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Lithuania Overview

Lithuania Overview

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Lithuania does not possess or produce nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, or ballistic missiles.

Independent between the two World Wars, Lithuania was annexed by the USSR in 1940. On 11 March 1990, Lithuania became the first of the Soviet republics to declare its independence, a proclamation Moscow did not recognize until September 1991. Vilnius is a member of NATO and the EU, as well as a number of treaties and organizations pertaining to WMD nonproliferation. Lithuania has one nuclear power plant, Ignalina, and cancelled its plans to build a new nuclear power plant, Visaginas. [1] [2]

Nuclear

Lithuania is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), has an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Lithuania has only one nuclear facility, which is no longer operational. The Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant consisted of two Chernobyl-type 1,500 megawatt RBMK reactors. [3] Unit 1 at Ignalina came online in December 1983 and Unit 2 came online in August 1987, while construction of Unit 3 was halted after the Chernobyl disaster. [4] As a condition of Lithuania's European Union accession agreement, Vilnius shut down Unit 1 on 31 December 2004 and Unit 2 on 31 December 2009. [5] In July 2000, Lithuania had rejected a Russian offer to lease or buy the plant. [6] The Ignalina plant provided up to 80% of Lithuania's electricity generation and housed the last RBMK reactor in operation outside of Russia. [7]

Since the shutdown of Unit 2 in 2009, work at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant has focused on dismantlement. In March 2020, the decommissioning reached the delivery of the final storage cask for spent nuclear fuel that is a new milestone. [8] The deconstruction of the plant is expected to be completed by 2038, with the reactors fully dismantled by 2035. [9] The European Union, member states of the European Commission, several international Ignalina decommissioning-specific funds, and the Lithuanian government have been the primary funders of this project. [10] Sales of decommissioned materials provide an additional source of funding for the project. [11]

In addition, construction continues at Ignalina on storage facilities for spent fuel. Since the power plant first went online, spent fuel has been stored in interim storage ponds near the reactor. [12] When the facility was constructed, it was anticipated that the spent fuel could be returned to Russia – a system that was never implemented as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. [13] Instead, interim facilities were constructed that would be able to hold the spent fuel safely for up to 50 years. [14] These facilities, however, are unable to hold the volume of spent fuel necessary. [15] As a result, contracts were signed in 2005 for both a new Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility (B1-ISFSF) and a new Solid Waste Management and Storage Facilities (B234-SWMSF) as part of the broader dismantlement effort at Ignalina. [16] The Solid Waste Management and Storage Facilities fell significantly behind schedule but entered the preliminary commissioning process in August 2015. [17] The Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility entered service on 14 October 2016, when the first spent fuel cask was placed in storage. [18]

On 18 October 1991 the Lithuanian Parliament (Seimas) established the Lithuanian State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) to handle safety issues related to the Ignalina plant. [19] The Lithuanian government approved its status as a regulatory and inspection agency under the Ministry of Energy on 21 October 1992. [20] In response to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, in 2011 the European Council called for the review of all European power plants. [21] Accordingly, VATESI conducted a stress test on Ignalina and the country's two spent fuel storage facilities and released its findings in 2011. [22] On 24 March 2015, VATESI approved an updated Plan of Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Lithuania, based on a report submitted to the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group in 2014, and including lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi incident in Japan. In 2018, Lithuania released a status report on the implementation of the Plan. [23]

Lithuania has also worked to upgrade its export control system as a condition for joining the EU. In 2004, Lithuania joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and became a part of the International System of Non-proliferation Export Control Regimes when it joined the EU. [24] The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has also assisted Lithuania in developing its export control system. [25] On 22 February 2011, Lithuania and the NNSA announced the signing of an Implementation Agreement on Cooperation in Preventing Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material as part of NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program. [26]

In February 2006, the leaders of the three Baltic States announced their support for an initiative to build a new nuclear power plant in Lithuania. The utilities of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania released a joint feasibility study in October 2006 calling for the construction of at least one new nuclear reactor of between 800 and 1,600 MW in Lithuania to replace Ignalina-2 and reduce the Baltic States' dependence on imported Russian electricity and natural gas. [27] In June 2012 the European Commission rendered a favorable opinion on the proposal, but four months later, in a referendum conducted alongside Lithuanian parliamentary elections, over 60% of participants voted against the construction of a new nuclear power plant. [28] Nonetheless, the Lithuanian government pushed forward with the project, and on 30 July 2014 signed a memorandum of understanding with the Japanese nuclear company Hitachi to establish a Project Company to operate the advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) power plant near the town of Visaginas. [29] Following this, the project stalled, and on 24 November 2016, the Lithuanian Ministry of Energy suggested that the Visaginas project be frozen until it becomes either cost effective or necessary for energy security. [30] In a February 2017 interview, Lithuanian Prime Minister Saulius Skvernelis signaled the end of the Visaginas project, stating, "We no longer consider this project as economically viable. It would not be safe, and therefore it is no longer on our agenda." [31]

Lithuania has also expressed environmental concerns regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant near Astravets, Belarus, less than 25 km from the Lithuanian border. The plant, with two VVER-1200 pressurized water reactors (PWRs), is being financed and built primarily by the Russian government. [32] Lithuania's attempts to block construction have been unsuccessful.

Lithuania did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not signed or ratified the Treaty. [33]

Biological

Lithuania acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in October 1998 and joined the Australia Group in June 2004. There is no evidence to suggest that Vilnius possesses or is developing biological weapons.

Chemical

Lithuania is a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and joined the Australia Group in June 2004. There is no evidence that Vilnius possesses or seeks to develop chemical weapons.

Missile

Lithuania does not possess or produce ballistic missiles and is a signatory to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). In August 2003, Vilnius submitted an application for membership to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Sources:
[1] "Technical Data," State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Accessed 24 June 2015, www.iae.lt; "About the Project," Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant, Accessed 24 June 2015, www.vae.lt.
[2] Axel Reiserer, “Ignalina decommissioning reaches new milestone,” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2 March 2020, www.ebrd.com.
[3] "Technical Data," State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Accessed 24 June 2015, www.iae.lt.
[4] "History," State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, 2011, www.iae.lt.
[5] "About us," State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, 2011, www.iae.lt.
[6] "Litva otklonyayet predlozheniye Rossii ne speshit s zakrytiyem Ignalinskoy Atomnoy Elektrostantsii," Interfax, No. 4, 20 June 2000.
[7] "Lithuania shuts its only nuclear power station," BBC News, 31 December 2009, www.bbc.co.uk; Nerijus Adomaitis, "Lithuania to shut Soviet-era nuclear plant," Reuters, 31 December 2009, www.uk.reuters.com.
[8] Axel Reiserer, “Ignalina decommissioning reaches new milestone,” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2 March 2020, www.ebrd.com.
[9] "Approximately 22 Thousand Tons of Equipment was Dismantled in Ignalina NPP," Press Release, State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, 18 February 2015, www.iae.lt.
[10] "Spain Ambassador to Lithuania: 'Nuclear Power Plant Decommissioning is Much More Complicated Process than the Construction of It,'" Press Release, State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, 30 April 2015, www.iae.lt; "Financing," State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, Accessed 24 June 2015, www.iae.lt.
[11] Natalija Survila-Glebova, "The Ignalina NPP additionally has earned almost 2 Million Euro for Decommissioning Activity," Press Release, State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, 16 January 2017, www.iae.lt.
[12] "Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage," Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant, Accessed 24 June 2015, www.vae.lt.
[13] V.V. Penkov and R. Diersch, "The Dry Spent RBMK Fuel Cask Storage Site at the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania," Proceedings from the International Symposium on Storage of Spent Fuel from Power Reactors (Vienna: IAEA, 1999), pp. 103-109, www.iaea.org.
[14] V.V. Penkov and R. Diersch, "The Dry Spent RBMK Fuel Cask Storage Site at the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania," Proceedings from the International Symposium on Storage of Spent Fuel from Power Reactors (Vienna: IAEA, 1999), pp. 103-109, www.iaea.org.
[15] Burkhard Koenning, Jose Fernandez Puga, Johannes Rausch, Ronny Ziehm, "Nuclear Waste Management Treatment Facility and Spent Fuel Storage at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant – 9192," Proceedings from Waste Management Symposium 2009: Waste Management for the Nuclear Renaissance (Tucson: Waste Management Symposia, Inc, 2009), pp. 3986, www.wmsym.org.
[16] Burkhard Koenning, Jose Fernandez Puga, Johannes Rausch, Ronny Ziehm, "Nuclear Waste Management Treatment Facility and Spent Fuel Storage at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant – 9192," Proceedings from Waste Management Symposium 2009: Waste Management for the Nuclear Renaissance (Tucson: Waste Management Symposia, Inc, 2009), pp. 3986, www.wmsym.org.
[17] "Ignalina NPP and Nukem Technologies reach settlement on disputed B234 decom contract," Nuclear Engineering International, 7 January 2014, www.neimagazine.com.
[18] "Interim storage facility in Ignalina inaugurated – the first cask is placed for storage," NUKEM Technologies, 18 October 2016, www.nukemtechnologies.com.
[19] Jurgis Bilemas and Detlev Reichenbach, Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Kernenenergie, atw 40. Jg., August-September 1995, pp. 530-531.
[20] Diana Medliene, ed., Valstybine Atomines Energetikos Saugos Inspekcija (1991-1996) (Vilnius: VATESI), 1996, pp. 4 and 8.
[21] State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate, "National Progress Report on 'Stress Tests,'" Republic of Lithuania, 15 September 2011, www.vatesi.lt.
[22] State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate, "National Progress Report on 'Stress Tests,'" Republic of Lithuania, 15 September 2011, www.vatesi.lt.
[23] “Implementation of Plan of strengthening nuclear safety in Lithuania,” Republic of Lithuania State Nuclear Power Inspectorate, 8 January 2018, www.ensreg.eu.
[24] "Nuclear Power Safety in Lithuania: Activity Report 2014," State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI), 2015, www.vatesi.lt.
[25] Richard Talley, "Export Control Training Seminars in Latvia, Georgia, and Lithuania," NIS Export Control Observer, October 2004, www.nonproliferation.org; "Shvetsiya prodolzhit okazaniye pomoschi Litve v ukreplenii bezopasnosti Ignalinskoy AES," Interfax, 27 January 2000.
[26] "U.S., Lithuania Expand Cooperation to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling," National Nuclear Security Administration, 22 February 2011, www.nnsa.energy.gov.
[27] "Baltic utilities say new nuclear is best new capacity choice," Nucleonics Week, 26 October 2006; "About the Project," Visaginas Nuclear Power Plant, Accessed 24 June 2015, www.vae.lt.
[28] "Lithuanian nuclear power plant OKed, with conditions," Euractiv, 30 June 2012, www.euractiv.com; "Lithuania swings left, abandons nuclear plant project," Euractiv, 15 October 2012, www.euractiv.com; Christian Lowe and Andrius Sytas, "Lithuanians send nuclear plant back to drawing board," Reuters, 15 October 2012, www.reuters.com.
[29] "Government of Lithuania came to an agreement with Hitachi to discuss for establishment of the Project Company for Nuclear Power Project," Hitachi Group, 30 July 2014, www.hitachi.com.
[30] Republic of Lithuania, Ministry of Energy, "Recommended Key Guidelines of the National Energy Strategy of Lithuania," 24 November 2016, p. 3.
[31] Georgi Gotev, "Lithuanian PM: Belarus nuclear plant is a threat to our country," Euractiv, 15 February 2017, www.euractiv.com.
[32] "Minsk to Report to EC After Stress Tests at Belarusian NPP – Energy Ministry," Sputnik News, 24 February 2017, www.sputniknews.com; Galina Dzesiatava, "Incident at Belarus Nuclear Power Plant Raises Safety Concerns," Belarus Digest, 3 August 2016, www.belarusdigest.com.
[33] Lithuania, Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor, November 2020, www.banmonitor.org.

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Glossary

Nuclear weapon
Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance that was formed in 1949 to help deter the Soviet Union from attacking Europe. The Alliance is based on the North Atlantic Treaty, which was signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. The treaty originally created an alliance of 10 European and two North American independent states, but today NATO has 28 members who have committed to maintaining and developing their defense capabilities, to consulting on issues of mutual security concern, and to the principle of collective self-defense. NATO is also engaged in out-of-area security operations, most notably in Afghanistan, where Alliance forces operate alongside other non-NATO countries as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). For additional information, see NATO.
WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
WMD: Typically refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, though there is some debate as to whether chemical weapons qualify as weapons of “mass destruction.”
Nonproliferation
Nonproliferation: Measures to prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. See entry for Proliferation.
Nuclear power plant
Nuclear power plant: A facility that generates electricity using a nuclear reactor as its heat source to provide steam to a turbine generator.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. See entry for Information Circular 540.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
Dismantlement
Dismantlement: Taking apart a weapon, facility, or other item so that it is no longer functional.
Spent nuclear fuel
Spent nuclear fuel: Irradiated nuclear fuel. Once irradiated, nuclear fuel is highly radioactive and extremely physically hot, necessitating special remote handling. Fuel is considered “self protecting” if it is sufficiently radioactive that those who might seek to divert it would not be able to handle it directly without suffering acute radiation exposure.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
Pressurized water reactor
A reactor in which the water which flows through the core is isolated from the turbine, unlike in a boiling water reactor. The primary water, contained in one loop, travels through an additional heat exchanger (or steam generator) and produces steam in the secondary loop which, in turn, powers the turbine. See entry for Boiling water reactor
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Australia Group (AG)
Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles (ICOC)
ICOC: A legally non-binding arrangement that was launched with the objective of preventing and curbing the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. States adhering to the ICOC agree not to assist ballistic missile programs in countries suspected of developing biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, as well as to exhibit "restraint" in the development and testing of their own ballistic missiles. It eventually became the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles (HCOC). For additional information, see the HCOC.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.

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