A Conflict in Space Could Go Nuclear. It Doesn’t Have To.
No major power has an interest in an unintended nuclear war. Weapons are now in orbit. The guardrails are not. The time to build them is before a crisis, not during one.
This post was written
by Madison Estes, an intern on NTI’s material security and minimization team who
recently completed her MA in Nonproliferation and International Security at King’s
College London.
On Monday, April 23, NTI launched its new seminar series with
a presentation from Siegfried Hecker and Robert Carlin of Stanford University
on the history of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear program. Hecker
started the program with a thorough overview of the evolution of the North
Korean program from its inception to present day, highlighting inflection
points in the relationship between the U.S. and DPRK across a spectrum of
issues.
Following Dr. Hecker’s detailed recount of the DPRK nuclear
program, he emphasized that:
Following the presentation, Hecker and Carlin discussed the
opportunity—and challenge—presented by the upcoming talks on DPRK
denuclearization. Noting that that not all weapons, missile tests, plutonium
inventory and other elements of their program could be eliminated at once, that
priority should be given to the most critical risks first..
Hecker and Carlin also discussed the evolution of North
Korea’s priorities, which have shifted from achieving a nuclear deterrent to the
pursuit of economic strength. This will be critical for negotiators to bear in
mind, as this public shift in position will allow DPRK leadership more
flexibility at the negotiating table to make potential concessions to achieve
economic goals.
As the discussion came to a conclusion, Hecker also
addressed a question from the audience regarding the Trump administration’s
desire to maintain a two-year timeline for North Korea’s denuclearization
process. He noted that he believed verifiable implementation of a moratorium on
nuclear and long-range delivery vehicle testing and plutonium production would
be a realistic pathway to denuclearization that could be accomplished in a
two-year timeframe.
The session concluded following additional audience Q&A
and a reception.
For a collection of educational resources on North Korea’s
nuclear program, click here.
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No major power has an interest in an unintended nuclear war. Weapons are now in orbit. The guardrails are not. The time to build them is before a crisis, not during one.
Congress’s oversight of U.S. nuclear policy is at a critical juncture. When the U.S. Senate approved New START in 2010, it mandated several annual reports and certifications to ensure strong congressional oversight of Russian compliance with the treaty. These requirements expired along with the treaty, creating oversight gaps just as strategic competition heats up.
Strengthening nuclear fail-safe measures and applying and adapting principles governing the use of outer space for peaceful purposes are essential to preventing nuclear use and maintaining strategic stability.
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