This section explores the monitoring and verification challenges states will likely face with future arms control and disarmament steps and how verification approaches might evolve to account for new sources of information and technologies, additional stakeholders, and issues such as cost and intrusiveness.
Key Documents in Future Monitoring and Verification Challenges:
The Nuclear Threat Initiative, Overview. Innovating Verification: New Tools & New Actors to Reduce Nuclear Risks. Part of the Cultivating Confidence Verification Series. 2014.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative, Verifying Baseline Declarations of Nuclear Warheads and Materials. Innovating Verification: New Tools & New Actors to Reduce Nuclear Risks. Part of the Cultivating Confidence Verification Series. 2014.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative, Redefining Societal Verification. Innovating Verification: New Tools & New Actors to Reduce Nuclear Risks. Part of the Cultivating Confidence Verification Series. 2014.
The Nuclear Threat Initiative, Building Global Capacity. Innovating Verification: New Tools & New Actors to Reduce Nuclear Risks. Part of the Cultivating Confidence Verification Series. 2014.
Verification Technology Research and Development Needs. U.S. Department of State. 2013.
Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: An Assessment of Methods and Capabilities. Committee on International Security and Arms Control, National Research Council. 2005.
Fuller, James, Verification on the Road to Zero: Issues for Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement. Arms Control Today. 2010.
Global Fissile Material Report 2013: Increasing Transparency of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament. International Panel on Fissile Materials. 2013.
The following additional resources are available:
The IAEA and Nuclear Disarmament Verification: A Primer. VERTIC. Verification Matters. No.11. 2015
Member State Views on an IAEA Role in Verifying Nuclear Disarmament. VERTIC. Verification Matters. No.10. 2015
Philippe, Sebastien, Boaz Barak, and Alexander Glaser, Designing Protocols for Nuclear Warhead Verification. Courtesy of Princeton University’s Nuclear Futures Laboratory. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2015. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2015. All rights reserved.
Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies. Defense Science Board. Department of Defense. 2014
Addressing the Issues of Today: FY2012 NIS Annual Report. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and International Security. 2012.
NIS Highlights Fall 2012. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. 2012.
NIS Highlights Summer 2012. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. 2012.
Saunders, Emily C. et al., Towards a Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards? LA-UR-12-22917. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2012.
Wuest, C.R., The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World. LLNL-TR-564612. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 2012.
Woolf, Amy, Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control. R41201. Congressional Research Service. 2011
Diakov, Anatoly et al., Nuclear Reductions After New START: Obstacles and Opportunities. Arms Control Today. 2011.
Securing the Future: FY2011 NIS Annual Report. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. 2011.
Doyle, James, Scenarios for Exercising Technical Approaches to Verified Nuclear Weapons Reductions. LA-UR-10-02687. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2010.
Elbahtimy, Hassan et al., Verification of Warhead Dismantlement: Challenges, Solutions and Prospects. VERTIC. 2010.
Merkle, Peter B. et al., Active Thermal Standoff Inspection for Physical Authentication. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2010. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2010. All rights reserved.
NIS Highlights October 2010. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control. 2010.
Hauck, Danielle K. et al., Defining the Questions – A Research Agenda for Nontraditional Authentication in Arms Control. LA-UR-10-03785. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2010.
A Reprint of the Executive Summary of the October 1991 Report to Congress: Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement and Special Nuclear Material Controls. PNNL-18034. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. 2008.
Persbo, Andreas and Marius Bjørningstad, Verifying Nuclear Disarmament: The Inspector’s Agenda. Arms Control Today. 2008.
Dunlop, William H. Thoughts on Verification of Nuclear Disarmament. UCRL-CONF-235078. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 2007.
Olinger, Chad T., Threat Characterization in Nonproliferation Assessment. LA-UR-03-4849. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2003.
Pilat, Joseph F., Transparency, Verification and the Future of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control. LA-UR-00-5497. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2000.
Voznyuk, Rodion et al., The Computer Modeling System for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CMSAC) for Warhead Dismantlement and Transparency. SAND2000-1531C. Sandia National Laboratory. 2000.
Voznyuk, Rodion et al., High Explosive Detection and Destruction Technology Applications For Warhead Dismantlement Transparency. SAND2000-1533C. Sandia National Laboratory. 2000.
Bukharin and Luongo, U.S.-Russian Warhead Dismantlement Transparency: The Status, Problems, and Proposals. PU/CEES Report No. 314. Center for Energy and Environmental Studies. School of Engineering and Applied Science. Princeton University. 1999
Olinger, Chad T. et al., Technical Challenges for Dismantlement Verification. LA-UR-97-2812. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 1997.
Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement. United States Department of Energy. Federal Register, Vol.62, No.13. 1997.
Transparency and Verification Options: An Initial Analysis of Approaches for Monitoring Warhead Dismantlement. U.S. Department of Energy Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation. 1997.
Drell, S. et al, Verification of Dismantlement of Nuclear Warheads and Controls on Nuclear Materials. JSR-92-331. JASON. The MITRE Corporation. 1993
Verification Technologies: Managing Research and Development for Cooperative Arms Control Monitoring Measures. OTA-ISC-488. Office of Technology Assessment. 1991
Weissenberger, Stein, Treaty Verification with an Uncertain Partner. UCRL-JC-105885. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 1991.
Note: The content on this website and in this resource collection does not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the International Partnership.
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IPNDV Phase II Summary Report: Moving from Paper to Practice in Nuclear Disarmament Verification
Sam Nunn Discusses Trump-Kim Summit on Bloomberg TV
NTI Co-Chair Sam Nunn discusses the agreement by the United States and North Korea to seek complete denuclearization and how to proceed through the disarmament process. He speaks with Bloomberg's David Westin on "Bloomberg Daybreak: Americas."
On Iran and North Korea: Don’t trust, and verify, verify, verify
Ernest J. Moniz, the former US secretary of energy, is CEO and co-chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. In this op-ed, published in the Boston Globe, he discusses the powerful verification measures within the Iran Deal and the importance of staying in the agreement, particularly as talks with North Korea approach.