Global Security Newswire
Daily News on Nuclear, Biological & Chemical Weapons, Terrorism and Related Issues
Syria Chemicals Move Into U.S. Custody
Crews in Italy began loading Syrian warfare chemicals onto a U.S. vessel equipped to neutralize the deadly substances at sea, the Associated Press reports.
The MV Cape Ray began receiving the materials shortly after the Danish vessel Ark Futura delivered them to Italy's Gioia Tauro seaport on Wednesday. Roughly one-third of the agents -- held in 78 crates -- had been moved onto the U.S. vessel by the middle of the day, according to government insiders.
The transfer was part of a chemical-disarmament operation launched in Syria last year, after sarin nerve agent killed hundreds of people in a Damascus suburb in August. Assad's regime denied responsibility for the incident in rebel territory, but pledged to relinquish its chemical arsenal amid threats of foreign military intervention in Syria's civil war.
"For now everything is going well. We have put in a huge amount of effort ... to manage the transfer operation smoothly," Agence France-Presse quoted Italian Environment Minister Gian Luca Galletti as saying on Wednesday.
Still, the stop in Gioia Tauro has stirred opposition from local residents.
"This is not a routine operation, it's a military operation and we are very worried," trade unionist Domenico Macri said to the news agency.
Law-enforcement officials cordoned off the port area, where workers were moving sarin-gas ingredients and mustard blister agent, the New York Times reported on Wednesday.
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The UNSCR 1540 Resource Collection examines implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all states to implement measures aimed at preventing non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons, related materials, and their means of delivery. It details implementation efforts in all of the regions and countries of the world to-date.
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This CNS issue brief examines the lessons learned from dismantling Libya and Iraq's chemical weapons programs and what these two cases presage for disarmament in Syria. In particular, this article explores the challenges relating to ensuring material and physical security for both inspectors and the chemical weapons stockpile itself; verifying the accuracy and completeness of disclosed inventories; and developing effective monitoring and verification regimes for the long-term. The conclusion examines recommendations stemming from this analysis.
This article provides an overview of Syria's historical and current policies relating to nuclear, chemical, biological and missile proliferation.