The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), the official name of the North Korean regime, has twice tested a nuclear explosive device and has deployed short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. The DPRK tested its first nuclear explosive device on 9 October 2006 and its second 25 May 2009. Pyongyang had withdrawn from the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in January of 2003. North Korea has also conducted numerous missile tests, including a series of cruise missile tests immediately following the May 2009 nuclear test. Pyongyang has also tested medium and intermediate-range ballistic missile on numerous occasions, including in 1993, 1998, 2006 and 2009. North Korea’s July 2006 test of the long-range Taepodong 2 (also referred to as the Paektusan-2) failed less than a minute after its launch. In what was seen as defiance of UN resolutions passed after the 2006 missile test, on 5 April 2009, North Korea once again tested a long-range missile, claiming it was a satellite launch. Launch of the three-stage rocket was seen as a technical failure with the first stage splashing down in the water between the Korean peninsula and Japan and the remaining stages, along with payload, falling into the Pacific Ocean. Although the 2006 and 2009 test were technical set-backs for North Korea’s program, concerns remain over the DPRK’s ambition for an intercontinental ballistic missile, particularly due to its nuclear aspirations and its role as a leading exporter of ballistic missile technology. Pyongyang also has a large stockpile of chemical weapons and possibly biological weapons.
The Six-Party Talks between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States began in 2003 to quell North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. In 2007, two agreements were reached which called for the DPRK to shut down, seal and disable its nuclear facility at Yongbyon in exchange for a total of one million tons of heavy fuel oil. North Korea also agreed to provide a "complete and correct" declaration of all its nuclear facilities. On 14 July 2007, the IAEA confirmed that the Yongbyon nuclear facility had been shut down and sealed. On 26 June 2008, North Korea handed over its nuclear declaration and the disablement process at Yongbyon was reportedly nearing completion. However, further tensions about verification of North Korean disablement led to a breakdown in the talks. After the UN Security Council condemned the North Korea’s April 2009 missile test, Pyongyang stated that it would no longer take part in the Six-Party Talks and that they were not beholden in any previous agreements related to the talks. This was soon followed by their second nuclear weapons test.
North Korea has conducted two nuclear weapon tests. On 9 October 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear device at 10:35AM (local time) at Mount Mant’ap near P’unggye-ri, Kilchu-kun, North Hamgyong Province. The yield from this test appeared to be less than 1 kiloton; North Korea was reportedly expecting at least a 4 kiloton yield, possibly indicating that the North Korean nuclear program still had a number of technical hurdles to overcome before it had a usable warhead. In reaction to the test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1718 placing sanctions on North Korea.
On 25 May 2009, North Korea conducted its second nuclear test after having apparently warned the U.S. and Chinese government of their intentions. North Korea’s Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that Pyongyang had carried out the nuclear test, and that it “was safely conducted on a new higher level in terms of its explosive power and technology of its control.” Initial estimates from the US government showed the test causing seismic activity equivalent to a magnitude of 4.7 on the Richter Scale and located close to the site of the first nuclear test in 2006. Early estimates pointed to a possible yield for the test of between 4 and 8 kilotons; while this is stronger than the first test, some analysts still questions the viability of Pyongyang’s nuclear warhead design.
Pyongyang’s nuclear infrastructure started taking shape in the 1950s with North Korea conducting research on radioactive isotopes for use in industry, agriculture, and medicine at the newly established Academy of Sciences (1952). In 1961, the DPRK began construction of the Yongbyon-kun nuclear energy research complex and completed it in 1964. The Soviet Union provided a small research reactor at the site in 1965, and Pyongyang subsequently expanded the complex and built a number of new facilities, including a large plutonium reprocessing plant (Radiochemistry Laboratory). North Korea signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1985 but did not submit to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections until May 1992. On 21 October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework in which the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear program and allow IAEA inspections. In return, the United States, Japan, and South Korea would provide North Korea with a light-water power plant and heavy oil to replace energy lost by loss of its graphite reactor. However, discrepancies between North Korean declarations and IAEA inspection findings indicate that North Korea might have reprocessed enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons. A December 2001 National Intelligence Council report ascertained that in the mid-1990s, North Korea had produced one, possibly two, nuclear weapons. In mid-2002, U.S. intelligence discovered that North Korea had been receiving materials from Pakistan for a uranium enrichment facility in violation of the NPT and the Agreed Framework.
With the terms of the 1994 Agreement unmet by either side, in December 2002, Pyongyang lifted the freeze on its plutonium-based nuclear weapons program and expelled IAEA inspectors. On 10 January 2003, North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT and on 10 February 2005, North Korea announced that it had manufactured nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the North Korean delegation to the Six-Party Talks in Beijing signed a "Statement of Principles" whereby Pyongyang agreed to abandon all nuclear programs and return to the NPT and restore IAEA safeguards in exchange for a U.S.-provided light-water reactor. Implementation has been delayed because North Korea and the United States have desired the other side fulfill its obligations under the agreement first.
Despite the September 2005 "Statement of Principles", the Six Party Talks process was put on hold for over a year. A key issue holding back the talks was a disagreement over financial sanctions placed by the United States on businesses working with North Korea. In particular, in September 2005, Washington froze the assets of Macao-based Banco Delta Asia. The reasons for this action are controversial, with the United States claiming that the bank was involved in money laundering unrelated to the nuclear issue, while experts on North Korea claimed it was to gain negotiating leverage over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
After the 2006 nuclear test, Beijing worked behind the scenes to get North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks. On 13 February 2007, North Korea agreed to an "Action Plan" based on the 2005 Statement of Principles. Under the deal, North Korea would shut down its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon within 60 days in exchange for 50,000 tons of heavy-fuel aid. Separate bilateral talks with the United States and Japan would also begin in order to normalize relations. Furthermore, in the Action Plan’s second phase, if North Korea disabled its nuclear weapons program entirely, another 950,000 tons of heavy fuel oil would be delivered along with other humanitarian, economic, and energy aid. On 19 March 2007, North Korean assets in Banco Delta Asia were released and on 14 July 2007, the IAEA confirmed the shutdown of Yongbyon nuclear facilities. In October 2007, the six parties agreed to a second phase Action Plan which called for North Korea to disable its key nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and furthermore to submit a full declaration of its entire nuclear program by 31 December 2007.
This timeline has not been met although uneven progress has been made towards disabling North Korea’s program. In June 2008, North Korea submitted its long-overdue nuclear declaration, and, in an effort to demonstrate its commitment to the denuclearization process, destroyed the cooling tower of its 5 Mw(e) experimental reactor at Yongbyon. The six parties then resumed negotiations to map out a verification plan. However, continued tensions about verification of North Korean disablement led to a breakdown in the talks. After the UN Security Council condemned the North Korean 2009 missile test, Pyongyang stated that it would no longer take part in the Six-Party Talks and that they were not beholden in any previous agreements related to the talks. This was followed within a few short weeks with their second nuclear test.
See North Korea Nuclear Profile
Although the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) acceded to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BWC) in 1987, it is suspected of maintaining an ongoing biological weapons program.
Defectors from the DPRK and the defense agencies of the United States and
Republic of Korea (ROK) generally agree that the country began to acquire a
biological weapons capability in the early 1980s. However, open-source
information on the DPRK's biological weapons program varies considerably, so it
is difficult to know of its true state. Perhaps the most authoritative analysis
was made in 2006 by the ROK's Ministry of National Defense (MND), which
estimates that the DPRK possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of
biological agents including the causative agents of anthrax, smallpox, and
cholera.[1] However, heightened concerns regarding DPRK 's efforts to acquire
nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, as well as its ongoing program to
export weapons and related dual-use equipment, have overshadowed international
considerations of whether the DPRK adheres to the BWC.[2]
See North Korea Biological Profile
The DPRK's chemical weapons agent production capability is estimated to be 4,500 metric tons per year; its military appears to have concentrated on acquiring mustard, phosgene, sarin,
and V-type chemical agents. Reports indicate that DPRK has approximately 12 facilitieswhere raw chemicals, precursors, and actual agents are produced and/or stored, as well as six major storage depots for chemical weapons. Pyongyang also has placed thousands of artillery systems—including multiple launch rocket systems that are particularly effective for chemical weapons delivery—within reach of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and Seoul. DPRK has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[3]
See North Korea Chemical Profile
North Korea began its missile development program in the 1970s and tested an "indigenous" Scud-B ballistic missile in April 1984. In its short-range arsenal, Pyongyang has produced the 500km-range Scud-C, the 800km-range
Scud-D, and the KN-02 which is an upgraded version of the Russian SS-21 "Scarab" with slightly longer range, about 100 to 120km.
In its medium and intermediate-range arsenal, North Korea has the 1300km-range missile known as the Nodong (Rodong) which it initially tested in1993 (500km) and again in 2006. North Korea has deployed about 175-200 Nodong missiles. In August 1998, North Korea flight-tested the two-stage
Paektusan-1 (Taepodong-1), a 1800km range missile, in a failed attempt to place a small satellite into earth orbit. In its second stage, it flew over the main Japanese island of Honshu and landed in the Pacific Ocean after traveling 1,380 km.
North Korea has also tested anti-ship cruise missiles in 1994, 1997, 2003, and 2007. The first three were based on the CSSC-3 'Seersucker' and identified as the AG-1. The latest anti-ship cruise missile tests on 25 May and 7 June 2007 are believed to have been either the KN-01 or Chinese-made CSSC-3 ‘Seersucker’.
In its long-range missile arsenal, North Korea tested the Taepodong-2 (Paektusan-2) on 5 July 2006 and 5 April 2009. The Taepodong-2 potentially has inter-continental range. However, the system failed in the 2006 test after about 40 seconds of flight. This test broke Pyongyang’s 1999 moratorium on long-range missile tests. More recently, North Korea informed the International Maritime Organization on 12 March 2009 of its intent to launch a satellite in early April. This launch was interpreted by most outside analysts and governments to be another test of the Taepodong-2 system. The 5 April 2009 launch, like the 2006 test, was a technical failure, with the multistage rocket crashing into the Pacific Ocean without the detachment of the second and third stages and its payload.
North Korea is also a major exporter of missile technology. North Korea has exported missiles, missile components, and technology to Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen. United States and Spanish naval forces intercepted a North Korean ship in December 2002 loaded with Scud missiles, but then allowed the ship to proceed to deliver the missiles to Yemen. In late January 2004, North Korea and Nigeria reportedly agreed to a missile deal, but Nigeria backed out of the agreement in early February under U.S. pressure.
North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
See North Korea Missile Profile
Sources:
[1] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2006 Defense White
Paper (English translation), May 2007, www.mnd.go.kr; Pak Tong-sam, "How Far Has
the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, in OSC document FTS19990121001655.
[2] "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements
and Commitments," prepared by the U.S. Department of State," 1 January 2001,
www.state.gov/ documents/ organization/ 22466.pdf; "Actual Problems of Chemical
Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Convention after the First Review Conference,"
Masaryk University (Brno), 12 April 2005, in OSC document
GRY20070108000026.
[3]Yi Kyo-kwan, "NK Report — North Korea Finishes Deploying Chemical Weapons in Forward Units," Choson Ilbo, 05 November 2002, in OSC document KPP20021105000236; "Defector Describes Various DPRK Arms Factories," Kin Seinichi no Himitsu Heiki Kojo (Tokyo), 25 November 2001, in OSC document KPP20021009000119; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Program," in North Korea's Weapons Programs: A Net Assessment, 21 January 2004, p.56, www.iiss.org/ EasysiteWeb/ getresource.axd? AssetID= 1869&type= full&servicetype= attachment.
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Updated June 2009 |
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