Kazakhstan Biological Overview
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Background
This page is part of the Kazakhstan Country Profile.
- Click for Recent Developments and Current Status
Kazakhstan has never pursued a biological warfare (BW) program, and acceded to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 2007. 1 However, its territory was used extensively by the Soviet government for research, production, and testing of biological warfare agents.
Kazakhstan housed four BW research, production, and testing sites that played a key role in the development of the Soviet offensive BW program. These facilities reported to different central authorities in Moscow, and belonged to various parts of the Soviet BW infrastructure. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the biological weapons program halted in Kazakhstan, and BW facilities have been dismantled or converted. The Kazakhstani government has been remarkably open with respect to facilities on its territory.
The four main Soviet BW facilities in Kazakhstan that were directly or indirectly involved in the Soviet BW program were the:
- Vozrozhdeniye Island Open-Air Test Site in the Aral Sea
- Scientific Experimental and Production Base (SNOPB) in Stepnogorsk
- Scientific Research Agricultural Institute (NISKhI) in Gvardeyskiy
- Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute in Almaty
History
The USSR conducted research and development for its BW program in Kazakhstan. Thus, the history of BW activities in Kazakhstan is the history of Soviet BW development.
The Soviet Union had the world’s largest BW program. Throughout the 20th century, the USSR developed the capability to produce massive quantities of a wide variety of BW agents, including the causative agents of plague, tularemia, glanders, anthrax, smallpox and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis. 2 The Soviet BW program dates from the late 1920s, when the USSR began developing antipersonnel BW agents. The Soviet military controlled almost all facets of the program. In 1936, the Soviet government established the Open-Air Test Site on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea, Kazakhstan, which was directly operated by the Soviet Ministry of Defense (MoD). Vozrozhdeniye Island was the USSR’s major proving ground for open-air testing of BW agents. 3 The other early Soviet BW facility on Kazakhstani territory was the Scientific Research Agricultural Institute (NISKhI) in Zhambyl Oblast, established in 1958, which developed anti-plant and anti-livestock microbial agents. NISKhI, was also likely supervised by the MoD, although it was officially controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture. 4
In the early 1970s, Soviet authorities created a network of facilities officially designated as civilian biological research centers. However, these new facilities, controlled by the MoD-funded Biopreparat, operated in tandem with the military BW research apparatus, and also served as cover for BW activities. 5 The covert military BW activities conducted in this new network of facilities were in clear violation of the Soviet Union’s obligation to end all offensive BW activities as stipulated under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWTC), signed and ratified by the Soviet Union in 1972 and 1975, respectively. 6
Approximately 40 research, development and production facilities operated under Biopreparat, many of which were actively involved in military BW programs in addition to civil biotechnology activities. The Scientific Experimental and Production Base (SNOPB) in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan, which was supervised by the 15th Directorate of the MoD, was historically one of the Biopreparat facilities involved in manufacturing offensive BW agents. Evidence suggests the SNOPB may also have shared technology and personnel with military facilities. 7
Soviet facilities were also involved in defensive developments. The Soviet Union developed a system of anti-plague research institutes and field monitoring stations under the Soviet Ministry of Health, and one such institute was located in Almaty, Kazakhstan. 8 Some institutes were also under the control of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Although those facilities were mainly responsible for civilian scientific or epidemiological investigations and did not have direct links to the MoD or Biopreparat BW facilities, on many occasions they were involved in supportive research activities for well-funded military projects. 9
In 1991-1992, Russia halted funding for the former Soviet BW centers in Kazakhstan, closed their military programs, and abandoned the sites. As a result, all Soviet offensive and defensive BW programs on Kazakhstani territory were terminated, and the four major BW facilities were either dismantled or converted. 10
Recent Developments and Current Status
Following a number of decrees by the Russian and Kazakhstani governments issued after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Vozrozhdeniye Island facilities were dismantled, the site’s infrastructure was destroyed, and its military settlement was abandoned. This was confirmed by experts from the U.S. Department of Defense when they assessed the site in 1995. 11
Since 1991, the Kazakhstani government has committed itself to civilian conversion of the former Soviet facilities, and particularly the SNOPB and the NISKhI. Due to a lack of funds and necessary expertise, initial efforts were unsuccessful. In 1993, Kazakhstan founded the National Center of Biotechnology (NCB), which subsumed most of the former Soviet military and civilian biotechnology facilities in Kazakhstan, including the SNOPB and the NISKhI. The NCB did not initially include the Anti-Plague Scientific Research Institute in Almaty, which was placed under the authority of the Kazakhstani Ministry of Health. Because a substantial amount of equipment was dismantled or destroyed in the SNOPB, its civilian conversion required considerable financial and material resources. 12 On the other hand, the NISKhI, which had less military-related equipment to dismantle and convert, made the transition to civil use on its own. 13 Most of the equipment at the Almaty Anti-Plague Institute was already suitable for civil applications. However, the task of converting weapons-related expertise to peaceful production required considerable effort at all of the former Soviet BW facilities in Kazakhstan. In August 2005, the National Center for Biotechnology (NCB) was reorganized into the state enterprise “National Center for Biotechnology of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” and placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Science. At present, NCB is a leading research institute in the fields of biotechnology, biosafety and ecology that uses Kazakhstan’s biotechnology sector to contribute to the social-economic development of Kazakhstan and other countries in the region. 14
In December 2004, Astana and Washington signed an agreement to reduce biological weapons proliferation risks. 15 This was an amendment to the 1995 bilateral agreement, a component of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program designed to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons technology, pathogens, and expertise. The $35 million in U.S. assistance has been used to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity at Kazakhstani facilities, to consolidate dangerous biological agents at secured central repositories and to eliminate BW-related equipment and infrastructure. 16
The laboratory is a high-tech facility that develops diagnostic tools and countermeasures for dealing with natural disease outbreaks and biological weapons attacks. In addition to the $103 million designated for the construction of the Central Reference Laboratory, the U.S. government also provided approximately $5.6 million to build another facility in the village of Otar in the Zhambylskaya region. 17 This laboratory opened in 2014 and serves to provide an early warning of new disease outbreaks in the region. 18
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Glossary
- Biological weapon (BW)
- Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants. Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
- Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
- The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
- Offensive (research, weapon)
- Meant for use in instigating an attack, as opposed to defending against an attack.
- Dismantlement
- Dismantlement: Taking apart a weapon, facility, or other item so that it is no longer functional.
- Plague
- Plague: The disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. There are three forms of plague: bubonic plague, pneumonic plague, and septicemic plague. Bubonic plague refers to infection of the lymph nodes by Y. pestis, causing black sores or “buboes,” pneumonic plague refers to infection of the lungs, and septicemic plague refers to infection of the bloodstream. Although no longer a serious public health hazard in the developed world, the bacterium can spread from person-to-person in aerosolized form, and has been investigated as a biological weapon by Japan and the Soviet Union.
- Tularemia
- Tularemia is a disease caused by Francisella tularensis, a bacterium that is native to rabbits and aquatic mammals, but is also one of the most infectious pathogens to humans. Tularemia can survive in harsh conditions, and just one organism can cause human infection. Tularemia aerosols can incapacitate a patient within one or two days. Tularemia infection causes fever and skin lesions, and can eventually develop into pneumonia. The Soviet Union and Japan investigated F. tularensis for bioweapons purposes during World War II, as did the United States during the 1950s and 1960s.
- Anthrax
- The common name of the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, as well as the name of the disease it produces. A predominantly animal disease, anthrax can also infect humans and cause death within days. B. anthracis bacteria can form hardy spores, making them relatively easy to disseminate. Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR/Russia have all investigated anthrax as a biological weapon, as did the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo. Anthrax-laced letters were also used to attack the U.S. Senate and numerous news agencies in September 2001. There is no vaccine available to the general public, and treatment requires aggressive administration of antibiotics.
- Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
- The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
- Ratification
- Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.
See entries for Entry into force and Signature. - Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program
- A U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) program established in 1992 by the U.S. Congress, through legislation sponsored primarily by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. It is the largest and most diverse U.S. program addressing former Soviet Union weapons of mass destruction threats. The program has focused primarily on: (1) destroying vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons (e.g., missiles and aircraft), their launchers (such as silos and submarines), and their related facilities; (2) securing former Soviet nuclear weapons and their components; and (3) destroying Russian chemical weapons. The term is often used generically to refer to all U.S. nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union—and sometimes beyond— including those implemented by the U.S. Departments of Energy, Commerce, and State. The program’s scope has expanded to include threat reduction efforts in geographical areas outside the Former Soviet Union.
- Pathogen
- Pathogen: A microorganism capable of causing disease.
Sources
- "Biological Weapons Convention: Meeting of Experts 2007," Interim Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Masood Khan (Pakistan), on Universalization Activities, 24 August 2007, unog.ch.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas, eds., "The 1971 Smallpox Epidemic in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program," p. i, Occasional Paper No. 9, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 2002.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas, eds., "The 1971 Smallpox Epidemic in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program," p. iii, Occasional Paper No. 9, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 2002.
- Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," p. 2, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999.
- Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," p. 2, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999.
- Status of the Convention," Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, June 2005, opbw.org.
- Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," p. 3, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999.
- Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," p. 3-4, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999.
- Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," p. 4, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999.
- Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," p. 13-17, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999.
- Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," p. 7-8, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999.
- Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," p. 13-14, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999.
- Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev, and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present and Future," p. 17, Occasional Paper, No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, June 1999.
- Official web site of the National Center for Biotechnology under the Kazakhstan Ministry of Education and Science, accessed 3 March 2008, www.biocenter.kz.
- "U.S., Kazakhstan Sign Nunn-Lugar Agreement Amendment to Prevent Biological Weapons Proliferation," States News Service, 8 December 2004.
- "Senior US Senator, Kazakh Security Chiefs Discuss Non-Proliferation Cooperation," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 19 August 2006.
- "Kazakhstan Breaks Ground on Biothreat Laboratory," Global Security Newswire, 31 March 2010, www.nti.org.
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency, "Director Joins U.S. Ambassador at Ribbon Cutting for a Public Health Research Laboratory in Kazakhstan," News Release, U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 27 September 2014, www.dtra.mil.