Brazil’s Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present

Brazil’s Nuclear Ambitions, Past and Present

Want to dive deeper?

Visit the Education Center

Daphne Morrison

Research Assistant, The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies


On May 6, 2006, Brazil inaugurated a controversial uranium enrichment facility at Resende, 90 miles to the west of Rio de Janeiro.[1]

The plant, which will enrich uranium for Brazil's nuclear power plants and eventually for sale on the international civilian market, first received attention during a 2004 dispute with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In early 2004, Brazilian authorities refused to give IAEA inspectors full visual access to the Resende uranium enrichment facility, which was under construction at the time.

IAEA officials who visited the plant alleged that some of the plant's equipment was sealed from view by walls and coverings. Brazilian authorities admitted to covering up part of the equipment inside the plant, citing the need to protect proprietary technology. As a member of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Brazil is subject to IAEA safeguards including mandatory inspections of nuclear facilities, as stated in Article III of the NPT, which provides that safeguards be implemented in a manner that "avoids hampering the economic and technological development of the parties."

The Brazilians persisted in refusing to grant the IAEA inspectors full access to the Resende plant, resulting in an impasse that lasted until November 2004, when an agreement was reached that satisfied both parties; still, questions persist about the extent and purpose of Brazil's nuclear program.

This issue brief will review the history of Brazil's nuclear program up to its 2004 dispute with the IAEA; it concludes with an overview of Brazil's current nuclear program and facilities, including its nuclear submarine plans.


Brazil's nuclear program dates back to the 1930s, when scientists began researching nuclear fission.[2]

In the 1940s, Brazil signed a mining agreement the United States; three subsequent agreements with the U.S. followed, including a U.S. commitment to transfer nuclear technology to Brazil.[3] In the 1950s, Álvaro Alberto, then-director of the National Research Council, went to Germany with the intent of purchasing experimental centrifuges. In 1965, Brazil signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States guaranteeing it a power plant; the U.S. supplied Angra I in 1971.[4] At that time Brazil's civilian nuclear program was transparent to both the Brazilian public and the international community. In 1975, the Brazilian state firm Nuclebrás signed an agreement with a West German company resulting in the transfer of nuclear technology, including the joint development of the experimental "jet nozzle" technology to enrich uranium.[5]

This breakthrough agreement with Germany appeared to be driven by a number of factors, such as Brazil's desire to combat the growing energy crisis of the 1970s[6]; but as Michael Barletta notes in his study of Brazil nuclear program, "while production of atomic weapons may have been one objective sought through the agreement, it was clearly not the only or primary goal."[7]
In the late 1970s, Brazilian President Figueiredo approved a clandestine parallel nuclear program: the Autonomous Program of Nuclear Technology (PATN). Figueiredo's decision to pursue a covert uranium enrichment program stems from the political situation at that time. Brazil was under military rule from 1964 to 1985, at which point the country democratized. During the years of military dictatorship, presidents were chosen by top military officials and approved by the Congress in an attempt to maintain a façade of free elections. The jet nozzle nuclear enrichment program, initiated under Nuclebrás by Figueiredo's predecessor, President Ernesto Geisel, constituted Brazil's official, civilian nuclear program. That program, however, failed to lead to an enrichment capability, frustrating military officials. President Figueiredo, guided by military advisors, approved the military program under PATN, whose primary goal was to master the nuclear fuel cycle, principally the enrichment of uranium.[8]

PATN, funded by the military, the National Security Council (CSN) and the National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), and comprised of three sub-units made up of the armed forces in conjunction with civilian researchers, pursued three distinct avenues to enrichment. Brazil's Air Force researched laser technology, while the Army focused on graphite reactors and the Navy, in conjunction with the Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research (IPEN) on ultracentrifuges.[9]

Furthermore, the enrichment paths pursued by the three branches of the armed forces were chosen ad hoc.

In the most notable case, the Navy's pursuit of enriched uranium through ultracentrifuge technology furthered its goal of developing nuclear powered submarines. Of the three programs pursued under PATN, the Navy's was by far the most successful, and ultracentrifuge technology became the chosen method of attaining enriched fissile material.[10]

President Figueiredo and the military's joint decision to actively pursue uranium enrichment through a clandestine military program stemmed from a number of factors, including a longstanding rivalry with Argentina over regional influence and international recognition.[11] Brazil's race for an enrichment capability was as much a competition with Argentina as it was an opportunity for Brazil to prove itself as a rising power. Brazil wanted to be the Latin American hub of science, technology, and nuclear power.[12] Argentina's covert nuclear program was also progressing, and this provoked a regional rivalry over nuclear development.[13] Some analysts believe that Brazil's nuclear program was intended to deter a potential Argentine nuclear weapons program: "the technology itself was seen as a "species of deterrence;" the mere capacity to match a potential Argentine bomb was presumed sufficient to deter its construction."[14] The Brazilian military viewed Argentina's growing nuclear capabilities as a serious threat to Brazil's national security.[15] While the Brazil-Argentine rivalry was later mitigated by democratization, it is believed that the Argentine nuclear program was an estimated ten years ahead of her Brazilian counterpart.[16]

On September 27, 1987, the Navy announced that it had successfully enriched uranium, although it is believed that Brazil had in fact mastered this process well before this announcement. One of Brazil's top nuclear scientists, Othon Pinheiro da Silva, and his team at IPEN constructed their first ultracentrifuge in 1981; by 1984 the number of ultracentrifuges at IPEN reached nine and the experimental facility was considered operational. In September 1987, when the program was openly acknowledged, IPEN allegedly had produced several kilograms of uranium enriched to 1.2% uranium-235 (U-235).[17] The following year Brazil inaugurated a pilot ultracentrifuge enrichment plant in Iperó. The Aramar Research Center was to enrich uranium to no more than 5% for research and submarine reactors. In 1989, Brazilian authorities allegedly announced that small amounts of uranium enriched to 20%[18] had been produced.[19]

The Brazilian nuclear program underwent a series of notable changes in the 1980s as a direct result of the changing political climate. While great advancements in nuclear enrichment were made, the decade was also marked by increased transparency and acknowledgment of the hitherto secret military program, generally attributed to democratization in 1985. However, full acknowledgment of the military program was not disclosed until 1990, when Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello famously denounced the Air Force's clandestine nuclear program at an alleged nuclear bomb testing site at a northern Brazilian air force base at Cachimbo.

He symbolically threw two shovels into the test site, demonstrating his commitment to bury the program.[20] In 1988, Brazil's Congress approved a new constitution banning all nuclear activities except for peaceful purposes, and in 1991, Brazil signed a bilateral agreement with Argentina pledging to use nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes, enforced by the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (SCCC). On the same day, the two countries created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in order to manage and apply the SCCC. [21] This agreement was extended in December of the same year to include the application of IAEA safeguards, known as the Quadripartite Agreement and in 1993, an agreement on privileges and immunities was added.[22]

A reoccurring question regarding Brazil's military nuclear program is whether or not the Air Force ever tried to build a nuclear weapon. The general consensus is that while Brazil did have the technological capability to make atomic weapons, it did not do so.[23] In August 2005, former Brazilian president José Sarney who took office from 1985 to 1990, disclosed information about the military nuclear program to a Brazilian television station, Globo TV.[24] Sarney alleged that the military tried to build a nuclear bomb during the military rule, marking the first public acknowledgment of an atomic weapons program. He added that he eliminated the program when he came to office,[25] but a top scientist and former president of Brazil's nuclear energy commission refuted the claims. Jose Luiz Santana came forward just weeks after Sarney's TV appearance, and acknowledged the atomic program but denied that the program was cancelled when Sarney took office. According to Santana, the military continued to work on developing an atomic weapon until 1990, when the program was finally terminated.[26]

In the 1980s, increased domestic opposition to decades of military rule was manifested in the public's hostility to all programs it considered military related, including nuclear programs. At its height, public antagonism in the form of protests and anti-nuclear activism seriously challenged the nuclear program, as well as the official German-Brazilian effort to build nuclear power plants, and while the government eventually won the public over by actively campaigning in the plant's favor, public pressure can be attributed in part to the creation of the 1990 Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry (CPI).

The CPI was set up to investigate the PATN and the military program, as well as secrecy and accountability, thereof.[27] According to one source, an investigation carried out by the Congressional Investigation Committee (CPI) in 1990 revealed designs for two nuclear weapon devices with yields of 20 to 30 kilotons and 12 kilotons, respectively.[28]

Furthermore, the alleged atomic weapons program included a 300-meter deep underground testing site for nuclear explosives in the Amazon jungle.[29] While the public's opposition to the country's nuclear program was mitigated with the disclosure of the secret program, the investigation into the program, and Brazil's entry into the Quadripartite Agreement,[30] the Brazilian Air Force's alleged nuclear weapons achievements remain a topic for speculation.

The question of Brazil's nuclear capabilities is further complicated by the Navy's ambitious nuclear submarine propulsion program.[31] While Collor's 1990 denouncement of the military program resulted in serious constraints and opposition to the military nuclear program, the military maintained a prominent role in the nuclear program. According to Barletta, "in a sense the Brazilian armed forces thus relinquished the theoretical option of constructing the bomb in tacit exchange for maintaining their tangible role in nuclear technological development."[32] Today, the Brazilian Navy continues its research into building nuclear-powered submarines. The Navy is also still in charge of uranium centrifuge technology; the centrifuges in the newly constructed Resende facilty were both designed and installed by the Navy, although the facility is ultimately operated by the INB.[33]

Brazil signed that Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 and ratified it in 1968 with a reservation. Brazil removed its reservation on May 30, 1994,[34] and four years later, in 1998, Brazil signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

To date, Brazil has not signed the IAEA Additional Protocol. Brazilian reluctance to sign the Additional Protocol can be traced back to sentiment toward the NPT. Despite the 1985 democratization and subsequent 1990 disclosure of the military program, Brazil did not ratify the NPT until 1998. Then-foreign minister Francisco Rezek defended Brazil's decision not to join the NPT in 1990 when he stated that while Brazil had no plans to build an atomic weapon, it did not want to be subject to foreign controls which might hinder nuclear objectives, although he did not specify what the objectives were.[35] Furthermore, when President Lula da Silva came in to power in 2002, he famously said about the NPT: "If someone asks me to disarm and keep a slingshot while he comes at me with a cannon, what good does that do?"[36] Da Silva later said that Brazil has no nuclear weapons ambitions.

Similarly, Jose Dirceu, a former top Brazilian official and President Lula's former chief of staff, recently expressed frustration with the dual-nature of the Additional Protocol.[37] When discussing the Additional Protocol in July 2005, Dirceu focused attention on the need for disarmament of nuclear weapon states.[38] Furthermore, of primary concern to experts are the stringent inspections; Brazil does not want to further curtail autonomy over their nuclear program.[39]

IAEA-Brazil Dispute

According to an article in the The Washington Post, IAEA inspectors were denied visual access to centrifuges in February and March 2004 at the Resende facility, still under construction.[40]

During the initial visits, Brazilian authorities shrouded the centrifuges with panels, hiding both the rotors and casings of the centrifuges.[41] Brazilian authorities insisted that full visual access of the centrifuges was not necessary to determine whether or not diversion was taking place. They cited the need to protect proprietary technology as justification for shrouding the centrifuges[42] and noted that Brazil and the IAEA were negotiating new inspection procedures to protect the technology.[43]

As the negotiations between the IAEA and Brazil continued, debates and allegations flared up in the international community over Brazil's nuclear intentions. One article in Science magazine published in October 2004 claimed that the Resende enrichment facility "will have the potential to produce enough 235U to make five or six implosion-type warheards per year."[44]

The article further alleged that by denying IAEA officials full inspection to their centrifuges, Brazil could theoretically clear the path for "rogue" nations such as Iran to demand that similar concessions be made for their nuclear inspections. Also, in September 2004, Henry Sokolski, a former Defense Department official and head of the Washington-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, reportedly told a Brazilian newspaper that IAEA officials speculated that Brazil derived some of its technology from A.Q. Khan's black market nuclear network.[45]

Brazilian authorities including the minister of science and technology, Eduardo Campos, denied all allegations and reminded that Brazil was bound by its constitution to the peaceful pursuit of nuclear technology. Brazilians also resented comparisons made between their enrichment activities to those of Iran as they are bound to the peaceful use of nuclear technology by their constitution and have not been found in violation of their obligations to the NPT.[46] Brazilian authorities also cited a bilateral agreement with Argentina, which uses IAEA safeguards as proof of further checks on their nuclear program. For their part, Brazilian scientists were most outraged by accusations that the secrecy behind Brazilian centrifuge technology was in part due to transfers of nuclear technology and technological know-how from A.Q. Kahn's illicit network. One Brazilian scientist called the allegations "absurd,"[47] yet Brazilian authorities persisted in shielding the centrifuges from inspectors.

Brazilian scientists claimed they needed to protect their proprietary centrifuge technology from IAEA inspectors. According to Brazilian authorities, their centrifuges are 25% more efficient than existing centrifuges.[48] Developed by the Navy, these centrifuges reportedly differ in that their rotors levitate as a result of electromagnetic bearings.[49] The minister of science and technology, Eduardo Campos, further alleged that this proprietary difference was 100 % Brazilian, a point of contention for some who believe that Brazil inaccurately sold their nuclear program as indigenous in order to win domestic support for a program whose longevity depends not only on a continued funding, but public approval as well. Skeptics, such as David Albright, a physicist and former nuclear inspector, alleged that the Germans helped the Brazilians develop an earlier centrifuge and there is speculation that they supported Brazilian scientists in developing their latest model.[50]

While Brazil has continued to deny these allegations, it's clear that the Brazilian nuclear program has benefited from foreign assistance in the past; not only were top scientists such as Othon Pinheiro da Silva educated in the United States, but IPEN officials contracted technicians trained in Germany and other foreign countries. As one researcher noted, "the 1987 enrichment announcement was delayed to allow for clandestine importation of key machinery, which included a special West German lathe used [for] precision-machine ultracentrifuges."[51]

The centrifuges at Brazil's Resende plant are considered not only commercially sensitive, but also as icons of Brazilian prestige and technological advancement. However, it is questionable whether Brazil had the right to deny the IAEA full access to the facility. The Brazilians made the case that in the past they had shrouded their centrifuges from IAEA inspectors, without consequence. But, as some argued, those centrifuges were part of a small pilot facility and not an industrial-sized plant where, in theory, enough uranium is enriched annually that diversion could go unnoticed. [52]

The dispute was further exacerbated by the IAEA's ongoing investigation of Iran. However, unlike Iran, the Brazilians had been open about their plans to enrich uranium since the early 1990s. Nevertheless, IAEA inspectors may have been aware that making concessions with Brazil could undermine their attempts to work with Iran.

Brazil and Argentina are bound by IAEA safeguards under the 1991 Quadripartite Agreement. The agreement, whose signatories include the IAEA, Brazil, and Argentina, emphasizes the need to avoid "unnecessary duplication of activities" between the IAEA and ABACC, as well as the importance of protecting proprietary technology. Article four of the Quadripartite Agreement states: The safeguards provided for in this agreement shall be implemented in a matter designed: (a) to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties… d) to enable the Agency to fulfill its obligations under this Agreement taking into account the requirement for the Agency to preserve technological secrets.

The safeguard agreement also states that the IAEA will require "only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this agreement."[53] However, article two of the agreement explicitly states that the IAEA has full rights and obligations to do what is necessary in order to verify nuclear programs are run according to safeguard standards. And while Brazil has not yet signed the IAEA Additional Protocol which would allow for broader inspections, including last minute visits and tighter regulations, Brazil is still accountable to existing standards under the safeguards agreement.

Resolving the Impasse

In October, 2004, after months of stalemated talks, both sides agreed to allow three IAEA officials for a preliminary visit of the enrichment facility at Resende on October 19, although at that time, Brazil still insisted on a "check without total and unrestricted access."[54] Subsequently, a deal was reached and from November 16 to 18, IAEA officials visited Resende, performed inspections, and were reportedly satisfied with the results. On November 24, Eduardo Campos announced that the plant would start enriching small amounts of uranium by the end of the year, predicting that the facility would be fully operational within six to eight months.[55] While the official terms of the agreement made between Brazil and the IAEA remain confidential (as with any other IAEA agreement), Brazilian authorities reportedly agreed to allow increased visual access, while the IAEA dropped its initial request for total and unrestricted access. According to one source, Brazil agreed to reduce the size of the panels that shrouded the technology.[56] Brazil also agreed to increased inspection and containment measures where uranium hexafluoride gas is inserted and withdrawn from the cascades.[57] Another report alleged that IAEA inspectors were allowed to view pipes and valves of the centrifuges, but other components were masked.[58]

Nuclear Facilities Today

Brazil has a myriad of nuclear civilian facilities including a number of power reactors, research reactors, uranium enrichment plants, and uranium processing plants. Brazil's nuclear power program consists of two functioning light-water power reactors using low-enriched uranium: Angra I and Angra II. A third plant, Angra III is currently under construction. Brazil has four research reactors including two operational facilities in Rio de Janerio and Belo Horizonte, where reactors run with U-235 to 19.9% and 20%, respectively.

Additionally, Brazil has two subcritical reactors in Rio de Janeiro and Recife. Lastly, notable uranium enrichment facilities include the Resende ultracentrifuge enrichment facility (the facility at the center of the 2004 controversy), and two facilities at the Aramar Research Center, the first of which is also an ultracentrifuge enrichment pilot plant, while the second is a centrifuge production plant. The most prominent uranium processing plant is the fuel-fabrication plant also located at Resende; the construction of a uranium-conversion plant at the Aramar Research Center has been postponed.[59]

Brazil's Nuclear Program since 2004

With the inauguration of the Resende enrichment facility in May 2006, Brazil plans to fuel 60% of Angra I and Angra II with uranium enriched to less than 5%[60] by 2010.[61] Brazil's ultimate goal is to reach self-sufficiency and sell surplus nuclear fuel on the international market.[62] And while skeptics of Brazil's ambitious nuclear program argue that supply currently exceeds demand, the Brazilians won't have the production capacity to sell nuclear fuel on the international market for many years, at which point, experts predict, nuclear fuel will be in much greater demand.[63] Whether or not demand for nuclear fuel will increase in the next decade is yet to be seen, but those who are critical of the plant's potential to save money in the short run may have a point. By supplying their own nuclear fuel, Brazil will save an estimated $10-12 million annually, but this hardly covers the plant's $180 million price tag (not including operation costs).[64] Nor does it come close to covering the estimated $1.6 billion needed to complete Brazil's third nuclear power plant, Angra III.[65]

The Brazilian civilian and naval nuclear programs come with a hefty price tag, accountable for some of the continuous delays in the completion of Angra III, as well as the Navy's nuclear submarine program. Since the 1970s under the clandestine military program, the Navy has actively sought fuel and a reactor for a nuclear powered submarine. While the Navy succeeded in enriching uranium through centrifuge technology, to date it has not been able to complete its original goal of constructing a nuclear submarine. While the program, which has cost Brazil an estimated $1 billion, remains stalled as a result of the submarine hull (which Brazilian scientists have not yet been able to master[66]) advances were made in January 2006 when the Navy announced the completion of a 50-megawatt reactor[67] it hopes will fuel a nuclear submarine.[68] In 2005, the Navy initiated the process of acquiring a new diesel submarine; however, the purchase of a new submarine would only make sense if the suppliers also promised to transfer sensitive technology.[69]
Aside from the issues of cost and design difficulties, the Brazilian nuclear submarine program has raised questions from critics who are either not convinced of its necessity or concerned about proliferation potential. Of primary concern is a loophole in the NPT which allows non-nuclear weapon states to acquire naval propulsion reactors, among other "acceptable" nuclear uses, free from safeguards.[70] Consequently, if Brazil succeeds in acquiring nuclear submarine technology, its propulsion reactors will not be bound by IAEA-ABACC safeguards.

Given that nuclear fuel used in nuclear propulsion reactors is enriched to a higher percentage than that used for nuclear power plants, and also that nuclear submarines can potentially act as missile delivery vehicles, many proliferation experts worry that the spread of nuclear submarines might exacerbate nuclear proliferation efforts.[71] Because the Brazilian submarine program is still years away from completion, critics have less to worry about in the short run, but given Brazil's ambitious nuclear history, its late arrival into the NPT, and its history with the IAEA, including the 2004 dispute, Brazil's submarine program may be met with increasing opposition.


The 2004 Brazil-IAEA dispute demonstrates the challenges facing nonproliferation efforts. Article IV of the NPT permits non-nuclear weapon states to pursue autonomous civilian nuclear programs, including the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle.[72] Some critics believe that the NPT is too generous, arguing that states could potentially manipulate Article IV in order to pursue a covert weapons program.[73] At the 2005 NPT Review Conference, IAEA Director ElBaradei suggested a five-year moratorium on enrichment activities, including the construction of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation plants[74]; Brazil and the United States, were among several of those opposed to the proposal.[75] States like Brazil which have mastered the fuel cycle are unlikely to give up their right to pursue enrichment technologies, especially given the time and money they have invested in these programs. Consequently the IAEA may face more challenges to its inspection authority.


  • George H. Quester, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
  • James Everett Katz and Onkar S. Marwah (eds.), Nuclear Power in Developing Countries, (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982), p. 346.
  • Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1987).
  • Jean Krasno, "Non-Proliferation: Brazil's Secret Nuclear Program" ORBIS, Summer 1994.
  • Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, Woodrow Wilson Center Special Studies, The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995.
  • Etel Solingen, Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil (Stanford University Press 1996).
  • Jose Goldemberg, "Giving Up Nuclear Weapons: Lessons Learned from the Past," Keynote address to the Sandia National Laboratories Fourteenth International Security Conference Strengthening the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime: Focus on the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle, April 4-6, 2005.
  • Jose Goldemberg, "Looking Back: Lessons from the Denuclearization of Brazil and Argentina," Arms Control Today, April 2006,
  • "Brazilian Nuclear Debate Highlights Parallels and Contrasts with Iran," WMD Insights, July/August 2006,


[1] Peter Muello, "Brazil inaugurates uranium enrichment center," The Associated Press, May 7, 2006 in Lexis Nexis (May 7, 2006).
[2] "Nuclear Weapons Programs-Brazil," Global Security,
[3] Ibid.
[4] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second Edition Revised and Expanded (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005) p. 396.
[5] Michael Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil, (Centre for International Security and Arms Control,Stanford University; August 1997) p. 4.
[6] Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil, p. 4.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil, pp. 4-6.
[9] Cirincione,Wolfsthal and Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals, p. 396.
[10] Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil, p. 6.
[11] Ibid pp 16-17.
[12] Sharon Squassoni and David Fite, "Brazil as Litmus Test: Resende and Restrictions on Uranium Enrichment," Arms Control Today (October 2005),
[13] Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals, p. 399.
[14] Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil, p. 7.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Harold Olmos, "Brazilian military dictatorship was working to develop nuclear arms, ex-president confirms," The Associated Press, August 8, 2005 in Lexis Nexis, (August 9, 2006).
[17] Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil, p. 7.
[18] Uranium enriched to greater than 20% U-235 is considered highly-enriched uranium (HEU).
[19] Squassoni and Fite, "Brazil as Litmus Test."
[20] Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals, p. 396.
[21] "Agreements and Other Dcouments," ABACC,
[22] Ibid.
[23] Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals, p. 396.
[24] Olmos, "Brazilian military dictatorship was working to develop nuclear arms."
[25] Ibid.
[26] The Associated Press, "Brazil nearly built atom bomb in 1990's, scientist says," The Globe and Mail, August 30, 2005.
[27] Ibid.
[28] "Nuclear Weapons Programs-Brazil," Global Security,
[29] Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals, p. 396.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil, pp. 28-9.
[32] Ibid. p. 28.
[33] Erico Guizzo, "How Brazil Spun the Atom," Spectrum,
[34] Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals, p. 397.
[35] Jorge Mederos, "Brazil Rejects Nuclear Arms Treaty, Proceeds with Nuclear Program," The Associated Press, April 17, 1990 in Lexis Nexis (April 17, 1990).
[36] Carmen Gentile,"Brazil finalizing nuclear deal with the U.N.," United Press International, November 26, 2004 in Lexis Nexis (November 27, 2004).
[37] Frank Braun, "Analysis: Brazil and additional protocol," United Press International, July 1, 2005 in Lexis Nexis (July 2, 2005).
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Peter Slevin, "Brazil Shielding Uranium Facility: Nation Seeks to Keep Its Proprietary Data from U.N. Inspectors," The Washington Post, Apr 4, 2004, A.01.
[41] Larry Rohter, "If Brazil Wants to Scare the World, It's Succeeding," The New York Times, October 31, 2004 in Lexis Nexis (October 31, 2004).
[42] Frank Braun, "Analysis: Brazil's nuke program," The Associated Press, July 19, 2005 in Lexis Nexis (July 20, 2005).
[43] "Brazil Says It Cooperates with Inspectors," Global Security Newswire, April 6, 2006,
[44] Liz Palmer,and Gary Milhollin, "Brazil's Nuclear Puzzle," Science 306 (October 22, 2004).
[45] Carmen Gentile, "Brazil and U.N. reach uranium agreement," United Press International, October 18, 2004, in Lexis Nexis (October 19, 2004).
[46] Peter Muello, "Brazil follows Iran's nuclear path, but without the fuss," The Associated Press, April 20, 2006 in Lexis Nexis (April 21, 2006).
[47] Gentile, "Brazil and U.N. reach uranium agreement."
[48] British Broadcast Corporation, "'Iran Factor'" complicates nuclear inspections in Brazil," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, October 27, 2004 in Lexis Nexis (October 27 2004).
[49] Guizzo, "How Brazil Spun the Atom."
[50] Larry Rohter, "If Brazil Wants to Scare the World, It's Succeeding" The New York Times, October 31, 2004 in Lexis Nexis (October 31, 2004) p. 3.
[51] Barletta, The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil, p. 12-13.
[52] Daniel Horner, "Brazil defends limits on SWU plant inspections," Nuclear Fuel 29 (May 24, 2004), p. 1 in Lexis Nexis (June 10, 2004).
[53] "Quadripartite Agreement," ABACC,
[54] British Broadcast Corporation," 'Iran Factor.' "
[55] Claire Applegarth, "Brazil, IAEA Reach Inspection Agreement," Arms Control Today, January/February 2005,
[56] Guizzo, "How Brazil Spun the Atom."
[57] Squassoni, and Fite, "Brazil as Litmus Test."
[58] Appleworth, "Brazil, IAEA Reach Inspection Agreement."
[59] Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals, pp. 403-404.
[60] Peter Muello, The Associated Press, April 20, 2006; "Brazil Follows Iran's nuclear path, but without the fuss," International News, April 20, 2006.
[61] Squassoni, and Fite, "Brazil as Litmus Test."
[62] Knight Ridder News Service, February 12, 2006, "Brazil poised to join world's nuclear elite," The Miami Herald, February 12, 2006.
[63] Squassoni, and Fite, "Brazil as Litmus Test."
[64] Guizzo, "How Brazil Spun the Atom."
[65] Squassoni and Fite, "Brazil as Litmus Test."
[66] Sao Paulo Folha de Sao Paulo, September 20, 2005; "Brazilian Armed Forces Discussing Bid to Purchase Submarines," FBIS Document ID: LAP20050921338001.
[67] Sao Paulo Istoe, May 24, 2006; "Brazil: French President's Visit May Speed Acquisition of Submarine," FBIS Document ID: LAP20060523340001.
[68] Sao Paulo O Estado de Sao Paulo, January 27, 2006; "Brazil: Navy Completes Key Phases in Nuclear Submarine Program," FBIS Document ID: LAP20060127032004.
[69] Sao Paulo Istoe, May 24, 2006; "Brazil: French President's Visit May Speed Acquisition of Submarine," FBIS Document ID: LAP20060523340001.
[70] Clay Moltz, "Closing the NPT Loophole on Exports of Naval Propulsion Reactors," The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1998).
[71] Ibid.
[72] "The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," Federation of American Scientists,
[73] Guizzo, "How Brazil Spun the Atom."
[74] Staff report, "Strengthening the NPT and World Security," International Atomic Energy Agency, May 2, 2005,
[75] 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "Statement by the Head of the Delegation of Brazil, Ambassador Ranoldo Sardenberg," The United Nations,

Stay Informed

Sign up for our newsletter to get the latest on nuclear and biological threats.

Sign Up

What Is Safeguards Effectiveness?


What Is Safeguards Effectiveness?

The term “safeguards effectiveness” means the effectiveness of IAEA verification—that is, the ability of the IAEA to detect non-compliance.

Ensuring Safeguards Sustainability


Ensuring Safeguards Sustainability

The ways sustainability of the IAEA safeguards system can be ensured by the agency, its Member States, and the international community


My Resources