NTI | bio Proposes New Solutions to Prevent Bioweapons Development and Use

The dual-use nature of modern bioscience and biotechnology, combined with the significant resources available to many states, makes it challenging to prevent the development of biological weapons using traditional arms control measures and policy approaches. During the fifth session of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Working Group meetings from December 2-13 in Geneva, Switzerland, NTI | bio presented solutions that could effectively reduce the risk of bioweapons development and use by states and other powerful actors.

Disincentivizing Bioweapons: Theory and Policy Approaches

On December 11, NTI | bio launched Disincentivizing Bioweapons: Theory and Policy Approaches, an essay collection that bridges theory and practical policy-relevant approaches to invigorate international efforts to reduce biological threats.

The collection includes essays that explore a variety of potential solutions to disincentivize states from developing or using biological weapons, and it identifies open questions and challenges that warrant further attention. Five contributing authors presented their essays during an event at the BWC, sharing their perspectives on potentially promising new approaches to reduce bioweapons risks globally. Speakers included:

• Dr. James Revill, co-author of “The Role and Limits of Transparency Measures in Disincentivizing Biological Weapons”

• Prof. Michelle Bentley, author of “The Biological Weapons Taboo: A ‘New’ Focus for Arms Control”

• Dr. Nathan A. Paxton, author of “Prospects for Assessing State Intent to Proliferate Biological Weapons”

• Dr. Tristan Volpe, author of “Biotechnology and the Dead Zone for Managing Dual Use Dilemmas”

• Dr. Jaime Yassif, co-author of “Guarding Against Catastrophic Biological Risks: Preventing State Biological Weapon Development and Use by Shaping Intentions”

“Policy solutions to problems such as bioweapons proliferation do not develop in isolation,” Dr. Nathan A. Paxton, senior director at NTI | bio, said during the event, “and a failure to think deeply and analytically about complex challenges can prevent the emergence of effective solutions.”

This essay collection is part of a broader NTI | bio effort to catalyze the development of an epistemic community to provide thought leadership and concrete policy proposals to effectively reduce the risk that states will develop or use bioweapons. This publication follows a 2023 NTI hosted workshop,  which convened thought leaders and policymakers to discuss effective ways to disincentivize bioweapons development and use by states.

The recorded livestream of the essay collection launch event is available on NTI’s YouTube channel.

Enhancing Transparency for Bioscience Research & Development

On December 13, NTI | bio hosted a side event that underscored how enhanced transparency can reduce the risk of misperceptions among states about bioscience and biotechnology research and development activities in other nations. These discussions directly supported the mandate of the BWC Working Group to develop concrete proposals to strengthen the Convention, including its specific efforts to bolster confidence building measures and to explore the possibility of establishing a verification mechanism for the Convention.

Dr. Jaime Yassif, NTI | bio vice president, and David Stiefel, director at NTI | bio, presented key findings from a recent NTI-hosted workshop focused on enhancing transparency  in bioscience research and development. Alongside co-panelists Dr. James Diggans, head of biosecurity at Twist Bioscience, and Ms. Musonda Mandona, biosafety and biosecurity advisor at the Zambian Ministry of Health, the discussion highlighted several approaches that could significantly enhance transparency and build trust among both States Parties and the private sector. Key examples that were presented include:

• Define a threat model that clarifies relevant threat scenarios and potential indicators of a biological weapons program – to focus information collection and analysis when assessing research and development activities.

• Pilot a project to evaluate the potential of publicly available information collection and AI analysis to detect meaningful signals of high-risk or illicit activities related to bioweapons development.

• Experiment with site visit procedures that incorporate sample and data collection while balancing intellectual property protection with transparency. Consider working with the private sector to test workable site visit procedures and/or incorporating sample collection into the ongoing voluntary peer review process associated with the BWC.

• Strengthen and modernize the Confidence Building Measure process to make it a more effective transparency tool.

• Develop a Joint Evaluation Exercise for the BWC to enable states parties to demonstrate and assess compliance through a structured, standardized, and internationally recognized process.

“As of 2022, there is renewed energy within the BWC to discuss measures related to confidence-building, transparency, compliance, and verification,” Stiefel noted during his remarks. “The approaches that NTI | bio plans to put forward in our final report will provide a menu that can be championed from both within and alongside the UN system, providing numerous options for an enterprise-wide effort to enhance transparency and minimize misperceptions.”

In early 2025, NTI | bio will publish a report outlining a range of options and highlighting key recommendations regarding potential approaches and methods to enhance transparency.