North Korea’s Procurement Network Strikes Again: Examining How Chinese Missile Hardware Ended Up in Pyongyang

Much to the surprise of North Korea watchers, six Chinese Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) showed up in downtown Pyongyang on 15 April 2012. Initial interest focused on the six new — and possibly fake — road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) displayed in the military parade honoring founding father Kim Il Sung (missiles known outside of North Korea as the KN-08). [1] However, the vehicles carrying the missiles may ultimately have the most immediate impact on regional nonproliferation efforts. Chinese bloggers quickly observed that the trucks carrying the missiles were externally identical to Chinese-made vehicles. This revelation holds significant consequences for nonproliferation efforts in the region.

"Fake?" ICBMs, Real Launchers, and Other Developments

Rather than following a linear path, North Korea's missile development trajectory appears to be fragmenting as it tackles new technologies before perfecting older ones; Pyongyang is developing ballistic and cruise missiles; solid and liquid fuel technologies; working on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) before it successfully tests and deploys intermediate-range systems; and attempting to make road-mobile ICBMs before perfecting a static design. Essentially, Pyongyang is trying to do everything at once, and with minimal testing.

While previously content to threaten South Korea and most of Japan with hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, North Korea is now engaged in testing longer range systems such as the Unha (Paektusan/Taepodong) with an estimated range of 4,000-8,000 kilometers — though rarely and without success. [2] Pyongyang has also at least nominally displayed the KN-08, the design for which could have a range of 10,000 kilometers depending on payload. [3] However, it is very likely that the KN-08s displayed by Pyongyang on 15 April were "fakes;" what kind of fakes they might be remains heavily debated. While some researchers like Markus Schiller and Robert Schmucker argue that the missiles are complete fantasy, other researchers like Jeffrey Lewis and Nick Hansen see them as design mockups, much as was the case with the Taepodong ICBM. [4] However, more than the missiles' alleged range, it is the road-mobile design that raises concern in the United States and elsewhere. Just before leaving office, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made a now-not-so-cryptic comment:

While the debate about the KN-08's "realness" has subsided pending more evidence, the debate about the vehicles on which the missiles were displayed remains very much alive. Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs) are the vehicles that transport, and eventually launch missiles. Countries such as China increase the survivability of their missile forces by making them road-mobile, and therefore easier to hide than missiles in fixed silos. North Korea is attempting to do the same with its own growing missile forces. In countries with established road-mobile programs, counting the number of missile launchers lends important clues to assessments of the country's missile capabilities.

A TEL is a specialized piece of equipment with varying degrees of complexity depending on the missile-type. Key components include the chassis — the strong and flexible undercarriage of the vehicle; specialized hydraulics for erecting and launching the missile; and systems to control the pressure of the tires to protect the missile on varied terrain. North Korea has a history of acquiring demilitarized vehicles and adapting them with its own erection and launching technology. [6] According to documents attributed to the U.S. State Department by Wikileaks, North Korea procures chassis abroad because they are too expensive and difficult for it to produce indigenously. [7]

Figure 1: North Korean Parade & Chinese-made WS51200 (Sources: KCNA and wstech.com.cn)

Within minutes of the broadcast of the 15 April parade footage, Chinese bloggers began posting images of a specialized off-road heavy-duty vehicle known as the WS51200 (see figure 1). The vehicle is produced by Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company, Ltd., a wholly-owned subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), a Chinese state-owned enterprise. [8] Wanshan — based in Xiaogan, Hubei Province — is a large company under the supervisory control of the 9th Academy of CASIC, which oversees its parent company, the Sanjiang Space Industry Group. The company produces specialty vehicles and chassis for civilian and military applications, with total assets estimated at 1.1 billion yuan (approximately $172.5 million USD). [9] According to the Economy, Trade and Information Bureau of Yuan'an County, Wanshan had previously traded with North Korea as of 2009, but the Bureau does not specifically disclose the type of trade that occurred. [10]

Before Wanshan's website's sudden removal from the internet, the WS51200 was advertised as a civilian heavy-duty off-road vehicle with eight axles, an American Cummins KTTA19 C700 diesel engine, and a German ZF Friedrichshafen WSK440+16S251 automatic transmission. [11] While this vehicle is marketed for civilian applications such as hauling lumber, coal, and fuel, Wanshan produces other WS-series vehicles for use as TELs by China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). These vehicles support ballistic and cruise missiles, some of which were developed by Wanshan's parent company CASIC. The short-range Dong Feng-11 (DF-11) uses the 8×8 WS-2400 series TEL, as do some DF-15s (or alternatively the TAS5450 TEL), and the Dong Hai-10 cruise missile. The DF-21C uses the newer WS-2500 TEL. [12]

Figure 2: MZKT-79221 carrying the SS-27 Topol-M ICBM (Source: Wikipedia.org)

Wanshan rated the WS51200 as 122 tons in total weight, 20.11 meters long, 3.35 meters wide, and 3.35 meters high, with a wheel diameter of 1.6 meters. [13] Interestingly, analyst Nick Hansen assesses the 122 ton WS51200 vehicle to be oversized for North Korea's KN-08 design, which is estimated to weigh approximately 35 to 40 tons. [14] Rather, Hansen finds the WS51200 comparable to the MZKT-79221 vehicle used by Russia for its SS-27 Topol-M ICBM, a much more substantial and weighty missile (see figure 2). [15] The similarity is not a complete coincidence, because in 2006 Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company, Ltd.'s parent company, Sanjiang Space Industry Group, set up a joint venture with Minsk Plant of Wheeled Carriers Belarus, which produces the MZKT-79221. [16] Perhaps North Korea felt comfortable with this design because it obtained Belarusian vehicles from the same design family in the early 2000s and modified them for use with its Musudan IRBM. [17] Similarly, this was a case of too much truck for the missile, as the 12 meter Musudan only uses a fraction of the 17 meter TEL. [18]

Wanshan's Export: Embarrassing Mistake or Calculated Sanctions Busting?

The apparent transaction was complex (see figure 3). Shortly after the first sighting of the TEL in the 15 April parade, a commenter on the Arms Control Wonk blog posted two links. The first was to an October 2010 China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) announcement of a WS51200 sale to a foreign party worth 30 million yuan (approximately $4.7 million USD). [19] The announcement went so far as to note the importance of developing the civilian trade of "military-civilian dual-use" technology [九院高度重视超重型越野车军民两用技术应用和民贸的开发工作]. [20] A second link, also from CASIC, noted that the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council reported in May 2011 on the successful delivery of WS51200 vehicles to an unnamed customer, who was satisfied with the vehicles' performance and wished to continue cooperation. [21]

In June 2012, the Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun reported that Japanese officials from the 5th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters Based in Kobe, operating on intelligence from Japan, South Korea, and the United States, boarded the ship Harmony Wish on 3 October 2011 at Osaka Port. [22] Documents recovered from the ship indicated that a North Korean front company known as Rimmok General Trading solicited the WS51200 vehicles from Wuhan Sanjiang Import & Export Co. based in China. [23] According to the documents, four WS51200 were delivered to North Korea after completion in May 2011, and four more were delivered in August 2011. This documents the transfer of eight vehicles, six of which were most likely on display in Pyongyang’s 15 April 2012 parade. [24]

Figure 3: Diagram of the Alleged Transaction (Source: CNS)

The Harmony Wish — a Cambodian-flagged ship operated by a Chinese company named Dalian Qingsong Co. with a Chinese and Burmese crew — delivered the August 2011 shipment of four WS51200 vehicles. [25] The ship left Shanghai, China on 1 August 2011 and arrived at the Port of Nampho in North Korea on 4 August 2011. [26]

The Chinese government has been tightlipped about the transaction. In public statements, Beijing has categorically denied that its enterprises, "exported any items prohibited by relevant UN Security Council resolutions and Chinese laws and regulations," to the DPRK. [27] However, some details about the transaction have surfaced, and Chinese leaders have reportedly talked with some outside governments about these allegations. [28] Chinese officials have also asserted that the exported vehicles "were intended for civilian use to mainly transport large pieces of lumber." [29] According to a June 2012 blog post by Mark Hibbs of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the intended end-user was "the DPRK Ministry of Forestry, a government agency that was squarely responsible for civilian-use activities having to do with public welfare and economic development and which had not been previously identified as a player in North Korea's ballistic missile or nuclear programs." [30] Despite the general dearth of economic activities in North Korea, the country was experiencing a (relative) construction boom in 2011 leading up to Kim Il Sung's centennial celebrations, which fueled growth in the forestry sector. [31]

There is little information about Wanshan's previous export activities. It is possible that if Wanshan was indeed already engaged in the trade of heavy-duty off-road vehicles with a party or parties in North Korea by 2009, that it became lax on the compliance side of the relationship, or engaged in willful blindness at the prospect of a multi-million dollar sale. However, a previous trade relationship with North Korea also makes it less likely that inexperience or naiveté played a role. Regardless, given that Wanshan's website disappeared precipitously from the worldwide web in the days after the parade, it seems likely that a powerful entity in China is looking into the case.

China is obliged by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to prevent the transfer of items and technology that could support North Korea's missile program. UNSC Resolution 1718, specifically decides that,

UNSC Resolution 1874 further reinforces and expands on the decision. Both of the North Korea-specific resolutions were drafted in response to Pyongyang's missile and nuclear tests, and as a member of the Security Council China played a central role in developing the texts.

While China is not yet a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it maintains its own domestic export control regulations and a control list for missile-related materials that very closely resembles the MTCR list. The control list includes, "vehicles designed or modified for the transport, handling, control, activation and launching of the systems in Item 1," which are: "ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missile and unmanned air vehicles that can be used to deliver at least a 500 kg payload to a range of at least 300 km." [33] Exports of items on this control list are restricted and require export licenses. Therefore, if Wanshan believed the item to be a military export, it would have had to apply for export per "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies."

Even if Wanshan believed the vehicle to be a dual-use item intended for lumber, China requires exporters to follow the "Measures for the Administration on Import and Export License for Dual-use Items and Technologies," as administered by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (MOFCOM). [34] This regulation includes a control list (in Chinese), which under "Ground Equipment" includes a provision for vehicles which verbatim duplicates the description listed above for regular missile-related exports. [35]

Additionally, China's export controls include a catch-all requirement that notes "where the exporter knows or should know" that the commodity it is exporting may "have the risk of being used in weapons of mass destruction and their related means of delivery, an export license shall be applied for towards the items and technologies concerned, whether included in the Controlling List or not, and an export license for dual-use items and technologies shall be handled in accordance with these Measures." [36]

It is unlikely that Wanshan could be unaware of these export requirements. According to the Ministry of Commerce, "export control regulations of China explicitly states that exporting enterprises should establish and improve the internal control mechanism for dual-use items and technologies." [37] A company as large and well-connected as Wanshan should indeed have such an internal compliance program, and should be well-aware of the export requirements for vehicles such as the WS51200, given that other WS-series vehicles are used as missile TELs by the Chinese military.

Some Explaining to Do: China's Underwhelming Transparency with the International Community

In the days after the 15 April parade, the UN Security Council committed to investigate the case. However, a senior official was quoted as saying that "political pressure not to implicate China in sanctions infringements may limit the panel's room to maneuver." [38] At the same time, the UNSCR 1874 Panel of Experts (POE) was preparing its 2012 annual report. According to Mark Hibbs, Beijing "would not accept draft reporting by the POE concerning equipment from China that showed up during a well-publicized military parade in Pyongyang earlier this year and was identified as TELs for new North Korean ballistic missiles." [39] Indeed, the POE report includes a photo of the KN-08 missile on its TEL, but makes no mention of the origin of the vehicle. [40]

It is not in China's strategic interests to support a road-mobile ICBM force in North Korea. China's goal on the Korean Peninsula is stability, because its greatest fear is the humanitarian disaster of a collapsed North Korea, followed closely by the possibility of sharing a border with a unified Korea allied with the United States. Supporting North Korea's ICBM program would undermine these goals, making it likely the TEL transfer was either accidental or the decision of a small number of individuals who prioritized their financial enrichment over larger Chinese strategic goals.

Unfortunately, until authorities in Beijing choose to disclose more public details on this case, it will be difficult to assess the full story and the extent to which the state-owned companies involved knowingly violated Chinese export controls and UN sanctions. If Wanshan engaged in willful blindness, this puts China and its state-owned enterprises in a very embarrassing position. Regardless, it is in China's best interests to actively participate in the investigation of the transaction. All members of the Security Council have faced embarrassment over export control violations, some of which were more severe than the transfer of the eight TELs. Regrettably, absent more transparency from Beijing, China will continue to leave itself open to critics who insinuate that the country is explicitly supporting North Korea's missile program to the detriment of its international reputation and regional relationships. If the export was not sanctioned by the Chinese government, it will remain unclear whether Beijing is taking steps to close the loopholes in its dual-use export controls that made possible the transfer. And more broadly, useful lessons that can be used to strengthen regional and international dual-use control efforts will remain undisclosed, aiding neither Chinese nor international security.

Sources:
[1] See: Jeffrey Lewis, "Real Fake Missiles?," Arms Control Wonk, 1 May 2012, https://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com.
[2] Lee Sangheon, "김태영 국방 장관 “북, IRBM 등 미사일 1천여기 보유" [North Korea Possesses 1,000 Missiles Including IRBM, Says Defense Minister Kim Tae-young]," The Hankyoreh, 17 March 2010, www.hani.co.kr.
[3] "Unha (Paektusan)," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 10 May 2012; Nick Hansen, "North Korea's New Long-range Missile: Fact or Fiction?," 38 North, 4 May 2012, https://38north.org.
[4] Lewis argues that the Taepodong also had similar mockups called "missile simulators" by the U.S.: Jeffrey Lewis, "Real Fake Missiles?," Arms Control Wonk, 1 May 2012, https://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com; Hansen argues that North Korea would not have invested so many resources on a "fake" missile: Nick Hansen, "North Korea's New Long-range Missile: Fact or Fiction?," 38 North, 4 May 2012, https://38north.org; Schiller and Schmucker's articles: Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, "A Dog and Pony Show: North Korea's New ICBM," Schmucker Technologie, 18 April 2012, via: https://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com; Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, "Assumed KN-08 Technology: Addendum to the April 18, 2012 Paper 'A Dog and Pony Show'," Schmucker Technologie, 26 April 2012, via: https://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com.
[5] John Barry, "The Defense Secretary's Exit Interview," Newsweek, 21 June 2011, www.thedailybeast.com; See also: Robert Gates, "The 10th IISS Asia Security Summit, The Shangri-La Dialogue, First Plenary Session Q&A," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 4 June 2011, www.iiss.org.
[6] Nick Hansen, "North Korea's New Long-range Missile: Fact or Fiction?," 38 North, 4 May 2012, https://38north.org.
[7] "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR): North Korea's Missile Program," Wikileaks id #228552, 11 July 2011, https://wikileaks.org, alleged to be a diplomatic cable of the U.S. Department of State, dated 6 October 2009.
[8] Note: Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Co. Ltd's website: www.wstech.com.cn has has since been taken offline.
[9] "湖北三江航天万山特种车辆有限公司 [Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company, Ltd.]," China Sanjiang Space Group, 31 March 2011, www.cssg.com.cn.
[10] "湖北三江航天万山特种车辆有限公司 [Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Company, Ltd.]," Yuan'an County Economy, Trade and Information Bureau, 23 July 2009, https://jjsw.yuanan.gov.cn.
[11] Note: Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Co. Ltd's website: www.wstech.com.cn has has since been taken offline.
[12] Sean O'Connor, "The PLA's Second Artillery Corps," I&A, Vol. 1, No. 11, December 2011.
[13] Note: Hubei Sanjiang Space Wanshan Special Vehicle Co. Ltd's website: www.wstech.com.cn has has since been taken offline.
[14] Nick Hansen estimates that the KN-08 and the launching and erecting modifications total only 45-50 tons. Nick Hansen, "North Korea's New Long-range Missile: Fact or Fiction?," 38 North, 4 May 2012, https://38north.org.
[15] Nick Hansen, "North Korea's New Long-range Missile: Fact or Fiction?," 38 North, 4 May 2012, https://38north.org.
[16] "Sanjiang Company, Minsk Plant of Wheeled Carriers to Set up Joint Venture in Belarus," Belarusian Telegraph Agency, 14 November 2006, https://news.belta.by; "Супермашины для «Темпа», «Тополя» и «Целины» [The Super-machines of the Tempa, Topol, and Tselin Transporters]," VOLAT, 2011, www.mzkt.by.
[17] Nick Hansen, "North Korea's New Long-range Missile: Fact or Fiction?," 38 North, 4 May 2012, https://38north.org.
[18] Nick Hansen, "North Korea's New Long-range Missile: Fact or Fiction?," 38 North, 4 May 2012, https://38north.org.
[19] Commenter "Koxinga," 15 April 2012, on Joshua Pollack, "North Korea's ICBM Unveiled," Arms Control Wonk, 15 April 2012, https://pollack.armscontrolwonk.com.
[20] Zhang Fengyi, "九院: 首次获大型非公路运输车批量出口订单 [9th Academy: First Time Heavy-Duty Off-Road Vehicle Bulk Export Order]," ed. Hai Rong, China Aerospace & Industry Corp., 19 October 2010, www.casic.com.cn.
[21] "国资委网站：中国航天科工研制成功国内最大越野运输车 [State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission Website: CASIC Successfully Develops the Nation's Largest Off-Road Vehicle]," China Aerospace & Industry Corp., 26 May 2011, www.casic.com.cn; "中国航天科工研制成功国内最大越野运输车 [CASIC Successfully Develops the Nation's Largest Off-Road Vehicle]," State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, 26 May 2011, www.sasac.gov.cn.
[22] "Document Confirms Chinese Firm Sold Missile Transport Vehicles to N. Korea," Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2012, https://ajw.asahi.com. Unfortunately, the English version of the article erroneously refers to China Aerospace & Industry Corp. as China Aerospace & Technology Corp., please see the Japanese version of the article for the correct name: "中国、北朝鮮に軍用車両　昨年８月　安保理決議に違反 [China Transfers Military Vehicles to North Korea in August in Violation of Security Council Resolution]," Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2012, www.asahi.com.
[23] "中国、北朝鮮に軍用車両　昨年８月　安保理決議に違反 [China Transfers Military Vehicles to North Korea in August in Violation of Security Council Resolution]," Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2012, www.asahi.com.
[24] "Document Confirms Chinese Firm Sold Missile Transport Vehicles to N. Korea," Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2012, https://ajw.asahi.com. Unfortunately, the English version of the article erroneously refers to China Aerospace & Industry Corp. as China Aerospace & Technology Corp., please see the Japanese version of the article for the correct name: "中国、北朝鮮に軍用車両　昨年８月　安保理決議に違反 [China Transfers Military Vehicles to North Korea in August in Violation of Security Council Resolution]," Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2012, www.asahi.com.
[25] Asahi notes that the name of the Chinese shipping firm Dalian Qingsong Co. is similar to that of a North Korean entity Qingsong Group which was sanctioned in May 2012 in response to North Korea's failed launch of the Unha-3. However, the name Qingsong (Green Pine) is a common name in China. Yoshihiro Makino, "Chinese Shipper May Have Ties to N. Korean Arms Dealer," Asahi Shimbun, 25 June 2012, https://ajw.asahi.com.
[26] "Document Confirms Chinese Firm Sold Missile Transport Vehicles to N. Korea," Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2012, https://ajw.asahi.com. Unfortunately, the English version of the article erroneously refers to China Aerospace & Industry Corp. as China Aerospace & Technology Corp., please see the Japanese version of the article for the correct name: "中国、北朝鮮に軍用車両　昨年８月　安保理決議に違反 [China Transfers Military Vehicles to North Korea in August in Violation of Security Council Resolution]," Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2012, www.asahi.com.
[27] "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Weimin's Regular Press Conference on June 13, 2012," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 14 June 2012, www.fmprc.gov.cn.
[28] Mark Hibbs, "China and the POE DPRK Report," Arms Control Wonk, 2 July 2012, https://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com.
[29] "Document Confirms Chinese Firm Sold Missile Transport Vehicles to N. Korea," Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2012, https://ajw.asahi.com. Unfortunately, the English version of the article erroneously refers to China Aerospace & Industry Corp. as China Aerospace & Technology Corp., please see the Japanese version of the article for the correct name: "中国、北朝鮮に軍用車両　昨年８月　安保理決議に違反 [China Transfers Military Vehicles to North Korea in August in Violation of Security Council Resolution]," Asahi Shimbun, 13 June 2012, www.asahi.com.
[30] Mark Hibbs, "China and the POE DPRK Report," Arms Control Wonk, 2 July 2012, https://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com.
[31] Christine Kim, "North Korean Economy Posts Rare Growth in 2011 – Seoul," Reuters, 7 July 2012, www.reuters.com.
[32] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1718 (2006)," 14 October 2006, www.un.org.
[33] Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies," 13 September 2007, https://cys2.mofcom.gov.cn.
[34] Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, "Measures for the Administration on Import and Export License for Dual-use Items and Technologies," 31 December 2005, https://english.mofcom.gov.cn.
[35] Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, "商务部、海关总署公告2011年第101号 发布«两用物项和技术进出口许可证管理目录»[Announcement No. 101, 2011 of the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China on the Catalogue of Dual-Use Items and Technologies Subject to Import and Export License Administration]," 31 December 2011, www.mofcom.gov.cn; link to Excel control list at bottom "两用物项和技术进出口许可证管理目录."
[36] Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, "Measures for the Administration on Import and Export License for Dual-use Items and Technologies," 31 December 2005, https://english.mofcom.gov.cn.
[37] Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, "MOFCOM Guideline on Internal Export Control Mechanism for "Dual-Use" Enterprises," 14 September 2007, https://xxhs2.mofcom.gov.cn.
[38] James Hardy, "Update: UNSC Investigating Chinese Link to North Korean TEL," Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 April 2012.
[39] Mark Hibbs, "China and the POE DPRK Report," Arms Control Wonk, 2 July 2012, https://hibbs.armscontrolwonk.com.
[40] United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)," S/2012/422, 14 June 2012, www.un.org. For additional analysis, see: Jeffrey Lewis, "Assessing the DPRK Panel of Experts," 38 North, 17 July 2012, https://38north.org.