Fact Sheet

Myanmar Overview

Myanmar Overview

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Background

Open source evidence cannot definitively confirm whether the country has any programs for the development of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Myanmar’s regime asserts the country has no such programs. 1

Myanmar, also known as Burma, is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and has ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 2

Nuclear

Myanmar became a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992, and signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty in 1995, committing not to develop nuclear weapons. The country signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and a Small Quantities Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1995. 3 After President Barack Obama’s visit in November 2012, Myanmar announced it would sign the Additional Protocol. Less than one year later, on 17 September 2013, Myanmar signed the agreement, but has yet to ratify the instrument. 4 Myanmar has also signed, but not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 5

Myanmar expressed an interest in nuclear energy for peaceful uses as early as 1955, when the country established an Atomic Energy Centre under the Union of Burma Applied Research Institute (UBARI). 6 It joined the IAEA in 1957, and participated in a number of IAEA technical cooperation projects in isotope applications for agriculture beginning in the 1960s. 7 In 1997, the government established the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) under the Ministry of Science and Technology; as of 2007, the DAE had 200 employees, of which roughly 25% were trainees. 8

Myanmar’s government has also undertaken some uranium exploration, though the extent and specifics of these activities are unknown. According to the Myanmar Ministry of Energy there are five areas for potential uranium mining: Magwe, Taungdwingyi, Kyaukphygon (Mogok), Kyauksin, and Paongpyin (Mogok). 9 Only Magwe has up to 0.5 percent medium-grade uranium ore while the rest have low-grade uranium ore (less than 0.1 percent). 10 Myanmar has no confirmed mining or milling facilities, despite allegations by dissident groups of the existence of sites near Mandalay. 11 Experts at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) assert, based on independent satellite and photographic imagery analysis, that the facility in question is most likely a cement plant. 12 Most of Myanmar’s uranium is a byproduct of gold mining. As Myanmar does not have a need for uranium, much is exported to China. 13

Myanmar has consistently looked to Russia for assistance increasing its technical capabilities in the nuclear field. In 2001, Russia signed a contract to design a 10 MW research reactor in Myanmar for radioisotope production. 14 Although the deal for a research reactor ultimately fell through, a few hundred specialists from Myanmar have trained in nuclear research in Russia. 15 However, it is unclear whether the government is continuing to send scientists abroad after its decision to sign the Additional Protocol and increase its transparency regarding its nuclear program. In March 2015, Rosatom, Russia’s State Atomic Energy Commission, announced that Myanmar and Russia agreed to cooperate further on nuclear energy development. 16

In May 2010, a pro-democracy dissident group Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB) precipitated considerable international debate about Myanmar’s nuclear program by alleging the existence of covert nuclear and missile facilities, the purchase of machinery for uranium enrichment from Germany, and Switzerland, and illicit cooperation with North Korea. 17 Former IAEA inspector Robert E. Kelley stated that the photographs and documents provided by the former Army Major Sai Thein Win, who had recently defected, led him to conclude that Myanmar’s “technology is only for nuclear weapons and not civilian use or nuclear power.” 18 Kelley further argued, however, that it would be extremely difficult for Myanmar, given its limited technical and financial capabilities, to develop nuclear weapons successfully. 19 However, a number of outside experts were skeptical of the DVB’s and Kelley’s allegations. ISIS, for example, stated the equipment under investigation could alternatively be used for producing “rare earth metals or metals such as titanium or vanadium.” 20

The United States government expresses diminishing concerns about a possible nuclear program in Myanmar, while withholding judgment on whether the country ever undertook activities in violation of its international commitments particularly with regard to trade with North Korea. The U.S. State Department expressed concern about Burma’s NPT compliance in 2011, however in its 2012 compliance report it stated that its concerns “were partially allayed” by 2012. 21 Myanmar’s vice president told a visiting U.S. delegation in 2011 that his country had halted its nuclear research program because the “international community may misunderstand Myanmar over the issue.” 22 Myanmar’s leaders also communicated to the IAEA, “Myanmar is in no position to consider the production and use of nuclear weapons and does not have enough economic strength to do so.” 23 During U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s first visit to the country, Myanmar also explicitly denied any cooperation with North Korea, and committed to complying with United Nations Security Council resolutions targeting the DPRK’s illicit activities. 24 As of July 2014, Myanmar announced that it would begin construction of nuclear research reactors once it had obtained the necessary infrastructure and “human resources.” 25

Biological

There is no evidence to suggest that Myanmar has ever pursued a biological weapons (BW) program. The country signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972. 26 In December 2014, Myanmar ratified the BTWC. 27

Myanmar has a limited biotechnology sector. In 2004, Myanmar established a Biotechnology Development Center at Pathein University in collaboration with the National Institute of Technology and Evaluation of Japan. 28 According to the Myanmar Department of Agricultural Planning, the public sector supports most biotechnology activities in Myanmar, including vaccine development for Newcastle disease, as well as detection of viral disease in shrimp in collaboration with the Government of Japan. 29 Myanmar has participated in the development of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Biosafety. The country is in the process of developing its National Biosafety Framework. 30 Myanmar is not a significant biotechnology exporter, and thus does not participate in or adhere to the Australia Group’s guidelines. 31

Missile

Myanmar does not subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). 32 The country possesses a small number of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) , produced predominantly by Chinese and Russian manufacturers. According to Jane’s, this inventory includes the Hong Ying-5 (红缨五号), 9K38 Igla (9K38 Игла́), and 9K310 Igla-1 (9K310 Игла́-1) man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); as well as the British Bloodhound Mk2, 2K12 Kub (2K12 Куб), S-125 Pechora-2M (Печора-2M), and the Hongqi-2 (红旗二号) SAMs. 33

North Korea and Myanmar officially resumed diplomatic relations in 2007 after a long period of estrangement. 34 Photographs and a trip report dated November 2008, provided by a Burmese dissident group, show General Shwe Mann (then a leader in Myanmar’s ruling military junta, and currently speaker of the lower house of parliament), meeting with high-ranking North Korean officials. Most notable of the officials is Jon Pyong Ho, (전병호) who, was a leading figure in North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation. 35 The photos also show the Burmese delegation visiting a number of missile-related facilities, Korean People’s Army (KPA) Air Force unit, facilities producing anti-aircraft and radar equipment, and production facilities for Igla SAMs and Scud missiles. 36 The United States has confronted two North Korean ships, which it asserted were en route for Myanmar bearing missiles or missile-related equipment. In 2009, the Kang Nam I turned back after the U.S. trailed it, and in 2011 the M/V Light similarly returned to its North Korean port. 37 In August 2012, Japan seized “50 metal pipes and 15 high-specification aluminum alloy bars” destined for a Yangon-based construction company that is alleged to be a front-company for military procurement. 38 The materials probably would have been used for Myanmar’s short-range missile program. 39 The material was stamped “DPRK,” and transported through China’s port of Dalian near the border with North Korea. 40

Press reports widely allege that other illicit shipments have occurred but successfully evaded interdiction. 41 For example, Myanmar received a shipment of dual-use cylindrical grinders from the Japanese company Toko Boeki in 2008. 42 The items were procured on behalf of a North Korean front company known as New East International, which is controlled by the Second Economic Committee and responsible for military procurement. These items can be used to make magnets for a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program, or for the gyroscopes of missile systems. Because of their special dual-use nature, their export is controlled under Japanese law. It is unknown if North Korea was attempting to use Myanmar as a transshipment point, or if Myanmar was using North Korea’s network to solicit illicit materials for its own use. 43 In 2013, the U.S. levied sanctions against Lt. General Thein Htay, the head of Burma’s Directorate of Defense Industries (DDI), as well as various other related government officials and private companies, due to their involvement in the North Korea’s supply of arms to Myanmar. 44

Myanmar also has a nascent domestic dual-use research capability in the form of the Myanmar Aerospace Engineering University (MAEU), established in Meiktila in 2002. 45 MAEU’s research includes the design and construction of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and solid propellant rockets. 46

Chemical

There is no evidence to suggest that Myanmar has a chemical weapons (CW) program, despite many decades of allegations to the contrary by Burmese dissident groups. 47 While the U.S. government voiced suspicions about a possible CW program in the 1980s and early 1990s, Burma has not been named in relevant U.S. compliance reports since 1992. 48 Myanmar is not a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but the country has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993. 49 Myanmar ratified the CWC in July 2015. 50

In January 2014, Unity Journal, a weekly news magazine in Myanmar, alleged that the military built a chemical weapons production facility in central Magway district. 51 The Government, while acknowledging the facility is for defense purposes, denied the allegations. CWC ratification would provide the international community mechanisms to clarify issues related to remaining facilities of concern in Myanmar. 52

In 1997 Myanmar adopted Agenda 21, which established an official strategy for sustainable development, including environmental management of toxic industrial chemicals. 53 Myanmar possesses only a limited chemical industry, and imports all toxic industrial chemicals it consumes. 54 As it is not a significant exporter of industrial chemicals or chemical equipment, Myanmar does not participate in or adhere to the Australia Group’s guidelines. 55

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Glossary

Nuclear weapon
Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ)
The Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) prohibits the development, manufacture, acquisition, or testing of nuclear weapons anywhere within the region. It also prohibits the transport of nuclear weapons through the region, as well as the dumping at sea, discharging into the atmosphere, or burying on land of any radioactive material or waste. In addition, the treaty requires all parties to apply International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. For additional information, see the SEANWFZ.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. See entry for Information Circular 540.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
Uranium
Uranium is a metal with the atomic number 92. See entries for enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium.
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. See entry for Information Circular 540.
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Security Council: Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. The Council consists of fifteen members, five of which—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are permanent members. The other ten members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. The five permanent members possess veto powers. For additional information, see the UNSC.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organization established on August 8, 1967, whose objectives include the acceleration of economic growth and the promotion of regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia. It was established by five original member countries, but now consists of ten members and two observers. Among other achievements, ASEAN was responsible for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, created by the Treaty of Bangkok at the Fifth ASEAN Summit in 1995. For additional information, see ASEAN.
HCOC
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), formerly known as The International Code of Conduct (ICOC), was adopted in 2002. The HCOC was established to bolster efforts to curb ballistic missile proliferation worldwide and to further delegitimize such proliferation by fostering consensus among states on how they should conduct their trade in missiles and dual-use items.
Scud
Scud is the designation for a series of short-range ballistic missiles developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s and transferred to many other countries. Most theater ballistic missiles developed and deployed in countries of proliferation concern, for example Iran and North Korea, are based on the Scud design.
Dual-use item
An item that has both civilian and military applications. For example, many of the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons have legitimate civilian industrial uses, such as the production of pesticides or ink for ballpoint pens.
Enriched uranium
Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
UAV: Remotely piloted or self-piloted aircraft that can take on various intelligence or combat roles such as reconnaissance or targeted missiles strikes. The rapid proliferation of UAVs has raised concerns that they might serve as a delivery vehicle for a terrorist strike involving WMD.
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Geneva Protocol
Geneva Protocol: Formally known as the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, this protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and bans bacteriological warfare. It was opened for signature on 17 June 1925. For additional information, see the Geneva Protocol.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Australia Group (AG)
Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.

Sources

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  29. United Nations Environment Programme, "National Biosafety Framework: Myanmar," November 2006.
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  32. Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), "Subscribing States," 11 February 2014, www.hcoc.at.
  33. "Inventory, Myanmar," Jane's Land-Based Air Defence, 9 February 2011.
  34. Seth Mydans, "North Korea and Myanmar Restore Diplomatic Ties," The New York Times, 26 April 2007, www.nytimes.com; Clyde Haberman, "Bomb Kills 19 Including 6 Key Koreans," The New York Times, 10 October 1983, www.nytimes.com.
  35. Untitled Photos, The Irrawaddy, www.irrawaddy.org; Pascal Khu Thwe, translation, "Report of Shwe Mann's Visit to North Korea," Democratic Voice of Burma, www.dvb.no; original document at: www.irrawaddy.org; "North Korea Reshuffles Top Officials," Chosun Ilbo, 8 April 2011, www.chosun.com.
  36. Untitled Photos, The Irrawaddy, www.irrawaddy.org; Jeffrey Lewis, "Pyongyang Pig Factory," Arms Control Wonk, 10 February 2011, http://armscontrolwonk.com.
  37. Sang-Hun Choe, "South Korea Says Freighter from North Turns Back," The New York Times, 6 July 2009, www.nytimes.com; David Sanger, "U.S. Said to Turn Back North Korea Missile Shipment," The New York Times, 12 June 2011, www.nytimes.com.
  38. Yoshihiro Makino, "Japan Intercepts N. Korea weapons-grade Material Bound for Myanmar," Asahi Shimbun, 24 November 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com.
  39. Yoshihiro Makino, "Japan Intercepts N. Korea weapons-grade Material Bound for Myanmar," Asahi Shimbun, 24 November 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com.
  40. Yoshihiro Makino, "Japan Intercepts N. Korea weapons-grade Material Bound for Myanmar," Asahi Shimbun, 24 November 2012, http://ajw.asahi.com.
  41. David E. Sanger, "U.S. Said to Turn Back North Korea Missile Shipment," The New York Times, 12 June 2011, www.nytimes.com.
  42. Stephanie Lieggi, Robert Shaw, and Masako Toki, "Taking Control: Stopping North Korean WMD-Related Procurement," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September/October 2010.
  43. Catherine Boye, Melissa Hanham, and Robert Shaw, "North Korea and Myanmar: A Match for Nuclear Proliferation?" The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 27 September 2010, www.thebulletin.org.
  44. U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Treasury Designates Burmese LT. General Thein Htay, Chief of Directorate of Defense Industries," 2 July 2013, www.treasury.gov; Jack Lew, "Treasury Designates Burmese Companies and an Individual with Ties to the Directorate of Defense Industries: Press Release," Project Vote Smart, 16 December 2013, http://votesmart.org.
  45. "Myanmar Aerospace Engineering University," Myanmar Aerospace Engineering University, www.most.gov.mm.
  46. "Research in MAEU," Myanmar Aerospace Engineering University, www.most.gov.mm.
  47. The following sources are included as an example of the persistent nature of these unconfirmed accounts. However, without further investigation it is not clear if the reports refer to agents recognized under international law as chemical weapons or to riot control agents-the latter is most likely. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Chronology for Karens in Burma," Minorities at Risk Project, 2004, www.unhcr.org; Jessica Le Masurier, "Myanmar 'Used Chemicals' on Rebels," 21 August 2005, CNN, http://articles.cnn.com; Pranamita Baruah, "Myanmar," Journal on Chemical and Biological Weapons, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, Vol. 3 No. 3, April-June 2010, www.idsa.in; Tania Branigan, "Burma's Military Junta Accused of Torturing and Killing Ethnic Rebels," The Guardian, 18 December 2011, www.guardian.co.uk; "Burma Denies Using Chemical Weapons in Kachin," AFP and Democratic Voice of Burma, 10 January 2013, www.dvb.no.
  48. Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 428-429. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency reported that Burma (Myanmar) has, "chemical weapons and artillery for delivering chemical agents" in a 1992 survey for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. However, the same report in 1993 indicated that Burma was no longer developing chemical weapons. See: E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1997, p. 38.
  49. Office of the Legal Adviser, "Note by the Technical Secretariat: Status of Participation in the CWC as of 14 October 2013," Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 14 October 2013.
  50. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Myanmar Joins Chemical Weapons Convention,” 9 July 2015, www.opcw.org; “Myanmar Signs Treaty on Chemical Weapons,” The New York Times, 9 July 2015, www.nytimes.com.
  51. Zarni Mann, "Journalists Detained for Reporting Alleged Burmese Chemical Weapons Factory," The Irrawaddy, 2 February 2014, www.irrawaddy.org.
  52. Catherine Dill and Jeffrey Lewis, "Suspect Defense Facility in Myanmar," James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, May 9, 2014, www.nonproliferation.org.
  53. United Nations, "Economic Aspects of Sustainable Development in Myanmar," www.un.org.
  54. UN Data, "Myanmar Trade Profile," Accessed 24 July 2014, http://data.un.org.
  55. The Australia Group, "Australia Group Participants," www.australiagroup.net.

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