Safeguarding a Nuclear Energy “Boom”

This paper was commissioned by NTI to inform projects aimed at promoting the responsible scaling of nuclear energy. The views in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of NTI, its Board of Directors, or institutions with which they are associated.

Executive Summary

The world is witnessing a wave of interest in nuclear energy. Many states are considering an increased role for nuclear energy to meet their electricity demands and combat climate change. For example, in December 2023, 25 states committed to tripling nuclear energy by 2050; in 2024, six more countries joined the pledge. Some experts doubt the feasibility of such an ambitious goal—but even if the effort is only partially successful, a nuclear energy footprint that is any larger will have implications for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) mission of verifying that nuclear material and technologies are used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Depending on how the expansion of nuclear energy programs unfolds across the globe, it could challenge the IAEA’s ability to safeguard nuclear material and facilities. Uncertainty in both the type and amount of new nuclear builds limits the IAEA’s ability to plan for increased demand. However, the current pace of deployment provides time for the IAEA to work with the international community to prepare for a surge in activity.

The burden on the IAEA will depend on both the type and location of future nuclear energy activity. New builds in nuclear-weapon states—where much of the current expansion is underway—are unlikely to seriously burden the IAEA because the agency has less responsibility in these countries. Expansion in non–nuclear-weapon states, especially those without an established nuclear industry, will be a heavier lift for the IAEA, which will need to develop and implement new safeguards approaches, particularly for small modular reactors (SMRs). Some SMR designs are essentially scaled-down versions of large light-water reactors that have been deployed since the dawn of the nuclear energy age, which could make them easier to build and safeguard. However, the IAEA may need to adapt new monitoring and accounting approaches for novel reactor and fuel types that pose different proliferation pathways.

Support from the international community will be necessary to help the IAEA absorb the additional tasks of a significant nuclear energy expansion. This support may take many shapes, including extra-budgetary funding, cost-free experts (or junior professional officers), R&D collaboration, or a newcomers fund for states planning new reactors to preemptively contribute to the IAEA’s safeguards work in their country.

Even with reasonably accurate estimates of a nuclear energy expansion, assessing the corresponding needs of the IAEA by 2050 is fraught with uncertainty. Nevertheless, the IAEA needs to be ready to meet its member states’ expectations and needs, and the agency must be afforded the resources to prepare for whatever scenario unfolds.