SS-19 silo at Pervomaysk, Ukraine after the silo headworks had been removed. Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program 130 such silos were eliminated at three locations in Ukraine.

When the Soviet Union broke apart, Ukraine inherited a large and modern strategic nuclear arsenal in the form of a Strategic Rocket Forces' 43rd Rocket Army equipped with over 100 SS-19 and SS-24 ICBMs. It also found itself in possession of over 40 strategic bombers and over 1,000 air-launched cruise missiles. Nevertheless, by the end of 1996, Kyiv gave up the Soviet nuclear arsenal that was left on its territory, and acceded to the START I Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. Subsequently, Ukraine eliminated its strategic bombers, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and missile silos, or transferred them to Russia, with U.S. financial assistance. The largest remaining missiles in Ukraine's possession are the Tochka [NATO designation SS-21 "Scarab"] tactical ballistic missiles, and the S-200 [NATO designation SA-5 "Gammon"] long-range anti-aircraft missiles. Although Ukraine also inherited a number of Scud-B tactical ballistic missiles, it is not clear whether they are operational.

Ukraine has the demonstrated ability to produce advanced ballistic missiles with intercontinental range capabilities. Its missile industry is second only to Russia's among the former Soviet republics. The linchpin of this industry is the former Yuzhnoye Scientific Production Association, arguably the foremost intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) design and production facility in the Soviet Union, whose capabilities are matched only by a handful of U.S. and Russian missile enterprises. Ukraine's missile industry suffered considerably during the 1990s because of the severe economic crisis that afflicted the country. The crisis has led to a deterioration of design and production infrastructure, as well as the loss of qualified technical cadre at Ukraine's missile facilities. Although Ukraine has attempted to embark on a number of joint projects with Western countries, implementation of these projects has been slow, leaving Russia as Ukraine's most important partner in this field and the sole source of funding for some of the missile enterprises. The combination of the difficult financial situation of Ukraine's missile facilities and their technological prowess has made them a vulnerable target for countries of proliferation concern.

One of the remarkable aspects of Ukraine's missile industry is that its facilities were originally developed as components of a much larger missile and space industry that was located in most Soviet republics. As a result, while Ukraine inherited outstanding capabilities in some areas (for instance, one of the world's most highly regarded ballistic missile design bureaus and production facilities), it is lacking in many other areas. For example, the programmatic decisions made in Moscow on the direction of the Soviet rocket industry left Ukraine without its own rocket launch facilities, other than the ballistic missile silos of the Strategic Rocket Forces that were deployed on its territory. Whereas in most cases a country's missile industry is the product of long-term efforts directed at achieving a specific goal, Ukraine's was by and large a somewhat random collection of facilities that happened to be located on the territory of the former Ukrainian SSR. In short, Ukraine is an inheritor of a missile industry in whose creation it played virtually no role—a product of the unique circumstances in which this former Soviet republic found itself.

During its early years of independence, Ukraine’s work on ballistic missile design and production ceased for a period of time. In spite of economic and other troubles, Kyiv certainly retains the potential to manufacture ballistic missiles. In May and June 1997, the Secretary of the Ukrainian Security Council Volodymyr Horbulyn asserted that Ukraine retains the right to build and deploy short-range nuclear-capable missiles (with ranges below the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) threshold of 500km) should its security be threatened.[1] Since 2005, Ukrainian defense and industry officials have discussed ongoing efforts to indigenously design and produce a cruise missile and a tactical ballistic missile, possibly for export.[2] A source of concern is the possibility that Ukrainian technologies might find their way into the hands of states of proliferation concern. This danger is exacerbated by the fact that Ukrainian missile industry employees are severely underpaid, and therefore, may be tempted to share sensitive technologies with other countries for supplemental income.

Ukrainian facilities continue to produce space launch vehicles (SLVs) or components for them. Ukraine possesses Tsyklon and Zenit rocket types, with work on new variants reportedly continuing. In addition, Ukrainian firms are working on a project to convert retired SS-18 ICBMs into Dnepr SLVs for use in commercial space launches from Russia. Ukraine hopes to preserve as much of its rocket industry as possible, which it regards as the most important high-tech sector of its economy. However, due to economic difficulties, its ability to provide necessary funding is limited. Ukraine is involved in a number of international space programs, including Sea Launch, a project to launch rockets from the Alcantara space launch facility in Brazil. As previously noted, Ukraine does not have its own space launch facility, so all launches using Ukrainian rockets are taking place from facilities in Kazakhstan, Russia, or the Sea Launch platform. There do not appear to be any plans to develop a domestic space launch facility.

As of February 2009, Ukraine was pursuing the following projects in the sphere of rocketry:

Sea Launch project: An international project involving Ukrainian Pivdenne Design Bureau and Pivdenmash Machine-Building Plant, Boeing, Kvaerner, and Russia's RKK Energiya. The project's work focuses on commercial satellite launches of Zenit-3SL rockets from a sea platform. Ukrainian enterprises' total share in the project is 15 percent. The first Sea Launch-related contract with Ukrainian facilities took place on 11 September 2000, when Pivdenmash/Pivdenne Design Bureau signed a contract to deliver 80 Zenit-3SL rockets.

Kosmotras: A Russian-Ukrainian joint venture that conducts commercial satellite launches of Dnepr SLVs (converted SS-18 ICBMs) from Baykonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Kosmotras has secured a number of foreign contracts for satellite launches. It is not clear what the future of this joint venture will be, as SS-18 stocks are finite, and moreover, the number of such ICBMs available for launches may have been reduced following the failure of START II to enter into force and the subsequent Russian decision to retain SS-18 ICBMs in service.[3]

Alcantara Tsyklon Space: In July 2002, the government of Ukraine approved a decision to pursue the development of Tsyklon-4 SLV for use from Brazil's Alcantara facility. The cost of the project is estimated at $180 million, which will be equally shared by Ukraine and Brazil. Ukraine hopes that this cost will be recouped after 36 commercial launches. Over 50 Ukrainian firms are reportedly set to participate in this effort.[4] After some delays in the project, active cooperation started in 2006, and the first launch is expected in 2010.[5]

Russia remains Ukraine's most important foreign partner in this sector, as shown by the central roles played by Russian companies in most Ukrainian rocketry projects. As noted earlier, because Ukraine's missile industry consists of components of the former Soviet missile industry, it is still not self-contained nor self-sufficient, and relies heavily on cooperation with its Soviet-era partners currently located in Russia. This dependence is reflected by, among other things, the participation of Russian companies in virtually all Ukraine's rocket programs and international ventures. In February 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma signed a joint statement pledging both countries to expand cooperation on aerospace. Details of the agreement included joint space services, continuation of Dnepr, Tsiklon, and Zenit SLV projects, and support for Sea Launch.[6]

However, Russia requires Ukrainian assistance as well, as many prominent missile types still in use by the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces were designed, manufactured, or assembled at Ukrainian facilities. Ukraine remains involved in the modernization of the Russian strategic arsenal, as some missile types (SS-18, SS-24) were manufactured or assembled at Ukrainian facilities. Moreover, during the debates in the Russian parliament on START II ratification, Pivdenmash reportedly received a Russian request for information on the feasibility of restarting ICBM production in Ukraine.[7] In addition, in 2003, Ukraine's National Space Agency transferred approximately 30 non-deployed SS-19s to Russia, a move that helped modernize the Russian SS-19 force. Today, Ukraine’s enterprises, under a contract with the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, have continued to provide a wide range of services aimed at extending the service life of those missile complexes still in use. The contract for life extension of Russia's SS-18 [NATO designation SS-18 'Satan'] missiles systems was renewed in January 2008. [8]

Ukraine has also made attempts to attract investments from other countries for its missile industry. In particular, Ukraine has approached Japan with proposals for investments and cooperation in space exploration and the aerospace industry. Japan, however, does not appear to have shown much interest.[9] Ukraine has also approached the United States in hopes of providing SLVs for launching components of the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) system into orbit. The former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Carlos Pascual announced on 11 April 2002 that the United States and Ukraine may cooperate in the area of anti-missile defense. Pascual told journalists that Ukraine has some of the world's best space launch technologies at its disposal, and that Ukraine understands that WMD technology proliferation to states of concern may become the greatest global threat.[10] Nevertheless, the supportive U.S. attitude has yet to translate into actual U.S. government contracts.

Key Sources:
[1] Interfax, 18 June 1997; in "Government Has Right to Build Missiles 'if Threatened'," FBIS-TAC-97-169.
[2] Nikolai Sokov, "Ukrainian defense minister says his country will not acquire nuclear weapons; announces new missile program," WMD Insights, April 2006. http://www.wmdinsights.org/.
[3] ISC Kosmotras Website, http://www.kosmotras.ru/.
[4] Interfax, 24 July 2002; in "Ukraine, Brazil launch construction of new booster rocket," FBIS Document CEP20020724000277.
[5] "Na 'Khartrone' treniruiut mozgi 'Tsiklonov," Vremya, 11 April 2008; in Integrum Techno, http://www.integrum.com/.
[6] Interfax, 12 February 2001; in "Russia, Ukraine to expand cooperation in aerospace field," FBIS Document CEP20010212000161.
[7] "Vozobnovleniye proizvodstva boyevykh raket v Dnepropetrovske vozmozhno, no potrebuyet ochen bolshikh sredstv," UNIAN, No. 006 (146), 5-11 February 2001.
[8] "Putin signs into law ratification of Russian-Ukrainian treaty extending use of 15P118M missile system," Interfax, 12 February 2008, OSC Document CEP20080212950129.
[9] "Ukraine Calls for Japan Cash for Space Industry," Reuters, 20 May 1997.
[10] "SShA i Ukraina mogut sotrudnichat v sfere protivoraketnoy oborony - posol," Interfax, 11 April 2002.
{2/23/09 AL}

	Updated February 2009