SS-19 silo at Pervomaysk, Ukraine after the silo headworks had been removed. Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program 130 such silos were eliminated at three locations in Ukraine.

Ukraine today has the demonstrated ability to produce advanced ballistic missiles with intercontinental range capabilities. Its missile industry can be considered world-class and is second only to Russia's among former Soviet republics. The linchpin of this industry is the former Yuzhnoye Scientific Production Association, arguably the foremost intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) design and production facility in the Soviet Union, whose capabilities could be matched only by a handful of U.S. and Russian missile enterprises. However, Ukraine's missile industry has suffered considerably during the 1990s because of the severe economic crisis that afflicted the entire Ukrainian economy. This has led to a deterioration of design and production infrastructure, as well as the loss of qualified technical cadre at Ukraine's missile facilities. This industry, which in the past was predominately dedicated to the design and production of strategic ballistic missiles, is at present being refocused on civilian applications. There are no indications that the government of Ukraine is planning to pursue military-related missile programs, but rather to focus on space exploration-related activities. Although Ukraine has attempted to embark on a number of joint projects with Western countries, most of them have collapsed, leaving Russia as Ukraine's most important partner in this field and the sole source of funding for many missile enterprises. The combination of the difficult financial situation of Ukraine's missile facilities and their technological prowess makes them a vulnerable target for countries of proliferation concern.

One of the remarkable aspects of Ukraine's missile industry is that its facilities were originally developed as components of a much larger missile and space industry that was located in most Soviet republics. As a result, while Ukraine inherited outstanding capabilities in some areas (for instance, one of the world's most highly regarded ballistic missile design bureaus and production facilities), it is lacking in many other areas. For example, the programmatic decisions made in Moscow on the direction of the Soviet rocket industry left Ukraine without its own rocket launch facilities, other than the ballistic missile silos of the Strategic Rocket Forces that were deployed on its territory. Whereas in most cases a country's missile industry is the product of long-term efforts directed at achieving a specific goal, Ukraine's was by and large a somewhat random collection of facilities that happened to be located on the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR. In short, Ukraine is an inheritor of a missile industry in whose creation it played virtually no role—a product of the unique circumstances in which this former Soviet republic found itself.

There are no indications that Ukraine is planning to exploit the considerable potential of its missile industry for military purposes. It should be noted that, in addition to its missile enterprises, Ukraine also inherited a large and modern strategic nuclear arsenal in the form of a Strategic Rocket Forces' 43rd Rocket Army equipped with over 100 SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs. Furthermore, it similarly found itself in possession of over 40 strategic bombers and over 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles. Nevertheless, by the end of 1996, Ukraine gave up the nuclear arsenal that was left on its territory after the Soviet collapse, and acceded to START I treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. Subsequently, Ukraine eliminated its strategic bombers, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and missile silos, or transferred them to Russia, with U.S. financial assistance. The largest remaining missiles in Ukraine's possession are the Tochka (NATO designation SS-21 "Scarab") tactical ballistic missiles, and the S-200 (NATO designation SA-5 "Gammon") long-range anti-aircraft missiles. Although Ukraine also inherited a number of Scud-B tactical ballistic missiles, it is not clear whether they are operational. Ukraine has also made no efforts to continue ballistic missile production or to modernize the ballistic missiles that were deployed on its territory. Over recent years, Ukraine has pursued a policy of integration with European and Western institutions, with its ultimate goal appearing to be membership in NATO and the European Union. Barring any significant political shifts in Ukraine, and/or a threat to its territorial integrity or political independence from one or more of its neighbors that would not be deterred by outside support, Ukraine is not likely to launch an effort to create a nuclear capability or a missile force for its delivery.

While no ballistic missiles are currently in production, Ukrainian facilities continue to produce space launch vehicles (SLVs) or components for them. Ukraine possesses Tsiklon and Zenit rocket types, with work on new variants reportedly continuing. In addition, Ukrainian firms are working on project to convert retired SS-18 ICBMs into Dnepr SLVs for use in commercial space launches from Russia.

Ukraine hopes to preserve as much of its rocket industry as possible, which it regards as the most important high-tech sector of its economy. However, due to the acute crisis of its economy, its ability to provide necessary funding is limited. Ukraine is involved in a number of international space programs, including Sea Launch (detailed in next section), and it is exploring the possibility of a project to launch rockets from the Alcantara space facility in Brazil. Other countries, including Malaysia, have also expressed interest in such activities. As previously noted, Ukraine does not have its own space launch facility, so all launches using Ukrainian rockets are taking place from facilities in Kazakhstan, Russia, or the Sea Launch platform. There do not appear to be any plans to develop a domestic space launch facility.

As of November 2003, Ukraine was pursuing the following projects in the sphere of rocketry:
Sea Launch project: an international project involving Ukrainian Pivdenne Design Bureau and Pivdenmash Machine-Building Plant, Boeing, Kvaerner, and Russia's RKK Energiya. The project's work focuses on commercial satellite launches of Zenit-3SL rockets from a sea platform. Ukrainian enterprises' total share in the project is 15 percent. The first Sea Launch-related contract with Ukrainian facilities took place on 11 September 2000, when Pivdenmash/Pivdenne Design Bureau signed a contract to deliver 80 Zenit-3SL rockets.

• Kosmotras: a Russian-Ukrainian joint venture that conducts commercial satellite launches of Dnepr SLVs (converted SS-18 ICBMs) from Baykonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Kosmotras has secured a number of foreign contracts for satellite launches. It is not clear what the future of this joint venture will be, as SS-18 stocks are finite, and moreover, the number of such ICBMs available for launches may have been reduced following the failure of START II to enter into force and the subsequent Russian decision to retain SS-18 ICBMs in service.[1]
• Proposed joint venture with Brazil: In July 2002, the government of Ukraine approved a decision to pursue the development of Tsiklon-4 SLV for use from Brazil's Alcantara facility. The cost of the project is estimated at $180 million, which will be equally shared by Ukraine and Brazil. Ukraine hopes that this cost will be recouped after 36 commercial launches. Over 50 Ukrainian firms will participate in this effort.[2]

Development of new SLV types: In May 2001, the National Space Agency of Ukraine announced that, as part of Ukraine's 2002-2006 National Space Program, the Pivdenne Design Bureau had launched work on Mayak family of SLVs, which is to consist of two vehicles: the Mayak-12, capable of launching cargoes up to 1.7t into orbits of up to 500km; and the Mayak-23, which can launch 3t cargoes into geostationary orbits. These SLVs will use rocket engines developed at Ukrainian and Russian design bureaus and then be produced at Pivdenmash. The first launch is planned for 2005 or 2006. However, because of financial problems, the status of this project is uncertain.[3]

Russia remains Ukraine's most important foreign partner of, as shown by the central roles played by Russian companies in most Ukrainian rocketry projects. As noted earlier, because Ukraine's missile industry consists of components of the former Soviet missile industry, it is still not self-contained nor self-sufficient, and relies heavily on cooperation with its Soviet-era partners currently located in Russia. This dependence is reflected by, among other things, the participation of Russian companies in virtually all Ukraine's rocket programs and international ventures. In February 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed a joint statement pledging both countries to expand cooperation on aerospace. Details of the agreement included joint space services, continuation of Dnepr, Tsiklon, and Zenit SLV projects, and support for Sea Launch.[4]

However, Russia requires Ukrainian assistance as well, as many prominent missile types still in use by the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces were designed, manufactured, or assembled at Ukrainian facilities. Despite stopping work on ballistic missile development, Ukraine remains involved in the modernization of the Russian strategic arsenal, as some missile types (SS-18, SS-24) were manufactured or assembled at Ukrainian facilities. Moreover, during the debates in the Russian parliament on START II ratification, Pivdenmash reportedly received a Russian request for information on the feasibility of restarting ICBM production in Ukraine.[5] In addition, in 2003, Ukraine's National Space Agency transferred approximately 30 non-deployed SS-19s to Russia, a move that helped modernize the Russian SS-19 force.

Ukraine has also made attempts to attract investments from other countries for its missile industry. In particular, Ukraine has approached Japan with proposals for investments and cooperation in space exploration and the aerospace industry. Japan, however, does not appear to have shown much interest.[6] Ukraine has also approached the United States in hopes of providing SLVs for launching components of the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) system into orbit. The former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual announced on 11 April 2002 that the United States and Ukraine may cooperate in the area of anti-missile defense. Pascual told journalists that Ukraine has some of the world's best space launch technologies at its disposal, and that Ukraine understands that WMD technology proliferation to states of concern may become the greatest global threat.[7] Nevertheless, the supportive U.S. attitude has yet to translate into actual U.S. government contracts. Another possible source of financial assistance for the struggling Ukrainian missile industry is Brazil. Since January 2002, Ukraine has been conducting negotiations with Brazil on creating a joint venture that would bring together Ukraine's leading rocket enterprises and unnamed Brazilian firms to develop the Tsiklon-4 SLV for launches from a Brazilian space port.[8] In addition, in August 2002, it was reported that Malaysia was interested in building a space launch facility for launching Dnepr SLVs.[9]

Kiev certainly retains the potential to manufacture ballistic missiles. However, as of November 2003, there appears to be little likelihood that Ukraine is going to resume ballistic missile development or deploy such weapons itself. In May and June 1997, the Secretary of the Ukrainian Security Council Volodymyr Horbulyn asserted that Ukraine retains the right to build and deploy short-range nuclear-capable missiles (with ranges below the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) threshold of 500km) should its security be threatened.[10] However, no work on such missiles appears to have been done. The only source of concern may be the possibility that Ukrainian technologies find their way into the hands of states of proliferation concern. This danger is exacerbated by the fact that Ukrainian missile industry employees are severely underpaid, and therefore, may be tempted to share sensitive technologies with other countries for supplemental income.

	Updated April 2007