A Pause in the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement
The Indo-US nuclear agreement's move toward finalization and implementation is effectively on hold with domestic hurdles preventing New Delhi from moving on to the next steps. In March 2008, during his visit to Washington, Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee informed his interlocutors that the agreement had run into difficulties in New Delhi and that progress was slow. It might be noted that shortly before this visit, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher had put July 2008 as the deadline for conclusion of the agreement. That deadline is unlikely to be met. In the meantime, New Delhi has more or less negotiated a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which needs to be approved by the political leadership in New Delhi as well as the IAEA Board of Governors.
The proposed nuclear agreement between India and the United States calls for separation of Indian nuclear facilities into civilian and military. Fourteen of the existing 22 reactors would be on the civilian list and under safeguards. (India already allows safeguards on six reactors). The remaining reactors will be on the military list and one of them will be shut down. In addition, New Delhi's fast breeder reactor program will not be under safeguards. In return for placing its civilian reactors under safeguards, India would be allowed to import select nuclear technology and fuel from foreign suppliers.
The political leadership in the two countries announced the agreement and its basic components in July 2005 and March 2006. Subsequently, the U.S. Congress passed the Hyde Act in December 2006 which authorized the Bush administration to negotiate a nuclear agreement with India under certain guidelines. The next step was negotiating the actual details of the agreement under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which deals with international nuclear cooperation. The text of the "123 agreement" was agreed to in July 2007, and 'frozen' pending approval of the two governments.
Three other steps remain in the overall nuclear agreement negotiating process. First, a safeguards agreement between India and the IAEA needs to be officially finalized. Second, once the safeguards agreement is officially concluded, the Nuclear Suppliers Group will then consider whether to amend its rules and allow India into the international nuclear trade system. If and when that is achieved, the third step can be taken, namely the 123 agreement goes back to the U.S. Congress for approval. But before the NSG considers an exemption to its rules for India, its members want the IAEA safeguards agreement to be finalized so they can consider the extent of oversight on Indian facilities in their final decision. Several concerns weigh on the positions of the various actors involved in the process, and these are reflected in the tough negotiations that are expected in the next stages. However, given the domestic opposition in India to the nuclear agreement, there is uncertainty over whether New Delhi will even get to those stages.
The IAEA Safeguards Agreement and the NSG
After five rounds of negotiations beginning November 2007, Indian negotiators reportedly finalized a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by March 2007. Although most details of the agreement have apparently been agreed to, the agreement is not sealed until endorsement from the Indian political leadership. Subsequently, the IAEA Board of Governors would also need to decide whether to approve the agreement. According to Indian reports, the safeguards will cover clusters of facilities, and the IAEA will also have a major role in designing a dedicated reprocessing facility for India which is a major component of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement. The 123 agreement which was negotiated in 2007 calls for a "national reprocessing facility" for reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material.
According to some sources, the safeguards agreement is in tune with INFCIRC-66, the IAEA's framework for safeguards arrangements with non-nuclear weapon states outside the Nonproliferation Treaty. Under this approach, India will not be allowed to switch a safeguarded facility from the civilian to the military list, or remove safeguarded material to a military facility. Indian news reports have stated that some IAEA sources have praised the safeguards agreement calling it more comprehensive than earlier agreements and a possible template for future agreements. But the agreement has its share of critics from the Indian scientific community. For example, a former director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), A.N. Prasad, has criticized the IAEA pact on the grounds that permanent safeguards would eventually also cover several facilities that New Delhi has kept off the civilian list as part of the separation plan.
In its negotiations with the IAEA, a key strategic objective for New Delhi has been to link the safeguards agreement with fuel supply assurances. Although the proposed safeguards agreement has not been publicly released, some reports in New Delhi have contended that fuel supply assurances are reflected in the draft IAEA agreement. Fuel supply assurances are important from the Indian perspective to avoid a situation in which transfer of fuel is halted after implementation of a nuclear agreement, as was the case with the 1963 U.S.-India nuclear agreement, when fuel supply ended in the late 1970s following India's nuclear test and the strengthening of U.S. domestic laws.
According to one source, although some clauses in the safeguards agreement are open to interpretation, the agreement reflects the right to construct a strategic reserve and to opt for corrective policy measures if fuel supply is disrupted, including turning to non-U.S. suppliers. From the IAEA's perspective, the principal objective is that the safeguards should be in perpetuity and that nothing is left open to interpretation. Here there might be some differences with the Indian approach, which reportedly has favored an interpretive statement from New Delhi (to be added to the safeguards agreement) on the kinds of measures that India would be allowed to pursue if nuclear trade with international suppliers was to be disrupted, in scenarios such as abrogation of the nuclear agreement with the U.S. or if the NSG rescinds its approval.
In late 2007, the NSG itself had begun discussions on the conditions under which India would be allowed to engage in nuclear trade, and Washington had already approached the group for this purpose on India's behalf. A key issue at the NSG is whether the group would impose conditions that mirror restrictions on India in the bilateral nuclear agreement with the U.S. through the Hyde Act and the 123 agreement. If NSG conditions are in tune with U.S. government provisions then New Delhi would have less of an incentive to opt for Russian and French suppliers of equipment, technology and nuclear fuel. At the same time, it might also undercut the fuel supply assurances that New Delhi has sought through the safeguards agreement.
One component of the supply assurances objective that New Delhi has sought is the possibility of approaching alternative suppliers in case the United States is unable to transfer fuel. However, if the NSG imposes across-the-board conditions, that would place constraints on fuel supply from other sources as well. Thus, such broad-based NSG rules would apply the same conditions to India's potential deals with Russian or French suppliers as they would to U.S. suppliers. U.S. policymakers have recommended to the NSG that it take into account Washington's export control laws regarding nuclear trade with India in their consideration of an exemption in its laws. To ensure at least some of the Indian reactor deals for U.S. suppliers, officials in Washington have also reportedly asked for firm assurances in this regard before the 123 agreement eventually goes up for approval to Congress, the final step of the nuclear agreement process.
A further issue is the level of intrusiveness of the additional protocol (AP) that India has to conclude with the IAEA. According to the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement and the Hyde Act, New Delhi has to negotiate an additional protocol in order for the United States to follow through on its side of the agreement. Although the text of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA has more or less been agreed to, talks between the two sides on the AP were still at an initial stage, as of March 2008. Neither public statements by the Indian government nor the IAEA have specified whether the protocol is part of the overall safeguards agreement. At the same time, in 2006, the head of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Anil Kakodkar had stated that the safeguards agreement and the AP would be India-specific, although no other details were given.
One NSG member, New Zealand, has already stated that it favors India accepting an AP if it wants an NSG exemption. Some analysts state that the AP should be intrusive enough to provide assurance to the NSG that foreign supplies into India's civilian program are not going into the military list. But it is likely that the Indian government and critics of the agreement in India would oppose IAEA supervision on facilities on the military list. Furthermore, given that the Australian government has now declined to consider uranium sales to India, it might diminish the chances of India getting NSG approval, even if the safeguards agreement is finalized. According to one report, Australia's decision on uranium sales can now encourage some other NSG members to oppose India's case at the NSG. As of late April, Canberra had not decided on its position on the agreement at the NSG and it is not necessary that its decision to decline uranium sales to India provides a firm indicator of its NSG position. The Kevin Rudd-government also has to take into account the importance of India as a major economic partner, and the possible impact on the bilateral relationship.
Other conditions might also be included at the NSG such as India's commitment to a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), restricting sale of enrichment and reprocessing technology and equipment to India, and New Delhi's forswearing of nuclear testing. So far the NSG has not conclusively decided what kind of conditions it would attach to the sale of enrichment and reprocessing technology to India. Recent proposals at the NSG for restricting transfer of these technologies in general have conditions for sale attached which, in the Indian case, would go beyond the conditions present in the Hyde Act. These conditions are part of a "criteria-based" approach and include NPT membership, intrusive inspections, and IAEA safeguards. Recent reports state that Washington has come around to supporting this approach and has also proposed other conditions such as restricting enrichment/reprocessing technology transfers to regions that might be prone to instability and might spur other states in the region to acquire similar technology.
Given that the Hyde Act is the main source of disagreement for Indian critics of the agreement (especially the communist parties, see discussion in next section), it is even less likely that they would agree to stringent NSG conditions for sale of enrichment and reprocessing technology (conditions such as membership of the Nonproliferation Treaty and full-scope IAEA safeguards). Thus, from New Delhi's perspective, the next stages of the nuclear agreement negotiating process, especially at the NSG, could pose significant hurdles, such as with respect to enrichment and reprocessing technology transfers.
Finally, one possible factor impacting on New Delhi's policymaking could also be the need to hedge its bets on the sequencing of the various stages of the agreement. As discussed in the next section, the main immediate stumbling block in the nuclear agreement is opposition from the Indian communist parties. However, according to at least one Indian news report in October 2007, there has been a sense among some Indian officials that unless New Delhi had some assurance that the NSG and the U.S. Congress would act in its favor in the penultimate and final stages of the agreement, it would be a risk to sign the safeguards agreement and the additional protocol with the IAEA. If the safeguards agreement is formalized and yet NSG approval does not come through or the U.S. Congress rejects or decides to delay the 123 agreement, in that scenario, it would be extremely difficult for New Delhi to then repudiate the safeguards pact and the additional protocol that it would have already accepted by that time.
Opposition from the Communist Parties
As is obvious, there is still a long way to go in terms of procedural stages, but the main immediate hurdle toward progress is the prevailing domestic political situation in India, specifically, the longstanding opposition from the communist front in the Parliament. The communist bloc controls 59 seats in the 552-member lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha) and is an important supporter of the coalition Congress Party-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. Ever since the agreement was first announced in July 2005, the increasingly influential communist parties had expressed their concern over its broader implications. Their main grouse against the agreement is that it puts constraints on Indian foreign policy and draws India into a de facto defense alliance with the U.S.
Nevertheless, the Manmohan Singh-government was allowed to go through the various stages of the negotiating process over a two and a half year period. But once the text of the 123 agreement was finalized in July 2007, opposition from the left became more pronounced and the government came under pressure to desist from going ahead with the agreement. The Left parties and the UPA government formed a panel in August to study contentious issues in the nuclear agreement. Then in October 2007, the communists permitted the government to begin talks with the IAEA on a safeguards agreement on condition that a final agreement could be accepted only after approval from the UPA-Left panel.
By March 2008, most elements of the safeguards agreement had been negotiated. Subsequently, the communist bloc stopped the government from taking any further steps at the IAEA or the NSG with a threat to withdraw parliamentary support, which would lead to the fall of the government. According to a senior communist leader, Sitaram Yechury, the left parties will take a "definite call" on the nuclear agreement by the end of April when the UPA-Left panel will review the progress on the safeguards agreement. At the same time, the Left parties have given suggestions to the government on the safeguards agreement, while also asking for further clarifications on its text. Although the text of the IAEA agreement has been agreed to, it has not been provided to the Left parties as of early April, leading to the view that the text might contain clauses unacceptable to the communist parties.
But regardless of the panel's findings and the text of the agreement, the communist parties are already of the firm opinion that the government should not go ahead to the next steps of the nuclear agreement negotiations. As stated, they have warned the government against going to the IAEA Board of Governors for getting final approval on the safeguards agreement. Their argument is that if the IAEA agreement is finalized, then there would be nothing to stop the government from proceeding to the NSG for the next step, and that the nuclear agreement would then be on 'auto-pilot.'
Moreover, one argument put forward by some sources is also that India cannot get credible assurances of fuel supply from the IAEA (which, as the previous section noted, might be reflected in the recently negotiated safeguards agreement) as it is only a "monitoring agency" and cannot neutralize conditions imposed by the Hyde Act. Thus, even if somehow the left parties agree to the IAEA safeguards agreement, they are hardly likely to allow the Manmohan Singh government to proceed to the NSG. One counter argument put forward by proponents of the agreement in India is that by blocking the safeguards agreement, the communist parties are also blocking nuclear trade with other suppliers such as Russia and France, which are not the target of the left's opposition.
At the same time, it is clear that the left parties are not necessarily opposed to the IAEA agreement, but in fact the Hyde Act which was passed by the U.S Congress in December 2006. Their contention is that the Hyde Act contains conditions and provisions that would abrogate the 123 agreement for a wide range of reasons from a nuclear test by India to non-conformity by New Delhi with Washington's foreign policy objectives. A key argument by the communist alliance with respect to the Hyde Act is that it would allow the U.S. to repatriate any equipment and fuel that has been transferred to India. Clarifications by senior U.S. officials that the basis for the nuclear agreement is the 123 agreement and that the Hyde Act is consistent with it are unlikely to change the position of the communist parties. Thus, their contention is that it is the Hyde Act and the nuclear agreement in general that would compromise Indian foreign policy and its nuclear program.
On a broader level, the Indian communists also argue that India will be drawn into a defense alliance with the U.S. in the South Asian region on the lines of Israel in the Middle East if the nuclear deal is allowed to progress in its current form. Changes in India's position on the Iranian nuclear issue at the IAEA since 2005 are cited as an example of far-reaching foreign policy concessions being made by New Delhi to Washington. Slow-down of India's engagement on the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline is also put forward as another example of U.S. pressure.
There had been periodic reports in the Indian media that the Manmohan Singh-government had decided to call the communists' bluff and go ahead with the agreement and dare the communists to withdraw support. The reasoning here was that the communists also risked the unprecedented influence they hold on the Indian government. Withdrawal of support would bring down the government, and precipitate elections ahead of the scheduled general elections in summer 2009. Early elections might bring back the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power, an anathema to the left. A second scenario could see the Congress Party coming back to power without needing the support of the left parties.
Indeed, one implicit warning given by Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, to the Left parties, has been that if the agreement was delayed indefinitely, then it is entirely possible that the next government might not need the support of the communist group, and that would mean a drastic reduction of whatever influence the left has on the nuclear agreement. Thus, it could conceivably be argued that the closer New Delhi gets to summer 2009, the greater might be the chances of the government daring the left front and proceeding to the IAEA and the NSG for the next stages of the nuclear agreement.
However, given New Delhi's formal communication to Washington that the agreement had run into domestic difficulties, the indication is that the government would prefer to see out its full term in office. Moreover, the view of the Congress Party leadership is that it would be meaningless to sacrifice the government over the nuclear deal because without the government, there would also be no nuclear agreement. More broadly, sudden economic pressures in the form of rapid increase in food prices in February-March 2008 further increased constraints on the central government and have reduced its ability to take any bold steps on the nuclear agreement. The communist parties' increased interest in a third political front (the Congress Party and BJP coalitions being the first two fronts) made of smaller regional parties can infuse more uncertainty into the political system, pushing nuclear cooperation issues further on the backburner.
Finally, it is also important to mention the stand of the BJP, which has also opposed the nuclear agreement but not necessarily for the same reasons as the Left. While the communists' objection is for a very basic reason – opposition to closer ties with Washington – the BJP's objection is on the specifics of the agreement. Its attitude is that a strategic partnership with the U.S. is actually beneficial, but that this type of a nuclear deal was not necessarily the best way to achieve this and therefore the agreement should be renegotiated.
Nevertheless, it is significant that in April the long time National Security Adviser under the previous BJP government, Brajesh Mishra, came out in support of the agreement, arguing that the 123 agreement would not compromise the development of India's nuclear deterrent. His statements were immediately disowned by the BJP and the party's presumptive prime ministerial candidate, L.K. Advani simultaneously opposed the agreement on the grounds that it would constrain India's ability to test a nuclear device, if warranted, and with it, the strategic nuclear program.
The relatively more flexible opposition of the BJP (relative to the communist parties) is probably why the Manmohan Singh-government approached the BJP leadership seeking support on the agreement ahead of a contentious parliamentary debate on the issue in late 2007. The support wasn't forthcoming, and the BJP roundly criticized the government in Parliament. It is also highly unlikely that the BJP would support the government in parliament if the Left withdrew support. Moreover, it might be noted that the BJP has also opposed the Hyde Act (like the communist parties), and has in fact, proposed that India should also enact a legislation to neutralize the objectionable elements of the Hyde Act. But according to Indian foreign minister, Pranab Mukherjee, the government cannot try to modify the agreement to assuage the objections of the communists and the BJP.
As the window of opportunity to push through the agreement at the IAEA and the NSG closes, New Delhi has tried to demonstrate an independent foreign policy stance to the left parties, especially by highlighting a brief visit to New Delhi in April by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinijad and by responding forcefully to U.S. advice that India should persuade Iran to halt its nuclear weapons program. Discussions on the stalled Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline have also been restarted.
Additionally, the Indian foreign minister stated that New Delhi would be willing to add a step in the nuclear agreement negotiation process – getting a "sense of the house" before the 123 agreement is put to the U.S. Congress for its approval. But there is no indication that such moves would be sufficient for the left parties to reconsider their position on the nuclear agreement. After all, their opposition to the agreement is for a very fundamental reason – that India should not have any kind of partnership with the U.S.
All this essentially diminishes the possibility of meeting the July 2008 deadline suggested by Washington for finalization of the nuclear agreement. The leaders of the communist parties are also aware that the election cycle in the U.S., and subsequently in India, will further push back the nuclear agreement and therefore final ratification talks with the IAEA could be delayed as long as possible. Indeed, according to one communist leader, their intention is to ensure that no further progress took place until at least July.
Relatedly, in February 2008, U.S. ambassador to India, David Mulford had said that this was close to a 'now or never' moment and that such a deal is unlikely to be offered again to New Delhi for the foreseeable future. A similar statement was also made by his predecessor, Robert Blackwill, who said that the next U.S. president may not be as committed to this agreement without the "same sunken costs" as the Bush administration.
While the 'now or never' characteristic was subsequently denied, the fact is that the U.S. Congress will go on break after the summer and the focus after that will be on the November presidential election. Although Indian and U.S. officials have stated that nothing prevents successor governments in India and the U.S. from finalizing the agreement, it might be difficult to achieve the same momentum under different circumstances.
Amidst the slowdown in negotiations, there are some conflicting reports on whether the shortage of domestic supplies of uranium has had some impact on the functioning of several nuclear power plants in the country. According to one report, in the last year, there has been a ten percent decline in nuclear power generation capabilities and as many as five reactors were shut down early in October 2007 for maintenance reasons, but also because of a gap between fuel supply and the increasing capacity of reactors. At the same time, Indian nuclear officials also acknowledge that the existing five uranium mines in Jharkhand province have only one processing mill which has decreased the amount of fuel available for the power plants.
In general, Indian experts are of the view that there is a greater need for uranium fuel for light water reactors and pressurized heavy water reactors than for nuclear technology and power plants. According to AEC chairman Kakodkar unless the nuclear agreement is concluded India would have to decrease its projected capacity of 20,000MW in 2020 by 6,000MW and also that increasing domestic production of uranium involves significant challenges. The uranium shortage has short-term and long-term consequences for India's Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) and Fast Breeder Reactor plans respectively and therefore proponents of the agreement in India favor the deal to help reduce the uranium shortage.
However, other commentators, skeptical of the agreement's benefits, posit that a uranium shortage in India is mainly for domestic reasons, including delays in opening new mines and inadequate support for expansion of the nuclear program. In this context, the decrease of about $330 million in the 2008-09 budgetary allocations for the Department of Atomic Energy is significant, and has been met with opposition from some senior scientists. AEC chairman Kakodkar has refuted concerns saying that such cuts had been effected for other departments as well, and that it would not have an adverse impact on current projects.
The uncertainty over whether and when New Delhi would proceed to the NSG to get an exemption has also delayed the expansion of India's nuclear cooperation with other suppliers, especially Russia and France. It might be noted that in late 2007, New Delhi and Moscow were expected to conclude an agreement for supply of four additional reactors to the Kudankulam complex, but this did not happen as the Indian government preferred an across the board exemption from the NSG to precede any future deals with individual countries. This position has been echoed by the NSG which has said that future nuclear trade between India and any other suppliers (such as Russia and France) has to be in accordance with NSG approval. But regardless of support from governments in the U.S., Russia, and France unless the Indian government goes to the NSG, the process will not move forward.
Despite the slowdown in progress on the nuclear agreement, other dimensions of Indo-U.S. cooperation are being strengthened at a steady pace. Several lucrative defense deals have been concluded and others are being considered. These include the sale of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft and the USS Trenton to India. Future defense acquisition by India include 126 multi-role combat aircraft for which Lockheed Martin's F-16 and Boeing's F/A-18 Super Hornet are among the contenders, and maritime patrol aircraft for the Indian Navy for which Boeing's P-8i Poseidon is the likely candidate.
Nevertheless, the nuclear agreement remains the centerpiece of the bilateral relationship. But under the present circumstances, it seems unlikely that the Indian government can proceed to the next step of the agreement process without risking its survival in Parliament. There is still some hope that the communist parties would give their go-ahead at the UPA-Left panel meeting in early May, just prior to the IAEA board meeting and the NSG plenary. This could conceivably be the final opportunity for the agreement to move ahead. For India and the United States, the quest over the last few years has been to move from being, in the words of one observer, "estranged democracies." The bilateral nuclear project might have run into difficulties, but both sides have emphasized that the broader relationship between them will continue to be strengthened, to ensure that there is no return to the "estranged" decades.
The author would like to thank Stephanie Lieggi and Jing-Dong Yuan for their review and comments. The shortcomings of this paper are solely the responsibility of the author.
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 The Congress Party leads a coalition of parties that is in power in New Delhi. The coalition is called the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The left front comprises of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), Communist Party of India, Revolutionary Socialist Party, and the All India Forward Bloc, and is not part of the UPA or the government; it supports the government from the outside.
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 Praful Bidwai, "India-US Nuclear Deal, RIP?" The News, March 18, 2008, www.thenews.com.pk.
 "'Sacrificing Govt for N-Deal Like Death Without Martyrdom'," The Times of India, April 16, 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
 See Surojit Gupta and Mark Williams, "Inflation Douses Talk of Early Polls," Reuters India, April 4, 2008, http://in.reuters.com.
 Sunil Saraf, "Indian Parties' Compromise Allows Talks With IAEA on Nuclear Deal," Nucleonics Week, November 22, 2007.
 Neena Vyas, "Brajesh-Mishra-BJP Differences on Nuclear Deal Out in the Open," The Hindu, April 29, 2008, www.thehindu.com.
 "Sub-Atomic Slips," The Indian Express, April 29, 2008, www.indianexpress.com.
 Sandeep Dikshit, "UPA Plays Lone Hand in Defending Nuclear Deal," The Hindu, December 5, 2007.
 "BJP For Law to Insulate India Against Hyde Act," The Hindu, March 22, 2008, www.thehindu.com.
 "We Can Neither End or Mend N-Deal: Pranab," Sify.com, March 19, 2008, http://sify.com.
 "India Dismisses US Advice to Pressure Iran to Give Up Nuclear Program," International Herald Tribune, April 23, 2008, www.iht.com.
 "Once IAEA Pact in Place, Will Bring Deal to House: Pranab," The Indian Express, April 24, 2008, www.indianexpress.com.
 Biswajit Roy, "Don't run nuclear deal risk, CPM warns again," The Telegraph, March 31, 2008, www.telegraphindia.com.
 Cithara Paul, "Left Plans to Freeze Deal by Carrying it to July," The Indian Express, April 30, 2008, www.indianexpress.com.
 "US envoy says almost 'now or never' for India to get such a nuclear deal," Press Trust of India, February 9, 2008, BBC Monitoring South Asia, Lexis-Nexis.
 "Next US President May Not Push N-Deal: Blackwill," The Times of India, April 20, 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
 Ramesh Ramachandran, "Saran: N-Deal Is Not on Hold," The Asian Age, April 9, 2008.
 Kandula Subramaniam, "Low on Uranium, 5 N-Power Units Are Shut Early," The Indian Express, October 24, 2007, www.indianexpress.com.
 Amitabh Sinha, "Low on Fuel & No Sign of Deal," The Indian Express, March 27, 2008, www.indianexpress.com.
 R. Ramachandran, "Indo-US Nuclear Agreement and IAEA Safeguards," pg. 580.
 "Power Target Will Have to be Slashed if Nuke Deal Fails: Kakodkar," The Hindu, October 31, 2007, www.hindu.com; "Enhancing Uranium Output a Major Challenge: Kakodkar," The Hindu, April 24, 2008, www.hindu.com.
 M.R. Srinivasan, "Nuclear Ground Realities," The Indian Express, March 29, 2008, www.indianexpress.com. Srinivasan is a former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).
 Brahma Chellaney, "Uranium Woes," The Asian Age, February 16, 2008, www.asianage.com.
 Subodh Varma, "Allocation for N-Programme Cut Sharply," The Times of India, March 24, 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com, Subodh Varma, "Thorium Plant Gets Rs. 2 Crore Less," Times of India, March 24, 2008, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
 Subodh Varma, "Allocation for N-Programme Cut Sharply."
 Indrani Bagchi, "Delhi says no more nuke deals before full & clear NSG waiver," The Times of India, November 15, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
 Mark Hibbs and Ann MacLachlan, "NSG won't allow more VVER exports to India without new agreements," Nucleonics Week, November 15, 2007.
 Huma Siddiqui, "Boeing Set to Bag Order For 8 Patrol Aircraft," Financial Express, March 17, 2008, www.financialexpress.com.
aircraft/285460/; Manu Pubby, "India to Sign Biggest Defence Deal With US Next Week," The Indian Express, April 20, 2008, www.indianexpress.com.
 Pranab Dhal Samanta, "On Bumpy Nuclear-Deal Road, UPA Switches on Left Indicator," The Indian Express, April 23, 2008, www.indianexpress.com.
 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1992).
 "U.S. Hints Nuclear Deal May Spill Over to the Next Administration," The Hindu, April 5, 2008, www.thehindu.com.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.
Sharad Joshi discusses the hurdles confronting the implementation of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement, both in New Delhi and within the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
the Nuclear Threat
Reducing the risk of nuclear use by terrorists and nation-states requires a broad set of complementary strategies targeted at reducing state reliance on nuclear weapons, stemming the demand for nuclear weapons and denying organizations or states access to the essential nuclear materials, technologies and know-how.