Fact Sheet

Tajikistan Overview

Tajikistan Overview

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Background

This is page is part of the Tajikistan Country Profile.

Tajikistan emerged from a devastating civil war (1992-1997) as one of the poorest countries in Central Asia. The country’s geographic location, porous borders, and robust drug trade raise concerns about the potential for its territory to be used for illegal transit of materials that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction programs. 1 However, Tajikistan does not currently produce or possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and is a party to relevant nonproliferation treaties and organizations.

Nuclear

Tajikistan never hosted Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory, and its leaders have repeatedly expressed a commitment to disarmament and the prevention of WMD proliferation. 2 Tajikistan has been an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member since 2001, and its Additional Protocol entered into force in 2004. Dushanbe acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1994 as a non-nuclear weapon state, has been a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) since 1998, and has signed the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. On 8 September 2006, Tajikistan joined four other Central Asian States— Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — in signing a treaty creating a Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (CANWFZ). Tajikistan attended some of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons negotiations, but did not formally participate. Although it signaled its support for the 2016 UN General Assembly resolution that created a mandate for treaty negotiations, it did not vote on the treaty in July 2017. 3

During the Soviet era, uranium ore mined in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan was milled into yellowcake at the Vostochnyy Rare Metal Industrial Association (Vostokredmet), previously known as the Leninabad Mining and Chemical Combine, in Chkalovsk. 4 5 This facility was the first uranium processing plant in the Soviet Union. 6 The combine incorporated seven mines and several plants, most notably Combine No. 6 (Uranium Plant V), and processed up to 1,000,000 metric tons (t) of uranium ore per year to produce yellowcake for the Soviet nuclear power and defense industries. 7 Reportedly, Chkalovsk once had the capability to convert uranium concentrate into uranium hexafluoride, and housed a secret uranium enrichment plant built in 1940. 8 The state enterprise Vostokredmet has refocused production on gold, silver, ferromolybdenum, and the manufacturing of various goods, though enterprise officials have expressed interest in restarting its uranium mining operations. 9

Tajikistan stopped mining uranium in 1992, and by law the size of its uranium reserves is considered a state secret. 10 Though the northern region, which includes Chkalovsk, is reportedly depleted of uranium, Tajik officials claim that the Pamir region in the south and east may contain huge uranium reserves. 11 Many media outlets have suggested that Tajikistan possesses 13% of the world’s uranium deposits following a reported statement to this effect by President Emomali Rahmon. 12 According to the IAEA, however, only two depleted uranium deposits exist in Tajikistan, although the Agency has indicated that it is unable to offer a full survey of the deposits owing to incomplete data. 13

In 2008, the Tajik government amended legislation that had prohibited foreign companies from participating in the state’s uranium industry, and Chinese, Iranian, and other foreign companies have discussed potential projects with the Tajikistani government. 14 In 2014, Tajik news agencies reported that the Tajik government had endorsed a draft Memorandum of Understanding on future collaborations between French company Areva Mines and the Tajik Main Geology Directorate to explore uranium and other rare-earth metal deposits. 15 Uranium mining has not resumed, however, and a representative from Areva indicated that talks have come to an end. 16

The Argus nuclear research reactor, completed in 1991 in Dushanbe, was designed to run on 21% enriched uranium, but was never loaded with fuel. Although government officials initially expressed interest in obtaining fuel and operating the reactor, in 2007 Tajikistan asked the IAEA to dismantle the reactor and replace it with a particle accelerator. 17 Until its dismantlement is complete, the reactor will remain under IAEA safeguards. 18 In 2015, President Rahmon approved the renovation of the Argus nuclear research reactor. The Argus FTI (the renovated Argus reactor) is scheduled for operational use in 2016-2020. 19

Russia and Tajikistan signed their first agreement on cooperation over peaceful nuclear energy in February 2017. While addressing the issue of uranium tailing legacy sites, the agreement also created a legal framework for new research reactors, waste management, uranium mining, and nuclear power industry education. 20

While Tajikistan currently has no operational nuclear reactors, there are strong radiation sources on Tajik territory as a result of Soviet-era industrial applications. 21 In its 2012 Environmental Performance Review of Tajikistan, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe announced that approximately 54.8 million tons of radioactive waste from Soviet-era uranium mining activities (mostly process residue tailings) are housed in unsecured facilities – many of them near the large city of Khujand. 22 The United Nations and the IAEA have expressed concern over the detrimental impact of this unsecured waste on the environment and ecology of Tajikistan; in response, in July 2014, the leadership of Tajikistan adopted a national concept on the rehabilitation of uranium tailings during the ten-year period from 2014 to 2024. 23 In June 2012, the Tajik Parliament requested assistance from its neighbors and international organizations, beyond the funding already received from the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). 24 The IAEA has helped Dushanbe to manage the waste and seek donor funding. According to the Tajik state news agency, by the end of 2014, Tajikistan had received $6.5 million in assistance from the IAEA for various projects, including the proper disposal of uranium waste and efforts to ensure the materials’ security. 25 26

The security of Tajikistan’s borders has long been a concern among international groups. In 1992, Tajikistan signed the Minsk Accord on CIS Export Control Coordination, by which the state parties agreed to create national export control systems, coordinate their efforts to control exports of materials used in the production of weapons of mass destruction, and create uniform control lists based on existing international export control regimes. 27 CIS border guards have participated in monitoring the border for illegal smuggling and trans-border crime. 28 As has been the case with many multilateral agreements among CIS countries, however, further efforts are needed to coordinate and implement export control policies among the states of the region. 29

In December 2014, the European Union provided 1.5 million Euros to Tajikistan’s Nuclear and Radiation Safety Agency in support of a project to introduce radiological detection capabilities at six border and railway sites. 30 The EU has also provided Tajik officials with related training since 2013 and will continue to do so under the terms of the 2014 supply contract. 31 The United Nations, too, has made efforts to support the initiatives of countries in the region in implementing UNSCR 1540, including Tajikistan. 32 In February 2016, Tajikistan approved a National Action Plan to implement UNSCR 1540. 33

The United States, Russia, and others have also assisted Tajikistan in strengthening its border security. Under the Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), and other programs, the United States has provided funding, training, and equipment to improve border controls and secure radioactive sources. 34 Russia controlled the Tajik-Afghan border from 1993 to 2005. 35

Tajikistan has also taken steps to strengthen its own border security and prevent trafficking. In 2005 Tajikistan ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and in 2014 Tajikistan participated in a peer review event with Kyrgyzstan organized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, UNODA, and the 1540 Committee to assess that country’s National Implementation Action Plan (NAP). 36 37 While Russia had provided Tajikistan with an estimated 7,000 Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan in to secure the Tajikistan border, in 2016 Russia announced plans to reduce the number of Russian troops in Tajikistan. 38

Biological

There is no evidence to suggest that Tajikistan produces or possesses biological weapons. Tajikistan is a party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). During the Soviet era, Tajikistan worked under the USSR Ministry of Health to administer public health-related services and institutions, including the Anti-Plague (AP) System. Tajikistan’s one Regional AP Station opened in 1956 in Dushanbe, and reported directly to the AP Institute in Almaty, Kazakhstan. 39 Despite the connection between some AP facilities and the Soviet biological weapons program, there is no evidence that Tajikistan’s AP station worked on any aspects of the Soviet biological weapons program.

During the Tajik civil war (1992-1997), researchers remaining at the Dushanbe AP station feared what could happen if the dangerous pathogens they worked with should be misused by the warring factions, and preventatively destroyed the station’s culture collection. 40 Following the loss of its culture collection, the Dushanbe AP Station worked exclusively on cholera. 41

With the Soviet Union’s collapse, funding from Moscow was discontinued, as were collaborations with the AP network and other scientific institutes around the former Soviet Union. Most scientists and trained personnel left Tajikistan for Russia and other republics, leaving both a funding and an expertise shortage. Tajikistan joined the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in 2003. The ISTC has since funded projects at the AP station and other biological institutes in Tajikistan to keep scientists well-employed, and to improve biosafety and biosecurity while furthering science. 42

Chemical

There is no evidence to suggest that Tajikistan produces or possesses chemical weapons. Tajik officials have stated that although Tajikistan has the capability to produce chemical precursors and toxic substances for industrial purposes, Dushanbe has not produced chemical weapons and will not do so in the future. 43 Tajikistan is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Missile

Tajikistan does not possess ballistic missiles, and lacks the industrial capability to produce them. However, a Soviet-era plant in the city of Taboshar once manufactured solid-propellant rocket motors for Soviet strategic missiles. 44 Tajikistan subscribes to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).

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NGO Declaration on the Future of Nuclear Energy 

NGO Declaration on the Future of Nuclear Energy 

At this critical juncture for action on climate change and energy security, 20 NGOs from around the globe jointly call for the efficient and responsible expansion of nuclear energy and advance six key principles for doing so. 



Glossary

WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
WMD: Typically refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, though there is some debate as to whether chemical weapons qualify as weapons of “mass destruction.”
Nuclear weapon
Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Nonproliferation
Nonproliferation: Measures to prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. See entry for Proliferation.
Disarmament
Though there is no agreed-upon legal definition of what disarmament entails within the context of international agreements, a general definition is the process of reducing the quantity and/or capabilities of military weapons and/or military forces.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. See entry for Information Circular 540.
Entry into force
The moment at which all provisions of a treaty are legally binding on its parties. Every treaty specifies preconditions for its entry into force. For example, the NPT specified that it would enter into force after the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union (the Depository governments) and 40 other countries ratified the treaty, an event that occurred on March 5, 1970. See entries for Signature, Ratification.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (NTC)
The NTC: The General Assembly adopted the Nuclear Terrorism Convention in April 2005. It opened for signature on 14 September 2005. The Convention addresses the unlawful possession or use of nuclear devices or materials by non-state actors. The Convention calls on states to develop a legal framework criminalizing offenses related to nuclear terrorism, as well as for international cooperation in nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions. For additional information, see the Nuclear Terrorism Convention.
Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ)
The Central Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone (CANWFZ) includes all five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The foreign ministers of the five countries signed the treaty establishing the zone on 8 September 2006 at the former Soviet nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan. The treaty entered into force on 21 March 2009. For additional information, see the CANWFZ.
United Nations General Assembly
The UN General Assembly is the largest body of the United Nations. It includes all member states, but its resolutions are not legally binding. It is responsible for much of the work of the United Nations, including controlling finances, passing resolutions, and electing non-permanent members of the Security Council. It has two subsidiary bodies dealing particularly with security and disarmament: the UN General Assembly Committee on Disarmament and International Security (First Committee); and the UN Disarmament Commission. For additional information, see the UNGA.
Uranium
Uranium is a metal with the atomic number 92. See entries for enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium.
Enriched uranium
Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
Dismantlement
Dismantlement: Taking apart a weapon, facility, or other item so that it is no longer functional.
Safeguards
Safeguards: A system of accounting, containment, surveillance, and inspections aimed at verifying that states are in compliance with their treaty obligations concerning the supply, manufacture, and use of civil nuclear materials. The term frequently refers to the safeguards systems maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. IAEA safeguards aim to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material in a timely manner. However, the term can also refer to, for example, a bilateral agreement between a supplier state and an importer state on the use of a certain nuclear technology.

See entries for Full-scope safeguards, information-driven safeguards, Information Circular 66, and Information Circular 153.
Research reactor
Research reactor: Small fission reactors designed to produce neutrons for a variety of purposes, including scientific research, training, and medical isotope production. Unlike commercial power reactors, they are not designed to generate power.
Nuclear energy
Nuclear energy: The energy liberated by a nuclear reaction (fission or fusion), or by radioactive decay.
Radioactive waste
Radioactive waste: Materials which are radioactive and for which there is no further use.
Radiation (Ionizing)
Radiation that has sufficient energy to remove electrons from substances that it passes through, forming ions. May include alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays, x-rays, neutrons, high-speed electrons, high-speed protons, and other particles capable of producing ions.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Multilateral
Multilateral: Negotiations, agreements or treaties that are concluded among three or more parties, countries, etc.
UNSC Resolution 1540
Resolution 1540 was passed by the UN Security Council in April 2004, calling on all states to refrain from supporting, by any means, non-state actors who attempt to acquire, use, or transfer chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or their delivery systems. The resolution also called for a Committee to report on the progress of the resolution, asking states to submit reports on steps taken towards conforming to the resolution. In April 2011, the Security Council voted to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for an additional 10 years.
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
The GTRI: A program established by the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration in May 2004 to identify, secure, remove, and/or facilitate the removal of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world. The GTRI incorporated, among other programs, longstanding U.S. efforts under the RERTR program to convert domestic and foreign research reactors from highly enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. See entry for RERTR 
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Plague
Plague: The disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. There are three forms of plague: bubonic plague, pneumonic plague, and septicemic plague. Bubonic plague refers to infection of the lymph nodes by Y. pestis, causing black sores or “buboes,” pneumonic plague refers to infection of the lungs, and septicemic plague refers to infection of the bloodstream. Although no longer a serious public health hazard in the developed world, the bacterium can spread from person-to-person in aerosolized form, and has been investigated as a biological weapon by Japan and the Soviet Union.
Pathogen
Pathogen: A microorganism capable of causing disease.
Cholera
Cholera: A disease of the digestive tract caused by the bacteria Vibrio cholerae. A water-borne disease, cholera infections usually occur via contaminated water or foods. Cholera causes severe diarrhea followed by severe dehydration, and can result in death within hours or days. Sanitation in the developed world has greatly lessened cholera’s public health impact. Unit 731 of the Japanese Imperial Army used cholera against the Chinese military and civilian populations during World War II.
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles (ICOC)
ICOC: A legally non-binding arrangement that was launched with the objective of preventing and curbing the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. States adhering to the ICOC agree not to assist ballistic missile programs in countries suspected of developing biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, as well as to exhibit "restraint" in the development and testing of their own ballistic missiles. It eventually became the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles (HCOC). For additional information, see the HCOC.

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  35. China View, “Russia transfers Afghan-Tajik border control to Tajikistan” 1 September 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com.
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  37. Permanent Representative of Tajikistan to the United Nations, “National report of the Republic of Tajikistan on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004),” Report to the 1540 Committee, accessed 24 June 2015, www.un.org; “The initial launch meeting of the peer review between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on UNSCR 1540 implementation,” Information note by the 1540 Committee Experts, United Nations, December 2014, www.un.org.
  38. “Russia to Cut Troop Levels in Tajikistan amid Questions about Its Influence,” Reuters, 4 February 2016, www.reuters.com.
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  41. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Staff, Interview with Tajik AP scientist, 6 May 2003.
  42. International Science and Technology Center, www.istc.ru; Alevtina Izvekova, “Issue Brief: International Assistance for Anti-Plague Facilities in the Former Soviet Union to Prevent Proliferation of Biological Weapons,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 2005, www.nti.org; Agricultural Research Service, “2013 Annual Report: USDA/ARS and the International Science and Technology Center,” Report on Research Project #414805, United States Department of Agriculture, 2013, ars.usda.gov; International Science and Technology Center, 2015, www.istc.ru.
  43. “Letter dated 11 January 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Tajikistan to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee (S/AC.44/2004/(02)/101),” UN Security Council, 12 January 2005, www.un.org; Richard F. Kaufman and John P. Hardt (eds.), The Former Soviet Union In Transition, Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, 1993, p. 788.
  44. Richard F. Kaufman and John P. Hardt (eds.), The Former Soviet Union in Transition, Joint Economic Committee Congress of the United States, 1993, p. 788.

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