Arms Control Agreements, Demonstrations & Experiments
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This section contains background information on past arms control agreements, demonstrations and experiments. Examples include the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START), as well as experiments like the Black Sea Experiment, the UK-Norway Initiative, and the Trilateral Initiative.
Key Documents in Arms Control Agreements, Demonstrations & Experiments:
Joint U.S.-U.K. Report on Technical Cooperation for Arms Control. U.S. Department of Energy and the U.K. Ministry of Defence. 2015.
The United Kingdom-Norway Initiative: Further Research into the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement. Working Paper submitted to the proceedings of the 2015 NPT Review Conference by the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 2015.
Haas, Eckhard et al., Trilateral Initiative: IAEA Authentication and National Certification of Verification Equipment for Facilities with Classified Forms of Fissile Material. IAEA-SM-367/17/04. The International Atomic Energy Agency. 2001.
Thomson, David B., The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and Its Verification. Los Alamos National Laboratory Center for National Security Studies, Report No.15, July 1992.
The following additional resources are available:
Conca, James, Destroying Nuclear Weapons Takes A Little Moxie. Forbes, April 23, 2013.
Pavlov, Alexander and Vladimir Rybachenkov, Looking Back: The U.S.-Russian Uranium Deal: Results and Lessons. Arms Control Today. 2013.
Saunders, Emily C. et al., Towards a Tactical Nuclear Weapons Treaty? Is There a Role of IAEA Tools of Safeguards? LA-UR-12-22917. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2012.
Wuest, C.R., The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World. LLNL-TR-564612. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. July 16, 2012.
Cochran, Thomas B., The Black Sea Experiment. The National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Institute of Peace, "From Reykjavik to New START: Science Diplomacy for Nuclear Security in the 21st Century. 2011.
Diakov, Anatoly et al., Nuclear Reductions After New START: Obstacles and Opportunities. Arms Control Today. 2011.
Høibråten, Steinar. NWS and NNWS: Lessons Learned from the UK/Norway/VERTIC Collaboration. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2011. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2011. All rights reserved.
The Nuclear Matters Handbook. The United States Department of Defense. 2011.
Baseley-Walker, Ben and Brian Weeden, Verification in Space: Theories, Realities and Possibilities. Disarmament Forum. 2010.
Cliff, David et al., Verifying Warhead Dismantlement: Past, Present, Future. VERTIC. Verification Matters, No.9. 2010.
The United Kingdom-Norway Initiative: Research into the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement. The Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. NPT/CONF.2010/WP.41. 2010.
Merkle, Peter B. et al., Active Thermal Standoff Inspection for Physical Authentication. Proceedings of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting. 2010. This paper is reprinted with permission from the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management. Copyright 2010. All rights reserved.
Persbo, Andreas and David Cliff, Verifying Warhead Dismantlement: Past, Present, Future. VERTIC. 2010.
2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement Fact Sheet. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. 2010.
2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement as Amended by the 2010 Protocol. U.S. Department of State. 2010.
Arms Control Verification. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 2010.
New START Treaty. Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 2010. Further resources provided here courtesy of the United States Department of State.
Kristensen, Hans, Nuclear Weapons Status and Options Under a START Follow-On Agreement. Arms Control Association Briefing, Next Steps in U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions: The START Follow-On Negotiations and Beyond. 2009.
Presentation on the UK –Norway Initiative on Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Verification. 2009.
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance. Arms Control Association Fact Sheet. 2008.
English-Chinese, Chinese-English Nuclear Security Glossary. Committee on the U.S.-Chinese Glossary of Nuclear Terms. 2008.
Shea, Thomas E., The Trilateral Initiative: A Model For The Future? Arms Control Today. 2008.
Gavron, Avigdor, The Role of Science in Treaty Verification. LA-UR-04-6091. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2004.
Priedhorsky, William C. et al., Eyes in Space: Sensors for Treaty Verification and Basic Research. LA-UR-03-4562. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2003.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty). United States Department of State. 2002.
Avens, Larry R., et al., The Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration. LA-UR-01-3570. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 2001.
Technology R&D for Arms Control. U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering. 2001.
Shea, Thomas E., Report on the Trilateral Initiative. IAEA Bulletin 43/4/2001. 2001.
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designed as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation. United States Department of State. 2000.
Voznyuk, Rodion et al., The Computer Modeling System for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (CMSAC) for Warhead Dismantlement and Transparency. SAND2000-1531C. Sandia National Laboratory. 2000.
Voznyuk, Rodion et al., High Explosive Detection and Destruction Technology Applications For Warhead Dismantlement Transparency. SAND2000-1533C. Sandia National Laboratory. 2000.
United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992. U.S. Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office. DOE/NV-209-REV-15. 2000.
Filarowski, C. et al., Lessons Learned from the First U.S./Russian Federation Joint Tabletop Exercise to Prepare for Conducting On-Site Inspections Under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. UCRL-ID-135318. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 1999.
Hadley, Anna, Just What Exactly Is A Warhead? An Analysis of Russian/English Translations and Definitions. SAND98-1201. Sandia National Laboratory. 1998.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. 1996.
Johnson, M.W. and T.B. Gosnell, Progress Toward Mutual Reciprocal Inspections of Fissile Materials From Dismantled Nuclear Weapons. LA-UR-95-2335. Los Alamos National Laboratory, 1995.
White, P.C., Los Alamos National Laboratory Scientific Interactions with the Former Soviet Union. LA-UR-94-3867. Los Alamos National Laboratory. 1994.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 1993.
Sutcliffe, W.G., Warheads and Fissile Materials: Declarations and Counting. UCRL-JC-108073. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 1991.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. United States Department of State. 1991.
Sandia Technology. Sandia National Laboratories. SAND89-0637. 1989.
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 1987.
Baker, J.C. et al, An Assessment of the Utility of On-Site Inspection for INF Treaty Verification. AD-A221 226. DTIC. 1983
The INF Treaty Monitoring and Verification Capabilities. United States Senate, Report 100-318, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, April 21, 1988.
SALT I. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XXXII.
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty. Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 1972.
Cloud Gap: Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons, Final Report, Volume 1. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 1969
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United Nations. 1968.
Note: The content on this website and in this resource collection does not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the International Partnership.
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