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Last Updated: July, 2015

Brazil has never developed either chemical or biological weapons. From the 1970s to the early 1990s, however, Brazil appeared to many outside experts to be using its robust nuclear energy program to develop a hedge capability for nuclear weapons development.

The international community—and the United States in particular—were worried that Brazil might use the technology from its space-launch vehicle program to produce ballistic missiles. [1] However, by the early 1990s, Brazil had renounced all interest in nuclear weapons and curtailed its ballistic missile program after transitioning to a civilian government and ending a nuclear and missile rivalry with neighbor Argentina. Today Brazil operates a civil nuclear program with plans to expand its nuclear energy sector over the next decades. [2]


Brazil is one of the few countries to possess competencies in all major dimensions of the "nuclear fuel cycle, from mineral prospecting to uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication. Brazil has never developed nuclear weapons, and there is no evidence that it has the intention to enrich uranium above the 20% level. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Brazil pursued an ambitious program of nuclear technology development, which included construction of an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility under the Navy's direction. [3] However, Brazil has since disavowed nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), and become a state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). [4]

With Argentina, Brazil established a bilateral inspection agency (the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), to verify both countries' pledges to use nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes. Brazil is also a party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but it has not agreed to sign an Additional Protocol (INFCIRC-540) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some of the Additional Protocol's provisions, including unannounced inspections, are already included in the Quadripartite Agreement signed in 1991 by Brazil, Argentina, the ABACC, and the IAEA. [5] The 2008 National Defense Strategy (NDS) states that Brazil will not sign any additions to the NPT, including the Additional Protocol, until the nuclear weapon states have made progress towards nuclear disarmament. [6] Brazil is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which in June 2011 approved revised guidelines for the export of sensitive nuclear technologies and recognized the Quadripartite Agreement as an alternative to the Additional Protocol. [7]

Brazil is the only non-nuclear-weapon state with a civilian nuclear program that leases uranium enrichment technology from the state’s military. [8] Nuclear energy accounts for approximately 3% of the country's production of electricity, provided by two operating nuclear plants, Angra 1 and Angra 2. A third plant, Angra 3 is under construction and expected to begin operation in 2018. [9] As of May 2015 Angra 3 will be the last state-owned nuclear power station, encouraging a shift toward private investment in nuclear power. Long-term plans call for the privately sponsored construction, by 2034, of four 1,000 MWe plants, and the expansion of nuclear fuel production to meet both increased domestic and possibly international demand. [10] Four sites have been selected for the development of these new plants, with plans to construct the units between 2020 and 2030. [11] Brazil believes that it is possible for the state to be self-sufficient in its nuclear energy production. With one of the largest uranium reserves in the world, Brazil could potentially use domestically-enriched uranium to cover all of its nuclear fuel needs. [12]

In the wake of the March 2011 accident at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the Brazilian government created a response plan that includes increased safety inspections, checks and guidelines at the existing nuclear plants to avoid similar disasters in the country. Plans regarding construction of the new plants were re-evaluated to incorporate the increased focus on safety. [13]

Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB), a state-owned company affiliated with the Ministry of Science and Technology, oversees nuclear fuel production. INB operates mining sites with reserves estimated at 1.1 million tons. [14] In Resende, state of Rio de Janeiro, INB operates the Nuclear Fuel Factory (FNC), an industrial complex that houses factories and laboratories for re-conversion, uranium enrichment, fabrication of uranium pellets, and fuel element manufacturing. [15] The 2015 refueling of the Angra 1 nuclear power plant will use domestically-enriched uranium from the Resende plant. The new ability to use domestically-enriched uranium is due to more cost-effective nuclear fuel production in Brazil. [16]

Brazil is currently the only non-nuclear-weapon state that is in the process of developing a nuclear submarine. [17] To fulfill these goals, Brazil sought cooperation agreements with foreign partners, including Argentina, [18] France, and Russia. [19] France is assisting with the design and construction of a 4,000-ton nuclear submarine by providing the non-nuclear materials. [20] Operational testing of the submarine turbine was successfully completed as of May 2015. [21] The Brazilian Navy will equip the vessel with a nuclear reactor—the 2131-R pressurized water reactor being developed at Brazil's LABGENE nuclear site—and supply its fuel. [22] Though the Brazilian government has not officially confirmed the fuel type of the submarine, it will most likely use low-enriched uranium (LEU) manufactured at the USEXA facility. [23] Brazil plans to complete its first nuclear submarine, the Álvaro Alberto (SN10), by 2025. [24] Brazil hopes to eventually deploy a fleet of six nuclear submarines. [25]


There is no evidence that Brazil has ever embarked on a chemical warfare (CW) program; to the contrary, Brazil is an extremely active participant in chemical weapons nonproliferation efforts. Even before the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came into force, Brazil engaged in regional CW nonproliferation efforts. For example, in September 1991 Brazil, Argentina, and Chile signed the Mendoza Agreement, which commits signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock, or transfer—directly or indirectly—chemical or biological weapons. [26] Brazil participated actively in the negotiations for the CWC and ratified it in March 1996, thereby becoming a charter member of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). [27]


There is no evidence that Brazil has ever developed or produced biological weapons. It ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1973 and signed the Mendoza Agreement in 1991, which prohibits the development, stockpiling or transfer of biological as well as chemical agents. [28] Brazil's opposition to biological weapons is evident from reports that senior government officials oppose using biological agents even to control coca production in neighboring Colombia. [29] Brazil has one of the world's largest crops of the castor bean [30] (which naturally produces the toxin ricin), and is proficient in advanced dual-use techniques such as gene sequencing. [31] However, Brazil is an avid proponent of biological weapons nonproliferation.


In the early 1990s, Brazil abandoned its activities to build ballistic missiles, placed the Brazilian Space Agency under civilian control, and joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). [32] Previously, however, military control over the space launch vehicle (SLV) program and an ambitious short-range rocket export program had raised concerns in the international community that Brazil might develop ballistic missiles and export them to other countries, particularly Libya and Iraq. [33] The rationale behind Brazil's policy change can be attributed to various factors, including the transition to civilian democratic government, Argentina's dismantlement of the Condor 2 missile project, and Brazil's difficulty in acquiring sensitive technology for its space program due to constraints imposed on suppliers by the MTCR. [34]

[1] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Seeks to Stop Brazil's Missile-Technology Deal," The New York Times, October 19, 1989, section A, p. 6, column 1, Foreign Desk.
[2] "Nuclear Power in Brazil," World Nuclear Association, May 1, 2015,
[3] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 395-397.
[4] Alicia Godsberg, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT]," Federation of American Scientists: The Nuclear Information Project,
[5] "Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards," ABACC,
[6] Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii, "Brazil's New National Defense Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear Developments," NTI Issue Brief, October 30, 2009,
[7] "Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)," Press Release n.237, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 24, 2011.
[8] "Nuclear Power in Brazil," World Nuclear Association, May 1, 2015,
[9] "Areva Signs Equipment Contract for Brazil's Angra 3," World Nuclear News, January 6, 2015,
[10] Marta Salomon, "Brasil Quer Exportar Urânio [Brazil Wants to Export Uranium]," O Estado de S. Paulo, August 11, 2010; William Freebairn, "Brazil Plans Four New Nuclear Units by 2028, Industry Group Says," Nucleonics Week, Volume 52 / Number 8, February 24, 2011.
[11] "Nuclear Power in Brazil," World Nuclear Association, May 1, 2015,; "Westinghouse Applauds Brazilian Government's Nuclear Energy Plans <6502.T>," Reuters, May 5, 2015,
[12] Marcelo Teixeira, "Brazil Sees Expanded Private Role in Nuclear Power – Minister," Reuters, May 27, 2015,
[13] Chris Cote, " Brazil's Nuclear Power Plans Three Years After Fukushima: A BrazilWorks Briefing Paper," BrazilWorks, April 2014,
[14] André Borges e Tarso Veloso, "Brasil Investe no Processo do Urânio [Brazil Invests in Uranium Processing]," Valor Econômico, February 4, 2011.
[15] "The Nuclear Fuel Cycle," Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil,
[16] "Brazil's Angra Plant to Get Domestic Fuel," World Nuclear News, November 6, 2014,
[17] "Nuclear Power in Brazil," World Nuclear Association, May 1, 2015,
[18] In August 2010, Brazil signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Argentina for the joint design of research reactors to produce radioisotopes. Daniel Rittner, "Argentina e Brasil acertam parceria na área nuclear [Argentina and Brazil Sign Nuclear Deal]," Valor Econômico, August 4, 2010.
[19] Brazil signed a nuclear cooperation memorandum with Russia on July 21, 2009 following an agreement reached during Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Brazil in November 2008. Potential areas for cooperation include: design and construction of research reactors, production of radioisotopes, and the development of technologies for power reactors and uranium prospecting. "Russia, Brazil sign nuclear cooperation memorandum," Interfax News Agency, July 21, 2009,
[20] Janet T Coelho, "Brazil Plans to Expand Submarine Fleet," IHS Jane's 360, December 16, 2014,
[21] Roberto Caiafa, "La Turbina del Primer Submarino Nuclear de Brasil Supera las Pruebas de Esfuerzo [The Turbine of Brazil's First Nuclear Submarine Passes Stress Tests]," Infodefensa, May 12, 2015,
[22] David Oliver, "Brazil's PROSUB infrastructure takes shape," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 2, 2013; Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii, "Brazil's New National Defense Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear Developments," NTI Issue Brief, October 30, 2009,
[23] Greg Thielmann and Wyatt Hoffman, "Threat Assessment Brief: Submarine Nuclear Reactors: A Worsening Proliferation Challenge," Arms Control Association, July 26, 2012; Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, "Brazil Moves Toward Nuclear Submarine," Arms Control Today, April 2013, Vol. 43.
[24] Paul Pryce, "The Brazilian Navy: Green Water or Blue?" Center for International Maritime Security, January 27, 2015,
[25] Roberto Godoy, "Submarino nuclear brasileiro sairá do papel em 2016," O Estado de S.Paulo, July 7, 2012,
[26] "The Declaration of Mendoza," United States Department of State, September 5, 1991,
[27] "Chemical Weapons Convention Signatories and State Parties," Arms Control Association, February 2015,
[28] "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction," The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs,
[29] "Biological Weapons in the Drug War. A Review of Opposition in South America," The Sunshine Project, Backgrounder Series, Number 3, December 2000,; "Brazilian security official concerned about Plan Colombia implications on border," O Estado de S. Paulo, September 5, 2000, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
[30] Elizabeth Johnson, "The Promise of the Castor Bean," Biodiesel Magazine, December 2004,
[31] Larry Rohter, "Brazil Bounding Forward as Genomics Powerhouse," The New York Times, May 1, 2001, section F, column 5, Science Desk, p. 1,
[32] "MTCR Partners," Missile Technology Control Regime,
[33] Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "The Brazilian Bomb, South America Goes Ballistic," New Republic, August 13, 1990,
[34] Wyn Q. Bowen, "Brazil's Accession to the MTCR," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring-Summer 1996,

Get the Facts on Brazil
  • Maintains a bilateral inspection agency with Argentina to verify peaceful uses of nuclear energy
  • Abandoned its ballistic missile program in the 1990s
  • Possesses an extensive peaceful nuclear program with advanced fuel cycle capabilities

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright 2019.