Egypt Missile Overview

This page is part of the Egypt Country Profile.

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Despite being one of the first developing countries to pursue a ballistic missile capability, relatively little is known about the development of Egypt’s missile programs. Egypt first became interested in acquiring ballistic missiles in the mid-20th century and has pursued several missile types since then. Despite prolonged interest, however, Egypt currently possesses only a limited production capability and a deployed arsenal based on rudimentary Soviet technology.

Egypt is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Hague Code of Conduct Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles (HCOC), and has refused to join either agreement until Israel signs the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Egypt possesses a limited arsenal of ballistic, cruise, and air defense missiles.

Ballistic Missiles

Egypt’s ballistic missile arsenal is composed entirely of short-range missiles, reflecting the regional nature of its threat perceptions. Egypt currently deploys R-300 Elbrus (Formerly R-17; NATO: SS-1-C Scud-B) and Project T (Scud-B-100) short range ballistic missiles (SRBM); R-70 Luna-M (NATO: Frog 7B) artillery rockets; and Sakr-80 artillery rockets. The R-300 Elbrus has a range of 275km to 500km, and is guided by a rudimentary inertial system. ¹ Egypt has a basic capacity to produce the R-300, but is dependent upon other countries for assistance and advanced components. Estimates currently place roughly 100 R-300 Elbrus missiles in Egypt’s arsenal. ² The Project T missile, also developed jointly with North Korea, is an improved Soviet R-300 Elbrus with a range of 450km. As many as 90 Project T missiles are currently in Egypt’s arsenal, and in 2009 a U.S. report estimated that Egypt possessed roughly 25 launch vehicles for the Project T missiles. ³ The Luna-M R-70, with a range of 70km, and the Sakr-80 artillery rocket, an indigenous Luna-M upgrade with a range of 80km, are unguided, spin-stabilized and have 400kg payloads. ⁴ Egypt’s ballistic missile force is divided into two brigades; one is strategic and equipped with R-300 Elbrus missiles, while the other is classified as offensive and equipped with the Luna-M R-70. ⁵ Speculation by U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources that Egypt possesses medium-range Nodong and Scud-C missiles remains unconfirmed. Egypt does not possess any intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Cruise Missiles

Unconfirmed reports allege that Egypt possesses the Chinese HY-2 ASCM (CSSC-3 Seersucker) land-to-ship cruise missile system. The infrared-guided HY-2 is notable for its large firing sector, enabling it to cover 14,000km2 of ocean; it has a range of 200km. ⁶ In July 2012, the Obama administration approved the sale of 20 BGM-84 Harpoon Block 2 anti-ship cruise missiles to Egypt. ⁷ The Harpoon Block 2, designed as an open-ocean anti-ship missile, has a range of 125km and GPS-aided inertial navigation. It carries a 500kg warhead. ⁸ Moreover, Egypt’s fast attack watercraft are equipped with Ramadan- and October-class Italian Otomat and Chinese SY-1 (CSS-N-1 Scrubbrush) cruise missiles, with ranges of 180km and 150km, respectively. ⁹

Air Defense

Egypt has one of the largest and best-organized air defense systems in the Middle East. Its arsenals include 12 batteries of MIM-23 Improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles with 78 launchers. ¹⁰ The Hawk has a range of 45km to 50km and is guided by semi-active radar homing; it has a single-shot success rate of 83%. ¹¹ In 1999, Egypt acquired 32 Patriot-3 (MIM-104-F/PAC-3) missile systems from the United States for $1.3 billion. ¹² The PAC-3 is a highly-maneuverable hit-to-kill missile designed to defend against short and medium-range ballistic missiles. Egypt also possesses many outmoded short-range Soviet-era surface-to-air missile defense systems, including the 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); an indigenous reverse-engineered S-75M (SA-2 Guideline) called the Tayer el-Sabah; and roughly 50 upgraded S-125 Pechora-M (SA-3) missile systems. ¹³ None of these systems have ranges longer than 45km. More recently, a November 2014 video released by the Ministry of Defense indicates Egypt has either upgraded or possibly obtained new Russian-made Buk medium-range and Tor short-range surface-to-air missiles systems. ¹⁴ The new Buk-M2 still uses the same 9M317 missile as its Buk-M1-2 predecessor, but “can simultaneously engage four times the number of targets than the Buk-M1-2.” ¹⁵ Similarly, the new or upgraded Tor-M2 is capable of engaging four targets simultaneously, up from the single target by the Tor-M1. ¹⁶

Decades of Failure: 1948 to 1970

Egypt’s initial foray into rocketry focused on the indigenous development of rocket artillery in the aftermath of its defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. While there is limited information on this initial effort, the program never entered production, and according to Owen Sirrs, the rocket artillery program “was doomed by bureaucratic ineptitude, the 1956 Suez War, and Egyptian impatience with the limited strategic applications of an artillery rocket.” ¹⁷

Egyptian interest in ballistic missiles would not arise until Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed power following the 1952 Revolution. Despite claiming victory over Britain, France, and Israel during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Egyptian forces proved outmatched; the ability of their bombers to infiltrate Israeli airspace “was increasingly in doubt.” ¹⁸ Facing this reality, Nasser sought to develop a ballistic missile capability. Initial efforts focused on acquiring missiles outright, notably from the Soviet Union, since the post-war reconstruction effort complicated spending vast sums on developing an indigenous capability. However, the Soviet Union refused to meet such requests and Egypt was forced “to explore the possibility of designing and producing its own ballistic missiles.” ¹⁹

Possessing a limited knowledge base and primitive technical infrastructure, Egypt turned to disgruntled West German scientists and technicians at the Stuttgart Institute for Physics and Jet Propulsion to spearhead its missile efforts. Chief among were Eugen Sänger, Wolfgang Pilz, and Paul Goercke; in 1960 they brought to Cairo designs based on the German V-2 and Wasserfall and the French Veronique rockets. The trio also held key management positions within the emerging Egyptian program. ²⁰ Given Egypt’s lack of resources, a secret industrial procurement network composed of front companies in several European countries was set up to acquire the materials and human resources needed for the program. ²¹ By the end of 1961, Egypt had established a rocket research and production facility known as Factory 333, and “the missile program had transitioned from chalkboard designs to actual prototype testing.” ²²

In July 1962 Egypt conducted four, reportedly successful, test flights of two missile types—the Al Zafir (Victor) and the larger Al Kahir (Conqueror)—at the Jabal Hamzah launch facility near Cairo. ²³ Both of these missiles were single stage, liquid fueled rockets possessing rudimentary, if not defunct, guidance and control systems. ²⁴ The following year, Egypt displayed improvements to these missiles during a military parade on 23 July 1963. Notably, the Al Zafir “was seen for the first time on a dedicated mobile erector launcher;” this was critical to the missile’s effectiveness, given that its limited range required it to be positioned close to intended targets. ²⁵ Also during the 1963 military parade, Egypt displayed four two-stage Al Ared (Pioneer) missiles. ²⁶ Egyptian officials claimed that the Al Ared had been successfully tested several times; however, the missile was never tested publicly or deployed on a working transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). ²⁷

Egypt originally planned to produce 900 missiles of these three types by 1970, but despite waging a vibrant propaganda campaign heralding the technological achievements and production capacity of its program, none of the missiles “actually reached operational service because of insurmountable guidance system difficulties.” ²⁸ In addition, Israeli covert and diplomatic pressure succeeded in halting the participation of West German scientists in the Egyptian program by mid-1965, stripping Egypt of the foreign assistance it required to advance its missile capabilities. ²⁹ While there are some reports that Egypt used the Al Zafir and Al Kahir missiles in the 1967 Six-Day War, none ever struck Israeli territory, and some experts doubted whether Egypt even launched any missiles during the conflict. ³⁰ Following the war, Egypt dropped any pretense of a continued indigenous ballistic missile program and officially canceled funding sometime in 1967. ³¹

Soviet Assistance Jumpstarts the Program: 1971 to 1978

In the aftermath of the 1967 war, Egypt had little choice but to develop a closer relationship with the Soviet Union in order to replace much of the military hardware it had lost. Along with massive deliveries of Soviet military assistance in the weeks and months following the war, enhanced ties resulted in Egypt’s receipt of Soviet Frog-7A artillery rockets and attendant launchers, but Moscow continued to reject Egyptian requests for Scud missiles. ³²

Despite Nasser’s death in September 1970, Egyptian-Soviet relations remained largely stable in the interwar period between 1967 and 1973. The massive influx of Soviet arms was critical to President Anwar Sadat’s goal of forcibly retaking the Sinai Peninsula. However, some friction remained over Moscow’s refusal to sell certain offensive weapons, including Scuds and SS-4/Sandal ballistic missiles, resulting in Sadat’s decision to expel nearly 15,000 Soviet advisors in July 1972. This decision may have influenced Moscow to finally transfer Scud-B missiles and launchers in early 1973, although the motives for this decision remain speculative.

The Scud-B, with a range of 280 to 300 kilometers and circular error probability (CEP) of approximately 400 meters, represented a significant upgrade. The capabilities of the Al Kahir and Al Zafir rockets remained severely limited despite the fact they had been removed from storage, re-tested, and refurbished in 1971. ^{33 34} The transfer of the Scud-Bs to Egypt came with strict limitations on their use, and according to a Soviet diplomat involved in their transfer, the missiles remained “practically under Soviet control.” ³⁵ Prior to the October 1973 Yom Kippur War Egypt possessed eighteen Scud missiles and nine launchers, but given Soviet restrictions on their numbers and use, “Cairo regarded them as strategic weapons for use in certain contingencies such as external threats to the regime.” ³⁶

Despite achieving initial success in the opening days of the conflict, Israel had turned the tables by October 16th, crossing the Suez Canal and penetrating the Egyptian mainland. That same day, Sadat delivered a speech to the Egyptian People’s Assembly in which he threatened to launch missiles into Israel, likely to warn Israel against attacking “Egyptian cities and targets beyond the Canal war zone.” ³⁷ Seven days later, on October 22nd, with the Egyptian Third Army surrounded, Sadat received permission from the Soviet Defense Ministry to fire three Scud missiles. ³⁸ While it is unclear whether the Scuds hit their intended targets, their launch was largely political, demonstrating Cairo’s willingness to use them “next against Israeli cities if the Israelis continued their advance on the west bank of the Canal.” ³⁹

Despite the limited military utility of the missiles used in the 1973 war, Cairo remained interested in developing its ballistic missile capability further. ⁴⁰ The emerging process of rapprochement with the United States in the mid-1970s, however, led to a deterioration of Egyptian-Soviet relations. Moscow’s refusal to sell Scud parts to Egypt necessitated that Cairo seek alternative sources of assistance.

Egypt Turns to North Korea, Iraq, and Argentina: 1979 to 2001

During the 1980s, Egypt’s ballistic missile activities occurred on two fronts. The first involved a joint project with North Korea to improve the Scud-Bs Egypt had acquired from the Soviet Union. Given the Scud-B’s limited range, however, Egypt also worked with Argentina and Iraq on a trilateral initiative to develop a two-stage short-range ballistic missile called the Condor II. While the Condor II project fell victim to the nascent efforts of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), cooperation between Cairo and Pyongyang continued to pay dividends throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century.

Egypt’s involvement in the Condor II project began sometime between 1982 and 1984. Under the trilateral arrangement, Iraq provided most of the funding, Argentina offered its European supply network and technical expertise, and given improved relations with the West, Egypt could act as a procurement agent without attracting significant attention. ⁴¹ While the initial batch of missiles was to be constructed in Argentina, each party would receive “the technical results from the project, including designs, and, eventually, prototypes.” ⁴² Thus, both Egypt and Iraq expected to build their own indigenous production capacities by the late 1980s. ⁴³ The project was notable for its extensive illicit supply network in Europe and the United States. Egypt played a particularly significant role in this regard, procuring a wide variety of U.S. missile-related technology and components through Abdel Kader Helmy, a naturalized U.S. citizen and rocket scientist holding a U.S. security clearance. ⁴⁴ According to Owen Sirrs, by the mid-1980s key features of the Condor II began to emerge, including a solid-propellant two-stage design; a projected range of 800 to 1000km; a 500kg payload; and a circular error probable of 800m. ⁴⁵

Progress on the Condor II, however, did not go unnoticed by outsiders, and likely contributed to the motivations of the United States and others to establish the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Almost immediately after negotiations concluded in April 1987, the United States engaged fellow MTCR members, including France, Italy, and West Germany, to restrain companies operating within their jurisdiction from providing assistance to the Condor II project. ⁴⁶

Around the same time, U.S. authorities had become aware of the efforts by Dr. Helmy and his Egyptian contacts to procure U.S. materials and technologies for the Condor II, initiating an investigation in early 1988. Helmy and his associates were arrested in June 1988 and “charged with conspiracy, unlawful export of controlled items, and money laundering in a twelve-count indictment.” ⁴⁷ Helmy’s arrest dealt a decisive blow to the Condor II project, as a U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimate assessed, “without the activities of Dr. Helmy and his co-conspirators in procuring restricted technology, completion of the Condor II missile program is doubtful.” ⁴⁸ Following the embarrassing revelations that several Egyptian officials, including Defense Minister Abu Ghazala, were personally involved in the smuggling operation, the United States began pressuring President Hosni Mubarak to end Egyptian participation in the program. Subsequently, Defense Minister Abu Ghazala was removed from his post in April 1989, and officials reportedly informed Washington that “Egypt [had] terminated its cooperation” on the Condor II. ⁴⁹

While the trilateral partnership was terminated in the late 1980s, Egypt likely continued to work independently on development of the Condor II technology under its Vector missile program. In 1998, the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence noted in a report to Congress that, “Egypt continues its effort…to develop the two-stage Vector short-range ballistic [missile].” ⁵⁰ In addition, the U.S. Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) identified a solid-fuel ballistic missile with an estimated maximum range of over 425 miles in a 2003 threat assessment. ⁵¹ However, NASIC has not included a mention of the Vector missile in subsequent threat assessments, indicating that Egypt is no longer pursuing a two-stage, solid-fueled SRBM.

Although the trilateral partnership never produced a working missile, Egypt likely gained substantial technical knowledge that contributed to its simultaneous efforts to improve the Scud-B throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Toward this end, Egypt formed a partnership with North Korea in the early 1980s to improve the accuracy and range of the Soviet-acquired Scud-B. In exchange for transferring the Scuds to North Korea, Egypt gained significant access to the results of Pyongyang’s research, received completed Hwasŏng-5 (Scud-B variant) missiles in 1987, and received assistance to develop its own production capability. ⁵² According to Owen Sirrs, “Cairo now has the capability to produce its own Scud-B missiles with technology obtained from Pyongyang,” and by some estimates, Egypt possesses approximately 100 Scud-B missiles. ⁵³ North Korea has also reportedly provided Egypt with the means to produce its own 500-kilometer Scud-C missiles. This may have included the provision of technical assistance to set up a production facility outside Cairo in the early 1990s, and numerous shipments of equipment and materials for producing Scud-Cs between 1996 and 1997. ⁵⁴ Some open source material also highlights Egypt’s efforts to develop a liquid-fueled 450-kilometer range missile within a program known as Project T. ⁵⁵ While reports on Project T remain unconfirmed, the effort has likely involved North Korean assistance and is directed towards extending the range of existing Scuds. ⁵⁶ Some estimate Egypt “may have as many as 90 Project T missiles.” ⁵⁷

At the beginning of the 21st century, controversy over Egypt’s ballistic missile activity concerned its reported interest in acquiring the 1,300-kilometer medium-range Nodong missile from North Korea. According to a report compiled by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies on North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities, “unconfirmed reports from 2000 and 2001 claimed that Egypt purchased complete Nodong systems and missile engines from North Korea.” ⁵⁸ Despite attempts by Egyptian officials, including former President Mubarak, to rebuff such claims, “U.S. intelligence reports suggest that Cairo obtained the technology for the Nodong from Pyongyang.” ⁵⁹ To date, speculation that Egypt acquired Nodong technology or missiles remains unconfirmed, and there is no evidence to suggest that Cairo is currently pursuing Nodong missiles.

While information on Egypt’s continued interest in ballistic missiles is limited, a number of experts believe Egypt severed ties with North Korea and abandoned its medium and long-range ballistic missiles ambitions sometime before 2005. ⁶⁰ In addition, a biannual report produced by the Director of Central Intelligence on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions has made no mention of Egypt’s ballistic missile activities since mid-2001. ⁶¹ However, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. identified significant expansion of the Jabal Hamzah missile launch facility near Cairo between April 2001 and December 2009, “including a new launch pad and horizontal processing building.” ⁶² Recognizing that Egypt’s intentions are “presently unclear,” Bermudez advances several possibilities, including: continued development of the Scud-B; development of the Scud-C, the Nodong, or an entirely new missile system; or an endeavor to achieve an indigenous space-launch capability. ⁶³

Recent developments notwithstanding, since the late 1990s and early 2000s Egypt has appeared to place priority emphasis on acquiring and upgrading its missile defense and cruise missile capabilities, primarily through the purchase of whole systems from the United States. In March 1999, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced that the United States would sell Egypt a Patriot-3 missile battery consisting of 32 missiles designed to defend against short and medium-range ballistic missiles. ⁶⁴ At a cost of $1.3 billion, this purchase represented the first time Egypt acquired the Patriot-3. Additionally, the Obama administration approved the sale of the Harpoon Block 2 anti-ship cruise missile to Egypt in July 2012. ⁶⁵ Despite U.S. restrictions placed on military aid to Egypt following the overthrow Mohammed Morsi’s government in July 2013, the Obama administration approved the transfer of four new fast missile crafts (FMCs) each equipped with eight Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles under the Foreign Military Sales program. ⁶⁶ Egypt received the first FMC in November of 2013, with the remaining vessels originally scheduled for delivery by the end of 2014. ⁶⁷ Such transfers suggest that even while the provision of military aid to Egypt has come under increasing scrutiny from U.S. lawmakers, the United States appears committed to supplying such assistance to Egypt for the foreseeable future. ⁶⁸

Despite these sales, lingering tension with the United States led Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi to broaden his options for arms purchases. According to reports, during a February 2014 visit to Russia, President Sisi held discussions with his counterpart Vladimir Putin over a multibillion-dollar arms deal, reaching a preliminary $3.5 billion agreement by September 2014. ⁶⁹ The deal reportedly includes anti-ship and anti-tank missile systems, and, controversially, S-300VM long-range air defense systems. ⁷⁰ Additional reports suggest that Egypt reached a $500 million agreement to buy the S-300VM systems from Russia in September 2014. ⁷¹ However, Russia subsequently denied Egypt had signed any such agreement, and officials remain skeptical that such a deal would be approved. ⁷² Separately, in November 2014, the Egyptian Ministry of Defense released a video of an air defense exercise revealing Egypt has either upgraded, or even obtained new Russian-made Buk medium-range and Tor short-range surface-to-air missiles systems. ⁷³ It is unclear whether these upgrades or purchases fell under the new arms deal.