Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- The United States has made little to no progress toward fully adopting an effective strategy to confront the threat of biological terrorism, a congressionally chartered panel of experts said today (see GSN, Jan. 19).

The absence of a comprehensive U.S. capability to rapidly recognize, respond to and recover from a disease-based attack is the most "significant failure" identified in the final "report card" issued this morning by the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism.

The country lacks the technical and operational capabilities required for an "adequate" response to a bioterror attack, the 19-page document states. That national capacity should include the ability to provide information to authorities and the general public; adequate supplies of medical countermeasures and a program for rapid distribution of those medicines; systems for isolating and treating and the sick; and environmental cleanup systems for materials such as anthrax.

"The United States is seriously lacking in each of these vital capabilities," according to the report, which gives the federal government an F for acting on the commission's 2008 call to augment the nation's ability for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties.

"We believe that the strategy which has the greatest potential is a strategy of the ability to respond, to reduce the impact of such an attack, and the ability to deter that attack," former Senator Bob Graham (D-Fla.), panel co-chairman, said at a press conference today.

Commission co-Chairman and former Senator Jim Talent (R-Mo.) later added: "Anybody who studies this will tell you that we are basically nowhere on biopreparation."

The document also assesses the administration's efforts on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament; government reform; and citizen and community preparedness. In all, 17 grades were given, ranging from A, meaning the panel's recommendations were fully adopted or steps were taken toward implementation, to I, meaning it was not realistic to assess government efforts in the 14 months allowed.

Established by Congress in 2007, the panel issued a report in December 2008 that concluded an attack involving a weapon of mass destruction was likely to occur somewhere in the world by 2013 unless urgent steps were taken. The analysis also found that a biological strike posed the top threat due to the widespread availability of deadly pathogens and materials.

The commission released an interim report last October that credited the Obama administration with making progress in addressing concerns over nuclear threats but concluded the United States lacks equal preparedness for biological terrorism (see GSN, Oct. 22, 2009).

"Our fundamental threat assessment of 14 months ago stands today," Graham said.

Graham said he hopes the F on bioterrorism preparedness, one of three given out of 17 total marks, "will be a stinging indictment and a message to our national leaders."

"Our concern is that this is like Russian roulette; eventually that bullet's in the chamber," according to Talent (see related GSN story, today).

The remaining F's were given under the government reform section for Washington's asserted failure to reshape congressional oversight of national security matters and to retain the next generation of security experts.

Today the nongovernmental Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation released a five-page response the commission's report card. The document says the bioterrorist threat "has been greatly exaggerated" and that such threats "need to be seen and addressed within a wider public health context" as just one of the many possible ways in which infectious agents might spread.

Talent countered: "The threat is not exaggerated. I do think dealing with it is largely, if not exclusively, a public health problem. It's preparing for it."

Graham said he had not seen the center's report but that it is "very much a minority view."

As with the interim report, the task force was critical of the "lack of priority" given to the development of medical countermeasures through Project Bioshield,, a program intended to promote development of medicines against weapons of mass destruction. Roughly $609 million was shifted in this fiscal year from the program's Special Reserve Fund, according to the Consolidated Appropriations Act (see GSN, Jan. 8).

The commission gave the administration a D+ for tightening government oversight of high-containment laboratories -- those that handle the most dangerous disease agents.

When it comes to governmental policies that are "consistent, enforceable, and promote important bioscience research ... regulatory fragmentation remains the norm," the report card states. "There are too many agencies at the federal, state and local levels that regulate pathogens, in sometimes conflicting ways."

To address this concern, the document urges passage of legislation introduced last year by Senators Joseph Lieberman (I-Conn.) and Susan Collins (R-Maine) that would require the Homeland Security Department to issue security regulations for federal and private laboratories working with the world's deadliest diseases (see GSN, Nov. 5, 2009).

The bill, passed by the Senate Homeland Security and Government Reform Committee, would also divide the select agent and toxin list into a tiered system, dictating that facilities handling the eight to 10 most harmful agents receive the highest security.

Still, "work by one committee in one House of Congress does not represent the kind of urgent and comprehensive action" the commission urged in its 2008 findings, the report card states. It suggests the full upper chamber act on the measure and that companion legislation be taken up in the House of Representatives.

Unlike the Senate bill, which would divide responsibility for laboratories between the Homeland Security and Health and Human Services departments, the commission also believes the HHS secretary should take the lead for laboratory security.

"A presidential directive could be used to improve some of these deficiencies," according to the report card.

The administration did receive an A for conducting a comprehensive review of the domestic program to secure dangerous pathogens (see GSN, Jan. 12). However, "reports and reviews alone will not protect us," the commission said, urging that the conclusions of that analysis and others be coalesced into a national strategy.

The White House also garnered an A for developing a national strategy for advancing biological forensics capabilities, which would help identify the origin of material used in a bioterror attack. Implementation of that plan is expected to be completed early this year, according to the report.

The commission gave the administration a B+ for proposing a new action plan for achieving universal adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention (see GSN, Dec. 12, 2009). The compact prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of weaponized disease agents such as anthrax, smallpox or plague.

"We were pleased to see the administration's rejection of efforts to restart BWC Protocol negotiations, recognizing that it is virtually impossible to verify compliance with the spread of dual-use advanced biotechnology around the world," the panel's report card says. "However, U.S. policy on biological weapons cannot rest solely on opposition of the BWC Protocol."

The United States must also take steps at home to enhance its ability to prevent biological terrorism, such as passage of the Lieberman-Collins legislation, in order to provide leadership at the 2011 BWC review conference.

The document adds: "To earn an A on this recommendation the U.S. Department of State must develop a full action plan for increasing international adherence to the biological weapons ban."

The WMD panel issued a C for steps taken to strengthen domestic and global "disease surveillance" networks that would track the spread of a disease outbreak.

White House spokesman Nick Shapiro said the administration has undertaken a comprehensive review of national bioterrorism preparedness policy, including an evaluation of how to best integrate planning at all levels of government and build the key capabilities needed.

In addition, the Obama administration in November rolled out a national strategy for countering disease threats and has "taken significant steps to enhance the nation's capabilities for rapid response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass casualties," he said. These include efforts on detection and diagnosis, medical countermeasure development, response and recovery.

"Despite years of effort and millions of dollars in taxpayer funds, the U.S. government's approach to the development and procurement of medical 'countermeasures' against emerging pandemics, certain endemic diseases, and biological weapons and other WMD threats has not produced the results we demand," Shapiro said today in an e-mail message. "Our results reflect in part the state of the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. As a nation, we are spending more time and money in research and development of pharmaceuticals, but fewer licensed products are emerging from the pipeline."

He added: "Recognizing this need, tomorrow during the State of the Union, the president will launch an initiative aimed at responding faster and more effectively to public health threats, including bioterrorism."

Nuclear Threats

The commission was generally more positive in the marks it gave the administration in addressing its concerns about nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

"The trend lines here seem to be running in the right direction," Graham said this morning.

The panel gave the White House an I, or incomplete, for implementing a comprehensive strategy toward Pakistan, which panel members initially characterized as a nexus of terrorism and WMD proliferation.

"Although significant action has been taken towards these ends, the situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate and remains precarious," the panel's report card states.

It notes that Congress and the administration recently approved $7.5 billion in aid to Islamabad over five years, tripling economic assistance for the country, and that as part of a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama has called for "an effective partnership with Pakistan."

A good grade on Pakistan would require improvements on multiple fronts including securing more territory from extremists and eliminating al-Qaeda, whose leaders are believed to take refuge on the South Asian state; establishment of additional hospitals, roads, schools and other infrastructure; and improved relations between Islamabad and Washington.

The administration earned a C for its work with Russia to reduce the dangers of weapons of mass destruction, in particular through its negotiations on a replacement for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (see GSN, Jan. 25).

The administration can raise its grades in this sector by taking "concrete steps" such as reinvigorating cooperative biological threat reduction programs in Russia, limiting fissile nuclear material, and by completing a post-START verification system.

Graham announced that he and Talent would soon stand up a nonprofit entity to continue their work. Tentatively dubbed the Bipartisan Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Research Center, the organization would issue another report next year, he said.