North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program and the Six-party Talks


On September 19, 2005, representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States signed a statement of principles that included a commitment by North Korea to abandon all of its nuclear programs.[1] However, the implementation of the statement ran into immediate obstacles, and now some analysts believe the six-party process is in danger of collapsing. In April 2006, representatives from the delegations to the Six-party Talks attended an academic conference in Tokyo with the hope of jumpstarting another round of talks; however, their efforts proved to be unsuccessful. The major obstacles to re-starting this diplomatic effort include Pyongyang's insistence on its right to use peaceful nuclear technology, and Washington's efforts to address North Korea's alleged illicit activities such as counterfeiting, narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.


In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence reportedly discovered evidence to support suspicions that North Korea was engaged in procurement activities for the development of a uranium enrichment program.[2] However, in the late 1980s, North Korea was already acquiring dual-use equipment that could be used for uranium metal processing and applied to a uranium enrichment program.[3] On February 4, 2004, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan confessed that he had led a smuggling ring that transferred uranium enrichment technology to North Korea, but Pakistani authorities have not allowed outsiders to have access to Khan, so the exact details of the transfers are uncertain.[4] However, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has since stated that Khan provided "probably a dozen" gas centrifuges to Pyongyang.[5] Little detail is known about the progress North Korea has made with its uranium enrichment program but in April 2003, Egyptian customs officials intercepted a shipment of 22 tons of 6061-T6 aluminum tubing on its way to North Korea from Germany. This quantity would be sufficient for a pilot cascade of about 100-200 centrifuges, so it is unlikely that Pyongyang is near completing a full-scale highly enriched uranium (HEU) plant.[6]

North Korea's uranium enrichment program remains a critical obstacle in the Six-party Talks, and the program is a serious challenge given North Korea's ability to conceal any enrichment facility underground.[7] During a visit to Pyongyang during October 3-5, 2002, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly confronted his North Korean counterparts with U.S. suspicions over the program, but North Korean officials now deny that Pyongyang even had a uranium enrichment program.[8] After Kelly's visit, the Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of October 1994, which had frozen the production of North Korean plutonium, quickly unraveled. In December 2003, North Korea expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who had been monitoring the nuclear freeze, and the following month Pyongyang declared its immediate withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[9]

Following the collapse of the Agreed Framework, the United States and North Korea declared their intention to seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but the two sides disagreed on the format for diplomacy. Washington insisted upon a multilateral format, but Pyongyang demanded a bilateral setting. The two sides eventually compromised and agreed to hold trilateral talks with China in Beijing April 23-25, 2003.[10] The talks were later expanded into a six-party format to include South Korea, Japan, and Russia in August 2003.[11] Subsequently, four more rounds of Six-party Talks were held in February 2004; June 2004; July 26 to August 7 and September 13-19, 2005;[12] and November 2005.

The fourth round of talks, which included an extended recess, concluded on September 19, 2005 when the six delegations signed a joint statement of principles in Beijing.[13] However, the following day, the DPRK Foreign Ministry issued a statement that cast doubt on the implementation of the statement of principles. The Foreign Ministry spokesman interpreted the statement of principles to mean that Pyongyang would "return to the NPT and sign an IAEA safeguards agreement immediately upon the U.S. provision of light-water power reactors (LWRs)," as had been stipulated by the Agreed Framework of 1994. The Foreign Ministry spokesman declared that "the U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs."[14] Pyongyang considers the LWRs to be a confidence-building measure that is necessary to complete any denuclearization deal, but Washington disagrees. The U.S. position has been that North Korea must verifiably abandon all of its nuclear programs before any discussion can be held on Pyongyang's peaceful use of nuclear technology.

The Statement of Principles

The statement of principles includes North Korea's commitment to abandon all of its nuclear programs, and broadly outlines an environment that would leave all six parties better off. North Korea agreed to return to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards at "an early date." The six parties also agreed that the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should be observed and implemented.[15]

The statement of principles also provides negative security assurances for North Korea. The United States pledged that "it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons." This assurance includes conventional weapons whereas the Agreed Framework did not explicitly include conventional forces.[16] However, according to the "U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement" on June 11, 1993, Washington had already agreed to provide assurances against the use of force, including the use of nuclear weapons.[17] And according to the "U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué" on October 12, 2000, Washington and Pyongyang agreed that "neither government would have hostile intent toward the other and confirmed the commitment of both governments to make every effort in the future to build a new relationship free from past enmity."[18] Nevertheless, DPRK media often warn that a U.S. preemptive attack is likely or that a nuclear war is imminent on the Korean peninsula.[19] DPRK media also cite Washington's "hostile policy" as the reason for Pyongyang maintaining a "nuclear deterrent."[20]

According to the September 19, 2005 statement, North Korea potentially could receive economic benefits in "the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally, including the ROK's proposal of July 12, 2005 for the provision of two million kilowatts of electric power to the DPRK."[21] Furthermore, Pyongyang "stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy," which the ROK subsequently supported; however, the provision of any LWRs to North Korea remains very controversial in the United States. While the United States has agreed to discuss this possibility "at an appropriate time," Washington considers that time to be far in the future.[22] U.S. officials believe Pyongyang must verifiably abandon all of its nuclear programs and come into full safeguards compliance before the matter can even be discussed.[23]

North Korea's demand for LWRs is based upon its energy supply problems and Article IV of the NPT, which grants the "inalienable right of all the parties to the treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination."[24] The North Korean delegation to the Six-party Talks insisted that Pyongyang reserves its Article IV rights even though the DPRK has withdrawn from the NPT and the IAEA has never been able to verify that North Korea was in full compliance with its safeguards obligations.

Although the parties also agreed to resume talks in November 2005, the fifth round of Six-party Talks ended in Beijing on November 11 with little or no progress.[25] The North Korean delegation complained about U.S. sanctions against North Korean firms for dealing in weapons of mass destruction and related materials, and about Washington having frozen the assets of Macao-based Banco Delta Asia for having handled North Korean financial transactions that were suspected of being related to WMD trade.[26]

Bush Administration Strategy

Applying pressure to obtain North Korean compliance has been a major component of the Bush administration's diplomatic strategy towards North Korea. Although North Korea has been under some form of U.S. sanctions since the Korean War, recent sanctions are a result of Executive Order 13382, which was issued by President George W. Bush on June 29, 2005 to seize any U.S. assets of WMD proliferators and their supporters. The order named three North Korean entities and authorized executive agencies to expand the list of sanctioned entities if warranted.[27] On October 21, 2005, the U.S. Treasury Department added eight North Korean entities to the sanctions list, and on April 6, 2006, the department issued a provision prohibiting any U.S. person from "owning, leasing, operating or insuring any vessel flagged by North Korea."[28]

The measures are part of an administration strategy to increase pressure on Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons program and implement the statement of principles of September 19, 2006. The strategy includes the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is designed to intercept WMD and WMD-related materials in the air, on land, and at sea.[29] The U.S. State Department is coordinating the administration's Illicit Activities Initiative, which is targeted at North Korea and designed to dry up Pyongyang's illicit sources of foreign exchange, such as counterfeiting and narcotics trafficking.[30] The Treasury Department's naming of Banco Delta Asia as a "primary money laundering concern" on September 15, 2005 appears to be part of this effort.[31]

As of April 2006, no further talks have been scheduled, although representatives of the Six-party Talks did meet at the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialog (NEACD) plenary, an academic "Track-II" conference, held in Tokyo April 10-11, 2006. While North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye-gwan expressed his willingness to meet with Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill to discuss counterfeiting and other issues, Hill declined to meet bilaterally with the North Korean delegation. Instead, Hill encouraged the North Koreans to return to the Six-party Talks in Beijing where he would be willing to participate in side meetings with the North Koreans on relevant issues.[32]

Pyongyang views Washington's economic sanctions as an effort to topple the North Korean government and is refusing to return to the Six-party Talks until recently imposed sanctions are lifted. The sanctions appear to have affected North Korea's international transactions and legitimate trade.[33] Since Executive Order 13382 is aimed at WMD proliferators and their supporters, the target of U.S. sanctions is open to interpretation by U.S. executive branch agencies. Two of the eight [34] entities sanctioned in October 2005—Korea Mining Development Corporation and Korea Ryonbong General Corporation—were targeted for being the parent companies of firms engaged in proliferation activities.

While the Bush administration has claimed recent sanctions against North Korea are part of law enforcement activities unrelated to the Six-party Talks, Assistant Secretary of State Hill warned on April 13, 2006 that Pyongyang could be targeted with more sanctions unless it abandons its nuclear program.[35] The Korean Central News Agency in Pyongyang has called this a contradiction given the Bush administration's stance that sanctions are unrelated to the Six-party Talks.[36] And despite the impact of the sanctions on Pyongyang, North Korean officials insist they will not return to the Six-party Talks until financial sanctions are lifted.

Now many analysts believe the talks have reached deadlock, and despite two and a half years of diplomacy, two conspicuous obstacles remain: the commitment (trust) problem, and the sequencing of deliverables in any negotiated settlement. Since many North Korean officials probably believe the Bush administration is determined to topple Kim Jong Il and the Korean Workers Party, the commitment problem might be insurmountable until Washington undergoes regime change in January 2009.

The Commitment Problem

The Agreed Framework addressed the commitment problem by breaking the agreement into a series of smaller transactions and extending the "shadow of the future" with the hope that mutual trust and cooperation could emerge.[37] However, by the late 1990s, suspicions were emerging that Pyongyang was secretly pursing a program to enrich uranium, and when Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted his North Korean counterparts about these suspicions during his visit to Pyongyang in October 2002, cooperation and the Agreed Framework collapsed.

North Korea acknowledges the commitment problem in resolving the nuclear crisis, and Pyongyang insists that the U.S. provision of an LWR will resolve this problem. While the U.S. delivery of an LWR would symbolize a U.S. sense of trust, it is unclear how an LWR project would eliminate the underlying mistrust that has lasted for over half a century. While Washington is correct in pointing out the severity of Pyongyang's commitment problem given its record of reneging on numerous international agreements, North Korea will neither accept nor implement any negotiated settlement until Washington's commitment problem, as perceived by Pyongyang, is addressed. While the resolution of the U.S. commitment problem is necessary for the implementation of any agreement, the discussion of Washington's commitment problem is politically unpalatable in the United States.

Did North Korea Sell Uranium Hexafluoride to Libya?

The Bush administration has drawn a red line at the export of WMD or WMD-related materials in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem.[38] However, in February 2005, the press reported that U.S. intelligence had concluded with at least 90 percent confidence that North Korea had exported uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to Libya, which would appear to approach or cross this red line.[39] The report claimed that when Tripoli abandoned its nuclear weapons program and turned its related equipment and materials over to the United States, gas canisters containing UF6 appeared to have come from North Korea. The conclusion was based upon the ratio of U-234, a rare isotope that carries a "fingerprint" related to specific uranium deposits. Even though the United States has no uranium samples from North Korea and the canisters belonged to Pakistan, analysts reached this conclusion on the process of elimination, and the fact that the containers contained traces of plutonium produced at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex in North Korea.[40]

Subsequent reports revealed Libyan officials had told the IAEA that Tripoli had imported UF6 in February 2001,[41] and Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan citizen involved in the Khan nuclear smuggling ring, told Malaysian authorities that the Khan network sold UF6 to Libya.[42] Moreover, at least one report indicates the Khan network provided North Korea with UF6 and centrifuges in the late 1990s,[43] which would fit the pattern of Khan's deliveries to other countries and raises the question why North Korea would buy UF6 from Khan if they could make it on their own. Furthermore, it is also doubtful that North Korea had a UF6 production plant in operation prior to February 2001 when Libya imported its UF6.[44]

U.S. claims that North Korea exported UF6 to Libya were subsequently discredited, and many viewed the reports as an effort by Bush administration hardliners to abandon the Six-party process and move to more punitive measures. However, the reports damaged U.S. credibility in the wake of intelligence failures over Iraq's WMD program,[45] and they increased skepticism about U.S. claims regarding North Korea's HEU program in general. China had already expressed doubts about U.S. claims,[46] but the reports of North Korean UF6 exports also tarnished Washington's reputation in Seoul.[47]


As North Korea continues to increase its "nuclear deterrent," the commitment problem and the sequencing problem of any agreement remain as the main obstacles to the implementation of the statement of principles signed on September 19, 2005. These obstacles would vanish if the DPRK were to collapse and disappear. "Regime change" advocates in Washington would prefer this outcome, but this is undesirable for Beijing, and even Seoul prefers gradual Korean integration to a sudden DPRK collapse and rapid unification. If a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem is implemented, it could be more similar to the Agreed Framework in terms of several small sequenced transactions than Agreed Framework critics might expect.

Stalemate will force the United States to rely more upon counter-proliferation measures such as the PSI, which is a worthwhile activity but insufficient for stopping the transfer of dangerous materials and technologies. Given the U.S. pre-occupation with Iraq and damaged credibility over intelligence failures, the Six-party Talks could drag on until the Bush administration enters lame duck status and Pyongyang procrastinates bargaining with a new administration. Both Washington and Pyongyang have an incentive to signal resolve and avoid the audience costs that would reverberate in their respective domestic political systems if they are perceived to be weak or to have made too many concessions. The Bush administration tends to believe Pyongyang is more likely to capitulate because of North Korea's economic problems, but the country has already withstood the worst of the economic shock that began over a decade ago. And even though recent U.S. sanctions have had an impact on Pyongyang, Chinese cooperation is necessary to impose an economic blockade, and Chinese leaders have expressed no desire or will to do so.

Failure to resolve the crisis could have serious implications for Northeast Asian security and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. There are significant legal, political, and normative constraints preventing a nuclear breakout by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. However, the technical barriers are less significant, and all three could be described as following a policy of "nuclear hedging." Even if horizontal proliferation is avoided in East Asia, and Pyongyang only maintains a small and ambiguous nuclear capability, the North Korean nuclear issue has the potential to severely damage or ruin the U.S.-South Korean alliance, which is already facing serious strain, and the nuclear issue could become the catalyst that triggers a rearrangement of the security architecture in East Asia.


[1] "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks," September 19, 2005,
[2]Joby Warrick, "U.S. Followed the Aluminum: Pyongyang's Efforts to Buy Metal Was Tip to Plans," Washington Post, October 18, 2002, p. A1; David E. Sanger, "In North Korea and Pakistan, Deep Roots of Nuclear Barter," New York Times, November 24, 2002, p.1.
[3] Daniel A. Pinkston, "When Did WMD Deals between Pyongyang and Islamabad Begin?" CNS Research Story, October 28, 2002,
[4] Shahid-ur-Rehman, "A.Q. Khan Admits Giving Bomb Know-how to DPRK, Iran, Libya," Nucleonics Week, February 5, 2004, pp. 9-10.
[5] David E. Sanger, "Pakistan Leader Confirms Nuclear Exports," New York Times, September 13, 2005. According to earlier reports, Pakistani officials had told Japanese government officials that Khan supplied about 20 centrifuges to North Korea. See Kyodo World Service, August 24, 2005, in "Kyodo: 2nd LD: Musharraf Says Khan Offered Centrifuges, Designs to N. Korea," FBIS Document ID: JPP20050824000095.
[6] Mark Hibbs, "Aluminum Tubing North Korea Sought Believed Meant for Pilot Cascade," Nuclear Fuel, October 13, 2003, p. 7.
[7] A uranium enrichment facility is much easier to conceal compared to a plutonium program, and North Korea has thousands of underground tunnels that could hide such a facility. For a discussion of North Korea's underground tunnels, see Barbara Demick, "N. Korea's Ace in the Hole," Los Angeles Times, November 14, 2003, p. A1.
[8] Yonhap News Agency, October 27, 2005, in "Yonhap: DPRK Envoy Denies HEU Program Existence, Demands LWR," FBIS Document ID: KPP20051027971194.
[9] Under Article X of the NPT, signatories have the right to withdraw if "extraordinary events jeopardize the supreme interests of the country." However, the signatory must notify all other parties of the treaty three months before the withdrawal becomes effective. North Korea announced its intention to withdraw in March 1993, but "suspended its intention to withdraw" one day before the effective date. See "Statement of DPRK Government on Its Withdrawal from NPT," Korean Central News Agency, January 10, 2003,
[10] David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says It Now Possesses Nuclear Material," New York Times, April 25, 2003, p. A1.
[11] Peter Slevin and John Pomfret, "N. Korea Threatens Nuclear Arms Test: Delegate to Talks Cites US Hostility," Washington Post, August 29, 2003, p. A1; John Pomfret, "N. Korea Nuclear Talks End With Agreement to Meet Again,"Washington Post, August 30, 2003, p. A23; "Keynote Speeches Made at Six-way Talks," Korean Central News Agency, August 29, 2003,
[12] The fourth round of talks was held in late July and early August before recessing and resuming in September.
[13] "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks," September 19, 2005,; "Joint Statement Released at Six-Party Talks," Korean Central News Agency, September 19, 2005,; Korean Central News Agency, September 19, 2005.
[14]"Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-Party Talks," Korean Central News Agency, September 20, 2005; NPT," Korean Central News Agency, September 20, 2005.
[15] Under the 1992 declaration, both North and South Korea pledged they would not enrich uranium, not reprocess plutonium, and neither manufacture nor possess nuclear weapons. See the "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," signed on January 20, 1992 and entered into force February 19, 1992,
[16] According to the Agreed Framework, "the United States will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S." See the "Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," October 21, 1994,
[17] "U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement," June 11, 1993,
[18] "U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqué," U.S. State Department, October 12, 2000, quoted inArms Control Today,
[19] For example, see "Rodong Sinmun Calls for Smashing U.S. Strategy for Preemptive Attack," Korean Central News Agency, April 11, 2006,; "U.S.-led War Exercises Flailed," Korean Central News Agency, April 4, 2006,; "U.S. Dangerous Move to Implement Its Nuclear War Scenario Blasted," Korean Central News Agency, January 17, 2006,
[20] For example, see "U.S. Preparations for Preemptive Nuclear Attack upon DPRK under Fire," Korean Central News Agency, April 13, 2006,; "DPRK Foreign Ministry's Spokesman Urges U.S. to Lift Financial Sanctions against DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, January 9, 2006,
[21] "Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks," September 19, 2005,
[22] Daniel Horner, "U.S. Diplomat Defends LWR Mention in New Deal with North Korea," Nucleonics Week, October 13, 2005, pp. 8-10; Peter Baker and Anthony Faiola, "U.S., S. Korea Find Unity Against North's Nuclear Arms Program," Washington Post, November 17, 2005, p. A20.
[23] Daniel Horner, "North Korea Deal Contemplates LWRs, but U.S. Wants to Axe KEDO," Nucleonics Week, September 22, 2005, pp. 1, 13-14.
[24] "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),"
[25] Donga Ilbo, November 12, 2005, in "ROK Daily: Outlook Uncertain as Six-Party Talks End," FBIS Document ID: KPP20051112971004; China Daily, November 11, 2005, in "China Daily: PRC FM Spokesman Says No General Consensus at DPRK Six-Party Talks," FBIS Document ID: CPP20051111057008.
[26] Mark Magnier, "U.S., N. Korea Stick to Their Positions in Nuclear Talks," Los Angeles Times, November 12, 2005,; "Kim Kye Gwan Interviewed in Beijing," Korean Central News Agency, November 12, 2005,; Korean Central News Agency, November 12, 2005,
[27] "Executive Order 13382—Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters," Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 126, July 1, 2005; U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, "Nonproliferation: What You Need to Know about Treasury Restrictions," March 30, 2006,
[28] The measures become effective May 8, 2006. See U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control, "North Korea: What You Need to Know about Sanctions," April 6, 2006,
[29] Although the PSI does not specifically target North Korea, it was created with Pyongyang in mind. For details on the PSI, see "Proliferation Security Initiative," Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
[30] See Raphael F. Perl and Dick K. Nanto, "North Korean Counterfeiting of U.S. Currency," CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RL33324, March 22, 2006.
[31] "Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act," U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Room, September 15, 2005,
[32] "U S Chief Nuclear Envoy Disappointed at N Korea's Stance," Yonhap News Agency, April 14, 2006, in Lexis-Nexis,
[33] Barbara Demick, "No More Gambling on N. Korea," Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2006, p. A1.
[34] "Treasury Targets North Korean Entities for Supporting WMD Proliferation," U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Release JS-2984, October 21, 2005,
[35] Barbara Demick, "Envoy Vows More Pressure on N. Korea," Los Angeles Times, April 14, 2006, p. A25.
[36] "KCNA Terms U.S. Assertion about Financial Sanctions Self-Contradictory," Korean Central News Agency, April 24, 2006,
[37] Daniel A. Pinkston, "Implementing the Agreed Framework and Potential Obstacles," A Paper for the 12th Pacific Basin Nuclear Conference in Seoul, Korea, October 29 to November 2, 2000,
[38] David E. Sanger, "Bush Shifts Focus to Nuclear Sales by North Korea," New York Times, May 5, 2003, p. A1.
[39] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Tests Said to Tie Deal on Uranium to North Korea," New York Times, February 2, 2005, p. 1.
[40] Glenn Kessler, "North Korea May Have Sent Libya Nuclear Material, U.S. Tells Allies," Washington Post, February 2, 2005, p. 1.
[41] Mark Huband, "Libya Had Diverse Nuclear Weapons Programme, Says IAEA,"Financial Times, February 21, 2005, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis,
[42] Rohan Sullivan, "Malaysia Clears Businessman Accused of Trading Nuclear Secrets," Associated Press, February 22, 2005, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis,
[43] Jack Boureston, "Fuel Cycle; Tracking the Technology," Nuclear Engineering International, September 30, 2004, p. 36, in Lexis-Nexis,
[44] Mark Hibbs, "DPRK Poised to Embark upon UF6 Production at Yongbyon, " Nuclear Fuel, September 1, 2003, p. 3; Mark Hibbs, "DPRK Enrichment Not Far Along, Some Intelligence Data Suggest," Nucleonics Week, October 24, 2002, p. 1; Mark Hibbs, "Enrichment by DPRK Likely, Rather than Any Time Soon," Nuclear Fuel, August 18, 2003, p. 6.
[45] For example, see Bob Drogin and John Goetz, "How U.S. Fell under the Spell of 'Curveball',"Los Angeles Times, November 20, 2005, p. 1.
[46] "China Doubts U.S. Views on N. Korea Uranium Enrichment Program," Japan Economic Newswire, January 7, 2004, in Lexis-Nexis,
[47] Hankyoreh Shinmun, March 22, 2005, in "ROK Daily: Asian Nations' 'Confidence' in US 'Damaged' by 'False Information' on DPRK," FBIS Document ID: KPP20050321000219; Donga Ilbo, March 22, 2005, in "ROK Daily: US 'False Information' on DPRK 'Can Shake' 'Foundation' of 6-Way Talks," FBIS Document ID: KPP20050321000188.

April 1, 2006

Daniel Pinkston analyzes the Six-party Talks and possible consequences of a breakdown in the process.

Daniel A. Pinkston

Center for Nonproliferation Studies

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright 2016.