A Second Grip on the Nuclear Football: Rethinking Sole Authority in a Volatile World

At noon on January 20, 2025, thousands will gather to witness the transfer of presidential power on the west lawn of the U.S. Capitol. One of the most significant elements of the transfer of power will likely go almost entirely unnoticed—the transfer of the nuclear football.

Notwithstanding its disarming moniker (pun intended!), the nuclear football, or “Presidential Emergency Satchel,” is neither a literal football nor radioactive. It is a highly secure briefcase, carried by a military aide who is always in the president’s vicinity, containing the strategic plans and communication systems necessary for the president to authorize a nuclear strike at any time, from anywhere. After President-elect Donald Trump takes the oath of office, President Biden’s designated military aide will hand the nuclear football off to President Trump’s military aide—henceforward, the football’s new keeper.

This physical exchange carries with it the transfer of immense power and responsibility, because in the United States the president has sole authority to launch nuclear weapons. This means the president can order a nuclear strike without the approval of or consultation with their vice president, Congress, the military, or any other government officials—and the military is beholden to any orders that are legal and come from the appropriate command authority. NTI’s own legal analysis on the authorities, limits, and process of presidential launch authority concluded that “[c]urrently, no statute limits or regulates the president’s authority to use nuclear weapons.”

Sole authority is a product of the Cold War, when fears of a massive Soviet nuclear attack put a premium on enabling a rapid response; essentially, making sure a retaliatory strike could be ordered and executed in the mere minutes between the United States detecting a Soviet launch and those missiles striking the United States. But while the nuclear landscape has changed considerably in recent decades, U.S. procedures for launching a nuclear strike have not. The ability to start a nuclear war—to potentially end life as we know it—still rests in the hands of a single individual.

If this seems to you like cause for concern, you are not alone. There has been a significant uptick in discussion of this approach in recent years. Last March, W.J. Hennigan highlighted  sole authority as part of the New York Times’ “At the Brink” series, and the Times recently sent a poll to all incoming members of Congress about their views on the topic. The results reflected the lack of any clear consensus, perhaps a reason why the efforts of some Congresspeople to introduce checks and balances into the nuclear launch process have not gotten any traction. A prime example is Senator Ed Markey and Representative Ted Lieu’s “Restricting First Use of Nuclear Weapons Act,” which they have introduced in every Congress dating back to 2016. The bill would require a congressional declaration of war before the president could launch a nuclear first strike.

Over the years, NTI has proposed ways to improve the decision-making process for nuclear use, cognizant that the current process prioritizes speed over consultation and leaves the United States and the world vulnerable to nuclear use by miscalculation or false warning. In 2019, NTI Co-Chairs Ernest J. Moniz and Sam Nunn proposed executive and legislative action to establish procedures for the president to consult within the executive branch and with Congress when considering the use of nuclear weapons. NTI consultant Steve Andreasen and former National Security Advisor Tony Lake raised again many of those same concepts in an article in Foreign Affairs in October 2024.

In other words, lawmakers, government officials, and civilians alike are increasingly questioning the relevance and safety of sole authority in today’s tumultuous and geopolitically complex landscape. Although the nuclear football endures as a symbol of presidential power, it also highlights the troubling reality of unchecked authority. Whether or not these concerns finally prompt meaningful reform, one thing remains certain: the risks posed by nuclear sole authority are far too significant to ignore.