
Sydney Brashears
Intern, Nuclear Materials Security
What are the most important drivers of nuclear proliferation risks in the current geopolitical environment? Which countries are most likely to develop nuclear weapons? And what can—and should—the United States do about it?
Representatives of the Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation and U.S. National Security—a joint initiative between NTI, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace—addressed these questions and more on a panel during the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s 2025 International Nuclear Policy Conference.
The panel, “Back to the Future? Nuclear Proliferation Risks in an Era of Uncertainty,” featured the Task Force’s co-chairs, NTI Co-Chair and CEO Ernest J. Moniz, Belfer Center Director Meghan O’Sullivan, and Carnegie President Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, along with Task Force member Stephen Hadley, who served as U.S. National Security Advisor for President George W. Bush.
With regional conflicts playing out in many corners of the globe, the panel’s moderator, The Wall Street Journal’s Nancy Youssef, asked the panelists how those dynamics are shaping U.S. allies’ considerations about whether to develop their own nuclear weapons programs and what such a decision would mean for the world.
According to the panelists, the combination of Russia, Iran, and North Korea’s nuclear threats with longstanding apprehensions about U.S. security guarantees is contributing to an uptick in interest in nuclear weapons among some U.S. allies. But the panelists were not convinced that increasing the number of nuclear-armed nations would improve regional or global stability; a better path forward is for countries to invest in their conventional capabilities.
Moniz underscored this idea, saying “We have to get past thinking of deterrence as simply a nuclear discussion.” He continued, “We need to put together…[a] coherent program that advances the collective security, and it doesn’t mean, and should not mean, that every country in this collective should have nuclear weapons. They should have complimentary capabilities to provide collective security.”
As for how the United States should proactively manage proliferation concerns from countries like Iran and North Korea, the panelists described Iran’s nuclear program as a particularly acute situation and expressed support for a diplomatic solution rather than a military strike on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, which would hardly hamper their progress and likely drive operations deeper underground, complicating verification and intelligence collection efforts. Furthermore, military interventions run the risk of giving Iran greater justification for a decision to develop nuclear weapons.
Beyond nuclear weapons, the panel also discussed what nuclear energy expansion means for the international nonproliferation regime. Panelists expressed concern at the dominance of Russia and China in global reactor exports and the lack of cooperation among the nations that once undergirded key nuclear nonproliferation institutions. Rectifying or counterbalancing this trend, panelists noted, would require decisions within the United States and other Western nations to scale up domestic nuclear industry and potentially collaborate with nuclear energy industry leaders in South Korea and the United Arab Emirates.
Across all topics the panel covered, it was clear that the path to achieving stability, strengthening deterrence, and preventing nuclear proliferation must be a collaborative one. Greater coordination between the United States and its allies is necessary to construct a comprehensive set of deterrent capabilities, and willingness to seek common ground with adversaries on the value of nonproliferation may be required to advance diplomatic approaches to nuclear nonproliferation.
Moniz recalled, “When the JCPOA was negotiated … Russia and China [were] fully a part [of negotiations] … It’s often not appreciated how that coherence was absolutely critical.” Despite the tense state of relations between the United States and Russia and China today, he went on to say, “we’re in a world where we have to pursue this diplomatic approach.”
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