United States Biological Overview
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Background
This page is part of the United States Country Profile.
During World War II and the Cold War the United States developed an extensive offensive biological warfare (BW) program that incorporated a wide-variety of anti-personnel, anti-crop, and toxin weapons armed with, among others, Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and Coxiella burnetii (Q-fever). However, President Richard Nixon unilaterally abolished this program on 25 November 1969 following an extensive policy review.
The United States has not possessed an offensive BW program since that time and thus was already in compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) before formally ratifying it in 1975. Although the U.S. biodefense program has at times generated controversy, the United States continues to play an important role in furthering global norms against the proliferation of biological weapons.
1918 to 1950: Early Development
U.S. biological weapons efforts began after World War I with limited research and development (R&D) of the toxin ricin. The United States Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) explored adhering the toxin to bullets and disseminating it as an aerosol. 1 However, findings from this R&D were never utilized. 2
In the early 1940s the United States took steps to acquire a robust BW program, because its intelligence community came to believe that Germany had its own program. This intelligence was proven wrong after the end of World War II. 3 However, the United States also learned after World War II that Japan had acquired a BW program in the late 1930s. From the start, the U.S. BW program included both offensive and defensive components; Secretary of War Henry Stimson argued that a strong BW defense required the United States to possess the means to retaliate in kind. 4
The BW program was originally organized under the War Research Service (WRS) as a committee affiliated with the Federal Security Agency. 5 George Merck, president of the pharmaceutical company Merck & Co., was appointed head of WRS and thus oversaw the whole program. 6 In January 1944 the WRS was abolished, and the CWS took over all BW-related research and production, while the War Department’s Army Surgeon General was made responsible for defensive measures.
A September 1945 memo to the Secretary of War detailed the program’s accomplishments: the United States had used pilot plants to mass produce, among other pathogens, Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and Brucella melitensis (brucellosis); had developed and field tested a new cluster bomb; and had constructed facilities for the large-scale production of several pathogens, including anti-crop agents. 7 BW-related R&D largely took place at Camp (later Fort) Detrick in Maryland under the leadership of George Merck. Pathogens that were weaponized at Detrick were transported to the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah where open-air testing of biological weapons was conducted. Biological weapons, such as bomblets, bombs, and spray systems that were realistically open-air tested and found to be effective and reliable were produced in large numbers at manufacturing plants located at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas. The U.S. invested more than $40,000,000 in these facilities and equipment between 1942 and March 1945. 8 By the end of the war, approximately 4,000 people were involved in the program. 9
1950 to 1969: Cold War Expansion
Following a brief lull immediately after World War II, the United States ramped up efforts to develop and manufacture biological weapons as the Cold War expanded. This included extensive new investments in research and production facilities, new laboratory construction at Fort Detrick, a large production plant at Pine Bluff Arsenal, and new production equipment for anti-personnel BW cluster bombs. 10 This expansion also coincided with a more offensively oriented BW strategy, as the U.S. military abandoned its retaliation-only policy.
After World War II, the United States used research obtained from Japan’s infamous biological warfare program, Unit 731, to support its efforts. American forces interviewed Japanese servicemen involved with the program after the war and discovered Japan’s widespread use during the war of pathogens to spread plague, anthrax, and other diseases throughout the Chinese military and civilian population. 11 In addition, Unit 731 had deliberately infected prisoners of war with deadly pathogens and dispersed BW agents throughout China. 12 In exchange for Unit 731’s data, the United States granted immunity from prosecution to many of the unit’s researchers and physicians. 13
In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. BW program developed a wide range of biological weapons that utilized toxins such as botulinum and enterotoxin B; anti-crop pathogens such as wheat rust; non-lethal, incapacitating pathogens such as Coxiella burnetii (Q-fever) and Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus; and lethal, anti-personnel pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis (anthrax). 14 The United States is not known to have weaponized several of the most lethal BW agents, such as Yersinia pestis (bubonic plague), variola virus (smallpox), and Marburg virus. 15
During the Korean War, China and North Korea accused the United States of using a wide variety of biological weapons agents, including pathogens that cause smallpox, plague, cholera, and other diseases, but no objective investigation was made to verify these allegations. 16 The World Peace Council, an organization founded by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1948, organized the International Scientific Commission, which visited North Korea in 1952 and there, among others, interviewed captured American pilots who “confessed” to having released biological weapons over North Korea. The Commission alleged that on fifty occasions, the United States had used biological weapons in North Korea. 17 Subsequent analysis of documents recovered from Soviet archives by U.S. scholar Milton Leitenberg concluded that the allegations were an orchestrated propaganda plot by the Chinese government, so the findings of the World Peace Council were completely disproven. 18
Other apparently spurious accusations of U.S. biological weapons began in the 1960s. Since 1962, the Cuban government has leveled eleven accusations against the United States of using biological weapons against its human, animal, and plant populations. 19 These accusations have included spreading Newcastle disease against the Cuban poultry industry in 1962; introducing the tobacco blue mold disease that devastated Cuba’s tobacco crop in 1979 and 1980; and introducing the insect pest Thrips palmi in 1996. 20 In the Thrips palmi case, the Cuban government invoked Article V of the BTWC to request the convening of a consultative meeting, at which time State parties would hear Cuba’s allegation and the rebuttal by the United States. 21 At this meeting the Cuban government provided no scientific information to support its allegations, and since strong alternative explanations were presented concerning why the Thrips insect had invaded Cuba, it was the sense of the majority of representatives at the meeting that Cuba’s allegations were politically motivated. 22
In 1961 the United States initiated Project 112 whose objectives were to examine the strategic impact of both chemical and biological weapons. 23 Project 112 found that both chemical and biological weapons should be seen as a part of a broader strategy of “gradual deterrence” in which chemical or biological attacks serve as intermediary steps to deter the Soviet Union from aggression against Europe without resorting to nuclear weapons. 24 Project 112 oversaw and orchestrated extensive new testing of biological and chemical weapons over land and using barges in far off areas of the Pacific Ocean. 25 Project 112 conducted at least fifty open-air trials from December 1962 to 1970. 26 (The sea trials, referred to as Shipboard Hazard and Defense (SHAD), generated controversy in later years, when former Navy personnel alleged that the tests had had a strong negative impact on their health.) 27 These efforts built on earlier tests such as Operation Large Area Coverage (1957-1958) that attempted to understand how air masses could spread biological agents over large areas. 28
1969 to 1972: Policy Review and Disarmament
On 30 April 1969 President Richard Nixon’s Secretary of Defense, Melvin R. Laird, launched a review of American biological and chemical weapons policies and programs. The review was spurred by public and congressional pressure over the U.S. chemical weapons program, which was perceived as being closely linked to biological weapons. In March 1998, over 6,000 sheep in Utah were killed after a cloud of VX gas drifted off the testing range at the Dugway Proving Grounds. 29 This event was heavily publicized by a documentary about the U.S. chemical and biological weapons program on NBC’s “First Tuesday” TV show, which precipitated major public and congressional backlash. 30 There was also extensive concern over revelations that the United States military had been dumping old chemical weapons from World War II at sea under Operation CHASE (Cut Holes and Sink ‘Em). 31
Focusing on the BW program, Laird’s policy review process generated differences of opinion among the relevant agencies; on the one hand, the President’s Scientific Advisory Committee (PSAC) advocated that the United States should retain a solely defensive BW program, as it viewed biological weapons as unreliable and useless. 32 This view was echoed by the United States Department of State, which supported biological disarmament. On the other hand, the military, as represented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, disagreed, viewing biological weapons as both reliable and an important part of overall strategic deterrence. 33 These views were submitted to President Nixon along with Laird’s recommendation favoring biological disarmament.
On 25 November 1969 President Nixon announced his decision to abolish all offensive BW capabilities but to retain a defensive program. 34 Before the policy was officially announced, the Department of Defense was ordered to halt all production of biological weapons and to destroy existing stockpiles. Nixon’s decision to dismantle stemmed from several considerations. First, Nixon was convinced that biological weapons had little tactical utility, and were not an effective strategic deterrent, especially when compared to nuclear weapons. 35 Second, Nixon hoped to generate positive publicity to deflect criticism of the U.S. use of tear gas and herbicides such as Agent Orange in Vietnam. Third, in unilaterally giving up biological weapons, Nixon hoped to encourage other countries to do the same.
Destruction of the biological weapons stockpiles took place at Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, the primary production facility. 36 Experts from the Army; the Departments of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Environmental Protection Agency; and state and local officials were consulted to evaluate all aspects of the plans, including the environmental impact. The destruction of BW agents was successfully completed in May 1972. 37
Immediately following the decision to dismantle the BW program, a bureaucratic debate ensued over how to address toxins, owing in part to the question of whether toxins should be considered chemical or biological weapons. The Department of Defense viewed toxins as chemical weapons that should not be banned. Furthermore, the military believed that toxins offered advantages over other chemical weapons because of their high potency per unit weight and their multivarious effects. 38 By contrast, the Department of State viewed toxins as biological weapons since the toxins in question, botulinum toxin and staphylococcal enterotoxin B, are both derived from bacteria using equipment similar to that used for creating Bacillus anthracis spores. 39 This debate touched off another policy review process, eventually resulting in President Nixon deciding to terminate all offensive-directed development of toxins, but to permit purely defensive research and development.
1975 to 2001: Nonproliferation
On March 26, 1975, the United States ratified the BTWC. 40 Ratification of the BTWC ensured a stronger institutional basis for long-term U.S. commitment to disarmament.
During the 1980s, the United States played an important role in investigating allegations that the Soviet Union had provided mycotoxins to its communist allies in Vietnam and Laos. 41 In particular, reports emerged in the late 1970s of widespread toxin attacks on Hmong villages in Southeast Asia. The Hmong are an ethnic group who allied with the United States during the Vietnam War, and so these attacks were believed to originate with the Soviet Union or its allies. Most of the reports described aircraft dispersing yellow material over targeted villages, causing severe illness, often leading to death, among inhabitants. Since the material usually resembled solid yellow dots, the local people named it “Yellow Rain.” 42 The United States initiated an investigation into the Yellow Rain incidents through chemical analysis of the substance, and interviews of the Hmong people. The investigation led the United States to conclude that the Soviet Union had developed a biological toxin derived from fungi as a weapons agent, and had provided the toxin to its allies in North Vietnam. 43 The Soviet Union denied U.S. allegations. On the request of the United States, the United Nations conducted two field investigations of Yellow Rain in 1982 and 1983, but both reported inconclusive findings. 44
In 1985 the United States became a participant of the Australia Group, whose initial objective was to develop robust export controls on dual-use chemical warfare material. In the early 1990s, the Australia Group expanded its scope to include dual-use biological warfare material. 45 However, prior to the Australia Group’s expanded mandate, U.S. suppliers exported to Iraq various bacterial cultures, including Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum (botulism) between 1985 and 1989. 46 At the time, Iraq was under increasing international condemnation for its widespread use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. 47
2001 to the Present: BTWC Verification and Biodefense Controversies
In July 2001, international negotiations for a new Ad Hoc Protocol to strengthen the BTWC collapsed following rejection of the protocol by the United States. 48 The protocol sought to remedy a major gap in the treaty by developing methods of verifying BTWC compliance through on-site inspections. 49 U.S. concerns were two-fold. First, U.S. negotiators believed the protocol was not strong enough, and that violators would be able to evade the proposed new verification measures. 50 Second, on-site inspections presented potential and opportunities for inspectors to steal intellectual property and conduct other industrial espionage on pharmaceutical and biotech companies. To date, no further negotiations on the draft Ad Hoc Protocol have commenced.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent (unrelated) anthrax attacks on the United States generated major national concern over the potential for biological terrorism. These fears were intensified by simulations such as Operation Dark Winter, which illustrated preparedness gaps in the U.S. health infrastructure concerning the likely high number of infected patients that a large-scale biological attack could cause, as well as the even larger number of “worried-well” patients (these are healthy people who seek medical attention out of the concern they could be infected). 51 This sentiment was reflected in President Obama’s May 2010 National Security Strategy, which stated that a biological weapons attack “would endanger the lives of hundreds of thousands of people and have unprecedented economic, societal, and political consequences.” 52
The scope of U.S. biodefense research has led to concerns over potential violations of the BTWC. 53 A 2003 article by Mark Wheelis and Malcolm Dando in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists argued that some activities by the United States suggest the possible existence of secret, offensive-oriented programs organized under the guise of biodefense. 54 Specifically, the authors point to revelations that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had built and tested a biological cluster bomb modeled on a Soviet design, and that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency had tested the ability of non-state actors to develop biological weapons by building a facility to develop, dry, and weaponize non-pathogenic bacterial spores as programs that might violate the BTWC. 55 Gregory Koblentz has also cited as problematic projects that have sought to assess the threat of biological weapons to the United States through scientific means by exploring the possibly for genetically engineered biological agents. 56 Despite being defensive in intention, other states have used the non-transparency surrounding these projects as a political shield against increasing their own programs’ transparency. 57 Specifically, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has responded to U.S. allegations of Russian non-compliance with the BTWC by pointing to the high number of U.S. biosafety level 3 labs, many of which conduct research on controlled pathogens in potential violation of the BTWC. 58
One of the major components of the post 9-11 defenses against bioterrorism is the BioWatch program. Under BioWatch, specialized air samplers employing existing Environmental Protection Agency filters have been installed in 33 major cities around the United States. 59 Filters from these samplers are collected every 24 hours and sent to state and local laboratories for analysis that aims to detect the presence of any airborne biological weapons agent. By quickly detecting and identifying a biological weapons attack, public health officials hope to mitigate its effects by quickly quarantining infected individuals and shutting down transportation systems. However, there has been controversy over the program due to the frequency of false positives and its high costs. Between 2003 and 2011, BioWatch had 56 false alarms, leading to decreased public faith in the program. 60 The new Generation-3 system that is meant to improve on its predecessor’s failings will cost $3.1 billion over its first five years. 61
Despite controversies over the BTWC and U.S. biodefense programs, the United States has played a key role in furthering global norms against the proliferation of biological weapons. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1992, the United States has sought to support research conducted by former Soviet biological weapons scientists to help ensure that they remain in Russia and do not share their knowledge with would-be proliferators. 62 The United States has also worked to develop new global standards for interdicting illicit trafficking of WMD materials, including material for biological weapons, through the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on 31 May 2003. 63 By September 2003, PSI included 15 countries, and by May 2013 PSI comprised the United States, Poland, and 70 partner states. 64 Beginning in 2005, the United States played an active role in dismantling the remnants of the Soviet biological weapons program by instituting the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program that aimed to secure former Soviet BW facilities and employ their scientists in peacefully-directed R&D. Due to opposition by the Putin administration, the CTR program, including its biological weapons dimensions, ended in 2012 following disagreement over the terms for its renewal. 65
As the largest contributor to the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction since 2002, the United States has played an important role in furthering the Partnership’s goals to improve biosecurity, prevent illicit trafficking of WMD materials, and further international nonproliferation cooperation. 66 The United States also co-sponsored United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent states from supporting non-state actors in developing WMD, including biological weapons. 67 The resolution was adopted on 28 April 2004, and its efforts remain ongoing.
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Glossary
- Biological weapon (BW)
- Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants. Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
- Anthrax
- The common name of the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, as well as the name of the disease it produces. A predominantly animal disease, anthrax can also infect humans and cause death within days. B. anthracis bacteria can form hardy spores, making them relatively easy to disseminate. Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR/Russia have all investigated anthrax as a biological weapon, as did the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo. Anthrax-laced letters were also used to attack the U.S. Senate and numerous news agencies in September 2001. There is no vaccine available to the general public, and treatment requires aggressive administration of antibiotics.
- Biological weapon (BW)
- Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants. Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
- Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
- The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
- Ratification
- Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.
See entries for Entry into force and Signature. - Pathogen
- Pathogen: A microorganism capable of causing disease.
- Anthrax
- The common name of the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, as well as the name of the disease it produces. A predominantly animal disease, anthrax can also infect humans and cause death within days. B. anthracis bacteria can form hardy spores, making them relatively easy to disseminate. Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR/Russia have all investigated anthrax as a biological weapon, as did the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo. Anthrax-laced letters were also used to attack the U.S. Senate and numerous news agencies in September 2001. There is no vaccine available to the general public, and treatment requires aggressive administration of antibiotics.
- Plague
- Plague: The disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. There are three forms of plague: bubonic plague, pneumonic plague, and septicemic plague. Bubonic plague refers to infection of the lymph nodes by Y. pestis, causing black sores or “buboes,” pneumonic plague refers to infection of the lungs, and septicemic plague refers to infection of the bloodstream. Although no longer a serious public health hazard in the developed world, the bacterium can spread from person-to-person in aerosolized form, and has been investigated as a biological weapon by Japan and the Soviet Union.
- Toxin
- Toxin: A poison formed as a specific secretion product in the metabolism of a vegetable or animal organism, as distinguished from inorganic poisons. Such poisons can also be manufactured by synthetic processes.
- Botulinum Toxin
- Botulism is caused by exposure to botulinum toxin (a neurotoxin). Most often caused by eating contaminated foods, botulinum poisoning prevents the human nervous system from transmitting signals, resulting in paralysis, and eventually death by suffocation. Botulinum toxin is the most toxic known substance. 15,000 times more toxic than VX nerve gas, mere nanograms of botulinum toxin will kill an adult human. A significant bioweapons concern, botulinum toxin has been investigated as a weapon by Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, Iraq and unsuccessfully by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo.
- Cholera
- Cholera: A disease of the digestive tract caused by the bacteria Vibrio cholerae. A water-borne disease, cholera infections usually occur via contaminated water or foods. Cholera causes severe diarrhea followed by severe dehydration, and can result in death within hours or days. Sanitation in the developed world has greatly lessened cholera’s public health impact. Unit 731 of the Japanese Imperial Army used cholera against the Chinese military and civilian populations during World War II.
- VX
- VX: The most toxic of the V-series nerve agents, VX was developed after the discovery of VE in the United Kingdom. Like other nerve agents, VX causes uncontrollable nerve excitation and muscle excitation. Ultimately, VX victims suffer death by suffocation. VX is an oily, amber-colored, odorless liquid.
- Disarmament
- Though there is no agreed-upon legal definition of what disarmament entails within the context of international agreements, a general definition is the process of reducing the quantity and/or capabilities of military weapons and/or military forces.
- Dismantlement
- Dismantlement: Taking apart a weapon, facility, or other item so that it is no longer functional.
- Nuclear weapon
- Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
- Ratification
- Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.
See entries for Entry into force and Signature. - Australia Group (AG)
- Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.
- Export control
- National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
- Dual-use item
- An item that has both civilian and military applications. For example, many of the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons have legitimate civilian industrial uses, such as the production of pesticides or ink for ballpoint pens.
- Chemical Weapon (CW)
- The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
- Nuclear-weapon states (NWS)
- NWS: As defined by Article IX, paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the five states that detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967 (China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Coincidentally, these five states are also permanent members of the UN Security Council. States that acquired and/or tested nuclear weapons subsequently are not internationally recognized as nuclear-weapon states.
- WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
- WMD: Typically refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, though there is some debate as to whether chemical weapons qualify as weapons of “mass destruction.”
- Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
- The PSI: Announced by U.S. President George W. Bush in May 2003, PSI is a U.S.- led effort to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials through the use of information sharing and coordination of diplomatic and military efforts. Members of the initiative share a set of 13 common principles, which guide PSI efforts. For more information, see the PSI.
- Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program
- A U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) program established in 1992 by the U.S. Congress, through legislation sponsored primarily by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. It is the largest and most diverse U.S. program addressing former Soviet Union weapons of mass destruction threats. The program has focused primarily on: (1) destroying vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons (e.g., missiles and aircraft), their launchers (such as silos and submarines), and their related facilities; (2) securing former Soviet nuclear weapons and their components; and (3) destroying Russian chemical weapons. The term is often used generically to refer to all U.S. nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union—and sometimes beyond— including those implemented by the U.S. Departments of Energy, Commerce, and State. The program’s scope has expanded to include threat reduction efforts in geographical areas outside the Former Soviet Union.
- G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction
- Launched in 2002 at the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, the G-8 Global Partnership is a multilateral initiative for financial commitments to implement and coordinate chemical, biological, and nuclear threat reduction activities on a global scale. Originally granted a ten-year lifespan and focused primarily on activities in the former Soviet Union, the Partnership has since been extended beyond 2012; it has also expanded its membership and scope of activities globally. For additional information, see the G-8 entry in the NTI Inventory.
- Nonproliferation
- Nonproliferation: Measures to prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. See entry for Proliferation.
- UNSC Resolution 1540
- Resolution 1540 was passed by the UN Security Council in April 2004, calling on all states to refrain from supporting, by any means, non-state actors who attempt to acquire, use, or transfer chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or their delivery systems. The resolution also called for a Committee to report on the progress of the resolution, asking states to submit reports on steps taken towards conforming to the resolution. In April 2011, the Security Council voted to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for an additional 10 years.
Sources
- Jeffrey K. Smart, “Chapter 2: History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: an American Perspective,” in Russ Zajtchuk and Ronald Bellamey, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, (Washington DC: TMM Publications, 1997) pp. 21-22, www.au.af.mil.
- Mark Poli, Chad Roy, Kermit Huebner, David Franz, and Nancy Jaax, “Ricin,” in Martha Lenhart, Dave Lounsbury, and James Martin, Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare (Washington DC: Office of the Surgeon General, 2007), P. 325, www.hsdl.org.
- Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), P. 59.
- Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 59-60.
- Jeffrey K. Smart, “Chapter 2: History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: an American Perspective,” in Russ Zajtchuk and Ronald Bellamey, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, (Washington DC: TMM Publications, 1997) P. 43, www.au.af.mil.
- Jeffrey K. Smart, “Chapter 2: History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: an American Perspective,” in Russ Zajtchuk and Ronald Bellamey, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, (Washington DC: TMM Publications, 1997) www.au.af.mil.
- Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), P. 73.
- Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare (London: Chatto & Windus, 1982) P. 96.
- Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare (London: Chatto & Windus, 1982) P. 96.
- “U.S. Army Activities in the United States Biological Warfare Programs 1942-1977 Volume 1,” Department of the Army, 25 February 1997, pp. 3-3 to 4-2.
- Jeffrey K. Smart, “Chapter 2: History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: an American Perspective,” in Russ Zajtchuk and Ronald Bellamey, eds., Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, (Washington DC: TMM Publications, 1997) pp. 42-43, www.au.af.mil.
- Tsuneishi Keeichi, “Unit 731 and the Japanese Imperial Army’s Biological Warfare Program,” translated by John Junkerman, Japan’s Wartime Atrocities, 2005.
- Norbert H. Fell, et al., Interviews and Reports from Japanese Scientists and Officers Who Were Involved in Biological Warfare Research During World War II, Chemical Corps Army Medical Center Maryland, 20 June 1947.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, “President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program,” National Defense University, October 2009, www.dtic.mil.
- Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001) P. 254.
- Milton Leitenberg, “False Allegations of U.S. Biological Weapons Use During the Korean War,” in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin, eds., Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008), www.cissm.umd.edu.
- International Scientific Commission, Report of the International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China, (Peking: Academica Sinica, 1952).
- Milton Leitenberg, “False Allegations of U.S. Biological Weapons Use During the Korean War,” in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy, and Susan B. Martin, eds., Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008), www.cissm.umd.edu.
- Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Cuban Allegations of U.S. Biological Warfare by the United States: Assessing the Evidence,” Critical Reviews in Microbiology vol. 25, no. 3, (1999), pp. 173-228.
- Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Cuban Allegations of U.S. Biological Warfare: False Allegations and Their Impact on Attribution,” in Anne Clunan, Peter Lavoy, and Susan Martin, eds., Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008).
- Elisa D. Harris, “U.S. Efforts to Investigate Biological Weapons,” cited in Anne Clunan, Peter Lavoy, and Susan Martin, eds., Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008).
- Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Cuban Allegations of U.S. Biological Warfare: False Allegations and Their Impact on Attribution,” in Anne Clunan, Peter Lavoy, and Susan Martin, eds., Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unraveling the Use of Biological Weapons, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008).
- Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), P. 109.
- Jonathan B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda, (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), P. 171.
- Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), P. 109.
- Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), P. 110.
- “Vets to Testify on Secret Weapons Test,” CBS News, 12 June 2008, www.cbsnews.com.
- John Ellis van Courtland Moon, “The US Biological Weapons Program,” in Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rozsa, and Malcolm Dando, eds., Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 (United States: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2006), P. 26.
- Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) P. 10.
- Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) pp. 101-106.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, “President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program,” National Defense University, October 2009, www.dtic.mil.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, “President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program,” National Defense University, October 2009, www.dtic.mil.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, “President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program,” National Defense University, October 2009, www.dtic.mil.
- Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001).
- President Nixon’s rationale for dismantlement is detailed extensively in: Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, “President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program,” National Defense University, October 2009, pp. 9-10, www.dtic.mil.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, “President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program,” National Defense University, October 2009, www.dtic.mil.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, “President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program,” National Defense University, October 2009, P. 17, www.dtic.mil.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, “President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program,” National Defense University, October 2009, P. 11, www.dtic.mil.
- Jonathan B. Tucker and Erin R. Mahan, “President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program,” National Defense University, October 2009, pp. 12-14, www.dtic.mil.
- Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction,” United States Department of State, www.state.gov.
- Jonathan Tucker, “‘The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2001, www.nonproliferation.org.
- Jonathan Tucker, “‘The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2001, www.nonproliferation.org.
- Jonathan Tucker, “‘The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2001, www.nonproliferation.org.
- Jonathan Tucker, “‘The ‘Yellow Rain’ Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control Compliance,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2001, www.nonproliferation.org.
- Arms Control Association, “The Australia Group at a Glance,” October 2012, www.armscontrol.org; The Australia Group, “The Origins of the Australia Group,” www.australiagroup.net.
- Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials and Technologies to State and Sub-state Actors,” testimony before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 7 November 2001, www.nonproliferation.org.
- Javed Ali, “Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance,” Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2001, pp. 50-51.
- Rebecca Whitehair and Seth Brugger, “BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Following U.S. Rejection,” Arms Control Today, September 2001, www.armscontrol.org.
- Kenneth D. Ward, “The BWC Protocol: Mandate for Failure,” Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2004.
- Rebecca Whitehair and Seth Brugger, “BWC Protocol Talks in Geneva Collapse Following U.S. Rejection,” Arms Control Today, September 2001, www.armscontrol.org.
- Operation Dark Winter illustrated an extreme worst-case scenario, as it involved the widespread release of smallpox that spread faster than smallpox has historically done. Tara O’Toole, Mair Michael, and Thomas V. Inglesby, “Shining Light on ‘Dark Winter,'” Clinical Infectious Diseases, Volume 34, 2002, http://cid.oxfordjournals.org.
- “National Security Strategy,” Distributed by The White House, May 2010, P. 24, www.whitehouse.gov.
- Mark Wheelis, Malcolm Dando, “Back to Bioweapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January / February 2003.
- Mark Wheelis, Malcolm Dando, “Back to Bioweapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January / February 2003.
- Mark Wheelis, Malcolm Dando, “Back to Bioweapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January / February 2003.
- Gregory D. Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009) pp. 237-238; Mark Wheelis, Malcolm Dando, “Back to Bioweapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January / February 2003.
- Gregory D. Koblentz, Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).
- Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to NATO, “Comments by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Report of the U.S. Department of State on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments;” “‘Lies, Hypocrisy, Propaganda’: Russia Slams US Over Claims of Nuclear Treaty Violations,” RT, 2 August 2014, www.rt.com.
- Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance: Evaluating Systems for the Early Detection of Biological Threats: Abbreviated Version (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2011).
- David Willman, “The Biodefender that Cries Wolf,” Los Angeles Times (Denver), 8 July 2012, http://articles.latimes.com.
- “DHS Official Opposes Next-Gen BioWatch Sensors,” Global Security Newswire, 13 November 2012, www.nti.org.
- Kenneth N. Luongo and William E. Hoehn III, “Reform and Expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction,” Arms Control Today, June 2003, www.armscontrol.org.
- Michael Byers, “Policing the High Seas,” American Journal of International Law, Volume 98, July 2004.
- Michael Byers, “Policing the High Seas,” The American Journal of International Law, Volume 98, July 2004; Department of State, “Proliferation Security Initiative,” www.state.gov.
- David M. Herszenhorn, “Russia Won’t Renew Pact on Weapons with U.S.,” New York Times (Moscow), 10 October 2012, www.nytimes.com; Mary Beth D. Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, “The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress,” distributed by Congressional Research Service, 8 July 2013, P. 36.
- Bonnie D. Jenkins, “The Future of the G-8 Global Partnership: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Stanley Foundation, June 2010, www.fmwg.org.
- “Security Council Decides All States Shall Act to Prevent Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons,” Distributed by United Nations Security Council, 28 April 2004, www.un.org.