Obama's Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agenda: Building Steam or Losing Traction?

Introduction

On 24 September 2009, President Obama chaired the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Summit on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament. This was the first time a U.S. president had presided over a UNSC Summit-level meeting. Significantly, the summit was conducted at the heads of state-level, underscoring the importance placed on the meeting by the administration. The UNSC unanimously adopted U.S. sponsored Resolution 1887 calling for, inter alia, "a world without nuclear weapons."[1] The resolution reflected the vision set out by President Obama in Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic on 5 April. Obama's role in these efforts earned him the Nobel Peace Prize for 2009.[2]

Since the Prague speech, the Obama administration has clearly demonstrated that the U.S. is recommitted to multilateralism. In addition to Obama chairing the UNSC Summit meeting, the United States sent Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT Article XIV Conference). Washington had not sent a representative to this conference in nearly a decade, and had never before sent an official of such stature. During the conference, Clinton declared that the CTBT is "an integral part of our nonproliferation and arms control agenda"[3] and indicated that the administration had begun working in earnest to secure U.S. Senate ratification of the treaty.

The president and Secretary of State's attendance at these meetings demonstrate a dramatic reversal from Bush-era disinterest in many of the multilateral approaches to achieving nonproliferation and disarmament objectives. However, the Obama administration faces formidable domestic opposition to key parts of its arms control agenda. The battle over health care reform, and other contentious legislation, threatens to divert the administration's attention from its plans to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

This issue brief analyzes the administration's progress and prospects for achieving the major goals outlined in Prague. To increase the likelihood for a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference, the administration must soon configure a concrete plan of action to transform its lofty rhetoric into actual government policies.

Key Issues

In his Prague address, President Obama described nuclear weapons as dangerous relics of the Cold War, devices that now represent a tremendous risk to international peace and security. The president underscored ways to strengthen the nonproliferation regime in order to reduce the security risks posed by the continued existence of thousands of nuclear warheads and loose nuclear material.

Nine months after his Prague speech, what progress has the Obama administration achieved in its efforts to turn lofty words into concrete actions? Below is a progress report on the major commitments articulated in Hradcany Square.

Negotiation and completion of a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) replacement treaty in 2009

Reaching agreement on a treaty to replace the 1991 START Treaty is crucial for Obama's nonproliferation agenda. Such a pact will enhance the administration's reputation for resolve and commitment to its disarmament objectives. In addition, it will bolster ties with Russia and open the door to more substantial support from Moscow for other elements of the U.S. foreign policy agenda (i.e., Iran and Afghanistan). Reaching a START follow-on agreement will also provide the United States with a stronger negotiating position going into the 2010 NPT Review Conference.[4]

Prospects for the United States and Russia concluding a START replacement treaty can be viewed within the wider context of improved bilateral relations between the two states. Bloody conflict between Russia and Georgia in the summer of 2008, and the possibility of eastward NATO expansion on Russia's borders led Moscow and Washington to view one another with mistrust and hostility in the past. By the end of George W. Bush's second term, U.S.-Russian relations had dropped to the lowest point since the fall of the Berlin wall.[5] Since inauguration day, the Obama administration has taken steps to place the U.S.-Russian relationship on firmer footing—most notably by scrapping the controversial missile defense deal with Poland and the Czech Republic.[6] The Obama administration called off the Bush-era plan to place 10 ground based interceptor missiles in Poland and a large, fixed radar facility in the Czech Republic in favor of a less contentious Aegis system.[7]

At a July summit meeting in Moscow, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed on the basic structure of a START replacement treaty. Each leader committed to reducing their country's strategic offensive arsenals to 1500-1675 warheads and 500-1100 delivery vehicles.[8] The wide range between minimum and maximum numbers—particularly with regard to delivery vehicles—leaves significant elbowroom for future negotiations. Counting rules are likely to become the primary sticking point. Russian diplomats favor counting delivery vehicles and accounting for "upload potential," or the quantities of warheads assigned to each delivery vehicle. While details are still being negotiated, there is room for optimism on this issue. After meeting with Medvedev in London, President Obama instructed his team to include warheads and delivery vehicles in its negotiations.[9]

Although there is broad bipartisan support for the negotiation of a START follow-on treaty from national security analysts both in the United States and abroad, it is also clear that negotiating the pact and passing it through the Senate with the necessary two-thirds majority will not be a stroll in the park, as some would have hoped. The president's initial objective to finalize the negotiations before the end of 2009 has not panned out, and domestic political factors have weakened U.S. negotiators' hands vis-à-vis their Russian counterparts. Recently, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated in an interview that U.S. missile defense plans were the main obstacle preventing conclusion of the follow-on treaty, and Russia needed more information about plans for the U.S. missile defense system in order to agree on strategic weapon limitations, a proposal that if granted would leave the treaty dead on arrival in the Senate. In a letter sent to President Obama, all 40 Senate Republicans and Independent Joseph Lieberman warned that any follow-on treaty must not "limit U.S. missile defenses, space capabilities, or advanced conventional modernization, such as non-nuclear global strike capability."[10] Indeed, the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act expresses a "Sense of the Congress" containing the same language.[11]

Complicating factors even further, the letter also stated that as the Senate considers further weapons reductions, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, due in February, must provide funding for a "modern warhead" for the U.S. stockpile, presumably akin to the Reliable Replacement Warhead, the development of which ceased in last year in accordance with the 2009 Department of Energy budget.[12] Apart from a "modern warhead," the letter also stipulated three conditions that must accompany the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex; Life Extension Programs for the B-61 and W-76 warheads, full funding for stockpile surveillance, and replacement of various facilities in the weapons complex and the establishment of a modern pit facility.[13] Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact definition of a "modern warhead," according to the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, also cited in the letter, the United States as a matter of policy "does not currently seek new weapons with new military characteristics."[14]

The intention of the letter is to tie any reductions in the U.S. arsenal through a new arms limitation treaty to the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex, as already enunciated in the Defense Authorization Act. However, the addition of the requirement for funding for a "modern warhead" goes beyond what the legislation stipulates. Crucially, the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act requires that the administration provide funding for the "nuclear weapons complex, including improving the safety of facilities" and "modernizing the infrastructure."[15] This language in no way would necessitate funding for a modernized warhead in order to proceed with the ratification of any START follow-on treaty, as the Republican letter would suggest. Nonetheless, the letter is indicative of the strategy that many Republicans have employed that would seek to obtain the maximum of concessions on the START follow-on treaty in order to deprive the administration of incentives it could offer to Republicans during any Senate reconsideration of the CTBT.

U.S. Ratification of the CTBT

President Obama has made U.S. ratification of the CTBT a key element of his nonproliferation agenda. As the President declared in Prague, "My administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned."[16] This pledge carries particularly high stakes. Successfully securing Senate ratification of the CTBT would represent a major achievement and significantly strengthen prospects for bringing the historic treaty into force. Moreover, Senate ratification of the CTBT is perhaps the most powerful way President Obama can demonstrate the U.S. commitment to Article VI of the NPT. Within the context of the NPT, the CTBT has been inextricably linked to both the indefinite extension of the treaty and nuclear disarmament. In 1995, the NPT was indefinitely extended as part of a package deal, which stipulated that CTBT negotiations were to be completed at the Conference on Disarmament "no later than" 1996.[17] The 2000 NPT Review Conference named the early entry into force of the CTBT as the first of the 13 "practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." U.S. CTBT ratification would generate international support for its wider nonproliferation goals. Failure to win ratification, on the other hand, would expose the Obama administration to criticism for not following through on his commitments and undercutting the president's efforts to reinforce the nonproliferation regime.

The administration faces an uphill climb to win Senate ratification. To be sure, all 58 Democratic Senators, as well as the 2 Independents, are expected to vote in favor of the treaty.[18] Notwithstanding Senator Lieberman's signing on to the aforementioned Republican drafted letter, Lieberman spoke out in favor of the CTBT preceding his affirmative vote in the Senate in 1999, stating that, "There are some risks involved. In my opinion, there are greater risks involved in not going ahead with the treaty."[19] Moreover, following the Treaty's rejection, Lieberman penned an op-ed with Senator Chuck Hagel (Republican - Nebraska) entitled Don't Give up on the Test Ban, in which Lieberman confirmed that he would vote in favor of the Treaty again.[20] The successful stewardship of the U.S. stockpile during the intervening years, and the vastly enhanced capabilities of the Treaty's verification regime, should only reinforce the Senator's views, and Lieberman has not indicated any signs of regret for supporting the Treaty.[21]

Given that treaty ratification requires consent from two-thirds of the Senate, if the Treaty were resubmitted to the Senate this year, at least seven Republican senators would have to be persuaded to vote in favor of the CTBT. The opposition includes Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, a particularly vocal critic of the CTBT who led the effort to defeat the treaty in 1999. As the current Republican Whip, Kyl has considerably more influence now than he did when the CTBT last came up for a vote. The Senator maintains his vehement opposition in spite of dramatic improvements in the CTBTO's International Monitoring System, which is now over 75% operational and has proved its value by accurately detecting the DPRK's nuclear tests in both 2006 and 2009.[22] Nevertheless, Senator Kyl has repeatedly claimed that the CTBT is unverifiable. He recently warned, "I will lead the charge against it and I will do everything in my power to see that it is defeated."[23]

While Vice President Biden has been tasked with serving as the administration's point man on nonproliferation issues and is said to be leading the CTBT ratification drive, he has been publicly quiet on the issue thus far. Nonetheless, the administration has begun laying the groundwork for the Senate's reconsideration of the treaty, attempting to move quickly when its political capital is still relatively high. Secretary of State Clinton's attendance at the CTBT Article XIV Conference reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to ratify the treaty. Recently, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry indicated that efforts to compile the technical monitoring data necessary to demonstrate the treaty's verifiability have already begun.[24] Kerry also indicated that he would begin to build bipartisan support for the treaty, and stated that ratifying the CTBT would be the "single greatest arms control accomplishment for the new Senate."[25] In order for the Senate to provide its consent to the CTBT, the Treaty would need the support of influential Republican Senators, most crucially Arizona Senator John McCain and Indiana Senator Richard Lugar. Both retain formidable influence on security issues. During the presidential campaign, McCain said the treaty merits another look, and Lugar has pledged to "study it thoroughly."[26]

Adding to the time lag between Obama's commitment to the CTBT and successfully championing the treaty through the Senate are three critical scientific and strategic studies that will be pivotal in making the case for ratification. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), originally slated to be released in December 2009 and now due at the beginning of March, will "analyze the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, the size and composition of nuclear forces necessary to support that strategy."[27] The second study is an update of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study on the technical issues related to the CTBT, also expected to be released in March.[28] The NAS study will "review and update aspects of the analysis in the 2002 National Academies' report" based on the latest evidence on stockpile stewardship, verification issues, sustainability of the U.S. arsenal, and technical advances in nuclear weapons capabilities of other countries.[29] The final report to be completed before the CTBT is resubmitted to the Senate for its advice and consideration is a National Intelligence Estimate that the "administration hopes will bolster ratification efforts," though it is unclear when the report is set to be released.[30]

Administration officials have emphasized the importance of timing in the ratification process. If a START follow-on agreement is ratified without a great deal of political infighting in the Senate, it could build momentum for CTBT ratification. However, this remains only a possibility at this point. START ratification discussions will certainly push the CTBT off the table until after the 2010 NPT Review Conference, leaving a very small window before the mid-term elections—the outcome of which could result in fewer Democrats in the Senate. However, if the Obama administration achieves U.S. Senate ratification of the CTBT, even if it occurs after the 2010 elections, it will remove a significant obstacle to entry into force of the treaty, and deprive the other Annex 2 States of a convenient justification for not to ratifying the treaty themselves.

Pursue a Verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

In Prague, Obama pledged that the "United States will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in...nuclear weapons."[31] Backing a verifiable treaty in accordance with the 1995 Shannon mandate is a key reversal of the Bush administration's position. This turnaround removed a major negotiating roadblock from the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The Obama administration's support of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)s is now gaining broader acceptance in the United States. One such indication came in May, when the bipartisan Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States recommended that the United States "explore a [FMCT] treaty with strong verification mechanisms." [32] However, formulating a verification mechanism for an FMCT is easier said than done. Verifying such a treaty would require a high level of intrusiveness and transparency, as well as significant costs that many states are reluctant to support.[33]

While U.S. support for an FMCT is necessary for the treaty to enter into force, it is far from sufficient. The CD has sought an FMCT since the UN General Assembly adopted resolution (48/75L) in 1993. The General Assembly recommended the negotiation of a treaty banning fissile material that is "non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable."[34] However, deep-seated divisions over the scope of the treaty (specifically, whether or not to include existing fissile material stockpiles), the particulars of its verification regime, and reluctance by some states to agree to a ban due to geo-strategic and regional security interests, deadlocked the 65-member body for over a decade.[35] The same issues plagued the CD earlier this year. On 29 May, and for the first time since 1998, the CD reached consensus on a program of work. This success was short lived, because the body was unable to agree on a framework to implement the program of work by the end of the year. In addition, under CD rules, the program of work requires annual renewal, so the CD must find consensus again in January before substantive negotiations can begin.

To achieve an FMCT, the Obama administration will likely need to launch a wide-ranging diplomatic effort to engage countries skeptical of any potential fissile material treaty. In the case of Pakistan, largely responsible for the CD's failure this year, this effort has been complicated significantly by the U.S.-India nuclear deal.[36] Officials in Islamabad have long been weary of locking in asymmetries between Pakistan and India's stockpiles. Significant U.S. material and technical support to India through the 2009 cooperation deal has exacerbated Pakistani concerns over inking an FMCT.[37] Regardless of whether the administration succeeds in other aspects of its nonproliferation and disarmament agenda, reaching agreement on an FMCT in the near future is little more than a pipedream.

Strengthen the NPT by providing more resources and authority to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and establishing 'real and immediate consequences' for treaty violators

Providing the IAEA with adequate resources and verification authority, as well as enhancing international arms control enforcement mechanisms, are integral to maintaining the legitimacy of the nonproliferation regime. Progress on these issues would increase confidence and transparency within the international community and deter NPT infringements. However, these objectives require multilateral agreement that would only be possible with broad political will for reform. The Obama administration's concerted effort to establish such momentum is evident, but fulfilling these pledges remains tremendously challenging.

Fortifying the IAEA with more resources and authority must include addressing the Agency's budgetary problems and universalizing the Additional Protocol. Historically, the IAEA has been forced to carry out growing responsibilities with almost completely stagnant financial resources—the amount of material under IAEA safeguards has increased by more than 10 times while the Agency has largely been restrained by a zero real-growth budget.[38] The Obama administration, for its part, has lobbied for an increase in the IAEA regular budget.[39] In September, the IAEA General Conference accepted a recommendation by the Board of Governors to raise the 2010 regular budget to $453 million, a 5.4% increase. Adjusting for inflation, this is a 2.7% increase from 2009.[40] While this equates to roughly half of what Director General ElBaradei has recommended, it does represent an atypical digression from the IAEA's zero-growth budget. In addition to the Obama administration's role in pushing for an increase in the regular budget, Washington announced in June that it would boost its voluntary contribution by 20 percent—approximately $10 million.[41]

The most effective way to increase IAEA authority is by universalizing the 1997 Model Additional Protocol (AP). The AP grants the IAEA expanded access to information and locations in states that have ratified the agreement. Without the AP, the IAEA cannot verify the non-diversion of sensitive material from undeclared facilities. In the years since the AP was introduced, many states have rallied for its universality. Today, ninety percent of NNWS with significant nuclear capabilities have either signed, ratified, or had an AP approved by the IAEA Board of Governors.[42] However, several states with significant nuclear activity that present genuine proliferation concern, including the DPRK, Iran, and Syria, currently do not have an AP in force.[43] Beyond declarations of support for AP universality by administration officials, the only U.S. contribution to reaching AP universality to date is pro-AP language in UNSCR 1887. Although the resolution does not explicitly refer to these outlier countries, it does call upon all states to ratify the AP. It also states that the AP and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements are "essential elements of the IAEA safeguards system,..[and] encourages States to consider whether a recipient State has signed and ratified an additional protocol... in making nuclear export decisions."[44]

The primary value of IAEA safeguards is that they serve to deter countries from developing nuclear weapons based on a credible threat of early detection. A long-standing weakness in the NPT, however, is its lack of an effective enforcement mechanism. NPT States Parties lack an independent secretariat or decision-making body that could take responsibility for issues of enforcement and implementation.[45] To be sure, the IAEA Board of Governors can declare states in noncompliance with their safeguards agreements and refer their file to the UN Security Council.[46] Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council is conferred the ultimate authority to "maintain or restore international peace and security" through the use of economic sanctions or military action.[47] In recent years, however, the DPRK and Iran have directly challenged the legitimacy and capacity of the regime's enforcement mechanisms.

The Security Council was unable to formulate a response to the DPRK's decision to leave the NPT in 2003. In addition, numerous resolutions imposing economic sanctions and imploring Iran to cease uranium enrichment have gone unheeded. These acts of defiance have exposed a gaping hole in the regime's capacity to enforce States Parties' obligations under the NPT.[48] President Obama addressed this issue in his Prague speech, by calling for "real and immediate consequences" for treaty violators.[49] UNSCR 1887 echoes this goal by underlining the role of the Security Council in addressing cases of NPT withdrawal, noting ongoing deliberations on the issue within the NPT review process, and affirming that States who violate international law while States Parties to the NPT are responsible for such violations,[50] However, many NPT States Parties from the non-aligned group are deeply opposed to taking on additional obligations without significant progress by nuclear weapons states on Article VI disarmament obligations. This opposition makes enforcement reform virtually unthinkable within the NPT review process.

Addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking

In Prague President Obama labeled nuclear terrorism "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security."[51] To tackle this threat, Obama announced a new international effort to secure all vulnerable fissile material within the next four years. Because Washington is still in the process of formulating a plan of action on this issue, no funding has yet been allocated.[52] However, the president has emphasized that efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear material must be international in scope. In this regard, Washington is off to a good start. UN Security Council Resolution 1887 reiterated the four-year goal and called upon states to "share best practices...[and] raise standards of nuclear security."[53]

The president also pledged to lead an effort to reduce the risks of illicit nuclear trafficking by dismantling networks of black markets and interdicting sensitive materials in transit.[54] Obama urged the international community to turn the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism into "durable international institutions."[55] In order to achieve these aims, Obama announced that the United States would host a Global Summit on Nuclear Security next April in Washington D.C.[56] While it remains to be seen how successful these efforts will be, it is clear that the Obama administration is proactively seeking to build upon momentum from the Prague speech and UN Security Council Resolution 1887.

2010 Midterm Elections

With many of the administration's proposed timeframes for action on the aforementioned nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives passing without success, the looming 2010 midterm elections will have to factor into the administration's calculations on how and when to move forward with items on the agenda. Democrats are very likely to retain control of the Senate. In order to gain control, Republicans would have to sweep every tossup contest and turn around some currently uncompetitive races. Nonetheless, the two-thirds majority necessary for treaty ratification in the Senate confounds such attempts even with a supermajority; therefore, if the Democratic Party were to take a major hit in the 2010 Senate elections, the administration would face an increasingly difficult task in corralling the required number of moderate Republican votes. Although the elections are months away and making predictions may prove to be a fool's errand, current polling suggests that many of the administration's policies will have to gain serious traction with the public before November if the Democrats are to build on or even maintain their current numbers.

Conclusion

Since the historic address in Hradcany Square, the Obama administration has sought to resurrect the nonproliferation regime through a number of calculated diplomatic initiatives. By calling for a world without nuclear weapons, President Obama has dramatically altered U.S. arms control policy. A follow-on agreement to the START treaty is likely to succeed in the coming months, but accomplishing the other major goals outlined in Prague, such as ratifying the CTBT and achieving an FMCT, remains elusive and difficult. This is to say nothing of the challenge of securing a favorable outcome at the 2010 NPT Review Conference scheduled in New York from 3-28 May. With the START follow-on yet to be finalized, the window of opportunity for passing any treaty through the Senate before the NPT Review Conference is closing fast, the failure of which would complicate further the administration's objectives at the upcoming conference. If the NPT Review Conference ends in disappointment, let alone the possibility of disaster, the administration's arguments for engagement and multilateralism in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime may lose credibility, thus reducing the administration's ability to deliver on its arms control agenda. The administration's disarmament and nonproliferation objectives also risk being sidelined by other important policy decisions—not least the acrimonious congressional debates over universal health care. Beyond the landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1887 and successful lobbying for a nominal increase in the IAEA regular budget, the administration thus far has been unable to turn lofty rhetoric into actual legislative victories.

Sources:

[1] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "White House Fact Sheet on United Nations Security Council Summit on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, UNSC Resolution 1887," www.whitehouse.gov
[2]The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009, Oslo, 9 October 2009, http://nobelprize.org.
[3] Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Remarks at CTBT Article XIV Conference, September 24, 2009, Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org.
[4] Steven Pifer, "After START, Hurdles Ahead," Brookings Institution, Octobober 2009, www.brookings.edu.
[5] Eugene B Rumer and Angela E. Stent, "Repairing U.S.-Russian Relations: A Long Road Ahead," Center for Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, April 2009, p. 10, http://ceres.georgetown.edu.
[6] Michael D. Shear and Ann Scott Tyson, "Obama Shifts Focus of Missile Shield," The Washington Post, September 18, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com.
[7] Michael D. Shear and Ann Scott Tyson, "Obama Shifts Focus of Missile Shield," The Washington Post, September 18, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com.
[8] The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Joint Understanding by Obama, Medvedev on Weapon Negotiations", www.america.gov.
[9] "U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller outlines the U.S. position on a new strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia," Interfax International Information Group, May 26, 2009, www.interfax.com.
[10] Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring: Nuke Modernization," Washington Times, 17 December 2009, www.washingtontimes.com.
[11] H. R. 2647—360, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 1251, "Report on the plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms and sense of Congress on follow-on negotiations to START Treaty."
[12] Ezekiel Tan, "Overview of the Department of Energy's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request for Nuclear Programs," Center for Defense Information, 15 May 2009, www.cdi.org.
[13] Letter to President Barack Obama from all 40 Republican Senators and Independent Joseph Lieberman regarding the START follow-on Treaty, 15 December 2009.
[14] William J. Perry, Chairman, & James R. Schlesinger, Vice-chairman, "America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Final Report)," The United States Institute for Peace, www.usip.org.
[15] H. R. 2647—360, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 1251, "Report on the plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile, nuclear weapons complex, and delivery platforms and sense of Congress on follow-on negotiations to START Treaty."
[16] Remarks by President Obama, Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic, www.whitehouse.gov.
[17] "1995 NPT Review Conference Package of Decisions," Reaching Critical Will, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[18] John Issacs, "A Strategy for Achieving Senate Approval of the CTBT," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, April 15, 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[19] Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee Subject: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Chaired by: Senator John Warner (R-VA), Federal News Service, 6 October 1999.
[20] "Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Senate rejection of Test Ban: US Statements & Comment," Acronym Reports, The Acronym Institute, www.acronym.org.uk.
[21] Jofi Joseph, "Renew the Drive for CTBT Ratification," The Washington Quarterly, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2009, www.twq.com.
[22] "Fact Sheet: Tremendous Progress in the Build-Up of the CTBT's Verification Regime" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, April 28, 2009, www.ctbto.org.
[23] Caitlin Webber, "Conservatives Cast Obama as 'Reluctant, Timid," Congressional Quarterly, September 22, 2009, www.cqpolitics.com.
[24] Josh Rogin, "Push for controversial nuke treaty expected next spring at the earliest," Foreign Policy, October 2, 2009, http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com.
[25] CRS Report, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Updated "Safeguards" and Net Assessments, www.fas.org.
[26] "McCain, Lugar Could Support Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," SENATUS, July 24, 2009, http://senatus.wordpress.com.
[27] US Department of Defense 2009 NPR Terms of Reference Fact Sheet, 2 June 2009, www.defense.gov.
[28] According to a senior official with the CTBTO.
[29] Project Update, "Review and Update of Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," The National Academies, www8.nationalacademies.org.
[30] Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring: Test Ban Treaty Sought," Washington Times, 10 December 2009, www.washingtontimes.com.
[31] Editorial, "The Test Ban Treaty," The New York Times, May 24, 2009, www.nytimes.com.
[32] "America's Strategic Posture, The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States," The United States Institute of Peace, May 2009, pg. 76, www.usip.org.
[33] "Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, International Panel on Fissile Material, p. www.fissilematerials.org.
[34] UN General Assembly passed a consensus resolution (48/75L), www.nti.org.
[35] "Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty," Reaching Critical Will, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[36] Ray Acheson, "The Conference on Disarmament in 2009: Could Do Better," Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 91, Summer 2009, www.acronym.org.uk.
[37] "Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty," Reaching Critical Will, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[38]Graham Allison, "Securing the Nuclear Renaissance, Testimony to the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, July 24, 2008, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu.
[39] Peter Crall, "IAEA Budget Gets Modest Boost," Arms Control Association, September 2009, www.armscontrol.org.
[40] GC (53)/RES/6, www.iaea.org. Also see "The Agency's Programme and Budget 2010-1011, International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org.
[41] Peter Crall, "IAEA Budget Gets Modest Boost," Arms Control Association, September 2009, www.armscontrol.org.
[42] John Carlson, "IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol," January 20, 2009, www.icnnd.org.
[43] Ibid.
[44] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887, http://daccess-ods.un.org.
[45] Rebecca Johnson, "Incentives, Obligations and Enforcement: Deos the NPT Meet its States Parties' Needs?" Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 70, April-May 2003, www.acronym.org.uk.
[46] John Carlson, "IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol," January 20, 2009, www.icnnd.org.
[47] United Nations Charter, www.un.org.
[48] George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, "NPT Withdrawal: Time for the Security Council to Step In" www.armscontrol.org.
[49] Remarks by President Obama, Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic, www.whitehouse.gov.
[50] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887, http://daccess-ods.un.org.
[51] Remarks by President Obama, Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic, www.whitehouse.gov.
[52] www.nti.org.
[53] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887, http://daccess-ods.un.org.
[54] Remarks by President Obama, Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic, www.whitehouse.gov.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Larry J Sabato, "Senate Shake-Up, 2010," Rasmussen Reports, 20 November 2009, www.rasmussenreports.com. Also see "2010 Senate Races Ratings," The Cook Political Report, 10 December 2009, www.cookpolitical.com.
[58] Larry J Sabato, "Senate Shake-Up, 2010," Rasmussen Reports, 20 November 2009, www.rasmussenreports.com. Also see "2010 Senate Races Ratings," The Cook Political Report, 10 December 2009, www.cookpolitical.com.

January 15, 2010
About

Theodore Kalionzes and Kaegan McGrath analyze the prospects for the Obama administration to achieve the major goals outlined in the April 2009 Prague speech.

Authors
Theodore Kalionzes

Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Kaegan McGrath

Center for Nonproliferation Studies

Countries

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright 2016.