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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: A New Standard for Safeguards Agreements

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: A New Standard for Safeguards Agreements

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Jeffrey Lewis

Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program, The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

There is an old joke about two elderly women at a Catskills resort. One says: "Boy, the food in this place is really terrible." And the other one says: "Yeah, I know. And such small portions."

That's the same complaint raised by opponents of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. Donald Trump called it, "one of the most incompetently drawn deals I've ever seen." And Rex Tillerson explained that, "in particular, the agreement has this very concerning shortcoming that the President has mentioned as well, and that is the sunset clause."

Such a terrible deal. Yeah, and it ends so early!

Far from being incompetently drafted, the JCPOA imposed a number of important limits on Iran's nuclear energy program to create a wider gap between Iran's nuclear energy programs and a bomb. Second, the JCPOA greatly strengthened Iran's safeguards arrangements to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, to verify that gap. And it does not have a single sunset.

Prior to the JCPOA, Iran had built a large and capable uranium infrastructure that would have allowed Iran to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapon in a matter of weeks if Iran chose to do so. Iran had nearly 20,000 centrifuges, including nearly 3,000 located in its deep underground facility near Qom.

 

 

View the PDF version of the infographic.

Iran was also developing new, more advanced generations of centrifuges including the IR-8 which is reportedly 20 times more efficient than the IR-1 models that made up most of Iran's supply of centrifuges. Iran was also on the verge of completing a heavy water reactor that would open a second route to the bomb, using plutonium.

The JCPOA imposed a number of limits, some lasting ten years, while others last fifteen, twenty or twenty five years:

  • For 10 years, Iran agreed to have no more than 5,060 IR-1 centrifuges at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) enriching uranium. Iran also agreed to limit in the number and type of more advanced centrifuges that may be tested over this period;
  • For 15 years, Iran agreed not to enrich uranium above the low level of 3.67% and not to stockpile more than 300 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU);
  • For 15 years Iran agreed that uranium enrichment would occur only at Natanz FEP under advanced safeguards technologies;
  • Under the agreement, the deeply buried enrichment plant near Qom is being converted to other uses for at least 15 years;
  • Iran agreed not to reprocess spent fuel for at least 15 years;
  • Iran agreed to extraordinary monitoring of its production of crucial parts of its centrifuges – the rotors and bellows – for 20 years, and monitoring of its uranium ore production for 25 years.

Many other provisions never sunset – they last in perpetuity. Iran will remain a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits the development of nuclear weapons. The JCPOA also provides for Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement and implement the modified Code 3.1 in its subsidiary arrangements, improvements to safeguards on Iran that will remain indefinitely. And Iran also agreed to an indefinite prohibition on research that could contribute to the development of a nuclear weapon. And finally Iran replaced its heavy water reactor at Arak to prevent it from producing a significant amount of weapons usable plutonium over the course of its lifetime. The old reactor vessel is now filled with concrete.

If the JCPOA were to collapse, all of these constraints on Iran's nuclear energy program would disappear with it:

  • Iran could build and test an unlimited number of advanced centrifuges at an unlimited number of sites with little notice and without any restrictions;
  • Iran could enrich uranium to any level and stockpile as much as it chooses;
  • Iran could build a heavy-reactor to produce plutonium and a reprocessing facility to extract the plutonium from spent fuel.

Most importantly, Iran would be able to do all this without the extraordinary scrutiny of the IAEA provided through the JCPOA. With no monitoring of centrifuge workshops or uranium mines, Iran could much more easily attempt to build new nuclear facilities in secret. And without the JCPOA, Iran would be in a much stronger position to stonewall the IAEA if it tried to investigate any allegations of covert sites.

The JCPOA is a strong agreement that imposes important limits to ensure that Iran's nuclear energy program remains peaceful. It provides the IAEA much better tools for monitoring those limits.

But the opponents are right about one thing – we should be working energetically to extend the innovative safeguards measures in the JCPOA as long as possible. The best way to do that is to work to make the JCPOA become the standard for all safeguards agreements, not just in Iran. That's why a group of eminent scientists recommended that the United States, "work with the IAEA to gain agreement to implement some of the key innovations included in the JCPOA into existing safeguards. … Thus in the future, when Iran is treated the same as all non-nuclear weapons states with nuclear energy programs, all such programs will be more stringently constrained and verified."

Before the JCPOA, Iran was in a position to do everything that North Korea is doing today and more. Fortunately for the international community, Iran made a different choice.

The JCPOA isn't a rubber chicken dinner in the Catskills. It's something entirely different: a carefully constructed agreement that prevents Iran's Supreme Leader from looking over the menu, peering over at Kim Jong Un’s table and telling the waiter: "I'll have what he's having."

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The term “safeguards effectiveness” means the effectiveness of IAEA verification—that is, the ability of the IAEA to detect non-compliance.


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Glossary

Nuclear energy
Nuclear energy: The energy liberated by a nuclear reaction (fission or fusion), or by radioactive decay.
Safeguards
Safeguards: A system of accounting, containment, surveillance, and inspections aimed at verifying that states are in compliance with their treaty obligations concerning the supply, manufacture, and use of civil nuclear materials. The term frequently refers to the safeguards systems maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. IAEA safeguards aim to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material in a timely manner. However, the term can also refer to, for example, a bilateral agreement between a supplier state and an importer state on the use of a certain nuclear technology.

See entries for Full-scope safeguards, information-driven safeguards, Information Circular 66, and Information Circular 153.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of more than 20% of the isotope U-235. Achieved via the process of enrichment. See entry for enriched uranium.
Centrifuge
Centrifuge: A machine used to enrich uranium by rapidly spinning a cylinder (known as a rotor and containing uranium hexafluoride gas) inside another cylinder (called the casing).
Enriched uranium
Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
Low enriched uranium (LEU)
Low enriched uranium (LEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of the isotope U-235 that is higher than that found in natural uranium but lower than 20% LEU (usually 3 to 5%). LEU is used as fuel for many nuclear reactor designs.
Reprocessing
Reprocessing: The chemical treatment of spent nuclear fuel to separate the remaining usable plutonium and uranium for re-fabrication into fuel, or alternatively, to extract the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
Spent nuclear fuel
Spent nuclear fuel: Irradiated nuclear fuel. Once irradiated, nuclear fuel is highly radioactive and extremely physically hot, necessitating special remote handling. Fuel is considered “self protecting” if it is sufficiently radioactive that those who might seek to divert it would not be able to handle it directly without suffering acute radiation exposure.
Uranium
Uranium is a metal with the atomic number 92. See entries for enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. See entry for Information Circular 540.
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).

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