²⁷

Since international inspections revealed no evidence of a biological weapons effort, it is unlikely that the Libyan government sponsored any extensive covert initiatives. As of 2005, U.S. intelligence could not confirm any historical Libyan desire for biological weapons. ²⁸ Therefore, if Libya decided to pursue a biological weapons program in the future, it would likely be forced to rely on its dual-use infrastructure to build up that program. Despite better access to legitimate international commerce since 2003, Libya has a very small civilian biotechnology community, and its biosciences infrastructure remains ill-equipped for undertaking a biological weapons program. ²⁹ While Libyan publication activity has increased significantly for bioscience since 2003, it remains miniscule when compared with the activities of Egypt, Israel, South Africa, Iraq, and even individual U.S. institutions. ³⁰ The global bioscience industry, which relies heavily upon university collaboration and industrial clusters, will continue to find Libya to be an unattractive investment opportunity in the near-term. ³¹ It is therefore unlikely that Libya will possess a robust biosciences dual-use infrastructure anytime in the foreseeable future.