Fact Sheet

Argentina Overview

Nuclear missile on a TEL truck

Argentina Overview

Save to My Resources

Want to dive deeper?

Visit the Education Center

Background

This page is part of the Argentina’s Country Profile.

From the 1960s to the early 1990s, Argentina’s nuclear program and missile activities aroused concern that the country was seeking to develop nuclear weapons and possibly aid other countries in developing and delivering them. Argentina has since eschewed nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons but retains an ambitious nuclear energy program. It dismantled its ballistic missile program in the early 1990s. Argentina is now a member of all relevant nonproliferation treaties and organizations.

Nuclear

Argentina has never produced nuclear weapons. From the 1960s to the early 1990s, however, Argentina pursued an ambitious program of nuclear energy and technological development, which included construction of an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility. During that time period, the Argentine government also refused to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and to accede to the Latin America nuclear-weapon-free zone (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967). When democratic rule returned in 1983, however, the new president placed the nuclear program under civilian control and initiated a process of nuclear confidence building and cooperation with neighboring Brazil. In the early 1990s, the two countries established a bilateral inspection agency (ABACC) to verify both countries’ pledges to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes, and signed the Quadripartite Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agencv (IAEA). 1 Argentina joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1994, and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on 10 February 1995. Argentina has not signed the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, which would give the Agency expanded access to undeclared sites. In June 2011 the NSG approved revised guidelines for the export of sensitive nuclear technologies, and recognized the Quadripartite Agreement as an alternative to the Additional Protocol. 2

Argentina is the first South American country to use nuclear energy. It has three operating nuclear plants, Juan Domingo Perón (Atucha I), Néstor Kirchner (Atucha II) and Embalse, which supply 10% of the country’s electricity. 3 Nucleoelectrica Argentina S.A. is the state-owned company responsible for operation of all Argentine nuclear plants. In August 2006, Argentina took an important step to revive its nuclear energy development program by announcing a major nuclear initiative worth $3.5 billion over eight years. 4 Argentina completed Atucha II in 2014, started work to extend the life of the Embalse nuclear plant by 30 years in 2013 5 and signed in 2014, a cooperation agreement with China to construct a second CANDU reactor (Atucha III). 6

Argentina’s advanced nuclear industry is coordinated by the CNEA established in 1950 to develop the country’s nuclear technology for civilian use. Four major nuclear complexes and various jointly-owned companies operate under the CNEA: 7

  • Centro Atómico Bariloche, located in San Carlos de Bariloche, houses training facilities for scientific research and technological development, including the Balseiro Institute. It also houses the state nuclear engineering firm INVAP which designs and builds research reactors and communication and scientific satellites. INVAP has expanded its activities to other areas such as space and medical equipment.
  • Centro Atómico Constituyentes, located in the district of San Martín, Buenos Aires, carries out a wide range of research activities and houses experimental labs and pilot plants for fabrication of nuclear fuel and research reactors.
  • Centro Atómico Ezeiza, located in the district of Ezeiza, Buenos Aires, houses laboratories for production of medical isotopes and the publicly held company (CNEA has 33.3% participation) Combustibles Nucleares Argentinos S.A. (CONUAR S.A.), which supplies fuel elements to Atucha I and Embalse and will be the main supplier to future nuclear plants and research reactors.
  • Complejo Tecnológico Pilcaniyeu, located in the district of Rio Negro, is dedicated to research in the fields of nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel cycle. It houses the Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) plant, the pilot gaseous diffusion plant for uranium enrichment, and the SIGMA advanced diffusion enrichment plant.
  • Empresa Neuquina de Servicios de Ingeneria (ENSI), a state partnership jointly owned by CNEA and the Neuquen Province, operates the heavy water industrial production plant located in Arroyito. The plant, with an annual capacity of 200 tons, meets domestic (Atucha I and Embalse) and international (Canada, United States, and South Korea) demands for heavy water. 8

Argentina has an active export business. INVAP has sold research reactors to Algeria, Australia, Egypt, and Perú; the company is now seeking to expand its export market by offering small power reactors and services for large power plants. 9 Another possible market for INVAP reactors is Jordan; Argentina signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Jordan in 2008. 10

CNEA supplies Brazil with more than one-third of its Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) requirement and smaller quantities of this medical isotope to Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Argentina is one of the six world producers of Mo-99 and the only one to use low enriched uranium (LEU) in its production. 11

Argentina is seeking technological diversification and has signed cooperation agreements within various nuclear partners in order to further develop its civilian program, give a boost to its domestic industry, and create high skilled jobs.

Since 2008 Argentina and Brazil have been exploring possible areas for nuclear cooperation including the development of reactors for the production of electricity and the creation of a bi-national company to produce radiopharmaceuticals and to enrich uranium on an industrial scale. 12 However, progress has been difficult because each country’s nuclear reactors use different technologies and there have been political challenges to allowing Argentina to participate in the Brazilian nuclear submarine program. In June 2010, Argentine Minister of Defense Nilda Garré announced a plan to develop nuclear propulsion for navy vessels. 13 She clarified initial news reports about a nuclear submarine 14 by stating that “it is too early to say whether it [nuclear propulsion] will be for icebreakers or submarines.” 15 In August 2010, Argentina signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Brazil for the joint design of research reactors to produce radioisotopes. These reactors will be built separately by each country at an estimated cost of $500 million. 16

In September 2009, Nucleoelectrica Argentina SA signed an agreement with AECL for the life extension of Embalse and a feasibility study for the development of an advanced CANDU Reactor (ACR-1000). 17

In April 2010, Argentina and Russia signed various cooperation agreements on space and nuclear energy among other areas. Argentine President Cristina Kirchner said in a joint news conference with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev that Argentina is looking into the possibility of building additional nuclear plants to meet the country’s need for electricity. 18 The agreement opens the door for Rosatom Nuclear Energy State Corporation to compete for the construction of those reactors. 19

Argentina participates in the U.S. “Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors” program, which seeks to prevent depleted radioactive fuel in various countries from being used for military purposes. Since 2008, all of Argentina’s operating research reactors use LEU. 20

Argentina is also a member of the U.S. Megaports Initiative, which aims at preventing illicit traffic of nuclear materials through the global maritime system. The agreement signed on 13 April will provide two Argentine ports—Buenos Aires and Campana—with radiation detection equipment and training for port personnel. 21

Biological

There are no indications to suggest that Argentina has ever possessed or sought to acquire biological weapons. It is a state party of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), having ratified it in November 1979. In September 1991, Argentina, together with Brazil and Chile, signed the Mendoza Accord, which commits signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock, or transfer—directly or indirectly—chemical or biological weapons. Argentina further strengthened its nonproliferation credentials when, in 1992, it became a member of the Australia Group, a voluntary system of export controls on chemical and biological agents, precursors, and equipment.

Chemical

There is no evidence that Argentina has ever had a chemical warfare program. Argentina has been active in CW nonproliferation efforts. In 1992, Argentina became a member of the Australia Group and, in October 1995, ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Even before participation in these bodies, Argentina engaged in regional nonproliferation efforts; for example, Argentina signed the Mendoza Accord in 1991, which prohibits both chemical and biological warfare agents.

Missile

Argentina dismantled its medium-range ballistic missile program, the Cóndor II, in the early 1990s. The Cóndor missile program received technical support from a consortium of European firms and funding from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iraq. Argentina’s intent was to develop the Cóndor II not only for its own use—which was largely motivated by its loss in the Falklands/Malvinas War with Great Britain—but for export as well. Concerns that missile technology was reaching the Middle East caused the United States to pressure Argentina to end the program, which it did in 1992. Argentina became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1993.

Stay Informed

Sign up for our newsletter to get the latest on nuclear and biological threats.

Sign Up

More on

The Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

Report

The Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

Costs incurred by the US developing and maintaining nuclear weapons, including dismantlement, storage & disposal of radioactive wastes. (CNS)


Indonesia Submarine Capabilities

Fact Sheet

Indonesia Submarine Capabilities

The Indonesian Navy, also known as Tentar Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut (TNI-AL), operates two classes of submarines:


The Nuclear Posture Review Debate

Report

The Nuclear Posture Review Debate

Possibilities for continuity and change in the 2009 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, based on the Obama administration's stance on arms control. (CNS)


Glossary

Nuclear weapon
Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Nuclear energy
Nuclear energy: The energy liberated by a nuclear reaction (fission or fusion), or by radioactive decay.
Dismantlement
Dismantlement: Taking apart a weapon, facility, or other item so that it is no longer functional.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Nonproliferation
Nonproliferation: Measures to prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. See entry for Proliferation.
Enriched uranium
Enriched uranium: Uranium with an increased concentration of the isotope U-235, relative to natural uranium. Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent U-235, whereas nuclear weapons typically require uranium enriched to very high levels (see the definitions for “highly enriched uranium” and “weapons-grade”). Nuclear power plant fuel typically uses uranium enriched to 3 to 5 percent U-235, material that is not sufficiently enriched to be used for nuclear weapons.
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Treaty of Tlatelolco
The Treaty of Tlatelolco: This treaty, opened for signature in February 1967, created a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first international agreement that aimed to exclude nuclear weapons from an inhabited region of the globe. The member states accept the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their nuclear activities. The treaty also establishes a regional organization, the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), to supervise treaty implementation and ensure compliance with its provisions. For additional information, see the LANWFZ.
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)
The ABACC: This bilateral safeguards agency was established under an agreement between Argentina and Brazil to verify the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy in each country. The agreement establishing the agency was signed in Guadalajara, Mexico, on July 18, 1991. For additional information, see ABACC.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. See entry for Information Circular 540.
Safeguards
Safeguards: A system of accounting, containment, surveillance, and inspections aimed at verifying that states are in compliance with their treaty obligations concerning the supply, manufacture, and use of civil nuclear materials. The term frequently refers to the safeguards systems maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. IAEA safeguards aim to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material in a timely manner. However, the term can also refer to, for example, a bilateral agreement between a supplier state and an importer state on the use of a certain nuclear technology.

See entries for Full-scope safeguards, information-driven safeguards, Information Circular 66, and Information Circular 153.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
Radioisotope
Radioisotope: An unstable isotope of an element that decays or disintegrates spontaneously, emitting energy (radiation). Approximately 5,000 natural and artificial radioisotopes have been identified. Some radioisotopes, such as Molybdenum-99, are used for medical applications, such as diagnostics. These isotopes are created by the irradiation of targets in research reactors.
Low enriched uranium (LEU)
Low enriched uranium (LEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of the isotope U-235 that is higher than that found in natural uranium but lower than 20% LEU (usually 3 to 5%). LEU is used as fuel for many nuclear reactor designs.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Mendoza Agreement
The Mendoza Agreement, signed in 1991 by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, never entered into force. The Parties agreed not to develop, produce, acquire in any way, stockpile or retain, transfer directly or indirectly, or use chemical or biological weapons. Prior to the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and in conformity with international law, the parties intended to establish in their respective countries the appropriate inspection mechanisms for those substances defined as precursors or chemical warfare agents. For additional information, see the Mendoza Agreement.
Australia Group (AG)
Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Ballistic missile
A delivery vehicle powered by a liquid or solid fueled rocket that primarily travels in a ballistic (free-fall) trajectory.  The flight of a ballistic missile includes three phases: 1) boost phase, where the rocket generates thrust to launch the missile into flight; 2) midcourse phase, where the missile coasts in an arc under the influence of gravity; and 3) terminal phase, in which the missile descends towards its target.  Ballistic missiles can be characterized by three key parameters - range, payload, and Circular Error Probable (CEP), or targeting precision.  Ballistic missiles are primarily intended for use against ground targets.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.

Sources

  1. Michael Z. Wise, "Argentina, Brazil Sign Nuclear Accord," Washington Post, 14 December 1991.
  2. "Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)," Press Release n.237, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 June 2011.
  3. Juan Domingo Perón (also known as Atucha I), a 363 MWe PHWR using a mix of natural uranium and slightly enriched uranium (0.85%) was supplied by Siemens AG (Germany) and started operation in 1974. Embalse, a 648 MWe CANDU 6 reactor supplied by Canada's Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL), uses natural uranium and started operation in 1974. Kirchner (Atucha II), a 745 MWe PHWR, has a Siemens design like Atucha I but uses only natural uranium. Construction on Atucha II began in 1981, was suspended in 1994 due to lack of funds, was finished in 2014 and the reactor reached full capacity in Feburary 2015, "Centrales Nucleares," Nucleoelectrica Argentina SA, www.na-sa.com.ar; "Nuclear Power in Argentina," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org.
  4. Antonio Rossi, "Invertirán US$ 3.500 millones para relanzar el plan de desarrollo nuclear," Clarin, August 2006, www.clarin.com; Ann MacLachlan, "Argentina unveils ambitious plan for nuclear power expansion," Nucleonics Week 47, no. 35, 9, 31 August 2006.
  5. William Freebairn, "Argentina's Atucha-2 reaches 100% of capacity for first time," Nucleonics Week, 26 Feburary 2015.
  6. "Nucleoeléctrica Argentina firmó el contrato para la construcción de la cuarta central nuclear argentina," Nucleoelectrica Argentina SA, www.na-sa.com.ar; "Argentina y China ratificaron el trabajo conjunto para la cuarta central nuclear," Telám, 2 March 2015, www.telam.com.ar.
  7. Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, www.cnea.gov.ar.
  8. Heavy Water, ENSI, www.ensi.com.ar.
  9. "INVAP – Nuclear Background," INVAP, www.invap.net.
  10. "La Argentina firmó un acuerdo nuclear con Jordania," Clarin, 23 October 2008, www.clarin.com.
  11. "El país, exportador de tecnología nuclear," La Nacion, 20 December 2009, www.lanacion.com.ar; "CNEA vende radioisótopos a Brasil," Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (CNEA), 19 November 2009, www.cnea.gov.ar.
  12. Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii, "Brazil's New National Defense Strategy Calls for Strategic Nuclear Developments," NTI Issue Brief, 30 October 2009, www.nti.org.
  13. "Garré Informó Sobre Proyectos Tecnológicos de Defensa," Argentine Ministry of Defense press release, 3 June 2010, www.mindef.gov.ar.
  14. Daniel Gallo, "Promete Garré que se construirá un submarino nuclear en el país," La Nacion, 4 June 2010, www.lanacion.com.ar.
  15. "Para Garré, es prematuro hablar del submarine," La Nacion, 5 June 2010, www.lanacion.com.ar.
  16. Daniel Rittner, "Argentina e Brasil acertam parceria na área nuclear," Valor Econômico, 4 August 2010.
  17. "AECL extends agreement with Argentina for expanded CANDU nuclear co-operation," AECL, 21 September 2009, www.aecl.ca.
  18. "Joint News Conference with President of Argentina Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner," President of Russia, http://eng.kremlin.ru.
  19. Lyubov Pronina, "Rosatom May Build Two Nuclear Reactors in Argentina (Update1)," Bloomberg, www.bloomberg.com.
  20. "Ya no quedan reactores con uranio de alto enriquecimiento en el país," Telam, 27 January 2009, www.telam.com.ar.
  21. "Signing of the Megaports Agreement," U.S. Department of State, 13 April 2010, www.state.gov; "U.S.-Argentina Megaports Agreement to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling," 13 April 2010, YouTube.com.

Close

My Resources