China Missile Overview

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According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “China produces a broad range of sophisticated ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles.” ¹ China is actively modernizing its nuclear delivery systems, which include ballistic missiles, bombers, and new-generation submarines.

The majority of China’s existing nuclear delivery systems were designed in the 1960s and 1970s, and it is in the process of modernizing many of its missile systems. At the same time, it maintains a nuclear doctrine based on a minimum deterrent. For example, China’s 2013 Defense White Paper notes that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Second Artillery Force is “primarily responsible for deterring other countries from using nuclear weapons against China.” ² Beijing has portrayed current modernizations as updates, rather than additions, to its missile force, with a special focus on enhancing the survivability of its nuclear deterrent.
U.S. policymakers have noted transfers of missile components and related technology by Chinese entities to nations of concern, most notably to Iran and Pakistan. ³ In 2002, China issued missile-related export control regulations and a control list, which was mostly in accordance with the control list issued by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). ⁴ Beijing has engaged in consultation with the MTCR and in 2004 applied to join the regime, but its application has so far been blocked by current members, particularly the United States, who believe that China’s missile-related export controls are still too weak. ⁵ The latest developments in China’s missile program include the successful testing in January 2014 and June 2015 of a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. ⁶ However, an August 2014 test likely was unsuccessful. ⁷ In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense assessed this year that is now capable of equipping ballistic missile with MIRV warheads as part of the country’s on-going efforts to modernize its nuclear arsenal. ⁸

See the table of China’s ballistic and cruise missile inventory. China possesses significant missile capabilities, ranging from short-range systems to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and is currently transitioning away from its older and relatively inaccurate liquid-fueled, silo/cave-based missiles, towards more accurate, solid-fueled road-mobile missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in order to strengthen its deterrent and increase its strategic options. The country also continues to invest in the development of several types of cruise missiles capable of standoff, precision strikes.

Ballistic Missiles

The vast majority of China’s nuclear-capable missile force is land-based, and much of China’s nuclear delivery system modernization has been focused in this area. China has several types of operational land-based systems that are nuclear-capable: the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) Dongfeng (DF)-3 and DF-21/21A, intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) DF-4, and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) DF-5/5A and DF-31/31A/31B. ⁹ China also has deployed nuclear capable short-range DF-11 and DF-15 missiles; however, most of China’s estimated 1,000-2,000 short-range missiles are aimed at Taiwan and unlikely to be armed with nuclear warheads. ¹⁰

China is currently in the process of modernizing its ballistic missile inventory. The upgraded version of the DF-3 — first deployed in 1971 — is the new DF-21/21A; the upgraded versions of the DF-4 — which started operation in 1981 — are the DF-21 and DF-31; and the upgraded version of the DF-5/5A — deployed in 1981 — is the DF-31A. ¹¹ The DF-31 and DF-31A, deployed in 2006 and 2007 respectively, are both road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles and have shortened launch preparation times. ¹² In 2014, China accidentally acknowledged possession of a DF-26C medium-range ICBM. The missile, known as the “Guam killer,” has a reported range of 3,500 km. ¹³ China also acknowledged the existence of DF-41 missiles after the Shaanxi Environmental Monitoring Center released security regulations related to the development of the DF-41. ¹⁴ The missile reportedly has a range of 12,000 km. ¹⁵ The new additions can be seen as more survivable replacements in order to maintain China’s nuclear deterrent. However, it is unclear whether the older missiles will continue to be deployed alongside the newer ones, which would amount to a quantitative increase in China’s ballistic missile arsenal.

Furthermore, China continues to develop technologies for ballistic missile defense countermeasures including “maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRV), multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and ASAT weapons.” ¹⁶ In 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that China deployed its first MIRV-equipped missile, the DF-5 Mod 3 ICBM. ¹⁷

China has also begun development on missile defense intercept systems, related to their established anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons systems, and has tested these systems on multiple occasions. ¹⁸ There is speculation that China could use a DF-31-type re-entry vehicle for a MIRV payload sometime in the near future. The DF-31 and JL-2 will also likely employ GPS technology for improved accuracy. This will strengthen China’s deterrent and enhance its strategic strike capabilities.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

China’s first ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) the Xia-class or Type-092, has yet to be used for deterrence patrols. It first became operational in 1981 and has since undergone numerous refits. In 2008, China’s single Xia-class SSBN left dry dock at the Jianggezhuang Naval Base near Qingdao, on China’s eastern coast, where it had undergone a multi-year overhaul. ¹⁹ However, whether it will finally become operational or function as a test platform remains uncertain. The Xia-class submarine can deploy 12 Julang-1 (JL-1) missiles, which are China’s first generation of operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). ²⁰

China has launched four Jin-class or Type-094 SSBNs, which are expected to replace the Xia-class. These new SSBNs have 12 launch tubes each and deploy a longer range SLBM, the Julang-2 (JL-2), that is the sea-based version of the DF-31. ²¹ In 2014, the U.S. Department of Defense reported the three Type-094 SSBNs are currently operational, while “up to five may enter surface” before the next generation of SSBNs is operational. ²² In 2015, the U.S. Pacific Command upgraded this estimate to eight SSBNs by 2020. ²³ A next-generation undersea deterrent in the form of the Jin-class SSBN and the JL-2 would amount to China’s first credible sea-based nuclear capability and would give Beijing greater strategic options to hedge against sudden shifts in the international security environment. ²⁴ The U.S. Department of Defense assesses China will likely conduct the first Type-094 SSBN patrols by the end of 2015. ²⁵ China is also developing a next-generation SSBN called Type 096. It is expected to become operational in the next decade. ²⁶

Cruise Missiles

China continues to invest in its cruise missile programs and is currently developing and testing several different models of advanced land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) that are capable of standoff, precision strikes. ²⁷ China’s first LACM was the ground-launched Hongniao-1 (HN-1), which has a range of 600 km and can carry a 300 to 400 kg conventional warhead or a 90 kT nuclear warhead. The HN-1 is believed to use inertial guidance with terrain comparison or GPS updates. An improved version, the DH-10 (CJ-10), has an increased range of more than 1,500 km and can be ground- or ship-launched. ²⁸ China has approximately 200 to 500 DH-10 missiles and between 40 and 55 launchers , and while these missiles may be capable of fielding a nuclear warhead, they currently appear to be conventionally armed. ²⁹

Anti-Ship Missiles

As a part of China’s anti-access strategy it is also developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the DF-21 MRBM (DF-21D). In a cross-strait conflict this could counter third party intervention. The missile has a range of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean. ³⁰ With regard to anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), “The PLA Navy has or is acquiring nearly a dozen ASCM variants, ranging from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2 to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 and SS-N-27B.” ³¹ In addition, the PLA Navy has developed the YJ-12 ASCM. It reportedly has a range of 400km, making it one of the longest-range ASCMs. ³²

Chinese Missile Exports and the MTCR

Though China in the past has transferred missile technology to countries of proliferation concern such as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea, Beijing has taken steps to develop and strengthen its export control legal infrastructure. Nevertheless, concerns remain about Chinese enforcement of these new rules.

In its missile sales, as with its conventional arms sales in general, China’s official policy states that the weapons being exported:(1) Must be meant for legitimate self-defense;(2) Must contribute to regional stability; and(3) Must not be intended for interference in another country’s internal affairs. ³³

China developed the “M” class of short-range ballistic missiles for export in the 1980s as a source of hard currency to continue funding defense research and development during the early stages of the country’s economic reform. ³⁴ Sales included transfers of M-11 (DF-11) missiles and technology to Pakistan, M-9 (DF-15) missiles and technology to Syria, and DF-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia. ³⁵ Although Beijing began to make commitments to nuclear nonproliferation during this period, it was less concerned about missiles, which are inefficient weapons without nuclear warheads. It viewed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a discriminatory tool by a small group of developed countries, who continued to sell other delivery systems such as combat aircraft while restricting sales of ballistic missiles, in which developing countries such as China had invested heavily. ³⁶

However, in the 1990s China’s views on missile nonproliferation slowly began to change. In response to U.S. pressure, including sanctions imposed in 1991 for transfers of missiles and technology to Pakistan, and Syria, China issued a unilateral pledge to abide by MTCR guidelines. ³⁷ Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the United States intermittently placed sanctions on China or Chinese entities for missile-related transfers to countries of proliferation concern, while also occasionally lifting sanctions in response to Chinese pledges with regard to export controls and MTCR guidelines. ³⁸

In a major policy development, China promulgated the long-awaited regulations on missile-related transfers in August 2002 entitled Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, and Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List. These regulations appeared to demonstrate Beijing’s increasing willingness to abide by international norms at controlling missile trade. ³⁹ The 2002 regulations and control list were relatively comprehensive and in some fields are stricter than MTCR guidelines. The regulations also follow the MTCR’s “presumption of denial” approach, requiring specific approval and an export license for exports to authorized end-users. ⁴⁰

In September 2003, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing indicated to the chair of the MTCR that China was ready to positively consider membership in the MTCR. In a statement at the Plenary for the 2004 session of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi announced the start of the first round of China-MTCR dialogues in Paris. ⁴¹ According to Liu Jianchao, the Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China reaffirmed its willingness to join the MTCR in the second round of China-MTCR dialogues. ⁴² However, China’s application to the MTCR is still under review, as entities in China continue to provide missile production assistance and components to developing nations. ⁴³

China continues to actively develop new missile technologies such as highly accurate cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles, as well as to modernize its existing ballistic missile arsenal by introducing newer versions that have longer ranges, increased accuracy, and increased survivability. ⁴⁴ Within the past half-decade China has deployed the DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs, the DH-10 LACM, and in 2007, successfully tested anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. ⁴⁵ China has also begun development and testing of missile defense interceptors and tested these interceptors in 11 January of 2010, 27 January 2013, and July 2014. In October 2015, China tested its new DN-3 missile interceptor. ⁴⁶ The PLA Navy is also developing the DF-21D ASBM and the JL-2 SLBM. The DF-21D ASBM system has already entered limited military service, but its unveiling at the recent Chinese parade marking the end of World War II may indicate that it has already been completed and deployed on a larger scale. Similarly, China unveiled the nuclear and conventional DF-26 MRBM for the first time at the military parade, and the missile is reported to have an ASM variant. ⁴⁷ With this modernization, Beijing seeks to increase its capability to shape and respond to the dynamic security environment. In September 2014, China conducted a flight test of its DF-31B ICBM at the Wuzhai test center in Shanxi Province. The DF-31B, an upgraded version of the DF-31A, has an estimated range of 10,000km. ⁴⁸ In January 2015, China carried out a flight test of its JL-2 SLBM. ⁴⁹

China continues to make advancements in boost-glide systems, railgun technology, and other next-generation missile weaponry. In November 2015, China conducted the sixth test of its hypersonic strike vehicle, the DF-ZF, also named the WU-14. ⁵⁰ During the same month, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), a state-owned defense company, announced a breakthrough in electromagnetic missile launching technology. ⁵¹

Despite the continued existence of export control legislation in China that aligns with MTCR guidelines, China is not a member of the regime, and Chinese entities likely continue to proliferate missile-related technology that could support national missile programs, including to Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea. ⁵² The trend in these proliferation activities has been toward “more ambiguous technical assistance (vs. transfers of hardware), longer range missiles, more indigenous capabilities, and secondary (i.e., retransferred) proliferation.” ⁵³