When Official Channels Close, Track IIs Keep Diplomacy Moving

Thirty-five kilometers from Tiananmen Square, in a science park in Beijing’s Fangshan District, there is a nuclear security training facility that China and the United States built together. During the first Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, several participating countries committed to building “Centers of Excellence” (COE), or centralized locations where nuclear security professionals train in protecting nuclear material. China was one of these countries, and in January 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama signed an agreement with Chinese President Hu Jintao to jointly construct a COE.

China’s COE—which has been run by China’s State Nuclear Security Technology Center (SNSTC) since opening in 2016—instructs nuclear security personnel in security equipment testing, intrusion detection, tactical response force training, and smuggling interdiction from across the Asia-Pacific. But the diplomatic environment that enabled the COE’s construction no longer exists. China-U.S. relations have deteriorated to the point where high-level collaboration on a similar facility today would be exceedingly difficult.

As the two countries with the largest civilian reactor fleets, Beijing and Washington’s approaches to nuclear security are as important as ever. But when an international relationship begins to deteriorate, it can become politically costly or infeasible for officials to conduct discussions without being derailed by external pressure. For a relationship as high stakes as Beijing and Washington’s, every diplomatic event has the potential to become a battlefield of strategic competition— even when the topic of discussion has nothing to do with the underlying dispute.

But cooperation is still possible in a different form: the China-U.S. Track II Dialogue on Nuclear Security, co-organized by NTI, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA), and the SNSTC. Although official communication channels are down, this dialogue between Chinese and American experts demonstrates that there is still plenty to agree on.

In such an uncertain climate, this nuclear security track II is particularly useful for helping the United States and China manage risks, identify areas of mutual interest, and deepen technical cooperation in an environment of rapid technological change. Convening multiple times since 2018, the dialogue is a rare opportunity for discussion of China and the United States’ top nuclear security priorities. During the most recent meeting—which was held at the Beijing COE in July 2026, ten years after the center’s opening—attendees addressed the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in nuclear security, the adaptation of domestic legal regimes to accommodate appropriate security measures for advanced reactors and SMRs, and the future of international nuclear security governance.

The delegations considered avenues for AI to improve nuclear security, such as integrating AI models to test more realistic threat scenarios, enhance material control and accounting procedures (particularly during transit), and improve other data management performance. At the same time, participants recognized the significant challenges that AI models posed, with the potential for AI-driven cyberattacks to damage critical systems, the erosion of human agency due to overreliance on advanced models, and security failures caused by machine error. To combat these challenges, participants agreed that humans must remain in the loop at all stages of AI deployment and decision making within nuclear facilities, that the IAEA must be funded and empowered to govern the use of AI in nuclear security, and that AI safety training must be a priority for states with burgeoning nuclear capabilities.

Another area of overlap among participants at the last meeting was on regulating novel reactor builds. The group recognized small modular reactors, for example, as requiring additional protection standards that would negate many of the cost benefits associated with their modularity. Both delegations traded views on how nuclear security regulations could be reformed to accommodate a wider variety of reactor models, fuels, and components. Experts underscored the importance of the Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material—the only legally binding international agreement governing nuclear material protection—and its upcoming 2027 Review Conference, expressing a willingness to shape the outcomes of the conference to forward treaty universalization and implementation. Further, attendees held a thorough discussion on how to best protect nuclear facilities from military attacks during wartime, with both delegations strongly asserting that nuclear facilities should always be off limits from military strikes.

As a growing number of reactors come online, Beijing and Washington must be on the same page to avoid nuclear material from falling into the wrong hands. Continued Track II engagement on nuclear security is essential for preserving cooperation within a critical area of shared interest, even when diplomacy between political officials is at an impasse.