Redefining Biological Weapons: Expanding the BWC to Incorporate Infrastructure Harm and Cyber-Biothreats

2025 Next Generation for Biosecurity Competition Winning Paper

Executive Summary

The definition of biological weapons in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
is being outpaced by emerging technologies, creating an “accountability vacuum” for
evolving threats.¹ Innovations in synthetic biology and biotechnology powered by artificial intelligence (AI) and large language models (LLMs) may enable the creation of highly targeted or controllable agents attractive to malicious actors. While the BWC’s strength lies in its broad, forward-thinking definition and general purpose criterion (GPC), its implicit focus on human, animal, and plant diseases is a potential vulnerability. This paper proposes that the current pathogen-centric definition of bioweapons should be expanded to address two overlooked threats: metabolic sabotage, in which engineered microbes degrade material infrastructure, and cyber-biothreats, in which digital attacks corrupt biological workflows, such as hacking DNA synthesizers or bioreactors to produce altered sequences and harmful agents. These novel threats weaken the BWC and United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540 by creating
an oversight gray area.²

To address metabolic sabotage, the definition of a biological agent should encompass harm to inanimate materials essential for sustaining life and the economy. To counter cyber-biothreats, the definition of a biological and toxin weapon should include digital systems and codes designed to produce or activate such agents for hostile purposes. These clarifications necessitate that statesparties agree not to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, or retain microbial/biological agents/toxins that harm living and/or inanimate entities, unless justified for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. To support this paradigm shift, a proactive oversight framework is essential. Key recommendations include adopting a “functional harm” principle, mandating “Biosecurity-by-Design,” establishing threat forecasting panels, fortifying cyber-bio infrastructure, integrating biosurveillance into infrastructure maintenance, and regulating access to high-risk microbes. These approaches help build a resilient biosecurity posture that effectively addresses 21st-century threats, safeguarding public health, infrastructure, and national security.