Fact Sheet

Kazakhstan Chemical Overview

Kazakhstan Chemical Overview

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Background

This page is part of the Kazakhstan Country Profile.

Kazakhstan has not engaged in chemical weapons production since it gained independence in 1991. 1 However, the Soviet Union pursued a chemical warfare (CW) program on its territory until 1987, when President Gorbachev formally decided to halt the CW program. 2 During the Soviet period, Kazakhstan housed one major CW facility, a dual-purpose chemical complex in the city of Pavlodar (northern Kazakhstan). 3

The Pavlodar plant manufactured precursor chemicals for CW agents, though it never actually produced any chemical weapons, because Soviet authorities halted the CW program before the final CW production lines were complete. 4 The Soviet Union designed the Pavlodar facility to produce a new generation of binary nerve agents in the 1980s. Although there are no further available details, these binary nerve agents were thought to be Novichok (newcomer) agents that were five to eight times more potent than most V-type agents. 5 In 1987, facilities programmed to operate with final CW agents were destroyed, and intermediate chemical weapon production lines were converted to manufacture organophosphorous products for commercial markets. 6 After independence in 1991, Kazakhstan converted the plant into a civilian chemical production facility. 7 Kazakhstan also housed a production plant in the city of Taraz (Zhambul) and storage barracks on the Ili River, but no open-source information on these facilities is available. 8

Kazakhstan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 13 January 1993 when the Convention first opened for signature, and ratified the CWC seven years later on 23 March 2000. 9 The Law on Export Control of Weapons, Military Technology, and Dual-Use Goods of 18 June 1996 provides the broad legal basis for export controls, which includes chemical materials that could be used for chemical weapons. 10 In November 2000 a new export control list, which included 1,266 items, entered into force. 11

History

Since Kazakhstan does not have an independent history of chemical weapons production, its past chemical weapons capabilities are discussed in the historical context of the Soviet CW program. Construction of the Pavlodar plant, the only Soviet CW facility built in Kazakhstan, began in 1965 under the authority of the Soviet Ministry of Chemical Industry. 12 By the beginning of the 1990’s, the plant extended over 2,500 hectares and employed approximately 6,500 people. As was common practice with Soviet CW production plants, the Pavlodar facility was a dual-use plant with the civilian part of the production facility serving as a cover, producing the basic chemicals for the military part of the plant. 13

The five military CW-related facilities at the Pavlodar site included:

  1. A plant for phosphorous trichloride (PCl3) production (PCl3 can be used to produce nerve agents). The plant has been used since 1987 for civilian PCl3 production;
  2. A building designed to produce intermediate and precursor CW chemicals (also converted for civilian use since 1987);
  3. A facility for final CW production, which was not completed by the time construction was halted in 1987;
  4. A building designed for operations with final CW products, which was destroyed in 1987;
  5. Laboratory buildings for testing CW agents on animals, which was not completed by 1987.

The main purpose for constructing the Pavlodar plant was reportedly to substitute for several chemical production lines of the Novocheboksarsk and Volgograd CW plants and to manufacture the latest (1980s-generation) of binary CW agents called Novichok (newcomer). 14

Recent Developments and Current Status


After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the government of Kazakhstan inherited the Pavlodar plant and continued commercial chemical production at the facility until 2005, when the plant’s administrators filed for bankruptcy. 15 Bazalt-PV bought the plant in March 2007 for 1.57 billion tenge (approximately $11 million USD). 16 There is also a significant mercury pollution problem in Pavlodar, which is caused by a mercury catalyst used for chlorine and sodium production. 17 Some estimates state that the plant released up to 1,310 tons of metallic mercury into the environment, contaminating the ground water and generating potential human health risks, in addition to environmental concerns. 18 In 2011 Kazakhstan created the Pavlodar Special Economic Zone (SEZ), a tax-free zone designed to develop Kazakhstan’s chemical and petrochemical industries by attracting foreign investors. Preliminary projects in the plant include production of inhibited hydrochloric acid, household chemicals, and disinfectants. 19 Modernization of the plant is scheduled to finish by 2018. 20

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Glossary

Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Dual-use item
An item that has both civilian and military applications. For example, many of the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons have legitimate civilian industrial uses, such as the production of pesticides or ink for ballpoint pens.
Chemical Agent Precursor
Any chemical reactant which takes part at any stage in the production by whatever method of a chemical agent. This includes any key component of a binary or multi-component chemical system.  Common precursors to toxic chemicals are listed alongside the agents in the OPCW Schedules of Chemicals.  Many precursors controlled through nonproliferation initiatives also have legitimate commercial uses.
Nerve agent
A nerve agent is a chemical weapon that attacks the human nervous system, leading to uncontrolled nerve cell excitation and muscle contraction. Specifically, nerve agents block the enzyme cholinesterease, so acetylcholine builds up in the nerve junction and the neuron cannot return to the rest state. Nerve agents include the G-series nerve agents (soman, sarin, tabun, and GF) synthesized by Germany during and after World War II; the more toxic V-series nerve agents (VX, VE, VM, VG, VR) discovered by the United Kingdom during the 1950s; and the reportedly even more toxic Novichok agents, developed by the Soviet Union between 1960 and 1990. The development of both the G-series and V-series nerve agents occurred alongside pesticide development.
Binary chemical weapon
A munition in which two or more relatively harmless chemical substances, held in separate containers, react when mixed or combined to produce a more toxic chemical agent. The mixing occurs either in-flight, for instance in a chemical warhead attached to a ballistic missile or gravity bomb, or on the battlefield immediately prior to use. The mechanism has significant benefits for the production, transportation and handling of chemical weapons, since the precursor chemicals are usually less toxic than the compound created by combining them.  Binary weapons for sarin and VX are known to have been developed; or
A munition containing two toxic chemical agents.  The United Kingdom combined chlorine and sulfur chloride during World War I and the United States combined sulfur mustard and lewisite. This definition is less commonly used.
Vomiting agent
A vomiting agent is a chemical weapon that attacks the nose and throat, leading to nausea and severe emesis (vomiting).  Vomiting agents can be used to force an enemy to remove protective equipment such as gas masks. Examples include adamsite and DA.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Entry into force
The moment at which all provisions of a treaty are legally binding on its parties. Every treaty specifies preconditions for its entry into force. For example, the NPT specified that it would enter into force after the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union (the Depository governments) and 40 other countries ratified the treaty, an event that occurred on March 5, 1970. See entries for Signature, Ratification.

Sources

  1. "Proliferation: Threat and Response," Department of Defense Report, Second edition, 1997, Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org.
  2. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  3. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  4. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  5. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  6. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  7. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  8. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  9. "Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 21 May 2009," Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, www.opcw.org.
  10. Dauletbay Ismagulov, "Ob eksportnom kontrole v Respublike Kazakhstan," Panorama, www.panorama.kz, No. 44, 10 November 2000, p. 3.
  11. Dauletbay Ismagulov, "Ob eksportnom kontrole v Respublike Kazakhstan," Panorama, www.panorama.kz, No. 44, 10 November 2000, p. 3.
  12. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  13. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  14. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  15. Gulbarshyn Bozeheyeva, "The Pavlodar Chemical Weapons Plant in Kazakhstan: History and Legacy," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000, pp. 136-145.
  16. "Kazakhstan: Pavlodar chemical plant's bankruptcy proceedings discussed," Kazinvest, 5 July 2007, www.kazinvest.kz.
  17. Susanne M. Ullrich, Mikhail A. Ilyushchenko, Trevor W. Tanton, Grigory A. Uskov, "Mercury contamination in the vicinity of a derelict chlor-alkali plant: Part II: Contamination of the aquatic and terrestrial food chain and potential risks to the local population," Science of the Total Environment, 1 August 2007, pp. 290-306.
  18. Susanne M. Ullrich, Mikhail A. Ilyushchenko, Trevor W. Tanton, Grigory A. Uskov, "Mercury contamination in the vicinity of a derelict chlor-alkali plant: Part II: Contamination of the aquatic and terrestrial food chain and potential risks to the local population," Science of the Total Environment, 1 August 2007, pp. 290-306; "Mercury pollution in Pavlodar," Environmental Protection Agency, www.epa.gov.
  19. Sergey Gorbunov, “Pavlodar SEZ, Three New Chemical Companies to Further Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy,” The Astana Times, 15 October 2014.
  20. Elena Kosolapova, “Refinery Modernization in Kazakhstan Delayed,” Trend News Agency, 21 February 2016, en.trend.az.

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