U.S. - UAE Nuclear Cooperation

Introduction

On May 21, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama submitted the text of a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement (123 Agreement) between the United States and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Congress. Congress has until October 17, 2009 to pass a resolution of disapproval or the agreement will come into force. Despite lingering concerns over the UAE's human rights record, lax export controls and relationship with Iran, it appears unlikely that Congress will vote against the agreement. The Obama administration and some congressional foreign policy leaders believe that the UAE's commitment to operational transparency and promise to forego domestic uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing are strong enough to prevent proliferation and set an important precedent for future U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements in the region. [1] Both enrichment and reprocessing can provide fuel for nuclear reactors or fissile material for nuclear weapons. As the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Howard Berman (D-CA) said in introducing a July 14 resolution in support of the agreement, "it is important to note that the nonproliferation conditions of the proposed U.S.-UAE Agreement go beyond those required by the NPT [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty], beyond those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and beyond those of even our own laws." [2]

Background

The UAE is among a number of Middle Eastern states that have recently shown interest in launching nuclear energy programs. [3] Independent analysts attribute the interest to a number of factors: increased energy demand including energy intensive water desalinization, desire for energy diversification, the desire to conserve oil and gas for export, and the status associated with nuclear technology. [4] The renewed interest in nuclear energy has also fueled speculation that Sunni Arab governments are responding to the security threat posed by Iran's nuclear program and potential development of nuclear weapons. [5] UAE officials deny that Iran's nuclear program influenced their decision to pursue nuclear power. According to UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, "it's hard to ignore a discernable trend among some commentators, who although acknowledging the progressive thinking embodied in the UAE policy, continue to ascribe the UAE's interest in nuclear energy to simple technological one-upsmanship. Such commentary is wrong and fails to acknowledge either the inherent advantages of nuclear energy." [6]

The U.S.-UAE cooperation agreement followed an announcement by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 2006 that it was examining civilian nuclear energy. [7] At a 2006 meeting in Saudi Arabia, all six foreign ministers instructed the GCC Secretariat to begin studying peaceful nuclear technology. However, concerns about long term energy supply prompted UAE officials launch a separate national program in 2007. The pace of nuclear developments in the UAE have cast doubts on the GCC's plan for a regional nuclear power program. [8]

According to an April 2008 Policy White Paper, released by the UAE, domestic electricity production must expand from 16 gigawatts (GW) to 40 GW by 2020 to meet projected demand increases in what has been a fast-growing region, which includes the important port of Dubai. [9] Even though the UAE has the fourth largest proven natural gas reserves in the Middle East, officials argue in the White Paper that, "known volumes of natural gas that could be made available to the nation's electricity sector would be insufficient to meet future demand." [10] The high sulfur content in UAE natural gas has made domestic production difficult and expensive. [11] Despite the high cost of natural gas extraction the UAE produced 1,659 billion cubic meters (Bcm) and consumed 1,457 Bcm of natural gas in 2007. [12] However, if estimates are correct and domestic energy consumption rises at rates between 11 to 18 percent the UAE will be a net gas importer after 2020. [13] These projected natural gas shortages and the high extraction costs led to the development of the Dolphin Project, an agreement to import natural gas from Qatar. [14] However, Emirate officials have insisted that relying on natural gas from Qatar will "raise the thorny issues related to security of supply," prompting examination of other potential sources of energy for electricity production. [15] Currently, the UAE relies on Qatar for sixty percent of its natural gas. However, Qatar has recently imposed a moratorium on additional natural gas exports until at least 2013, putting on a hold a planed expansion of the Dolphin pipeline. The UAE is now considering importing natural gas from Egypt and Iran to diversify supply. [16]

The UAE has the fifth largest proven oil reserves in the Middle East and officials acknowledge that diesel fuel and crude oil could be used to produce electricity in the future. However, UAE officials have determined that the loss of export revenue and the environmental effects of fossil fuels make this option unattractive. [17] Thus, the UAE envisions producing six to seven percent of its future energy from renewable sources in tandem with natural gas, fossil fuels, and nuclear energy from ten reactors. These assumptions led the UAE to conclude that nuclear power generation is a commercially competitive option to produce electricity. [18] However, the UAE has not released the financial data or economic model on which it based its conclusion and it is unclear if the UAE considered other cost saving measures or programs to reduce consumption. Furthermore, relying on nuclear energy does not address the UAE's dependence on foreign suppliers for energy resources. The UAE's commitment to forego domestic enrichment means that the UAE will be vulnerable to uranium supply interruptions and market fluctuations. [19] Despite these factors, by the end of 2009 the UAE plans to select its primary contractor and negotiate contract incentives to ensure the delivery of the first power plant in 2017.

123 Agreement

In order to help the UAE achieve its goals, its government and Washington first concluded a memorandum of understanding on April 21, 2008. Simultaneously, UAE officials quickly sought to reassure a skeptical international community that its nuclear ambitions were peaceful and solely for energy production. On April 20, 2008, the UAE released its comprehensive Policy White Paper to clarify and enumerate the program's objectives and motivations. [20] On January 15, 2009, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed signed a proposed nuclear cooperation agreement. After the signing ceremony Secretary Rice said the deal is, "powerful and timely for the world and region." [21]

To address proliferation concerns, the UAE pledged in its White Paper "to pursue the highest standards of nonproliferation, sign and implement the Additional Protocol to its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], conclude all relevant safeguard agreements with the IAEA, and forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing." [22] The Additional Protocol is a voluntary agreement that grants the IAEA greater inspections rights to detect the diversion of nuclear material, particularly from undeclared nuclear sites. [23] With such a protocol in place, inspectors have the right to conduct short notice inspections of all nuclear facilities in the UAE, collect environmental samples at or beyond declared nuclear facilities, install remote monitoring equipment, and gather information about nuclear research and development, as well as information regarding the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear technology. On March 3, 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors approved the UAE's Additional Protocol, and the UAE and IAEA signed the agreement on April 8, 2009. [24]

Provisions in the initial U.S.-UAE 123 agreement, signed by the Bush administration on January 15, 2009, gave the UAE prior approval to send its spent nuclear fuel to the United Kingdom or France for reprocessing. The agreement also allowed the United States to terminate the deal and required the return of any nuclear material or equipment if the UAE were found to have acquired sensitive nuclear facilities related to reprocessing and enrichment. [25] However, after taking office, the Obama administration sought to strengthen the nonproliferation provisions and negotiated a revised agreement in April 2009. The updated agreement explicitly prohibits the UAE from possessing enrichment and reprocessing facilities within its territory. [26]

The UAE also supports the Proliferation Security Initiative, is an active partner in the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism and the Global Initiative to Fight Global Terrorism and is consulting with the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The UAE will or already joined several nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear security, and safety conventions including: 1) The IAEA' Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radiocative Waste Management, 2) The Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 3) the Convention on Nuclear Safety. [27] In addition the UAE has also pledged ten million dollars for the Nuclear Threat Initiatives fuel bank effort and will adhere to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. [28] The UAE embassy claims that the commitment to forego domestic enrichment and reprocessing is expected to become part of national legislation and similar enrichment and reprocessing provisions can be found in all the nuclear cooperation agreements the UAE has recently signed. However, specific provisions limiting domestic enrichment and reprocessing are not included in the UAE's cooperation agreement with the France. [29]

Congressional Support for and Opposition to the Deal

After concluding the agreement in January 2009, the UAE reportedly asked the Bush administration to hold off sending the 123 agreement to Congress until the Obama administration took office in order to diffuse potential congressional opposition. [30] UAE officials had been chastened by their prior experience when state-owned Dubai Ports World (DP World) sought to take over the operation of six U.S. ports in 2006. [31] Controversy erupted after DP World won approval from the British High Court to purchase Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation (P&O), a British company that provides terminal operations for twenty-one ports in the United States. [32] The acquisition had already received approval from the U.S. government's Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. Controversy erupted after PSA International of Singapore dropped its bid to acquire P&O clearing the way for DP World's take over bid. [33] At the time, lawmakers were concerned that transferring control over port operations to a state owned company based in a Muslim country would increase the likelihood of terrorism in the United States. Lawmakers also had been concerned with the UAE's participation in the Arab boycott of Israel; Congress questioned whether the UAE should be rewarded for shunning a strong American ally. [34] UAE officials, surprised by the uproar, eventually bowed to the pressure and sold U.S. port operations to a U.S. company in March 2006.

The 123 agreement has received the support of several key lawmakers in the House and Senate. These include Representative Berman as well as top lawmakers on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, including Senator John Kerry (the Democratic chairman from Massachusetts) and Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana (its top Republican). [35] According to Berman, "I am satisfied that this agreement is in the nonproliferation interest of the United States. This is a model that any future U.S. civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, and all other nuclear supplier states, should follow." [36] Ellen Tauscher, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, echoed these statements: "By signing this agreement, the United States and the UAE have taken an important step in building a long and mutually beneficial partnership to enhance nonproliferation and energy security in the region. The proposed agreement deserves the support of the Congress." [37]

Still, some members of Congress oppose the agreement, citing the UAE's poor human rights record, the UAE's trade relationship with Iran, and its lax export control laws. These concerns prompted Representative. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (Republican of Florida) to introduce H.R. 364, which would bar the 123 agreement from becoming effective until the president certifies to Congress that the UAE has taken steps to prohibit the potential transfer of sensitive nuclear material to Iran, tightened up its export control laws, and ensured that it does not violate any applicable U.S. law. As of July 2009 H.R. 364 has only nine co-sponsors and is unlikely to garner enough support to block the 123 agreement. [38]

Concerns about human rights violations were exacerbated in April 2009 after several public reports about a video recording showing Sheikh Issa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, a member of the UAE royal family and a private security officer brutally torturing a grain merchant from Afghanistan. [39] Congressional opponents seized on the video as proof that the UAE is not a responsible actor and should not be trusted with nuclear technology. [40] In response to the public outcry, the UAE announced that it had arrested Sheikh al-Nahyan and was thoroughly investigating the incident. State Department officials have indicated that the torture video and the nuclear cooperation agreement have nothing to do with each other. [41]

UAE—A Transshipment Hub for Banned Goods?

Opponents of the 123 agreement are most troubled by the UAE's lax export control regime and the transshipment of banned technologies through out the Middle East from Dubai. UAE export controls have been under international scrutiny for several years after 2004 revelations that A.Q. Khan used Dubai as a transshipment point for his nuclear network. [42] Kahn's export operation was run by a Malaysian man named Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir based in Dubai and Malaysia. Khan assembled a large number of experts, companies, suppliers, and workshops to manufacture and export centrifuges know-how and components to third countries. The bulk of the equipment and centrifuge technology was shipped to Dubai, using false end-user certificates where it was repackaged and shipped to Khan's customers. The overwhelming majority of A.Q. Khan's nuclear equipment was transshipped via Dubai to avoid detection. [43]

On September 11, 2008 the U.S. Justice Department unsealed an indictment alleging that eight individuals and eight corporations violated the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the United States Iran Embargo by illegally shipping U.S. manufactured products to prohibited Iranian entities. [44] The indictment alleges that Ali Akbar Yahya, an Iranian national and naturalized British Citizen, illegally exported "120 field-programmable gate arrays, more than 5000 integrated circuits of varying types, approximately 345 Global Positioning Systems (GPS), 12,000 Microchip brand micro-controllers, and a Field Communicator."[45] All of these items are dual-use and could be used to construct improvised explosive devices (IED's). American officials allege that the same type of items have been found in IED's in Iraq and Afghanistan and have been traced back to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. [46]

Operations for the illegal export business were based in Dubai and used the Mayrow Trading Company to circumvent U.S. export controls. Mayrow worked with three other companies that alternated placing orders from U.S. firms for the sensitive electronic equipment to avoid raising the suspicions of the U.S. export control authorities. The shipment routes were designed to hide the end user from detection by U.S. export control officials and used Dubai to transship the equipment to Iran. [47] The Mayrow trading company operates in one of Dubai's free trade zones — an area specifically designated by the Emirates to encourage international trade because tariffs are waived and there are minimal regulations and oversight. [48] These free trade zones has limited the capacity of the Dubai government to effectively monitor and control the re-export of banned goods to third countries. These events prompted Stuart Levey, The U.S. Treasury Department's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, to press UAE banks to not grant Iranian companies export credits or financing options until Tehran complies with UN Security Council Resolutions. Since the program started Levey has visited Dubai eighteen times to try and persuade Dubai officials to bolster export controls and deny Iranian entities access to Emirate based banks. [49]

The use of Dubai for illegal transshipments to Iran are part of a complicated relationship between the two Gulf states. Relations between the two countries have been strained since Iran seized control of the three islands Greater Tunbs, Lesser Tunbs and Abu Masu in 1971. [50] Nonetheless, the two countries have strong cultural and ethnic ties that have fostered close economic cooperation. [51] Iran is the largest market for the UAE's non-petroleum exports, and the UAE is Iran's largest trading partner. [52] Still, UAE officials are suspicious of Iran's nuclear program and history of territorial expansion. UAE and GCC officials worry that a nuclear capable Iran will seek to dominate the region and will foment Shiite violence in the Gulf Kingdoms. UAE foreign policy appears to balance an interest in maintaining close economic ties with Iran with an interest in maintaining strong defense ties with the United States. [53]

These concerns prompted the UAE to conclude a bilateral defense pact with the United States in 1994. [54] The UAE hosts a large U.S. Air Force base and allows the U.S. Navy to make port visits. At the same time, the UAE and other Gulf states worry that overtly participating in Western efforts to isolate Iran will risk igniting regional and ethnic tensions. [55] So the UAE explicitly forbids the use of its territory for an attack against Iranian nuclear facilities. In general, the GCC states have refrained from making public statements denouncing Iran's nuclear program and have instead chosen to rely on European diplomacy and American military might to prevent Iran from going nuclear. [56]

In the realm of dealings in banned goods with Iran, the result, according to one observer is that the UAE opts not to stringently enforce export provisions because it is concerned about upsetting regional security. However, this is balanced with selective enforcement of U.S. sanction policy because the UAE relies on the United States for its defense. [57] Yet, beginning in 1987, Iranian officials have set up a number of front companies in Dubai to re-export banned materials to Iran in order to circumvent U.S. and then UN sanctions. Separated by a mere thirty miles a large number of Iranian businesses set up local offices in Dubai to avoid U.S. sanctions. [58] Outside of the free trade zones foreign entrepreneurs need to partner with locals to go into business because Dubai law mandates that locals must hold a majority stake in local businesses. [59] Dubai is Iran's primary transit point for illicit goods banned by the UN Security Council and a number of active front companies continue to operate in the free trade zones in and around Dubai. [60] UAE officials claim to have clamped down on these front companies and have instituted a number of programs to improve monitoring and enforcement of re-exports.

To date the UAE is participating in the following U.S.-led programs [61]:

  • Department of Energy's Megaports Initiative
  • Container Security Initiative
  • Secure Freight Initiative

After an intense diplomatic exchange the UAE agreed to adopt a more comprehensive export control law in August 2007. But as of May 2009, the government has not fully staffed the administrative body tasked with overseeing the implementation of this new law. [62] The UAE is likely to continue balancing U.S. demands for tighter export controls with its economic relationship with Iran. [63]

Recent Developments and Regional Implications

If the UAE agreement goes through, it is likely that the United States will conclude similar 123 agreements with other Middle Eastern countries. Before leaving office, the Bush administration signed a Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) pertaining to nuclear cooperation with Bahrain, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Initially, all three countries indicated that they would not pursue indigenous enrichment or reprocessing in return for U.S. technical assistance and a guaranteed fuel supply. [64] These MOUs were intended to be the first step towards the negotiation of a formal nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States. In each case, the United States contrasted the Gulf state's commitment to forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing with Iran's decision to pursue enrichment and used the UAE deal as a model for the MOU's provisions.

However, Jordan still has not agreed to terms for a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement because it is hesitant to forgo domestic enrichment and reprocessing. [65] Since signing the MOU, Jordan has made plans to develop its uranium reserves. According to Khaled Toukan, chairman of the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission, Jordan's commitment to implementing IAEA safeguards and the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires "the IAEA and technology holders to share their nuclear technology and expertise to address developing countries' challenges." [66] Jordanian officials are eager to begin exploiting the estimated 70,000 metric tones of uranium in central Jordan. In 2008, Jordan signed MOUs with Areva and Rio Tinto for the development of its uranium reserves. Some officials have even begun advocating for Jordan to be considered as a possible candidate to host a regional uranium enrichment center. [67]

Should Jordan prove unwilling to forgo enrichment and reprocessing this could prove particularly problematic because of a provision in the U.S.-UAE deal allowing the UAE to re-negotiate the terms of the agreement if it determines that other U.S.-Middle Eastern nuclear cooperation agreements have more favorable terms and conditions. [68] Jordan has received an initial offer from Korea Electric Power (KEPCO) for light water reactors, desalinization plants, and related infrastructure. Reportedly, the offer is not conditioned on Jordan forgoing enrichment or reprocessing. [69] Furthermore, Jordan has concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with France, China, South Korea, and Canada, and is expected to conclude agreements with Russia and the United Kingdom in the near future. These developments appear to have led Jordanian officials to believe that they can develop their nuclear program without any large-scale support or assistance from the United States. [70]

There are also lingering concerns that the Middle East's interest in nuclear energy is motivated by Iran's nuclear program and Israel's nuclear arsenal. Critics question the economic and environmental justification for nuclear energy in the oil-rich Gulf States. Opponents also point to Saudi Arabia's poor human rights record and involvement with Pakistan's nuclear program as evidence that the Saudis cannot be trusted with nuclear technology. [71] In addition, concerns have been raised about Bahrain's political stability. Bahrain is the only Arab country where the Sunni Muslim minority rules over a majority Shi'ite population. At times the simmering tension has erupted into violent protests and a failed coup attempt by Shiite militants in 1981. [72] Ethnic tensions fuel concerns that terrorists or anti-government activists may target nuclear facilities. These factors lead some analysts to question whether or not the United States should conclude 123 agreements with countries in the Middle East. [73]

Conclusion

The UAE is on track to be the second Middle Eastern country, after Iran, to produce commercial-scale nuclear energy. Officials have not publicly disclosed the companies that are competing for reactor construction contracts but the UAE is reportedly considering offers from three groups of contractors: a French Consortium of Areva, GdF Suez, and Total; a Korean group comprising Korea Electric Power Corp and Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co; and a third comprised of Hitachi and General Electric. [74] Officials estimate that the UAE's nuclear program is worth nearly 60 billion dollars. [75]

Despite the concerns over the spread of nuclear technology, supplier countries are competing to gain access to the lucrative Middle Eastern market. Beginning in February 2006, thirteen countries in the Middle East and North Africa announced new or revived plans to study civilian nuclear energy programs. [76] China, France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States have concluded cooperation agreements with a number of states through out the region. [77] The United States has sought to model its nuclear cooperation agreements with Middle Eastern states on the strict provisions in the UAE nuclear deal.

However, only Bahrain and Saudi Arabia has joined the UAE in explicitly enumerating its intention to forego domestic enrichment or spent fuel reprocessing. [78] Supporters of the U.S.-UAE 123 agreement argue that the enrichment and reprocessing provisions limit the spread of sensitive fuel cycle technology and minimize the proliferation risk of nuclear technology. Critics argue that the United States should not cooperate with the UAE until enforces its export control law and limits cooperation with Iran. The renewed interest in nuclear technology in the Middle East provides the United States with an opportunity to condition future nuclear cooperation with stringent nonproliferation provisions. Furthermore, the UAE agreement allows the U.S. to prove that it is willing to support nuclear cooperation with Middle Eastern countries if the recipient states are in good standing with nonproliferation norms. U.S. support for nuclear energy in the region could reassure skeptical countries that U.S. cooperation is not conditioned on geo-strategic interests but rather nuclear transparency and nonproliferation.

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[10] Ibid.
[11] "Country Analysis Briefs: United Arab Emirates," Energy Information Administration, October 15, 2007, www.eia.doe.gov.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Chen Kane and Dominic Monetta, "Assessing the Viability, Feasibility and Sustainability of Proposed New Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East - United Arab Emirates (UAE)," Unpublished Paper prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, April 2009.
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[16] Chen Kane and Dominic Monetta, "Assessing the Viability, Feasibility and Sustainability of Proposed New Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East - United Arab Emirates (UAE)," Unpublished Paper prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, April 2009.
[17] "Policy Evaluation of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy," April 20, 2008.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Chen Kane and Dominic Monetta, "Assessing the Viability, Feasibility and Sustainability of Proposed New Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East - United Arab Emirates (UAE)," Unpublished Paper prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, April 2009.
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[25]"Text of the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates Concerning the Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy," May 21, 2009, www.npec-web.org.
[26] 'Memorandum from Hillary Clinton and Steven Chu to President Obama concerning the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy," 20 April 2009, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov.
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[29] Chen Kane and Dominic Monetta, "Assessing the Viability, Feasibility and Sustainability of Proposed New Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East -United Arab Emirates (UAE)," Unpublished Paper prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, April 2009.; For more information about the UAE-France Nuclear Cooperation Agreement please refer to the Accord De Cooperation Entre Le Gouvernement de la Republique Francais et le Gouvernement de la Federation Des Emirats Arabes Pour Developpement des Utilisations Pacifiques De L'Energie Nucleaire: www.ambafrance-eau.org.
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[36] The full text of the Resolution can be found here: www.hcfa.house.gov.
[37] Statement by Ellen Tauscher before the House Foreign Affairs Committee regarding the "Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates Concerning Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy," July 8, 2009, www.state.gov.
[38] The full text of the legislation can be found here: www.govtrack.us.
[39] Elise Labott, "Torture Video Threatens U.S. — UAE Nuclear Deal," CNN, May 21, 2009.
[40] See, "Markey: UAE Torture Tape Horrific," Press Release from Congressman Ed Markey, May 13, 2009.
[41] Caryle Murphy, "Torture Caught on Camera in UAE," Global Post, May 2, 2009, www.globalpost.com.
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[44] See, "Sixteen Foreign Nationals and Corporations Indicted on Charges of Illegally Exporting Potential Military and Explosives Components to Iran," Press Release from the Department of Justice, September 17, 2008, www.usdoj.gov.
[45] Ibid.
[46] David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Scheel, "Iranian Entities' Illicit Military Procurement Networks," Institute for Science and International Security, January 12, 2009, www.isis-online.org.
[47] Eric Lipton, "U.S. Alarmed as Some Exports Veer Off Course in the Mideast," The New York Times, April 2, 2008.
[48] Walt Bogdanich, "Counterfeit Drugs' Path Eased by Free Trade Zones," The New York Times, December 17, 2007.
[49] Robin Wright, "Stuart Levy's War," The New York Times, November 2, 2008.
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[52] Ibid.
[53] Chen Kane and Dominic Monetta, "Assessing the Viability, Feasibility and Sustainability of Proposed New Nuclear Power Programs in the Middle East - United Arab Emirates (UAE)," Unpublished Paper prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, April 2009.
[54] Kenneth Katzman, "The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, July 31, 2008, www.au.af.mil.
[55] Elena McGovern, "Export Controls in the United Arab Emirates: A Practical Manifestation of a Strategic Dilemma," WMD Insights, February 2009, www.wmdinsights.com.
[56] Emile El-Hokayem and Matteo Legrenzi, "The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge," The Stimson Center, May 26, 2006, www.stimson.org.
[57] Elena McGovern, "Export Controls in the United Arab Emirates: A Practical Manifestation of a Strategic Dilemma," WMD Insights, February 2009, www.wmdinsights.com.
[58] Joby Warrick, "Iran Using Front Companies to get Bomb Parts From U.S.," The Washington Post, January 11, 2009.
[59] Robin Wright, "Stuart Levey's War," The New York Times, November 2, 2008.
[60] Elena McGovern, "Export Controls in the United Arab Emirates: A Practical Manifestation of a Strategic Dilemma," WMD Insights, February 2009, www.wmdinsights.com.
[61] Please refer to the UAE Embassies Fact Sheet: www.uae-embassy.org.
[62] Christopher Blanchard and Paul Kerr, "The United Arab Emirates Nuclear Program and the Proposed U.S. Nuclear Cooperation," Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 11, 2009, www.fas.org.
[63] McGovern, "Export Controls in the United Arab Emirates: A Practical Manifestation of a Strategic Dilemma"; El-Hokayem and Legrenzi, "The Arab Gulf States in the Shadow of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge."
[64] Daniel Horner, "U.S., Jordan Nearing Completion of Nuclear Pact, Official says," Platts Nucleonics Week, July 10, 2008.
[65] Mark Hibbs, "Jordan Holding off on Agreeing to Terms for Cooperation with U.S.," Platts Nucleonics Week, May 7, 2009.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid.
[68] "Text of the Proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates Concerning the Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy," May 21, 2009.
[69] Mark Hibbs, "Jordan to Identify Site, Technology for First Power Reactors by Early 2011, Platts Nucleonics Week, March 26, 2009.
[70] Mark Hibbs, "Jordan Holding off on Agreeing to Terms for Cooperation with U.S.," Platts Nucleonics Week, May 7, 2009.
[71] Mark Fitzpatrick, Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies), 2008), pp. 43-45.
[72] "Bahrain Charging Plot, Calls Iran Envoy Home," The New York Times, December 19, 1981.
[73] Joseph Cirincoine, "Chain Raction," Foreign Policy, May 2009, www.foreignpolicy.com.
[74] Tahani Karar, "UAE Nuclear Energy Push May Start Deal Bonanza," Zawya Dow Jones, July 20, 2009, www.zawya.com.
[75] Shashank Shekhar, "Firms Eye UAE's Nuclear Contracts," Zawya News, May 31, 2009.
[76] Peter Crail and Jessica Lasky-Fink, "Middle Eastern States Seeking Nuclear Power," Arms Control Today, May 2008, www.armscontrol.org.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Daniel Horner, "U.S., UAE Sign New Nuclear Cooperation Pact," Arms Control Association, June 2009, www.armscontrol.org.
[79] Mark Fitzpatrick, "Drawing a Bright Red Line: Forestalling Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East," Arms Control Today, January 17, 2009, www.iiss.org.

August 13, 2009
About

Aaron Stein discusses the implications of the 2009 bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and United Arab Emirates.

Authors
Aaron Stein

Research Assistant, Center for Nonproliferation Studies

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright 2016.