Mark Melamed
Deputy Vice President, Global Nuclear Policy Program
Atomic Pulse
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen had a lively discussion about the increasingly challenging U.S.-China relationship during NTI’s annual Board of Directors dinner on Oct. 22. Mullen reflected on a recent visit to Beijing as part of a senior-level, NTI-organized delegation, and Haines shared insights on sources of friction in U.S.-China relations and areas where interests potentially overlap even amid growing tensions.
The discussion, moderated by Judy Woodruff of the PBS NewsHour, was titled “Advancing Global Security in an Era of U.S.-China Competition.” Before an audience that included NTI board members and leadership and top officials and experts, the two panelists explored growing U.S.-China competition in the nuclear space and across other domains. Haines and Mullen both emphasized the two countries’ shared interest in preventing a complete breakdown in the relationship, while acknowledging that tensions are dangerously high. They called for sustained dialogue and engagement on areas of disagreement and identified some topics where cooperation might be possible.
“Both countries are pursuing the potential for peaceful coexistence,” Haines noted. “The challenge is how do we get to that visionary state where you’re not destabilizing each other as you’re moving toward it.” She said that Beijing perceives that the United States is in decline while China is rising, and China’s increasingly aggressive activities—including its territorial claims, its growing nuclear arsenal, and activities in cyber space and outer space—are part of an effort to pressure the United States and its allies and partners and restrict their ability to counter or constrain China’s rise. Haines noted that a key question facing U.S. policymakers is, “How can we continue to counter, in a sense, aggression from the PRC [People’s Republic of China] while actually not escalating the situation?” This requires ensuring that channels of communication remain open, especially in a crisis, she said.
Mullen further emphasized the importance of dialogue between the United States and China, especially at the presidential level, arguing that if the presidents “don’t guide this relationship, we’re coming apart.” He lamented the precipitous drop in U.S.-China engagements across the board, noting that in addition to fewer government-to-government channels of communication, there are now far fewer flights between the United States and China, fewer Chinese students studying in the United States, and fewer U.S. congressional delegations traveling to China. This steep decline in engagement underscores the importance of maintaining and expanding dialogues that do exist, whether among experts at the Track 2 level or among government officials in Track 1 channels.
Mullen indicated his expectations were positively exceeded because the recent NTI-organized Track 2 workshop with Chinese experts on the concept of nuclear “fail-safe” had gone so well. He reported that the high-level Track 2 Chinese delegation at the meeting was engaged and receptive to the “fail-safe” concept, which centers on nuclear-armed states reviewing and taking unilateral measures to strengthen safeguards against accidental, inadvertent, or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon. Both Mullen and Haines heralded the “fail-safe” concept as a potentially fruitful avenue of engagement with China, given that such reviews can be done unilaterally without requiring negotiated limitations or verification. Haines expressed her support and appreciation for Track 2 dialogues in general as potential precursors to official level discussions and was encouraged that senior Chinese experts were willing to have a discussion about “fail-safe” given Beijing’s reluctance at the official level to have substantive conversations with the United States about nuclear weapons.
Haines and Mullen also each underscored areas of overlapping interests between the Washington and Beijing, in particular noting that neither side would benefit from economic collapse in China. But Haines noted that even areas where the United States and China have historically cooperated have become increasingly fraught. On biosecurity, the United States and China have a track record of constructive engagement, but China is increasingly seeking to “influence international organizations in ways that serve their geopolitical [interests] and that in many ways undermine the rules-based order” built and supported by the United States. Traditional cooperation with China and Russia on nonproliferation—especially with regard to Iran and North Korea—has fallen victim to Russia’s increasing dependence on North Korea and Iran and deepening cooperation between Moscow and Beijing following the invasion of Ukraine.
Mullen summed up the state of play by arguing that the U.S. relationship with China is the most critical one in the world in the 21st century, and managing the relationship “requires strategic patience when there isn’t time for it” and the sustained personal focus of the U.S. and Chinese leaders. Regardless of the challenges, the two countries must be willing to talk to each other, because the world is more dangerous when they are not engaging.
Sign up for our newsletter to get the latest on nuclear and biological threats.