Fact Sheet

India Nuclear Overview

India Nuclear Overview

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Background

This page is part of the India Country Profile.

India possesses both nuclear weapons and extensive nuclear fuel cycle capabilities. India tested its first nuclear device in May 1974, and remains outside both the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, India has a facility-specific safeguards agreement in place with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) allowing it to participate in global civilian nuclear technology commerce. India has a sizable and growing nuclear arsenal, primarily due to decades of conflict with its nuclear-armed neighbor Pakistan.

Capabilities

According to the 2019 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal includes 130 to 140 warheads. 1 The ranges of such estimates are generally dependent on analyses of India’s stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium, which is estimated at 0.58 ± 0.15 tons. 2 India has also stockpiled roughly 4.0 ± 1.4 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU), some of which is intended for use in nuclear submarines and research reactors. 3

The plutonium for India’s nuclear arsenal is obtained from the 100 MWt research reactor, Dhruva, which began operations in 1988. 4 Another 40 MWt CIRUS reactor produced about 4 to 7 kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually until it was decommissioned in 2010 under the separation plan of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement. 5 Irradiated fuel from the reactors is reprocessed at the Plutonium Reprocessing Plant in Trombay, which has a capacity of roughly 50 tons of spent nuclear fuel per year. 6 A 500MW prototype fast breeder reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu was expected to reach criticality by 2019 to increase India’s plutonium production capacity, but has not yet reached this goal. Starting in 2021, India plans to construct six more PFBR-type reactors. 7 8

Assessments of the yield and reliability of India’s nuclear devices vary considerably. When India tested its first fission device in May 1974, Indian scientists claimed the device had a yield of about 12 kilotons (kt), while other independent analysts estimated a much lower yield. 9 Similar disputes surrounded India’s May 1998 tests. After its first of round of tests on 11 May, India announced that it had simultaneously tested three nuclear devices: a thermonuclear device, a fission device, and a sub-kiloton device with a combined yield of around 65 kt. 10 However, analysts and scientists outside of India – citing evidence from geologic and seismic data – concluded that the cumulative yield of the Indian tests was lower. 11 12 Some scientists in India seem to agree with this analysis and argue that India should therefore refrain from signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and conduct further tests. 13 14 15 However, former leaders of the Atomic Energy Commission of India who oversaw these tests dispute such claims, maintaining that their original estimates were correct and that further testing is unnecessary. 16 17 18

History

1947 to 1974: Developing a Peaceful Nuclear Program

India’s nuclear program was mainly conceived by Homi Bhabha, an influential scientist who persuaded political leaders to invest resources in the nuclear sector. 19 The first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, launched an ambitious nuclear program to boost the country’s prestige and self-reliance in energy with primary focus on producing inexpensive electricity. However, the decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle also gave India the technical capability to pursue nuclear weapons. 20

In the years that followed, the internal debate over whether India should develop a nuclear explosive device continued. On one hand, the scientific establishment wanted to prove that it was technically capable of detonating a nuclear device, whereas hawks within the security establishment pointed to security developments in China and elsewhere as necessitating a nuclear deterrent. 21 Many politicians opposed nuclear weapons both for economic and moral reasons, arguing that nuclear weapons would not make India safer, and that the solution to nuclear proliferation was comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. 22 As a result, a consensus emerged on both sides that India should not sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) when it was opened for signature in 1968 unless the nuclear weapon states agreed to a clear plan for nuclear disarmament. 23

Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorized theoretical work on the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP) project in November 1964. 24 In the late 1960s nuclear scientists continued to develop the technical capacity for a nuclear explosion, although the political decision had not yet been made to carry out the test. 25 Ultimately, on 18 May 1974, under orders from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India tested a fission device which it described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE). 26

1974 to 1998: The Slow Path Toward Weaponization

India’s 1974 nuclear test was condemned by many countries as a violation of the peaceful-use agreements underlying U.S. and Canadian-supplied nuclear technology and material transfers, and was a major contributing factor to the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). 27 However, due to international alarm about the military implications of its nuclear explosion, India did not follow the 1974 test with subsequent tests, nor did it immediately weaponize the device design that it had tested. 28 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi authorized weaponization of India’s nuclear capability in late 1980s as a response to oblique nuclear threats issued by Pakistan in the wake of the 1986 to 1987 Brasstacks crisis. 29 30 At the same time, India continued to support efforts for nuclear disarmament. In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi submitted an Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World Order to the United Nations General Assembly. 31

As negotiations on the CTBT rapidly progressed in the early 1990s, India came to regard the CTBT as an instrument of nonproliferation that sought to freeze countries’ nuclear capabilities. This, along with the indefinite extension of the NPT, reignited domestic political pressure to conduct further tests. 32 In 1995, the Narasimha Rao government considered an accelerated program of nuclear tests but test preparations were detected by U.S. intelligence agencies, and the resultant U.S. diplomatic pressure convinced the Rao government to postpone the tests. 33 When Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee came to power in 1998, his government authorized two rounds of nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998, after which India formally declared itself to be a nuclear-weapon state. 34 Almost no one outside of India foresaw the test; however, geospatial analysis by Vipin Gupta and Frank Pabian had identified a likely site and timeframe for the test. 35

1998 to 2009: India as an Emerging Nuclear Power

India’s nuclear tests were followed within a month by a similar set of tests by Pakistan, resulting in fears in the international community of an arms race or an escalation of conflict between the two openly declared nuclear powers in South Asia. 36 The 1999 Kargil War and the 2001 to 2002 Twin Peaks Crisis heightened tensions between the two countries, although these conventional conflicts did not escalate to the nuclear level. 37 38 The US government imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan in response to their 1998 nuclear tests. 39

After the 1998 tests the Indian government established a National Security Advisory Board, which issued a Draft Report on Indian Nuclear Doctrine in 1999 that broadly outlined India’s nuclear no-first-use policy and defensive posture of “credible minimum nuclear deterrence.” 40 In January 2003, a Ministry of External Affairs press release maintained adherence to no-first-use, although with the condition that nuclear weapons could also be used in retaliation for a biological or chemical attack, or to protect Indian forces operating in Pakistan. 41 In line with this posture, India does not keep its nuclear force at a heightened state of alert. The country’s nuclear weapons remain under the control of the civilian Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), comprising of a Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, and an Executive Council, led by the National Security Advisor. 42

A turning point in U.S.-India relations occurred when plans for negotiating a U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement were unveiled in July 2005 under the George W. Bush administration. This agreement, and the subsequent endorsement of India’s case by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), enabled India to engage in international nuclear trade. In return, India agreed to allow safeguards on a select number of its nuclear facilities that are classified as “civilian” in purpose. The remaining “military” facilities remained off-limits to international inspectors. The U.S. Congress passed the Hyde Act in January 2006 to exempt nuclear cooperation with India from provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, allowing for the adoption of a bilateral 123 nuclear cooperation agreement in August 2007. 43 In September 2008, the NSG approved an exemption allowing the members of this export control regime to conduct nuclear trade with India. 44 Finally, a safeguards agreement for select civilian nuclear facilities was concluded between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in February 2009, after approval by the IAEA Board of Governors the previous year. 45

2009 to Present: India as an Established Nuclear Power

In October 2009, India submitted a separation plan to put its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards by 2014. 46 In late July 2010, India and the United States signed a bilateral agreement allowing India to reprocess U.S.-obligated nuclear material at two new reprocessing facilities, to be constructed and placed under IAEA safeguards. 47 However, the nuclear power industry did not grow as expected because India’s liability laws regulating civilian nuclear power plants far exceeded the international standards for nuclear liability and held suppliers legally liable for any damages resulting from accidents. To address these concerns and give impetus to nuclear power industry, India ratified the IAEA Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in 2016. 48

By 2019, India had put total of 26 reactors under IAEA safeguards. 49 Enabled by the NSG waiver granted to it in 2008, India has signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia, United States, France, United Kingdom, South Korea, Canada, Argentina, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Australia, Sri Lanka, Japan, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Czech Republic and Namibia. 50 Additionally, India continues to participate in international nuclear trade and has signed agreements with Canada, Kazakhstan and Australia to supply uranium to fuel its civilian nuclear reactors. Negotiations are currently underway for concluding negotiations to construct six reactors in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh by Westinghouse. 51

Recent Developments and Current Status

India was recently accepted as a member of three of the four major export control regimes. It was admitted as a member into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2016, Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017 and Australia Group in 2018. 52 53 54

India has been actively pursuing membership into the NSG and has received explicit support for its membership from many current NSG members including the United States, Russia, Switzerland and Japan. 55 56 57 58 In arguing for NSG membership, India has portrayed itself as a responsible nuclear power, pointing to its positive record on nonproliferation and consistent support for complete nuclear disarmament. 59 However, China does not support an explicit membership in the NSG for India but instead proposes a two-step approach: first would be to reach consensus on a non-discriminatory resolution that would apply to all non-NPT countries alike and then discuss individual membership applications by non-NPT countries. 60 India argues that its membership should be considered under current rules because NSG is an export-control mechanism and not a nonproliferation one so question of linking NSG membership to the NPT membership does not arise. 61 Furthermore, India argues that there is a precedent for non-signatories of NPT joining the NSG when France became a founding member of the NSG in 1974 but did not accede to the NPT until 1992. 62

India’s declared nuclear posture is of credible minimum deterrence and has successfully developed a strategic triad of nuclear delivery systems. 63 64 India has not signed the CTBT, but maintains a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing and supports negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) that is “universal, non-discriminatory, and internationally verifiable.” 65 The Indian mission to the United Nations has also submitted several draft recommendations on “reducing nuclear danger,” which include “steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons.” 66 At the same time, India has remained firmly outside of the NPT, arguing that “nuclear weapons are an integral part of our national security and will remain so pending the global elimination of all nuclear weapons.” 67 India maintains its official commitment to no-first-use of nuclear weapons. However, during prepared remarks at the Pokhran nuclear test site in August 2019, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh implied that India’s no first use policy would not be continued indefinitely. 68

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Glossary

Fuel Cycle
Fuel Cycle: A term for the full spectrum of processes associated with utilizing nuclear fission reactions for peaceful or military purposes. The “front-end” of the uranium-plutonium nuclear fuel cycle includes uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. The fuel is used in a nuclear reactor to produce neutrons that can, for example, produce thermal reactions to generate electricity or propulsion, or produce fissile materials for weapons. The “back-end” of the nuclear fuel cycle refers to spent fuel being stored in spent fuel pools, possible reprocessing of the spent fuel, and ultimately long-term storage in a geological or other repository.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
Safeguards
Safeguards: A system of accounting, containment, surveillance, and inspections aimed at verifying that states are in compliance with their treaty obligations concerning the supply, manufacture, and use of civil nuclear materials. The term frequently refers to the safeguards systems maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. IAEA safeguards aim to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material in a timely manner. However, the term can also refer to, for example, a bilateral agreement between a supplier state and an importer state on the use of a certain nuclear technology.

See entries for Full-scope safeguards, information-driven safeguards, Information Circular 66, and Information Circular 153.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
Weapons-grade material
Weapons-grade material: Refers to the nuclear materials that are most suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, e.g., uranium (U) enriched to 90 percent U-235 or plutonium (Pu) that is primarily composed of Pu-239 and contains less than 7% Pu-240. Crude nuclear weapons (i.e., improvised nuclear devices), could be fabricated from lower-grade materials.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of more than 20% of the isotope U-235. Achieved via the process of enrichment. See entry for enriched uranium.
Research reactor
Research reactor: Small fission reactors designed to produce neutrons for a variety of purposes, including scientific research, training, and medical isotope production. Unlike commercial power reactors, they are not designed to generate power.
Irradiate
Irradiate: To expose to some form of radiation.
Reprocessing
Reprocessing: The chemical treatment of spent nuclear fuel to separate the remaining usable plutonium and uranium for re-fabrication into fuel, or alternatively, to extract the plutonium for use in nuclear weapons.
Spent nuclear fuel
Spent nuclear fuel: Irradiated nuclear fuel. Once irradiated, nuclear fuel is highly radioactive and extremely physically hot, necessitating special remote handling. Fuel is considered “self protecting” if it is sufficiently radioactive that those who might seek to divert it would not be able to handle it directly without suffering acute radiation exposure.
Fast Reactors
Fast breeder reactors are designed to produce more fissile material than they consume. The surplus fissile material is produced by surrounding the core of the reactor with a blanket of fertile U-238, which is transmuted to plutonium (Pu-239). However, fast reactors do not have to operate as breeders. The same underlying fast reactor technology can be used to burn (or consume) plutonium and other actinides, such as americium and neptunium. Such reactors are known as fast burner reactors.
Critical
Critical: A state where the number of neutrons in each period of time, or generation, remains constant. When a nuclear reactor is “steady-state,” or operating at normal power levels for extended periods of time, it is in this state.
Fission
The splitting of the nucleus of a heavy atom into two lighter nuclei (called fission fragments). It is accompanied by the release of neutrons, gamma rays, and fission fragments with large amounts of kinetic energy.  It is usually triggered by absorption of a neutron, but in some cases may be induced by protons, gamma rays or other particles
Kiloton
Kiloton: A term used to quantify the energy of a nuclear explosion that is equivalent to the explosion of 1,000 tons of trinitrotoluene (TNT) conventional explosive.
Thermonuclear weapon
Thermonuclear weapon: A nuclear weapon in which the fusion of light nuclei, such as deuterium and tritium, leads to a significantly higher explosive yield than in a regular fission weapon. Thermonuclear weapons are sometimes referred to as staged weapons, because the initial fission reaction (the first stage) creates the condition under which the thermonuclear reaction can occur (the second stage). Also archaically referred to as a hydrogen bomb.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
Fuel Cycle
Fuel Cycle: A term for the full spectrum of processes associated with utilizing nuclear fission reactions for peaceful or military purposes. The “front-end” of the uranium-plutonium nuclear fuel cycle includes uranium mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication. The fuel is used in a nuclear reactor to produce neutrons that can, for example, produce thermal reactions to generate electricity or propulsion, or produce fissile materials for weapons. The “back-end” of the nuclear fuel cycle refers to spent fuel being stored in spent fuel pools, possible reprocessing of the spent fuel, and ultimately long-term storage in a geological or other repository.
Deterrence
The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict through the credible threat of retaliation. To be effective, a deterrence strategy should demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would outweigh any potential gains. See entries for Extended deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
Disarmament
Though there is no agreed-upon legal definition of what disarmament entails within the context of international agreements, a general definition is the process of reducing the quantity and/or capabilities of military weapons and/or military forces.
Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)
PNEs are nuclear explosions carried out for non-military purposes, such as the construction of harbors or canals. PNEs are technically indistinguishable from nuclear explosions of a military nature. Although Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows for PNEs, no significant peaceful benefits of these explosions (that outweigh the drawbacks), have been discovered. In the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the state parties agreed that Article V of the NPT is to be interpreted in light of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which will ban all nuclear explosions, including PNEs, once it enters into force.
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
United Nations General Assembly
The UN General Assembly is the largest body of the United Nations. It includes all member states, but its resolutions are not legally binding. It is responsible for much of the work of the United Nations, including controlling finances, passing resolutions, and electing non-permanent members of the Security Council. It has two subsidiary bodies dealing particularly with security and disarmament: the UN General Assembly Committee on Disarmament and International Security (First Committee); and the UN Disarmament Commission. For additional information, see the UNGA.
Nonproliferation
Nonproliferation: Measures to prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. See entry for Proliferation.
No-First-Use
No-First-Use: A pledge on the part of a nuclear weapon state not to be the first party to use nuclear weapons in a conflict or crisis. No-first-use guarantees may be made in unilateral statements, bilateral or multilateral agreements, or as part of a treaty creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Bilateral
Bilateral: Negotiations, arrangements, agreements, or treaties that affect or are between two parties—and generally two countries.
Nuclear Cooperation (Section 123) Agreement
Nuclear Cooperation (Section 123) Agreement: Named after Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, this type of agreement governs U.S. peaceful nuclear cooperation with foreign states, and must be in place for certain types of transactions to occur.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Nuclear power plant
Nuclear power plant: A facility that generates electricity using a nuclear reactor as its heat source to provide steam to a turbine generator.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Uranium
Uranium is a metal with the atomic number 92. See entries for enriched uranium, low enriched uranium, and highly enriched uranium.
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty us currently under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to end the production of weapons-usable fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for nuclear weapons. For additional information, see the FMCT.
De-alert
To reduce the level of readiness to launch of nuclear weapons systems. Measures include removing nuclear warheads from missiles, and storing the warheads separately from the missiles.
De-targeting
Removing the targeting information from, or substituting ocean-area target coordinates on, a ballistic missile, in order to reduce the consequences of an accidental or unintentional launch. De-targeting cannot be verified, and missiles can be rapidly re-targeted.

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