Fact Sheet

France Nuclear Overview

France Nuclear Overview

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Background

This page is part of the France Country Profile.

France’s involvement in the development of nuclear energy dates back to the years immediately prior to WWII, when the so-called “Paris Group” was instrumental in sustaining a chain reaction through the use of a moderator. The Paris Group—comprised of four scientists at the College de France in Paris—showed that when fission occurs in a uranium nucleus two or three neutrons are released, creating the possibility for a chain reaction.

However, it was not until the 1950s that France embarked on a nuclear weapons program; its first successful nuclear test was carried out in the Sahara Desert of Algeria in 1960. The rationale for France developing its own nuclear weapons program has been largely attributed to reasons of security and prestige.

Current Force Configuration

France’s maintains up to 300 warheads and deploys submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and fighter aircraft. In February 2015, President François Hollande reaffirmed this warhead limit, which was first announced by former President Nicholas Sarkozy in 2008. 1

The sea-based leg of the French nuclear force consists of four Le Triomphant-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), based at Ile Longue, Bretagne on the Atlantic coast. While at least one SSBN is always deployed, three vessels must be operational at all times. 2 The submarines are fitted with 16 M45 or M51 domestically-manufactured SLBMs that can carry up to six MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles) TN75 warheads. 3 The French Navy is currently transitioning from the aging M45 SLBMs to newer M51s. The newest submarine in the French fleet, Le Terrible, entered into service in September 2010, and is fully equipped with the extended-range M51.1 (estimated at 6,000 km). 4 France began to place M51s on its remaining three SSBNs in 2010 with plans to complete the process by 2020. 5

The French air-based deterrent consists of four squadrons of fighter aircraft located at four bases. Land-based squadrons―deployed at Avord, Istres, and Saint-Dizier―comprise of 23 Mirage 2000N aircraft and 20 Rafales, both fitted with ASMP-ALCM air-launched cruise missiles. 6 France also deploys a squadron of up to 24 newer Rafale M aircraft on the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, based out of Toulon. 7 In 2011, France completed the replacement of the ASMP ALCM, which had been carried by French fighter aircraft since 1986, with the upgraded ASMP-A. The ASMP-A has a range of 500 km (up from 300km), and is fitted with the new 300-kiloton TNA warhead. 8 Both France’s Mirage 2000N K3 aircraft squadron at Istres and its Rafale F3 aircraft squadron at Saint Dizier are equipped with the new missile. 9 In February 2015, Francois Hollande revealed that, “France…possesses 54 AMP-A missiles,” a figure which had not been previously released. 10

Modernization

France is in the process of updating both its sea and air-based nuclear forces pursuant to a new Military Programming Law passed in December 2013. 11 In February 2015, President François Hollande announced that Paris would allocate 12.3 % (180 billion euros) of its annual defense budget towards the enhancement of its nuclear deterrent capabilities until 2019. 12

At least two of France’s oldest Triomphant-class SSBNs have undergone modification for deployment of the M51 SLBM, with a third, Le Téméraire, reportedly slotted for upgrade in 2016. 13 The newest SSBN, Le Terrible, was built to accommodate the M51. In addition to the ongoing replacement of M45 SLBMs with the M51, France aims to begin deployment of an improved version, the M51.2, in 2016, which has a range of 9,000 km. 14 The M51.2 will be equipped with a new warhead known as the TNO (Tete Nucleaire Oceanique) warhead. 15 Reportedly, the TNO has maneuverable capabilities, and an estimated yield of 150 kilotons of TNT (kt). 16 Paris has also initiated studies on a third generation SSBN, with hopes of replacing its current vessels starting in 2035. 17 This new SSBNs will be armed with further improved M51.3 SLBMs. 18

Paris is also in the process of replacing its entire Mirage 2000N fleet with the new Rafale F3 fighter jet. The transition should be completed by 2018. 19 In addition, France aims to integrate the ASMP-A cruise missile on all new Rafale jets by 2018 as well. 20 In 2014, French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian announced France had commenced studies on a new airborne, hypersonic missile known as the air-sol nucléaire fourth-generation (ASN4G) to replace the ASMP-A. 21 The new missile is planned to enter service in the 2030s, but before that time, France will upgrade the ASMP-A in the mid-2020s. 22

In November 2010, France and the United Kingdom signed the bilateral “Lancaster Agreement,” allowing for joint projects “to test the safety of their nuclear warheads” without performing actual nuclear explosive tests. 23 Activities will involve construction of the EPURE simulation facility in Valduc, France, where scientists from both countries will conduct work on the safety and security of their respective nations’ warheads. A joint Technology Development Center will also be established in Aldermaston, UK, to develop simulation technology for the center at Valduc. 24 The Valduc facility became operational in 2014 with construction costs split equally between France and the United Kingdom. 25 In a testament to the treaty’s success, on the fifth anniversary of the agreement in November 2015 Defense Secretary Michael Fallon and French Minister for Defense Le Drian reaffirmed the two countries’ commitment to defense cooperation. 26

Force Posture and Doctrine

France relies on nuclear deterrence as an ultimate guarantee of French sovereignty. 27 French officials describe the function of nuclear deterrence as “aiming to protect [the country] from any form of state actor aggression against the [country’s] vital interests, regardless of its origin or its form.” 28 Over the years, this core policy has been reaffirmed by various presidents, (Chirac, Sarkozy, and Hollande) as well as in the 2008 and 2013 White Papers on National Defense and Security. 29 Although the definition of France’s vital interests is left vague, analysts agree that it covers the free exercise of sovereignty as well as integrity of national and overseas territories, and extends beyond the protection against nuclear attack. 30 For example, in 2008 President Sarkozy stated “Our nuclear deterrence protects us from any aggression against our vital interests emanating from a state―wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take.” 31

Arms Reductions and Disarmament

Arms Reductions

In 1996, President Jacques Chirac introduced a number of reforms to France’s nuclear forces, including scaling back the strategic submarine fleet from five vessels to four (in 1991 France reduced its fleet of Le Redoutable-class SSBNs from six boats to five after the lead vessel,Le Redoutable, was decommissioned), withdrawing aging Mirage IVP bombers from service, and dismantling the Plateau d’Albion land-based ballistic missile site. The decision to disband Plateau d’Albion is significant as France became the only state to have designed, developed, and dismantled its land-based nuclear missiles in their entirety. During a speech delivered in March 2008 in Cherbourg, then President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that the “number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft will be reduced by one-third.” 32 As a result of this reduction, the country would have no more than 300 nuclear warheads in total. This declaration of total (as opposed to operational) warheads represents a high-level of French transparency with regards to its nuclear weapons arsenal. However, France’s commitment to retaining its nuclear deterrent remains strong and the new administration has no plans for further reductions.

Disarmament

Historically, France has adopted a conservative approach towards nuclear disarmament. This can be seen today in the more cautious approach taken by French officials in comparison to their British and American counterparts. 33 Such conservatism can be explained by the strong link that exists between the possession of nuclear weapons and feelings of national independence, something that is reflected in a general public that is relatively pro-nuclear. While French opinion polls on this subject are rare, one conducted by the French Ministry of Defense in 2006 found that 61 percent of the population believes France requires nuclear weapons in order to defend herself. 34

French officials have expressed support for the eventual goal of complete nuclear disarmament, but have been reticent to push for multilateral negotiations towards this end, emphasizing that “the strategic context that [would] allow for it,” does not yet exist. 35 This perspective stems in part from a sense of doubt by the French that disarmament will result in increased security. Although President Sarkozy’s Cherbourg speech did address the disarmament subject directly, something that marks a subtle change in French policy, it also urged caution and reinforced the message that France will continue to maintain its nuclear weapons at a level of “strict sufficiency.” 36 The Ministry of Defense continues to highlight its Nuclear Transparency and Security Law, a law that guarantees a commitment to nuclear security through the maintenance of a nuclear weapons arsenal. 37

Nevertheless, France has taken some practical steps towards disarmament. In September 1996, Paris signed and two years later ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and dismantled its nuclear testing sites at the Pacific Testing Center (CEP) in 1998. 38 France also no longer produces fissile material for nuclear weapons, ceasing production of plutonium in 1992 and production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in 1996. 39 France announced and initiated the dismantlement of its production facilities at Marcoule and Pierrelatte in 1996. 40 The Pierrelatte facility was completely dismantled by 2008, while similar efforts at the Marcoule plant are expected to continue through 2035. 41 Consistent with this policy, France has repeatedly pushed for negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty within the Conference on Disarmament, believing “these negotiations constitute the next logical step at the multilateral level [towards] creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.” 42

Civilian Nuclear Sector

Home to 58 nuclear power plants generating about 75 percent of the country’s electricity, France has a robust civil nuclear sector. 43 France is also Europe’s largest provider of electricity generated from nuclear power, which it regularly supplies to neighboring countries such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 44

The origins of French nuclear energy policy stem from the first oil shock of 1973, after which the government decided to rapidly expand the country’s nuclear energy sector and to reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels. Beginning in 1974, an aggressive nuclear power program was launched based on Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) technology and France has since invested more than $160 billion in its nuclear program. 45 As a result, the country is now largely energy independent and produces relatively low carbon emissions (some of the lowest CO2 emissions per capita in the world in developed countries). 46

All of France’s reactors are currently PWRs designed by Areva (the French nuclear energy company), but the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) is also in the early process of designing Generation IV reactors for operation in 2020. Three fourth-generation technologies are being pursued: gas-cooled fast reactors; sodium-cooled fast reactors; and very high temperature gas-cooled reactors. 47 Areva, in conjunction with the German company Siemens, is also developing the European Pressurized Water Reactor (EPR) at a nuclear site in Flamanville, Normandie. In mid-2004 the board of EDF decided to build a demonstration unit for an expected series of 1650 MWe Areva EPRs, a decision which was confirmed in 2006. 48 Construction of the EPR at Flamanville began in December 2007, and was initially slated for completion by 2012. 49 However, the reactor is now scheduled to begin operations in 2017. 50

On 27 June 2011, President Sarkozy announced his government’s intention to borrow and invest one billion Euros into the French civilian nuclear sector, and particularly into fourth-generation technology. 51 Sarkozy’s speech linked the plan to maintaining French energy independence, creating economic growth, and improving nuclear security. 52 His successor, Francois Hollande, has been less enthusiastic about the future of France’s nuclear energy sector. By 2025 Hollande would like to reduce the amount of electricity produced by nuclear plants from 75 to about 50 percent. In 2014, he also announced plans to close the Fessenheim Nuclear Power Plant by 2017 due to safety concerns. 53

France is also an active international supplier of civilian nuclear technology, having previously exported PWR reactor technology to Belgium, South Africa, South Korea and China. 54 Both China and Finland are currently building French-designed reactors and Beijing recently signed an 8 billion Euro contract to buy two Areva EPRs. 55 Areva had also initiated talks to export EPR technology to Abu Dhabi, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 56 However, the company halted development projects in the United States and lost its tender with Abu Dhabi. 57

In 2009, the French nuclear energy company Areva signed a Memorandum of Understanding with India’s state-owned Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) for the provision of six EPR reactors to India’s Jaitapur site, as well as a 25- year fuel supply. 58 After a series of delays, in January 2016 the project was taken over by French utility EDF. 59 Just a day before EDF and NPCIL signed the preliminary agreement, French President Francois Hollande met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India, during which time the two leaders “encouraged their industrial companies to conclude techno-commercial negotiations by the end of 2016,” with an aim to begin project implementation by 2017. 60 If successfully concluded, the contract would constitute “the largest in the history of the nuclear industry,” making the Jaitapur nuclear site one of the biggest in the world. 61

Fuel Cycle Facilities

France imports uranium oxide from Canada and Niger, while most fuel cycle services are carried out domestically by Areva. 62 The country’s fuel-cycle facilities can be categorized as follows:

  • Conversion – Natural uranium is converted to hexafluoride at several different plants. Natural uranium is converted to tetrafluoride at the newer Malvesi plant, and is then converted into hexafluoride at either the Comurhex Pierrelatte plant or the Pierrelatte plant in Tricastin. 63
  • Enrichment – Gaseous diffusion takes place at the Eurodif plant, Tricastin. In 2003 Areva also agreed to purchase a 50 percent stake in the Urenco Enrichment Technology Company (ETC). 64 This deal will provide Areva with access to Urenco centrifuge technology. A new enrichment plant, Georges Besse II, started running in 2011. 65
  • Fuel Fabrication – Areva carries out fuel fabrication in multiple plants in both France and Belgium. Once spent fuel has been reprocessed at La Hague in Normandy, plutonium is then fabricated at the Melox plant near Marcoule to produce mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. 66
  • Reprocessing – Reprocessing is carried out by Areva at La Hague, where back-end services are provided for France and other countries. 67

Nuclear Fusion

In 2005, France was awarded the right to host the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), an attempt to demonstrate the feasibility of producing commercial energy from fusion. The experimental reactor is located at a CEA (Atomic Energy Commission) research and development site at Cadarache in southern France. Partners in the project include the European Union (EU), the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and China. 68 Site preparation began in 2007 and facility construction began in July 2010. Cadarache narrowly beat another prospective site, Rokkasho in Japan, partly because the EU agreed to pay 45 percent of the plant’s construction costs. While the facility was expected to begin operations in 2023 it has already experienced a series of delays, driving up costs and prolonging commencement of operation until potentially the 2030s. 69

Fissile Material

According to an August 2014 declaration of civilian plutonium and HEU holdings to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), France possessed 42.6 metric tons (t) of separated plutonium in product stores at reprocessing plants and 9.5t held up in the course of fuel fabrication at the end of 2013. 70 In addition, France declared 26.0t of plutonium in unirradiated MOX fuel and 0.7t “held elsewhere.” 71 France also reported an estimated 120.0t of plutonium contained in spent fuel at civilian reactor sites, 149.1t in spent fuel at reprocessing plants, and 6.4t in spent fuel “held elsewhere.” 72

The report also details French stocks of civilian HEU. At the end of 2013 France possessed 792kg of HEU at fuel fabrication or processing plants, 128kg at civilian reactor sites, 2125kg at laboratories and research centers, 128kg of irradiated HEU at civilian reactor sites, and 1480kg of irradiated HEU at other locations. 73

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Glossary

Nuclear weapon
Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
SLBM: A ballistic missile that is carried on and launched from a submarine.
SSBN
Ship, Submersible, Ballistic, Nuclear: A hull classification for a submarine capable of launching a ballistic missile. The "N", or nuclear, refers to the ship's propulsion system. SSBN's are generally reserved for strategic vessels, as most submarine launched ballistic missiles carry nuclear payloads. A non-strategic vessel carries the designation SSN, or attack submarine.
Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)
An offensive ballistic missile system with multiple warheads, each of which can strike a separate target and can be launched by a single booster rocket.
Entry into force
The moment at which all provisions of a treaty are legally binding on its parties. Every treaty specifies preconditions for its entry into force. For example, the NPT specified that it would enter into force after the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union (the Depository governments) and 40 other countries ratified the treaty, an event that occurred on March 5, 1970. See entries for Signature, Ratification.
Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)
A missile designed to be launched from an aircraft and jet-engine powered throughout its flight. As with all cruise missiles, its range is a function of payload, propulsion, and fuel volume, and can thus vary greatly. Under the START I Treaty, the term "long-range ALCM" means an air-launched cruise missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
Kiloton
Kiloton: A term used to quantify the energy of a nuclear explosion that is equivalent to the explosion of 1,000 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT) conventional explosive.
Deterrence
The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict through the credible threat of retaliation. To be effective, a deterrence strategy should demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would outweigh any potential gains. See entries for Extended deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Bilateral
Bilateral: Negotiations, arrangements, agreements, or treaties that affect or are between two parties—and generally two countries.
Dismantlement
Dismantlement: Taking apart a weapon, facility, or other item so that it is no longer functional.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Disarmament
Though there is no agreed-upon legal definition of what disarmament entails within the context of international agreements, a general definition is the process of reducing the quantity and/or capabilities of military weapons and/or military forces.
Multilateral
Multilateral: Negotiations, agreements or treaties that are concluded among three or more parties, countries, etc.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
Fissile material
Fissile material: A type of fissionable material capable of sustaining a chain reaction by undergoing fission upon the absorption of low-energy (or thermal) neutrons. Uranium-235, Plutonium-239, and Uranium-233 are the most prominently discussed fissile materials for peaceful and nuclear weapons purposes.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of more than 20% of the isotope U-235. Achieved via the process of enrichment. See entry for enriched uranium.
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty us currently under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to end the production of weapons-usable fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for nuclear weapons. For additional information, see the FMCT.
Conference on Disarmament (CD)
The CD is an international forum focused on multilateral disarmament efforts. Although it reports to the UN General Assembly and has a relationship with the United Nations, it adopts its own rules of procedure and agenda, giving it some degree of independence. The CD has a permanent agenda devoted to the negotiation of disarmament issues. The CD and its predecessors have negotiated major nonproliferation and disarmament agreements such as the NPT, the BTWC, the CWC, and the CTBT. In recent years, the CD has focused on negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS); and negative security assurances. For additional information, see the CD.
Pressurized water reactor
A reactor in which the water which flows through the core is isolated from the turbine, unlike in a boiling water reactor. The primary water, contained in one loop, travels through an additional heat exchanger (or steam generator) and produces steam in the secondary loop which, in turn, powers the turbine. See entry for Boiling water reactor. 
Uranium
Uranium is a metal with the atomic number 92. See entries for enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium.
Fuel Cycle
Fuel Cycle: A term for the full spectrum of processes associated with utilizing nuclear fission reactions for peaceful or military purposes. The “front-end” of the uranium-plutonium nuclear fuel cycle includes uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. The fuel is used in a nuclear reactor to produce neutrons that can, for example, produce thermal reactions to generate electricity or propulsion, or produce fissile materials for weapons. The “back-end” of the nuclear fuel cycle refers to spent fuel being stored in spent fuel pools, possible reprocessing of the spent fuel, and ultimately long-term storage in a geological or other repository.
Diffusion
Diffusion: A technique for uranium enrichment in which the lighter Uranium 235 isotopes in UF6 gas move through a porous barrier more rapidly than the heavier Uranium 238 isotopes.
Enriched uranium
Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
Spent nuclear fuel
Spent nuclear fuel: Irradiated nuclear fuel. Once irradiated, nuclear fuel is highly radioactive and extremely physically hot, necessitating special remote handling. Fuel is considered “self protecting” if it is sufficiently radioactive that those who might seek to divert it would not be able to handle it directly without suffering acute radiation exposure.
Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel
Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel: A type of nuclear fuel used in light water reactors that consists of plutonium blended with uranium (natural, depleted or reprocessed). The MOX process also enables disposition of military plutonium, with the resulting fuel usable for energy generation.
Reprocessing
Reprocessing: The chemical treatment of spent nuclear fuel to separate the remaining usable plutonium and uranium for re-fabrication into fuel, or alternatively, to extract the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
Fusion
Nuclear fusion is a type of nuclear reaction in which two atomic nuclei combine to form a heavier nucleus, releasing energy. For a fusion reaction to take place, the nuclei, which are positively charged, must have enough kinetic energy to overcome their electrostatic force of repulsion (also called the Coulomb Barrier). Thermonuclear fusion of deuterium and tritium will produce a helium nucleus and an energetic neutron. This is one basis of the Hydrogen Bomb, which employs a brief, uncontrolled thermonuclear fusion reaction. A great effort is now underway to harness thermonuclear fusion as a source of power.
Irradiate
Irradiate: To expose to some form of radiation.

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