Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls Brazil's Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present The Bush Proposals: A Global Strategy for Combating the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology or a Sanctioned Nuclear Cartel? Bush-Putin Summit, November 2001 на русском (In Russian) China Enters the Nuclear Suppliers Group: Positive Steps in the Global Campaign against Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Companies Reported to Have Sold or Attempted to Sell Libya Gas Centrifuge Components Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) на русском (In Russian) DOE's Domestic Nuclear Security Initiatives Egypt and Saudi Arabia's Policies toward Iran's Nuclear Program The Emerging Arab Response to Iran's Unabated Nuclear Program Going Beyond the Stir: The Strategic Realities of China's No-First-Use Policy IAEA Board Deplores Iran's Failure to Come into Full Compliance: Is Patience with Iran Running Out? IAEA Board Welcomes EU-Iran Agreement: Is Iran Providing Assurances or Merely Providing Amusement? Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS на русском (In Russian) Implications of Proposed India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Indo-Pakistani Military Standoff: Why It Isn't Over Yet The International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk: A Step Towards Assured Fuel Supply? Iran and the IAEA: A Troubling Past with a Hopeful Future? Is Syria a Candidate for Nuclear Proliferation? The New IAEA Resolution: A Milestone in the Iran-IAEA Saga North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program and the Six-party Talks Nuclear Conflict in the 21st Century: Reviewing the Chinese Nuclear Threat Nuclear Posture Review на русском (In Russian) Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement на русском (In Russian) Nuclear Trafficking Hoaxes: A Short History of Scams Involving Red Mercury and Osmium-187 Practical Steps for Improving U.S. Nonproliferation Leadership Presidential Nuclear Initiatives: An Alternative Paradigm for Arms Control на русском (In Russian) Plutonium Disposition на русском (In Russian) Radiological Materials in Russia на русском (In Russian) Reykjavik Summit: The Legacy and a Lesson for the Future Risks of Plutonium Programs The Role of Security Assurances: Is Any Progress Possible? Russian Spent Nuclear Fuel на русском (In Russian) Russia's Nuclear Doctrine на русском (In Russian) The Second NPT PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference: Prospects for Progress Seven Years After the Nuclear Tests: Appraising South Asia's Nuclear Realities Sixty Years After the Nuclear Devastation, Japan's Role in the NPT Submarine Dismantlement Assistance Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) на русском (In Russian)  Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Germany: Time for Withdrawal? Taiwan and Nonproliferation The Treaty of Moscow на русском (In Russian)  UN Disarmament Committee Forecasts Troubled Nonproliferation Future UN General Assembly Tackles Nonproliferation and Disarmament After Disappointing Summit U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation на русском (In Russian) Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons?
	Biological Weapons The Anti-plague System in the Newly Independent States, 1992 and Onwards: Assessing Proliferation Risks and Potential for Enhanced Public Health in Central Asia and the Caucasus Assessing the Threat of Mass-Casualty Bioterrorism на русском (In Russian) The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) на русском (In Russian) Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Compliance Protocol на русском (In Russian) Developments in the Biosciences: Do Recent Scientific and Technological Advances Lower the Threshold for the Proliferation of Biological Weapons? на русском (In Russian) The Fifth Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) на русском (In Russian) International Assistance for Anti-plague Facilities in the Former Soviet Union to Prevent Proliferation of Biological Weapons на русском (In Russian) Is the Avian Influenza Virus a Suitable Agent for a Biological Weapon? Lessons from Select Public Health Events Having Relevance to Bioterrorism Preparedness на русском (In Russian) The Next Generation of Sensor Technology for the BioWatch Program Security and Public Health: How and Why do Public Health Emergencies Affect the Security of a Country?
	Chemical Weapons Dusty Agents and the Iraqi Chemical Weapons Arsenal на русском (In Russian) First Review Conference of the CWC: Coming of Age Global CW Assistance Industrial Chemicals as Weapons: Chlorine The Seventh Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) на русском (In Russian) Vinalon, the DPRK, and Chemical Weapons Precursors на русском (In Russian) What to Expect at the Eighth Conference of State Parties to the CWC
	Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Delivery Vehicles A Look at National Missile Defense and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System Addressing the Spread of Cruise Missiles and Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) Examining China's Debate on Military Space Programs: Was the ASAT Test Really a Surprise? Future Space Security на русском (In Russian) Japan's Space Law Revision: the Next Step Toward Re-Militarization? Radiological and Nuclear Detection Devices Russia's Approach to the U.S. Missile Defense Program на русском (In Russian) Space Security and Bush Administration Policy: Results of the First Term Taiwan's Response to China's Missile Buildup Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and Northeast Asian Security на русском (In Russian) Unmanned Air Vehicles as Terror Weapons: Real or Imagined?
	General Nonproliferation Topics The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism China's White Paper on Nonproliferation: Export Controls Hit the Big Time Department of Homeland Security: Goals and Challenges на русском (In Russian) DP World and U.S. Port Security The European Union and the Arms Ban on China G8 10 Plus 10 Over 10 на русском (In Russian) The Global Partnership 2004 Global Submarine Proliferation: Emerging Trends and Problems Instability in Georgia: A New Proliferation Threat? Iraq's WMD Scientists in the Crossfire Islamist Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Region на русском (In Russian) Kazakhstan's Proposal to Initiate Commercial Imports of Radioactive Waste на русском (In Russian) The Mitutoyo Case: Will Japan Learn from its Mistakes or Repeat Them? Nonproliferation Assistance to the Former Soviet Union на русском (In Russian) North Korea's 11th Supreme People's Assembly Elections Nuclear Watch—Pakistan: The Sorry Affairs of the Islamic Republic Radiological Materials in Russia на русском (In Russian) To Comply or Not to Comply: Outline of the UN Inspections Mechanism in Iraq на русском (In Russian) Unlocking the Impasse: Who Holds the Key to the Conference on Disarmament Was Libyan WMD Disarmament a Significant Success for Nonproliferation? Weapons of Mass Destruction in Central Asia на русском (In Russian) Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East на русском (In Russian) Will Emerging Challenges Change Japanese Security Policy?

Issue Brief

DOE’s Domestic Nuclear Security Initiatives
Hugh E. Naylor IV and Charles D. Ferguson
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
Monterey Institute of International Studies
July 2004

 Issue Introduction        Issue Brief          Relevant Resources

Issue Introduction

The resonating effects of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks have forced the United States to reassess the state of security at the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) nuclear facilities. In the years since, both governmental and non-governmental organizations have raised concern over inadequate defenses at these locations. Lost keys to sensitive buildings, guards asleep at their posts, and widely dispersed storage facilities that house potentially vulnerable, nuclear-bomb-grade material are a few of the problems underscored by the U.S. General Accounting Office, the Project on Government Oversight, and the news media.

Los Alamos National Laboratories   Photo Credit: Bob Nichols, USDA

Responding to these reported deficiencies, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham on May 7, 2004, presented a set of initiatives to improve security at DOE facilities around the country. The efforts include more stringent safeguards on sensitive nuclear information; reinforced physical security to prevent unwarranted intrusion; consolidation of widely dispersed, nuclear-weapons-grade material; and management adjustments to improve information exchange between DOE employees and their supervisors. Although these newly proposed initiatives are praiseworthy, DOE may need to devote more effort toward developing effective action plans to ensure that the highest priority security improvements are completed first. In particular, because of the relative ease of use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in a terrorist-constructed crude nuclear weapon, or improvised nuclear device, DOE should ensure that HEU stockpiles are secured and consolidated expeditiously. Moreover, by down blending all excess HEU to non-weapons-usable form as soon as possible, DOE could further substantially work to prevent the most catastrophic acts of nuclear terror. Finally, although Secretary Abraham has committed DOE to reevaluate the design basis threat (DBT) – the government’s assessment of plausible, but challenging, threats faced by nuclear facilities – on an annual basis, many critics have expressed concern that the most recently revised DBT from May 2002 significantly underestimates the size of post-9/11 terrorist assault forces.

 Issue Introduction        Issue Brief          Relevant Resources

Back to Top

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

 

HOME   |  CONTACT US   |  GET INVOLVED   |  SITE MAP