Fact Sheet

Saudi Arabia Missile Overview

Saudi Arabia Missile Overview

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Background

This page is part of the Saudi Arabia Country Profile.

Saudi Arabia has a limited ballistic missile arsenal consisting of the Chinese Dongfeng-3 (DF-3; NATO: CSS-2), and reportedly the Dongfeng-21 (DF-21; NATO: CSS-5). 1 Riyadh has not demonstrated an interest in developing an indigenous missile program.

Although China originally designed both the DF-3 and DF-21 to carry nuclear payloads, the DF-3s were modified to deliver conventional warheads before being transferred to Saudi Arabia. 2 Similarly, Saudi Arabia’s DF-21s have reportedly been modified to carry only conventional warheads. 3 Riyadh does not possess WMD, and has pledged that it will not arm the missiles with unconventional payloads. 4

Capabilities

Ballistic Missiles

Until recently, Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile arsenal was believed to be limited to the Chinese Dongfeng-3 (DF-3; NATO: CSS-2), purchased from China in 1987. The DF-3 is a road mobile, liquid fuelled, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). With a range of 2500km, the DF-3 has extensive regional reach. Saudi Arabia deploys the DF-3 at two confirmed sites: Al-Joffer, northwest of Riyadh, and As-Sulayyil, southwest of Riyadh. 5 Although not independently confirmed, analyst Sean O’Connor identified two additional DF-3 launch sites in 2009 at Rawdah, 280 km west of As-Sulayyil, in the far northwestern desert region. 6 In July 2013, O’Connor released a new report identifying a potential missile base at al-Watah. 7 O’Connor’s analysis noted two launch pads with orientation lines aimed at Israel and Iran, serving to expedite the launch process by providing parking-lines, or guidelines, for the placement of the mobile launch vehicle to target a given area. 8

Even so, the DF-3 is a highly inaccurate missile, and would therefore be ineffective against discrete military or tactical targets when equipped with a conventional warhead. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has never tested the DF-3, which would be critical for ensuring its reliability and training missile forces. 9 Riyadh is dependent upon China to maintain and operate the DF-3, which further limits the missile’s military utility. 10 In a step that could improve Saudi Arabia’s ability to hit regional targets with improved accuracy, recent reports suggest Riyadh purchased the Dongfeng-21 (DF-21; NATO: CSS-5) ballistic missile from China in 2007. 11

Missile Defense

Saudi Arabia began pursuing a ballistic missile defense capability (BMD) following the Gulf War in 1990, during which Iraq used short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and cruise missiles against the Kingdom. Currently, Riyadh fields two variations of the Hawk surface-to-air missile system (SAM) (MIM 23B I-Hawk and MIM J/K Hawk), which have limited anti-ballistic missile capabilities. Saudi Arabia also fields two variations of the more advanced and longer range Patriot SAM system, the Pac-2 (MIM 104C) and the Pac-3 (MIM 104F). The U.S. State Department approved a sale of PAC-3 associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support worth $1.75 billion. The deal will replenish Saudi Arabia’s existing PAC-3’s, which are older and have limited parts available for maintenance. 12 Riyadh’s missile defense system is designed to defend the Kingdom against its primary adversary, Iran. Given Iran’s continued push to develop more sophisticated missile systems, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, and the U.S. are seeking to integrate radar, early warning, and SAM sites into a regional missile defense system. 13 Media reports have suggested that Saudi Arabia is considering bolstering its missile defense capabilities with BMD-capable Aegis destroyers and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. 14 In February 2015 Mike Trotsky, the Vice President of Air and Missile Defense at Lockheed Martin, announced that Saudi Arabia will order a THAAD ballistic missile defense system; however, it could take up to three years for the deal to be finalized. 15

Cruise Missiles

Saudi Arabia possesses two air-launched cruise missiles, the anti-ship (ASCM) AGM-84L Harpoon and the land attack (LACM) Storm Shadow (the United Kingdom; France: Scalp EG). The Storm Shadow is an advanced conventionally armed cruise missile that gives Riyadh precision strike capabilities in excess of 250km. While the Storm Shadow manufacturer, MBDA, lists the range as “exceeds 250 km,” many experts and organizations, including the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, list the range as being greater than 300 km. 16 While Saudi Arabia is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the United Kingdom is, and the sale of a 300 km range cruise missile is prohibited as a Category I system. 17 The sale of the missile, confirmed in April 2012, has therefore renewed debate over the capacity and utility of the MTCR to prevent the proliferation of sensitive missile technologies. 18

Recent Developments and Current Status


Saudi Arabia does not currently have the domestic capacity to develop ballistic missiles, lacking both the infrastructure and the scientific and technological capability. In January 2014, it was reported that Saudi Arabia had purchased Dongfeng-21 (DF-21; NATO: CSS-5) ballistic missiles from China in 2007. 19 Although the DF-21 has a shorter range, it is more accurate than the DF-3, leading some observers to regard the purchase as a replacement or update of the DF-3 missile purchased in 1987. 20 Neither Saudi Arabia nor China is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, so such an exchange would not violate any of their international commitments. Even so, Saudi Arabia allegedly sought and received U.S. approval of the deal, after the CIA verified the DF-21 design would be incompatible for nuclear warheads. 21 Jeffrey Lewis of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies predicts the missile buy will have no major strategic impact on the region, but “assesses that Saudi Arabia could modify the ballistic missile frame to carry a nuclear warhead.” 22

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has sought to draw attention to its ballistic missile program. In July 2013, Saudi Arabia released a photo of high-ranking officials holding scale models of three different missiles, including the DF-3 and two unknown missiles. 23 Almost a year later in April 2014, Saudi Arabia displayed its DF-3 missiles in public for the first time during a major military parade, a move which some experts viewed as an effort to signal its military strength vis-à-vis Iran and its autonomy from the United States. 24

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Glossary

Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
WMD: Typically refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, though there is some debate as to whether chemical weapons qualify as weapons of “mass destruction.”
Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Ballistic missile defense (BMD)
All active and passive measures designed to detect, identify, track, and defeat incoming ballistic missiles, in both strategic and theater tactical roles, during any portion of their flight trajectory (boost, post-boost, mid-course, or terminal phase) or to nullify or reduce their effectiveness in destroying their targets.
Cruise missile
An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customized flight paths and to evade missile defense systems.
Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD)
THAAD: The U.S. Army's air defense program designed to provide extended defense, and to engage an incoming missile at ranges of up to several hundred kilometers. THAAD deploys a hit-to-kill interceptor equipped with an infrared seeker. The interception is intended to occur outside the earth's atmosphere, or high in the atmosphere.
Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)
A missile designed to be launched from an aircraft and jet-engine powered throughout its flight. As with all cruise missiles, its range is a function of payload, propulsion, and fuel volume, and can thus vary greatly. Under the START I Treaty, the term "long-range ALCM" means an air-launched cruise missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.
Cruise missile
An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customized flight paths and to evade missile defense systems.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.

Sources

  1. Jeff Stein, "The CIA Was Saudi Arabia's Personal Shopper," Newsweek, 29 January 2014.
  2. "DongFeng 3 (CSS-2) Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile," Sino Defence, www.sinodefence.com.
  3. Jeff Stein, "The CIA Was Saudi Arabia's Personal Shopper," Newsweek, 29 January 2014; Jeffrey Lewis, "Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?" Foreign Policy, 30 January 2014.
  4. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions (Westport: Praeger 2003), p. 313.
  5. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions (Westport: Praeger 2003), p. 325.
  6. Sean O'Connor, "Saudi Arabia's Ballistic Missile Force," Imint & Analysis, 10 February 2009, www.geint.blogspot.com.
  7. Sean O'Connor, "Saudi ballistic missile site revealed," HIS Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 July 2013, www.janes.com.
  8. Sean O'Connor, "Saudi ballistic missile site revealed," HIS Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 July 2013, www.janes.com.
  9. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions (Westport: Praeger 2003), p. 326.
  10. Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century: The Military and International Security Dimensions (Westport: Praeger 2003), p. 325.
  11. Jeff Stein, "The CIA Was Saudi Arabia's Personal Shopper," Newsweek, 29 January 2014; Jeffrey Lewis, "Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?" Foreign Policy, 30 January 2014.
  12. Binnie, Jeremy, "US Approves Saudi PAC-3 Sale," IHS Jane's 360, 2 October 2014, www.janes.com.
  13. "Gulf States Requesting ABM-Capable Systems," Defense Industry Daily, 29 July 2012, www.defenseindustrydaily.com; "Saudi Arabian Programs," Raytheon, www.raytheon.com; "Persian Gulf states speed up U.S. missile shield," United Press International, 1 October 2012, www.upi.com.
  14. Christopher Cavas, "Saudi Arabia Mulling BMD-Capable Destroyer," Defense News, 13 June 2011, www.defensenews.com; "GCC States Interested in THAAD Missile-Defense System," Al-Defaiya: Arabian Defense and Aerospace Business, 17 August 2012, www.defaiya.com; Adam Entous, "Saudi Arms Deal Advances," The Wall Street Journal, 12 September 2010, online.wsj.com.
  15. Binnie, Jeremy, "Saudi, Qatari THAAD contracts in the pipeline," IHS Jane's 360, 24 February 2015, www.janes.com; Jon Lake, "Gulf nations build up air defense umbrellas," IHS Jane's 360, 25 February 2015, www.janes.com.
  16. "Storm Shadow/Scalp," MBDA Missile Systems, May 2011, www.mbda-systems.com; National Air and Space Intelligence Center, "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat," Federation of American Scientists, April 2009, www.fas.org.
  17. Jeffrey Lewis, "Saudi Storm Shadow Sale Confirmed," Arms Control Wonk, 3 April 2012, lewis.armscontrolwonk.com; Missile Technology Control Regime, "Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers," www.mtcr.info.
  18. Jeffrey Lewis, "Saudi Storm Shadow Sale Confirmed," Arms Control Wonk, 3 April 2012, lewis.armscontrolwonk.com; Missile Technology Control Regime, "Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers," www.mtcr.info.
  19. Jeffrey Lewis, "Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?" Foreign Policy, 30 January 2014.
  20. Jeff Stein, "The CIA Was Saudi Arabia's Personal Shopper," Newsweek, 29 January 2014; Ethan Meick, "China's Reported Ballistic Missile Sale to Saudi Arabia: Background and Potential Implications," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 16 June 2014.
  21. Jeff Stein, "The CIA Was Saudi Arabia's Personal Shopper," Newsweek, 29 January 2014.
  22. Ethan Meick, "China's Reported Ballistic Missile Sale to Saudi Arabia: Background and Potential Implications," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Report, 16 June 2014; Jeffrey Lewis, "Why Did Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?" Foreign Policy, 30 January 2014.
  23. Jeffrey Lewis, "Saudi Arabia's Strategic Dyad," Arms Control Wonk, 15 July 2013, lewis.armscontrolwonk.com.
  24. Simon Henderson, "Saudi Arabia's Missile Messaging," The Washington Institute, 29 April 2014, www.washingtoninstitute.org.

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