Cristina Chuen
Senior Research Associate, The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy plans to commercially import, temporarily store, reprocess, and repatriate spent nuclear fuel (material that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, or SNF). Illegal until July 2001, opponents continue to protest against the project, and fight to amend Russian laws yet again. Minatom avers that it needs SNF import profits to fund domestic SNF reprocessing and environmental remediation, while arguing that the project will help it promote its other exports as well as decrease global proliferation risks. Opponents counter that Russia will be unable to handle the additional SNF safely, may store the material indefinitely instead of reprocess it, will not reap the profits it claims or spent them on the environment, and would instead increase proliferation risks. Russia's plans hinge in large part upon U.S. decisions, as the United States controls some 80 percent of the world's SNF. At present, the U.S. administration has stated that authorization of U.S.-origin SNF exports to Russia hinge upon the cancellation of Russian nuclear projects in Iran. Nonproliferation experts have argued that the considerable U.S. leverage in this matter should be used to insist upon several other Russian concessions as well, including some degree of control over the spending of SNF import profits.
For much of the last decade, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) has promoted the idea of importing, temporarily storing, reprocessing, and repatriating spent nuclear fuel (material that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, or SNF) as a means for generating revenue. However, Article 50 of the Russian Environmental Protection Law of 1991 [1] prohibited the "import for storing or burying of radioactive waste and materials from abroad…." Although Russian law allowed the import of such materials for reprocessing, Government Decree No. 773 of 29 July 1995 obligated Minatom to send back the radioactive waste resulting from the reprocessing of SNF to its country of origin within thirty days.[2] The only exception was the fulfillment of contracts that predated the environmental protection law for the repatriation of SNF from nuclear power plants (NPPs) that the Soviet Union helped construct, in countries such as Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Finland, Bulgaria, Armenia, and Kazakhstan. Most of these contracts expired in the mid-1990s. Minatom continued to push for amendments to legislation and promoted its spent fuel import plan, while environmentalists in particular fought against any legal changes. Spent fuel imports were finally legalized in July 2001.
On 10 July 2001, President Putin signed a package of laws that would allow the import of irradiated spent fuel into Russia for "technical storage" and "reprocessing." Article 50 (Section 3) of the Environment Protection Law was amended so as to differentiate between SNF and radioactive waste.[3] Minatom had argued that spent fuel is a valuable energy resource.[4] It also cited the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, passed in Vienna in September 1998 and signed by the Russian Federation on 27 January 1999, which distinguishes between "spent nuclear fuel" and "radioactive waste."[5]
This legal change was much fought over, and may still be amended. Large demonstrations have been held protesting against SNF imports, most recently in November 2002.[6] In 2000, some 200 organizations gathered signatures to force a referendum on the issue. Although 2,561,000 signatures were submitted to regional election commissions on 25 October 2000, the Russian courts found that 800,000 were invalid (2 million signatures are required), many for technicalities such as "incorrect" street abbreviations.[7,8] The Yabloko political party in particular has made subsequent efforts to gather signatures and hold a referendum, but to date no referendum has been held. In addition, Yabloko deputy Sergey Mitrokhin has pushed for an investigation into the feasibility study Minatom presented to the Duma when it was considering the laws. According to Mitrokhin, reprocessing costs were understated and returns wildly overstated.[9] Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of Russia's Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor), has pointed out other oversights in Minatom's analysis, including "incorrect" assessments of transport problems, the failure of transport containers to meet international standards, and the unsuitability of Mayak for imported SNF storage.[10]
Some Russian papers have also suggested that the current National Security Concept, adopted in January 2000, might lead to alterations in the laws on SNF imports, since it identifies the main environmental danger to Russia as "a trend toward the use of Russian territory as a place for reprocessing and burying environmentally dangerous materials and substances." However, there is no indication at present that a new edition of the security concept will expand upon this statement or that the Russian government intends to stop Minatom's SNF import plans for security reasons.[11]
In its argument to the Duma in support of the legal change, Minatom laid out six benefits:
The political party Yabloko, environmentalists, and others opposed to spent fuel imports have voiced the following concerns:
Although Minatom has yet to begin importing spent fuel from NPPs it did not help construct, it has been negotiating with potential customers for some time. On 17 September 1998, Minatom subsidiary Tekhsnabeksport signed its first letter of intent, with Internexco (a Tekhsnabeksport subsidiary, in Germany)[39] and the Swiss company Suisse Utilities, on the import of over 2,000 tons of SNF for reprocessing and subsequent repatriation between 2000 and 2030.[37] The following year contacts were made with the nuclear industries of Switzerland, Germany, Spain, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.[40]
However, some 80 percent of the non-Russian origin nuclear fuel in the world is of U.S. origin, and as such remains under U.S. control. Other countries cannot send U.S.-origin SNF for storage or reprocessing to third nations without U.S. consent, and under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, the United States must negotiate a Section 123 agreement for nuclear cooperation in order to give such permission. Minatom is very aware of this issue, and has been trying to persuade the U.S. Department of Energy to begin such negotiations. On 23 December 1998, Adamov sent a letter to then U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson proposing a joint study of options for the temporary storage and subsequent reprocessing of U.S. spent nuclear fuel in Russia, both with and without its eventual repatriation to the United States.[41,42] Although Richardson declined this initial proposal, he did say that the United States was looking forward to further discussions.[42]
The U.S. government has yet to agree to the Russian SNF import plan, objecting to Minatom's reprocessing plans due to plutonium proliferation concerns as well as to Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran. In April 2000, Minatom reportedly suggested that a 20-year long moratorium on reprocessing of nuclear spent fuel should be established in exchange for U.S. assistance in the construction of a dry storage facility.[43] In any event, Minatom has no plans to begin reprocessing for the first 40-60 years, as noted above.
Nevertheless, Russia has continued to construct nuclear power reactors in Iran, despite U.S. objections, and is even considering bidding for a contract to construct additional reactors after the completion of Bushehr.[44] In October 2002, Undersecretary of State John Bolton said that the U.S. had proposed a deal in which "if the Russians end their sensitive cooperation with Iran…we would be prepared to favorably consider" transfers to Russia of U.S.-origin spent fuel held in third countries for long-term storage.[45] In "Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action," Matthew Bunn, John Holdren and Anthony Wier point out that the United States should not use all of its considerable leverage on the Iran issue. They suggest insisting that a portion of the revenues be spent on securing and destroying WMD stockpiles. In addition, they argue that effective arrangements (including independent regulation) of the entire operation, the elimination of excess plutonium stockpiles, and a democratic process whereby those most affected by the project might have their concerns effectively addressed, should also be criteria for determining if the project contributes to international security and deserves support.[46]
Tom Cochran, a physicist at the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C., developed the idea of establishing a non-profit trust located outside of Russia that would control the spent fuel profits, assist in the creation of a safe geologic repository for SNF in Russia, and make sure that all additional profits are spent on securing fissile material, environmental remediation, and the provision of alternative jobs for nuclear workers as well as support for pensioners and orphans, while no funds would be spent on reprocessing plants.[47] A trust, named the Nonproliferation Trust (NPT) Inc., was then established,[48] and on 5 May 1999 Minatom and NPT signed a memorandum, according to which NPT would hold title to the fuel in storage.[47] An additional agreement, signed on 25 October 1999, also mentions the receipt and disposal of radioactive wastes. That agreement specifies that after 40 years, the spent fuel could be removed to another "duly authorized location" or transferred to Minatom for ultimate disposition, at NPT II's sole discretion. According to the second agreement, the spent fuel would never be converted for weapons use or be reprocessed, even were its ownership transferred to Minatom. The spent fuel would be stored in accordance with Russian and IAEA safety requirements and the storage facility under Gosatomnadzor review.[49] [For more information on NPT, see the Spent Fuel Imports Overview in the NIS Nuclear Profiles Database.]
Some nuclear industry sources have reportedly questioned who will accept liability for the operations and how the money will be raised up-front. Foreign utilities, they argued, would be unlikely to commit large sums of money unless they could send their fuel for permanent disposal. At a conference in September 2002, Kurchatov Institute Deputy Director Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy voiced his opposition to the project because at the end of the project the long-term interim cask storage facility would remain the property of the trust, the foreign SNF would remain in Russia, and the project would not have paid for construction of a final repository, he said. Reportedly USEC, Inc., the managers of the U.S.-Russian "Megawatts to Megatons" program, also known as the HEU-LEU deal, have also indicated their interest in involvement in SNF imports, which might be modeled after the HEU deal.[50] Others have questioned whether Russia would agree to have all profits devoted to the purposes NPT proposed. Russian environmentalists and even the Duma Environmental Committee have worried about the plan to hold the funds earned in accounts outside Russia, and thus outside the control of both Minatom and the Russian government.[42] Environmentalists often argue that the import plan could be a Western plot to dump its waste in Russia and leave it there, and that the Russian government would have little recourse. While this objection should be dealt with, the project offers the transparency and clarity of purpose (and ability to audit funds) that the United States has the leverage to insist upon.
If Russia can come to an accommodation with the United States regarding Russia's nuclear reactor projects in Iran, the United States has suggested it would conclude a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia and authorize the export of U.S.-origin SNF to Russia. Although Minatom statements regarding the possible profits resulting from SNF import plans far exceed the revenues from constructing reactors in Iran (particularly since the construction projects are all funded from cheap loans offered by Russia itself), Russia has yet to indicate that it might consider dropping its Iran projects. However, it seems likely that an agreement will eventually be concluded. If the United States accedes to something less than cancellation of Russia's projects in Iran, it should push for further transparency of the Iranian program, and ask Russia to demand that Iran sign the Additional Protocol that would make spot inspections by the IAEA possible.
The SNF import project has been touted as a possible source of funding for plutonium disposition and safer storage of Russian SNF. However, Minatom never agreed to use these funds for plutonium disposition, and instead expects international assistance to turn plutonium into MOX fuel. Otherwise, Minatom plans to maintain its surplus plutonium stocks. If Minatom can be persuaded to dispose of excess plutonium, it is unclear why the ministry should be required to fund plutonium disposal itself (in much of the world, the defense industry doesn't fund itself and polluters aren't required to fund clean-up projects by earning money handling additional waste).
On the negative side, the SNF import plans create a market for spent fuel and radioactive waste. Kazakhstan has already proposed its own SNF import plans, while Minatom is likely to argue for the import of radioactive wastes if the level of SNF imports is less than expected. In addition, the plan promotes a closed fuel cycle market and the attendant increase in materials of proliferation concern. Finally, the United States is putting itself at political risk by allowing the import of U.S.-origin fuel, even if it is able to control much of the earnings (through an arrangement such as the Non-Proliferation Trust) and assists in the construction of safe storage facilities and helps insure the safety of SNF transport. The United States is likely to be blamed in the event of any accident with U.S.-origin or other spent fuel, unless the process is opened up to local and national politicians, and there is oversight by Gosatomnadzor and Russian citizens. The Russian public will surely blame a new influx of SNF for stressing their SNF storage system to the brink of collapse, and argue that the storage of imported SNF in "safe" storage facilities takes up space that may otherwise have been used for Russian material (even if the facility might not have been built without SNF import money). While opening up the process with have no affect on legal liability, it will make a great difference in public opinion, and thus increase the likelihood that an accident would affect U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation in other areas. Without democratic involvement, it will be difficult to control Minatom, while other Russian organizations are unlikely to promote project success, help alleviate project problems, or shoulder the responsibility for dealing with Russia's own legacy of spent nuclear fuel.
[1] Russian Federation Law No. 2060-1, On Environmental Protection, 19 December 1991.
[2] "Ob itogakh deyantelnosti Departamenta yaderno-toplivnogo tsikla v 2002 godu," Minatom, https://old.minatom.ru, 28 July 2003.
[3] "Russia May Make $10 Bln Processing Used Nuclear Fuel," Interfax, 23 June 1999.
[4] "Zampred komiteta Dumy po ekologii protiv popravki, razreshayushchey vvoz v Rossiyu yadernykh otkhodov," Interfax, No.2, 10 October 2000.
[5] Yuriy Sazonov, "Minatom predlagayet alternativu kreditam MVF," Nezavisimaya gazeta online edition, www.ng.ru, 29 June 1999.
[6] Charles Digges, "Minatom and Environmentalists Square Off on Ministry Steps Over SNF Imports," Bellona, www.bellona.no, 22 November 2002.
[7] Galina Stolyarova, "Groups Seek National Vote on Waste Import," St. Petersburg Times, 29 August 2000.
[8] "Eko-referendum: podpisi sobrany, debaty prodolzhayutsya," Ekologiya i prava cheloveka, 26 October 2000.
[9] TVS, Moscow, 9 August 2002; in BBC Worldwide Monitoring; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[10] Charles Digges, "Minatom's Starry-Eyed Import Plans Defy Safety Imperatives and Business Sense," Bellona, www.bellona.no, 25 July 2002.
[11] See Paul Webster, "The Grab for Trash," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 58, No. 5 (September-October 2002); and Leonid Ivashov, "Yest li u Rossii sistema natsionalnoy bezopasnosti?" Pravda, 14 November 2002, in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.ru.
[12] Gennadiy Voskresenskiy, "Iskusheniye ‘otkhodami,'" Vek, No.13, 2-8 April 1999, p. 8.
[13] Rossiyskaya gazeta, www.rg.ru, 13 July 2001.
[14] "Problemy obrashcheniya s OYaT," Duma i kontrol nad vooruzheniyami, Electronic News Bulletin, PIR-Center, www.pircenter.org, November 2000.
[15] "Problemy obrashcheniya s OYaT," Duma i kontrol nad vooruzheniyami, Electronic News Bulletin, PIR-Center, www.pircenter.org, December 2000.
[16] Gleb Pyanykh, "Otkhodnyy promysel Minatoma," Kommersant-Vlast, No. 29, 27 July 1999, pp. 18-22.
[17] Ekaterina Chistyakova, "Russia Wants to Store World's Radioactive Waste," Environment News Service, www.lycos.com, 8 September 1999.
[18] Nadezhda Simonova, "Pod znakom Kyuri," Vechernyaya Moskva, 10 February 1999; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.ru.
[19] "Russian Duma Votes Down Proposal to Allow Import of Spent Fuel," Nuclear Weapons & Material Monitor, Vol. 3, No. 20, 30 August 1999.
[20] Viktor Svinin, "Oligarkhi derutsya – problema ne reshayetsya," Tomskiy vestnik, 10 July 1999, pp. 1-2; in WPS Yadernyye Materialy, No. 26, 23 July 1999.
[21] Yevgeniy Velikhov, "Na radiatsionnuyu bezopasnost nuzhno zarabatyvat," Moskovskiye novosti, No. 27, 20-26 July 1999.
[22] Andrey Lukin, "Minatom khochet, chtoby nashi deti vyrosli na yadernoy pomoyke," Komsomolskaya pravda, https://home.mosinfo.ru, No. 138, 29 July 1999.
[23] Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya "Obrashcheniye s obluchennym yadernym toplivom 2002: novyye initsiativy Rossii," 8-12 September 2002, www.tenex.ru.
[24] "Ugroza bezopasnosti zhizni rossiyan iskhodit iz Minatoma i Gosdumy," Yabloko Press Service, 27 February 1999; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.ru.
[25] "Ministerstvo RF po atomnoy energii k kontsu 2004 goda planiruyet uvelichit obyom khranilishcha obluchennogo yadernogo topliva," Ural Business Consulting, www.uralbusinessconsulting.ru, 10 July 2002.
[26] "Krasnoyarsk-26/Zheleznogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine," Federation of the American Scientists, www.fas.org.
[27] "Rossiya mozhet zarabotat $20 mlrd. za 10 let na khranenii zarubezhnogo otrabotannogo yadernogo topliva, schitayut v Minatome," Interfax, 31 October 2000.
[28] Aleksey Tarasov, "Radiatsionnaya zona Rossiya," Izvestiya, 3 June 1999; in WPS Yadernyye Materialy, No. 20, 4 June 1999.
[29] Report from the Zheleznogorsk Mining and Chemical Combine, NTV, 14 February 2002; in "Russia: Siberian Krasnoyarsk-26 nuclear storage to increase capacity," FBIS Document CEP20020216000146.
[30] Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. February 2002, www.ymp.gov.
[31] Yevgeniya Musikhina, "Zhdat li Uralu novykh yadernykh poyezdov?" Gudok, 16 February 1999 p. 3; in WPS Yadernyye Materialy, No. 7, 19 February 1999.
[32] Valeriy Bogdan, Viktor Murogov, Vladimir Kagramanyan, Mikhail Troyanov, "Ispolzovaniye plutoniya v Rossii," Yadernyy kontrol, November 1995, pp. 13-17.
[33] "Zavod po regeneratsii obluchennogo yadernogo topliva (RT-1)," Minatom, www.integrum.ru.
[34] Yuriy Medvedev, "Na radioaktivnom rasputye," Izvestiya, www.online.ru, No. 179, 24 September 1999.
[35] "Poyasnitelnaya zapiska k proyektu federalnogo zakona ‘O promyshlennom khranenii i pererabotke otrabotavshego yadernogo topliva,'" Zelenyy mir, No. 12, 25 May 1999, p. 4.
[36] Zelenyy mir, No. 21, 20 October 1999, p. 3.
[37] TVTs, 21 April 2001; in TsRPI Monitoring Teleefira; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.ru.
[38] Andrey Galkin, RIA Novosti, 26 April 1999; in "Zhirinovskiy: Profit for Russia Handling Nuclear Waste," FBIS Document FTS19990426000750.
[39] "Internexco Handels GmbH," Anti-Atom, www.anti-atom.de.
[40] "Russia Seeks To Reprocess the World's Spent Fuel," Nuclear Weapons & Materials Monitor, 1 February 1999, p. 3.
[41] "Richardson Tells Russia 'No Thanks' on Reprocessing But Offers Vague Support for Work on Storage," SpentFuel, Vol. 6, No. 252, 19 April 1999, pp. 3-4.
[42] Letter "O nedopustimosti naznacheniya Ministrom Rossiyskoy Federatsii po atomnoy energii E.O. Adamova" to acting Prime Minister V.V. Putin from the Chairwoman of the Russian State Duma Committee on the Environment T.V.Zlotnikova, 16 August 1999.
[43] P. Brown, "Ecology and the Human Rights," The Guardian; in "Nam vse eshche navyazyvayut chuzhiye RAO," Zelenyy mir, No. 19-20, September 2000.
[44] Angela Charlton, "Russia Expands Nuke Ties With Iran," Associated Press, 26 July 2002.
[45] Ann MacLachlan, "Bushehr Spent Fuel Accord Said to be Advancing as U.S. Seeks Russian Exit," NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 22 (28 October 2002), p. 3.
[46] Matthew Bunn, John P. Holdren, and Anthony Weir, "Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate Action," Harvard University, May 2002, www.bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu, pp. 77-78.
[47] "Russia Considers International Waste Stores," Nuclear Engineering International, July 1999, p. 23.
[48] FAQ, NPT, www.nptinternational.com.
[49] Non-Proliferation Trust II, Long-Term Fissile Materials Safeguards and Security Project, Unpublished Draft, 25 October 1999.
[50] Ann MacLachlan, "Moscow Conference Vets Key Hurdles to Any Russian Spent-Fuel Import Deal," NuclearFuel, Vol. 27, No. 19 (16 September 2002), p.1.
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