After Stuxnet: Acknowledging the Cyber Threat to Nuclear Facilities

After Stuxnet: Acknowledging the Cyber Threat to Nuclear Facilities, by NTI Program Associate Alexandra Van Dine highlights the threat posed to nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks and the current lack of adequate domestic and international legal and institutional protections for such facilities.

Van Dine argues that although Stuxnet was a precise weapon that targeted an illicit nuclear weapons program in a way that never endangered human life or the environment, it also opened the door to more sinister or indiscriminate cyber-attacks against less secure, higher consequence nuclear facilities vulnerable to theft or sabotage. The lesson Stuxnet teaches the international community is that we must take steps to defend against these threats to avoid disaster. 

The paper was included in the volume, Project on Nuclear Issues: Collection of Papers from the 2016 Nuclear Scholars Initiative and PONI Conference Series, a product of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI). The report comprises of research from participants in the 2016 Nuclear Scholars Initiative, including Ms. Van Dine, and the PONI Conference Series and span a range of technical and policy issues. PONI sponsors this research to provide a forum for facilitating new and innovative thinking and a platform for emerging thought leaders across the nuclear enterprise. 

May 18, 2017
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After Stuxnet: Acknowledging the Cyber Threat to Nuclear Facilities, by NTI Program Associate Alexandra Van Dine highlights the threat posed to nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks and the current lack of adequate domestic and international legal and institutional protections for such facilities.