Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON -- The United States has retrieved 52 kilograms of highly enriched uranium spent fuel from overseas nuclear reactors in the past 12 months, the National Nuclear Security Administration disclosed today. The announcement revealed the latest progress of a program designed to repatriate material the United States provided to friendly nations during the 1960s and 1970s when there was little perceived risk of terrorists stealing weapon-usable nuclear materials (see GSN, Sept. 19, 2007).

During the fiscal year that ended Sept. 30, NNSA officials coordinated the return of all "eligible" highly enriched uranium spent fuel from four nations: Argentina, Germany, Portugal and Romania. The most recent batch, 10.3 kilograms from Germany, was delivered Sept. 23 to the U.S. Savannah River Site in South Carolina, according to an NNSA spokeswoman.

The eligible designation applies to types of fuel that the United States either has the technology or plans to develop the technology to dispose of safely.

"The complete removal of all eligible U.S.-origin highly enriched uranium from Argentina, Portugal, Romania and Germany is another milestone in NNSA's cooperative effort to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation and demonstrates the U.S. government's strong international commitment to nonproliferation," said NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino in a prepared statement.

Argentina

The fiscal 2008 transfers began with completing the removal of 6 kilograms of HEU spent fuel from Argentina in December 2007, according to Kelly Cummins, NNSA director of former Soviet Union and Asian threat reduction. Argentina retains about 2 kilograms of additional, "noneligible" uranium that Buenos Aires has promised to blend down to less dangerous enrichment levels, she said.

The total of about 8 kilograms corresponds somewhat with an independent estimate of Argentina's holdings by the Institute for Science and International Security. That 2005 study determined there were 8.8 kilograms of HEU material at the nation's RA-6 reactor site. The study also reported, however, the presence of an additional 13 kilograms of HEU material used for producing medical isotopes (see related GSN story, today).

Germany

Germany had two transfers in fiscal 2008, starting with 8.8 kilograms from a research reactor in June and finishing with last month's shipment of 10.3 kilograms from the same site, Cummins said. Some U.S.-origin material is set to remain, but the United States intends to support the return of a batch of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium, she said.

The ISIS study estimated that Germany has significantly more than 1 metric ton of highly enriched uranium.

Portugal and Romania

NNSA officials orchestrated a joint shipment of HEU spent fuel from Portugal (6.6 kilograms) and Romania (15.3 kilograms) that was completed in August, Cummins said. Portugal is now completely free of highly enriched uranium and Romania has some Russian-origin material that it plans to repatriate with U.S. assistance, she added.

Consequences of Theft

The United States began to recognize the risk of shipping weapon-usable material overseas in the 1970s when it became clear that security measures at many research reactors were inadequate.

Before then, the United States typically exported nearly weapon-grade uranium when it offered fuel assistance to foreign research reactors, Matthew Bunn of Harvard University's Managing the Atom project told Global Security Newswire today.

"Most U.S.-origin material tends to be in the 90-percent range or the 70-percent range," he said, describing the proportion of the uranium 235 isotope in the material. Uranium in U.S. nuclear weapons has generally been enriched to 90 percent or more.

In 1978, Washington began a take-back program to retrieve much of the material from foreign research reactors.

More recently, the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative programs was created to aid the repatriation of both U.S.- and Russian-origin highly enriched uranium. It has supported several such transfers over the past few years, including the fiscal 2008 projects (see GSN, July 18).

The project's aims, however, are complicated by a poor understanding of how much material is held overseas, Bunn said.

"Remarkably, [the Energy Department] simply does not know how much U.S.-origin HEU exists in foreign countries," says his annual report, Securing the Bomb 2007.

The department, however, is completing an effort to estimate the amount, Bunn said today.