The Seventh Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

The Seventh Conference of State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will be held in The Hague from October 7-11, 2002. The Convention entered into force in April 1997 and currently has 145 State Parties. State Parties to the Convention have committed not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile nor retain chemical weapons. The two primary issues before this session of the Conference are the approval of the Organization's 2003 budget and the request of the Russian Federation for an extension of the deadline for the total destruction of its stockpile of chemical weapons. The First CWC Review Conference, which will convene for a two-week period commencing on April 28, 2003, will review the operation and implementation of the Convention since it entered into force. In preparation for this event, a review process of the CWC and its implementation is being carried out by the OPCW.

The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) bans an entire category of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Convention entered into force in April 1997 and currently has 145 State Parties. State Parties to the Convention have committed not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile nor retain chemical weapons. The Convention prohibits the transfer, directly or indirectly, of chemical weapons to anyone. States Parties are also bound not to use chemical weapons, not to engage in military preparations for use of chemical weapons and not to assist, encourage, nor induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited under the Convention. State Parties are required to destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities they own or possess or that are located in any place under their jurisdiction or control, as well as any chemical weapons they abandoned on the territory of another State Party no later than 10 years after entry into force of the Convention or as soon as possible in the case of States ratifying or acceding more than 10 years after entry into force. Verification is conducted through a combination of reporting and routine on-site inspections of declared sites.

To ensure the implementation of the Convention's provisions, including those on verification and compliance, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established upon the entry into force of the Convention. The Organization, based in The Hague, The Netherlands, is served by a Technical Secretariat tasked to conduct the practical work of the OPCW, particularly in the area of verification. The Secretariat comprises the Director-General (Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter from Argentina), who is its head and chief administrative officer; an inspectorate responsible for verification activities; and scientific, technical, administrative, and other support personnel.

The Conference of the States Parties is the OPCW's principal organ, attended by representatives of all Member States. A regular session of the Conference is held annually unless otherwise decided, and special sessions convened when necessary. The Conference can make decisions on any matters brought to its attention by the Executive Council or any of the States Parties. The Conference is responsible for taking measures necessary to ensure compliance and for redressing situations of non-compliance. It has the power to suspend the rights and privileges of States Parties in non-compliance upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, and may recommend collective measures if a State Party engages in activities prohibited by the Convention. The Executive Council is the executive organ of the OPCW. The significance of national chemical industry and political and security interests are among the factors that determine the composition of the Members States of the Executive Council. The Council can request States Parties to take measures to redress situations of non-compliance. If the State Party concerned fails to take the requested action, the Council may inform the other States Parties and make recommendations to the Conference. In cases of particular gravity and urgency, the Council is to bring the matter directly to the attention of the UNGA and UNSC.

The Seventh Conference of State Parties will be held in The Hague from October 7-11, 2002. The two primary issues before this session of the Conference are the approval of the Organization's 2003 budget and the request of the Russian Federation for an extension of the deadline for the total destruction of its stockpile of chemical weapons. Despite several months of consultations and informal discussions, most recently at a special meeting on October 3, 2002, the Executive Council has been unable to recommend an agreed draft budget for 2003 that accurately reflects the needs of the Organization to fulfill its mandate of ensuring the complete elimination of all chemical weapons. As a result, discussions will continue in parallel with the Conference itself. The request of the Russian Federation for an extension of the deadline for the total destruction of its stockpile of chemical weapons to 2012 relates to the provisions of Article IV of the Convention. This request has been under consideration since the Executive Council's 27th session in 2001 and despite being raised at every session since then, no decision has been made. Although many members of the Council are willing to approve the extension request, the United States and a number of its closest allies on the Executive Council have continued to block consensus. The October 3rd meeting of the Council agreed to recommend that the Conference of the States Parties consider this matter despite the absence of a recommendation. However, it is expected that there will be no agreement on this matter due to continuing U.S. objections. The primary objection is the unwillingness to grant a blanket extension until the Russian Federation demonstrates its willingness to act upon its undertakings. To date, the Russian Federation has not met the deadline for destroying 1 percent of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons.

The First CWC Review Conference, which will convene for a two-week period commencing on April 28, 2003, will review the operation and implementation of the Convention since it entered into force. In preparation for this event, a review process of the CWC and its implementation is being carried out by the OPCW. This review process will focus on issues of scientific and technological developments and their impact on the CWC, the verification regime and its challenging context, the scope of the Schedules, the need for universal adherence to the CWC, and programs to coordinate international cooperation and assistance.

Resources

Websites

• Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), www.opcw.org.
• OPCW Fact Sheets
• Chemical Weapons Convention Homepage, www.cwc.gov.
• U.S. Department of State, Biological and Chemical Weapons, www.state.gov.
• U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, www.dtra.mil.
• Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, https://cns.miis.edu.
• Federation of American Scientists, Chemical Weapons, www.fas.org.

Articles and Reports

• Javed Ali, "Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War," The Nonproliferation Review 8, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Spring 2001.
• Michael Barletta, "Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence," The Nonproliferation Review 6, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Fall 1998.
• Milton E. Blackwood, Jr., "Arsenic and Old Weapons: Chemical Weapons Disposal in Russia," The Nonproliferation Review 6, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Spring-Summer 1999.Gorbachev, "Abolishing Weapons of Mass Destruction: Addressing Cold War and Other Wartime Legacies in the Twenty-First Century," OPCW Synthesis, June 2001.
• Gert Herigel, "Chemical and Biological Weapons: Use in Warfare, Impact on Society and Environment," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
• Deng Hongmei and Peter O'Meara Evans, "Social and Environmental Aspects of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China," The Nonproliferation Review 4, Spring-Summer 1997.
• Igor Khripunov and George W. Parshall, "U.S. Assistance to Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction: Identifying the Next Steps," The Nonproliferation Review 6, Fall 1999.
• Frederick R. Sidell et al., eds., Textbook of Military Medicine, Part I: Warfare, Weaponry, and the Casualty: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Borden Institute, 1997).
• Amy Smithson, "Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons Complexes," The Henry L. Stimson Center, December 1999.
• Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., The Chemical Weapons Convention: Implementation and Challenges (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, April 2001).
• Jonathan B. Tucker, "Russia's New Plan For Chemical Weapons Destruction," Arms Control Today, July/August 2001, www.armscontrol.org.
• Jonathan B. Tucker, "The 'Yellow Rain Controversy': Lessons for Arms Control and Compliance," The Nonproliferation Review 8, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Spring 2001.
• Theodore Karasik, "Toxic Warfare," RAND, October 2002, www.rand.org.
• Joan Link, "Getting Verification Right: Proposals for Enhancing Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention," Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), September 2002.
• Jonathan B. Tucker, "The Conduct of Challenge Inspections Under the Chemical Weapons Convention," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, September 2002.
• Daniel Feakes, "The Emerging European Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agenda on Chemical and Biological Weapons," The Acronym Institute, July/August 2002.
• Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), "Mending the OPCW: Getting Verification Right," Trust & Verify, May/June 2002.
• The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Synthesis, Spring 2002.

Official Documents and Reports

• U.S. General Accounting Office, "Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks," September 1999, www.gao.gov.
• U.S. National Security Council, "Fact Sheet: Iraq's Program of Weapons of Mass Destruction," November 14, 1997.
• U.S. State Department, "Fact Sheet: 1989 Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding," September 1998, www.state.gov.

Chronologies and Charts

• Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program, Chronology of State Use and Biological and Chemical Weapons Control, updated October 2001.

Books and Print Material

• Frederic Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968).
• Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).
• Center for Counterproliferation Research, The Impact of the Proliferation of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons on the United States Navy (Washington, D.C.: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, 1996).
• Eric Croddy, with Clarisa Perez-Armendariz and John Hart, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Copernicus Books, 2001).
• Hugh D. Crone, Banning Chemical Weapons: The Scientific Background (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
• Trevor Findlay, ed., Chemical Weapons and Missile Proliferation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991).
• Randall Forsberg et al., Nonproliferation Primer: Preventing the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
• Al Mauroni, America's Struggle with Chemical-Biological Warfare (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000).
• Al Mauroni, Chemical-Biological Defense: US Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1998).
• J. Paxman and R.A. Harris, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Chemical and Biological Warfare (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982).
• SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Volumes 1-6 (New York: Humanities Press, 1973).
• Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
• Jonathan B. Tucker, "From Arms Race to Abolition: The Evolving Norm Against Biological and Chemical Warfare," in Drell, Sofaer, and Wilson, eds., The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1999).
• U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The Biological & Chemical Warfare Threat (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1999).
• Victor A. Utgoff, The Challenge of Chemical Weapons: An American Perspective (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).
• Thomas C. Wiegele, The Clandestine Building of Libya's Chemical Weapons Factory: A Study in International Collusion (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992).