Fact Sheet

Ukraine Overview

Ukraine Overview

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Background

This page is part of Ukraine’s Country Profile.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited a sizeable nuclear weapons infrastructure. Its sudden possession of the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world left this newly independent country with a strategic decision on whether to return the weapons to Russia or become a nuclear weapon state itself. In the end, Ukraine, along with Kazakhstan and Belarus, decided to return their weapons and delivery systems to Russia and to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Additionally, all three countries signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and helped facilitate the transfer of all strategic and tactical nuclear warheads out of their territories, as well as the dismantlement and/or removal of all their associated launch systems and delivery vehicles. Kiev returned all chemical weapons to Russia for elimination, and is not known to have ever possessed biological weapons, though it may have been involved in some production of Soviet biological agents during its time as a part of the Soviet Union. Ukraine is a member of all of the major nonproliferation treaties and regimes, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Australia Group (AG), the Zangger Committee (ZC), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles (HCOC).

Nuclear

Ukraine inherited a sizeable nuclear weapons arsenal from the former Soviet Union in the form of 130 SS-19 and 46 SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with 1,240 warheads, and 44 Tupolev-95 and Tupolev-160 strategic bombers (with 1,081 nuclear cruise missiles). 1 Kiev also possessed an unspecified number of tactical nuclear warheads. However, Ukraine acceded to START I in 1992 and joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1994, choosing to give up the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union. By June 1996, Ukraine had completed the transfer of approximately 1,900 strategic nuclear weapons to Russia (in return for nuclear reactor fuel), and deactivated all 176 ICBM silos located on its territory. 2

With assistance from the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Ukraine in March 2012 fulfilled its 2010 Nuclear Security Summit commitment to remove all Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from its territory. Russia, which originally supplied Ukraine with HEU, accepted the returned 234 kilograms for downblending to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). 3 Ukraine has no indigenous uranium enrichment facilities, but relies upon 15 nuclear reactors to generate approximately half of its electricity. 4 The demand for electricity in Ukraine is expected to double by 2020 and increase by nearly 40 percent over the following decade. 5 Like its predecessor, the new Ukrainian government formed in 2014 hopes to meet half of this projected demand with nuclear power. 6

Following a number of energy disputes with Russia, Kiev is looking to diversify its reactor fuel suppliers to reduce reliance on the Russian firm, TVEL and its parent company, Rosatom. In a bid to achieve this diversification, Ukraine’s state-run nuclear energy firm Yadernoye Toplivo purchased a 10% share in the international nuclear fuel repository planned for Angarsk, Russia. 7 Increased tensions with Moscow due to the current crisis in Ukraine have provided further impetus for diversification of supply. In April 2014, Ukraine’s National Nuclear Energy Generating Company (NNEGC EnergoAtom), the state enterprise that operates all currently operating power plants in Ukraine, extended an existing contract with American firm Westinghouse Electrical Company to supply fuel to three of its Russian-made nuclear power plants in southern Ukraine through 2020. 8

Biological

Since its independence in 1991, Ukraine has not engaged in offensive or defensive biological weapons activities. Although some Ukrainian anti-plague research facilities were historically involved in Soviet defensive biological warfare (BW) activities, they were mainly responsible for civilian epidemiological investigations. 9 However, as with other Soviet anti-plague institutes, the Ukrainian anti-plague facilities may have provided virulent strains to the USSR Ministry of Defense or Biopreparat. They may also have developed vaccines against, and diagnostic materials for, pathogens weaponized by the Soviet military. 10

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukrainian officials publicly stated that they viewed biological weapons proliferation as a threat to Ukraine’s national security. Ukraine does not have a biological weapons program, and joined the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). 11 Under an August 2005 Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement, the United States has been funding security upgrades at Ukrainian biological institutes where dangerous pathogens are kept. 12 In June 2010, a new disease research laboratory named the “Interim Central Reference Laboratory” opened in Odessa as part of the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The laboratory studies biological agents such as tularemia, anthrax and Q-fever. 13 The U.S. Government has upgraded nine Ministry of Health and Veterinary labs in Ukraine since 2013. 14

Missile

Ukraine inherited significant Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) design and production capabilities from the Soviet Union. These included the Pivdenne (formerly Yuzhnoye) Design Bureau, responsible for the design of the SS-18 and the SS-24 ICBMs, and the Pivdenmash (formerly Yuzhmash) Machine-Building Plant, which was the primary producer of liquid-fueled ICBMs such as the SS-18. 15 Other former Soviet missile industrial complex facilities in Ukraine include the Pavlohrad Chemical and Mechanical Plants, which were also involved in ICBM manufacture, and the Khartron Production Association, which produced guidance systems. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, these enterprises, particularly Yuzhmash, remained involved in a variety of space projects, including cooperation with Russian firms on the conversion of ICBMs such as the SS-18 into space launch vehicles (SLVs). 16 In August 2014, amid growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine, Russia announced that it would move production of high-pressure fuel tanks used in liquid fuel rocket engines out of Ukraine to the Voronezh Mechanical Factory in Russia. 17 The move may be part of an effort to reduce Russian dependence on space components built in Ukraine, which have, until this point, been an essential part of Russia’s defense industry. 18 The loss of this contract will likely have significant economic repercussions for Ukraine, where defense contracts with Russia represent a major source of both employment and revenue. 19 Ukraine is a member of the MTCR and has signed the HCOC.

Chemical

Since gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has not engaged in offensive or defensive chemical warfare (CW) activities. Prior to 1991, however, its territory was used by the Soviet government for chemical weapons storage and testing. The Red Army conducted marine tests with experimental chemical weapons in the Black Sea near the cities of Odesa and Sevastopol. The USSR also established storage sites in Zolotonosha (Cherkasy oblast), Ochakiv (on the Dnepr estuary and on the Black Sea), and Fastiv (Kiev oblast). 20 Ukraine transferred all of the chemical weapons on its territory to Russia by January 1992. Kiev is a party to the CWC, which it ratified in 1998.

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Glossary

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I, II, & III)
Refers to negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, held between 1982 and 1993 to limit and reduce the numbers of strategic offensive nuclear weapons in each country’s nuclear arsenal. The talks culminated in the 1991 START I Treaty, which entered into force in December 1994, and the 1993 START II Treaty. Although START II was ratified by the two countries, it never entered into force. In 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin discussed the possibility of a START III treaty to make further weapons reductions, but negotiations resulted in a stalemate. Following the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in 2002, Russia declared START II void. START I expired on 5 December 2009, and was followed by the New START treaty. See entries for New START and the Trilateral Statement. For additional information, see the entries for START I, START II, and New START
Tactical nuclear weapons
Short-range nuclear weapons, such as artillery shells, bombs, and short-range missiles, deployed for use in battlefield operations.
Dismantlement
Dismantlement: Taking apart a weapon, facility, or other item so that it is no longer functional.
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Australia Group (AG)
Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.
Zangger Committee (ZC)
A group of 35 nuclear exporting states established in 1971 under the chairmanship of Claude Zangger of Switzerland. The purpose of the committee is to maintain a "trigger list" of: (1) source or special fissionable materials, and (2) equipment or materials especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable materials. Additionally, the committee has identified certain dual-use technologies as requiring safeguarding when they are supplied to non-nuclear weapon states. These include explosives, centrifuge components, and special materials. The Zangger Committee is an informal arrangement, and its decisions are not legally binding upon its members. For more information see the Zangger Committee
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles (ICOC)
ICOC: A legally non-binding arrangement that was launched with the objective of preventing and curbing the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. States adhering to the ICOC agree not to assist ballistic missile programs in countries suspected of developing biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, as well as to exhibit "restraint" in the development and testing of their own ballistic missiles. It eventually became the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missiles (HCOC). For additional information, see the HCOC.
Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): A ballistic missile with a range greater than 5,500 km. See entry for ballistic missile.
Cruise missile
An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customized flight paths and to evade missile defense systems.
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).
Silo
Hardened underground facility for housing and launching a ballistic missile.
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)
The GTRI: A program established by the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration in May 2004 to identify, secure, remove, and/or facilitate the removal of vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world. The GTRI incorporated, among other programs, longstanding U.S. efforts under the RERTR program to convert domestic and foreign research reactors from highly enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. See entry for RERTR 
Nuclear Security Summits
Nuclear Security Summits: A series of international summits that emerged out of U.S. President Barack Obama's call in April 2009 to "secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years." The summit process focuses on strengthening international cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism, thwarting nuclear materials trafficking, and enhancing nuclear materials security.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of more than 20% of the isotope U-235. Achieved via the process of enrichment. See entry for enriched uranium.
Downblending
Downblending: Refers to the process of blending down HEU to LEU. This is done by mixing HEU and the blendstock (of natural, depleted, or slightly enriched uranium) in either liquid or gas form. See highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium.
Low enriched uranium (LEU)
Low enriched uranium (LEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of the isotope U-235 that is higher than that found in natural uranium but lower than 20% LEU (usually 3 to 5%). LEU is used as fuel for many nuclear reactor designs.
Enriched uranium
Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
Nuclear reactor
Nuclear reactor: A vessel in which nuclear fission may be sustained and controlled in a chain nuclear reaction. The varieties are many, but all incorporate certain features, including: fissionable or fissile fuel; a moderating material (unless the reactor is operated on fast neutrons); a reflector to conserve escaping neutrons; provisions of removal of heat; measuring and controlling instruments; and protective devices.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Plague
Plague: The disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. There are three forms of plague: bubonic plague, pneumonic plague, and septicemic plague. Bubonic plague refers to infection of the lymph nodes by Y. pestis, causing black sores or “buboes,” pneumonic plague refers to infection of the lungs, and septicemic plague refers to infection of the bloodstream. Although no longer a serious public health hazard in the developed world, the bacterium can spread from person-to-person in aerosolized form, and has been investigated as a biological weapon by Japan and the Soviet Union.
Pathogen
Pathogen: A microorganism capable of causing disease.
Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program
A U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) program established in 1992 by the U.S. Congress, through legislation sponsored primarily by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. It is the largest and most diverse U.S. program addressing former Soviet Union weapons of mass destruction threats. The program has focused primarily on: (1) destroying vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons (e.g., missiles and aircraft), their launchers (such as silos and submarines), and their related facilities; (2) securing former Soviet nuclear weapons and their components; and (3) destroying Russian chemical weapons. The term is often used generically to refer to all U.S. nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union—and sometimes beyond— including those implemented by the U.S. Departments of Energy, Commerce, and State. The program’s scope has expanded to include threat reduction efforts in geographical areas outside the Former Soviet Union.
Tularemia
Tularemia is a disease caused by Francisella tularensis, a bacterium that is native to rabbits and aquatic mammals, but is also one of the most infectious pathogens to humans. Tularemia can survive in harsh conditions, and just one organism can cause human infection. Tularemia aerosols can incapacitate a patient within one or two days. Tularemia infection causes fever and skin lesions, and can eventually develop into pneumonia. The Soviet Union and Japan investigated F. tularensis for bioweapons purposes during World War II, as did the United States during the 1950s and 1960s.
Anthrax
The common name of the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, as well as the name of the disease it produces.  A predominantly animal disease, anthrax can also infect humans and cause death within days.  B. anthracis bacteria can form hardy spores, making them relatively easy to disseminate.  Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR/Russia have all investigated anthrax as a biological weapon, as did the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo.  Anthrax-laced letters were also used to attack the U.S. Senate and numerous news agencies in September 2001.  There is no vaccine available to the general public, and treatment requires aggressive administration of antibiotics.
Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM): A ballistic missile with a range greater than 5,500 km. See entry for ballistic missile.
Space Launch Vehicle (SLV)
A rocket used to carry a payload, such as a satellite, from Earth into outer space. SLVs are of proliferation concern because their development requires a sophisticated understanding of the same technologies used in the development of long-range ballistic missiles. Some states (e.g., Iran), may have developed space launch vehicle programs in order to augment their ballistic missile capabilities.
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.

Sources

  1. Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukraine’s Nuclear Nostalgia,” World Policy Journal, Winter 2009-2010, p. 95.
  2. “Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus,” U.S. Department of Defense, www.dod.gov.
  3. “Fact Sheet: Ukraine Highly Enriched Uranium Removal,” White House Press Release, 27 March 2012, www.whitehouse.gov.
  4. “Nuclear Power in Ukraine” World Nuclear Association, Updated August 2014, www.world-nuclear.org. Leonid Benkovskyi, “Nuclear Energy Prospects for Ukraine,” Presentation to INPRO Dialogue Forum on Global Nuclear Energy Sustainability: Long-term Prospects for Nuclear Energy in the Post-Fukushima Era, 27-31 August 2012, www.iaea.org.
  5. “Nuclear Power in Ukraine,” World Nuclear Association, Updated August 2014, www.world-nuclear.org.
  6. “Nuclear Power in Ukraine,” World Nuclear Association, Updated August 2014, www.world-nuclear.org.
  7. “Ukraine Purchase Stake in International Nuclear Fuel Bank,” Global Security Newswire, 8 October 2010, www.nti.org.
  8. “Westinghouse and Ukraine’s Energoatom Extend Long-term Nuclear Fuel Contract,” Westinghouse Press Release, 11 April 2014, http://westinghousenuclear.com; Alexander Bor, “Ukraine to resume Westinghouse fuel imports: energy minister,” Nucleonics Week, 10 April 2014; Sean Carney, “Westinghouse, Ukraine Near Deal on Nuclear Fuel for Reactors,” The Wall Street Journal, 3 April 2014, online.wsj.com.
  9. Serguei Popov and Marina Voronova, “Russian Bioweapons: Still the Best-Kept Secret?” The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 2004, Vol. 11, No. 3.
  10. Ukraine Ministry of Health, “I.I. Mechnikov Anti-Plague Scientific and Research Institute of Ukraine,” Odessa, 2003.
  11. “Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus,” U.S. Department of Defense, www.dod.gov.
  12. Roger Roffey, Wilhelm Unge, Jenny Clevstrom and Kristina Westerdahl, Support to Threat Reduction of the Russian Biological Weapons Legacy – Conversion, Biodefence and the Role of Biopreparat, (Umeå: Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2003); “U.S., Ukraine Sign Agreement to Counter Threat of Bioterrorism,” America.gov, 29 August 2005, www.america.gov.
  13. “Germ Research Lab Opens in Ukraine,” Global Security Newswire, 16 June 2010, www.nti.org.
  14. Defense Threat Reduction Office, “Biological Threat Reduction Program,” U.S. Embassy Kyiv, http://ukraine.usembassy.gov.
  15. Nikolai Sokov, "Ukraine: A Postnuclear Country,” in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 2 A Comparative Perspective, eds. William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010), p.259.
  16. Nikolai Sokov, “Ukraine: A Postnuclear Country,” in Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Volume 2 A Comparative Perspective, eds. William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010), p.259.
  17. Aleksander Tikhonov, “Proizvodstvo komponentov dlya raket perenesut s Ukrainy v Voronezh,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 August 2014, www.rg.ru.
  18. Alexandra McLees and Eugene Rumer, “Saving Ukraine’s Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 July 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org.
  19. Alexandra McLees and Eugene Rumer, “Saving Ukraine’s Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 July 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org.
  20. Lev Fedorov, Khimicheskoye oruzhiye v Rossii: istoirya, ekologiya, politika [Chemical Weapons in Russia: History, Ecology, Politics], (Moscow: Center of Ecological Policy of Russia, 1994).

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