Fact Sheet

Indonesia Overview

Indonesia Overview

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Indonesia does not possess nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and is a member in good standing of most relevant nonproliferation treaties and organizations. [1]

As an active participant of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Indonesia has been critical of those non-universal nonproliferation mechanisms that potentially limit the access of non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS) to technologies for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although Indonesia, a prominent member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), supports the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) and the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM), Jakarta remains skeptical of multilateral export control regimes. Indonesia has generally viewed them as supply cartels that impede the flow of technology to the developing world, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). On 20 September 2017, Indonesia signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. [2]

Indonesia has a nascent export control system and does not maintain control lists for most dual-use items. Indonesia’s leadership is looking to foreign partners—including the United States, the European Union, and Japan—to help with implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and especially the strengthening of its dual-use control lists. [3] Although Indonesia actively cooperates with neighboring Singapore and Malaysia on maritime security issues, Jakarta has not agreed to participate in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), due to concerns that PSI-related activities could encroach on its national sovereignty, and its belief they may contradict the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. [4]

Nuclear

Indonesia does not possess a nuclear weapons program, although President Sukarno, Indonesia's leader from 1945 to 1967, considered the option in the mid-1960s. [5] After Sukarno's removal from power in 1967, the Indonesian government agreed to a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement for its fledgling nuclear facilities, marking the beginning of Indonesia’s role as a proponent of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In 1970, Indonesia signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state, ratifying it in 1979. [6] Indonesia acceded to the Additional Protocol in 1999, becoming the first state in Southeast Asia to be bound by this more rigorous verification mechanism. [7] Indonesia is a member of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (the Bangkok Treaty), which entered into force in 1997. Indonesia signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, ratifying it in February 2012. [8] Indonesia began implementation of the IAEA Integrated Safeguards, including the additional protocol, in 2003. [9]

Indonesia continues to advocate strongly for the protection of the rights of non-nuclear weapon States to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Jakarta issued a statement at the 2010 General Conference of the IAEA in support of the newly created ASEAN Regulatory Network (ASEANTOM), which facilitates collaboration for the security of the peaceful use of nuclear technology. [10] In November 2013, Indonesia hosted the 4th Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network and held the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty – Regional Conference for States in Southeast Asia, the Pacific and the Far East in May 2014. [11] In February 2018, the IAEA and Indonesia signed a practical arrangement promoting enhanced peaceful nuclear technology cooperation among developing countries. [12]

Indonesia has taken an active role in nuclear safety and security, and is a signatory to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. With the cooperation of the IAEA, Indonesia has installed seven Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) at its main harbors of Batam, Balawan, Makassar, Bitung, Tanjung Priuk, Tanjung Perak, and Semarang. [13] In 2016, with the cooperation of the U.S. Department of Energy, Indonesia down-blended its remaining stock of highly enriched uranium (HEU), making Southeast Asia entirely free of HEU. [14]

Indonesia’s nuclear energy agency, BATAN (Bandan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional), operates three nuclear research reactors in complexes on the island of Java: the Bandung Nuclear Complex, with a 2MWt TRIGA Mark II reactor; the Yogyakarta Nuclear Complex, with a 100kW Kartini TRIGA Mark II reactor; and the Serpong Nuclear Complex, which houses the 30MWt G.A. Siwabessy Multipurpose Research Reactor. [15]

Indonesia has long sought to develop nuclear power, but none of the proposed projects have gotten past the planning stages. In the 1990’s, BATAN identified 14 possible locations for nuclear power plants, yet many of the proposed sites proved controversial. [16] The controversy surrounding these sites highlighted two key challenges facing Indonesia's future nuclear development: concerns about placing facilities in areas prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions and strong political opposition to nuclear energy.

Biological

Indonesia is not believed to have ever pursued the development of biological weapons (BW). Jakarta signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972, ratifying it in 1992. Indonesia participates regularly in meetings of BTWC state parties, and has hosted meetings on regional efforts to improve the treaty's implementation. [17] The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported in 2010 that Indonesia had yet to undertake any biotechnology research or development. Indonesia has taken a defensive stance with regard to biological weapons, forming a unit to combat bioterrorism in 2008 and later establishing a biodefense lab in 2010. [18]

Indonesia is not a member of the Australia Group. Jakarta has a growing medical and agricultural research industry, which could potentially present a proliferation risk if proper export controls are not put into place. [19] Currently, Indonesia relies on its domestic laws and regulations to manage the prevention and suppression of biological weapons, including the Penal Code, Law on Customs, Law on Animal, Fish and Plant Quarantine, Law Concerning Money Laundering Crimes, Law on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade Decree. [20] However, Indonesia is also in the process of drafting the Bill on the Implementation of the BWC. [21]

Chemical

Indonesia is not known to have developed or to have attempted to procure chemical weapons-related materials. Indonesia became a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993, ratifying it in 1998. In accordance with its CWC obligations, Indonesia controls chemicals listed within the treaty and additionally, enacted the Law of the Republic of Indonesia on the Use of Chemical Materials and the Prohibition of Chemical Materials as Chemical Weapons in 2008. [22] Indonesia also emphasizes the total destruction of chemical weapons by the remaining states in possession of CW as the main priority of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and is of the view that OPCW’s verification capabilities should be enhanced in order to increase confidence in the system. [23] In April 2014, Jakarta co-hosted a regional workshop on Article X of the CWC for Asian states party to the CWC focusing on regional cooperation and assistance. [24]

Missile

Indonesia is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and does not have control lists covering dual-use materials as it is not a large producer of such items. Indonesia's navy and air force maintain a small inventory of air-to-air (AAMs) and surface-to-air (SAMs) missiles.

The Indonesian Air Force's (TNI-AU) inventory includes the U.S.-origin AIM-9P-4 and AGM-65 Maverick Sidewinder, as well as the Chinese QianWei-3. In March 2016, the United States approved the sale of 36 AIM-120c-7 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) and missile guidance to Indonesia in a deal estimated at $97 million. [25] In October 2017, Indonesia contracted with Norwegian defense company Kongsberg for a complete Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS) worth an estimated $77 million. [26] The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) maintains a small number of C-802 and C-705 anti-ship missiles obtained from China, as well as French-origin AM 39 Exocet systems. [27]

Sources:
[1] Michael S. Malley and Tanya Ogilvie-White, "Nuclear Capabilities in Southeast Asia," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2009; and "Nuclear Safety in Southeast Asia: Issues, Challenges, and Regional Strategy," CSIS (Indonesia) Strategic Policy Report 2010.
[2] “List of Countries Which Signed Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, accessed 21 February 2018, www.un.org.
[3] Discussions between CNS researcher Stephanie Lieggi and Indonesian government officials, Jakarta, February 2011.
[4] Charles Wolf, Jr., "Asia's Nonproliferation Laggards: China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia," Wall Street Journal, 9 February 2009; and Stephanie Lieggi, "Proliferation Security Initiative Exercise Hosted by Japan Shows Growing Interest in Asia But No Sea Change in Key Outsider States," WMD Insights (December 2007 to January 2008), www.wmdinsights.com.
[5] Sukarno officially had only one name; this is not uncommon in Indonesia. For more on Sukarno's interest in nuclear weapons, see Robert M. Cornejo, "When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian Nuclear Aspirations in the Mid-1960s," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2000.
[6] "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Status of Treaty," Indonesia entry, Accessed 1 March 2011, www.un.org.
[7] "Status of Additional Protocols," International Atomic Energy Agency, 20 December 2010, www.iaea.org.
[8] For more background see: Sean Dunlop and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, "Indonesia Takes the Lead on the CTBT," CNS Feature Story, 4 May 2010, www.nonproliferation.org.
[9] Mutiara Solichah, “Implementation of Integrated Safeguards in Indonesia,” Directorate Inspection Installation and Nuclear Material – Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency, IAEA-CN-184/334, 2010, www.iaea.org.
[10] H. E. Rachmat Budiman, “Statement by H.E. Rachmat Budiman at the 57th Annual Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA,” 16-20 September 2013, www.iaea.org.
[11] H. E. Rachmat Budiman, “Statement by H.E. Rachmat Budiman at the 57th Annual Regular Session of the General Conference of the IAEA,” 16-20 September 2013, www.iaea.org.
[12] Aabha Dixit, “IAEA Director General Visits Indonesia: Highlights Close Cooperation in Using Nuclear Technology,” 9 February 2018, www.iaea.org.
[13] “National Progress Report: Indonesia,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 31 March 2016, www.belfercenter.org.
[14] “NNSA Announces Elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) From Indonesia,” National Nuclear Security Administration, 29 August 2016, nnsa.energy.gov.
[15] "Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia," IISS Strategic Dossier, September 2009, pp. 65-66, www.iiss.org.
[16] Discussions between CNS researcher Stephanie Lieggi and Indonesian nuclear agency officials, February 2011; see also Richard Tanter, Arabella Imhoff, and David Von Hippel, "Nuclear Power, Risk Management and Democratic Accountability in Indonesia: Volcanic, Regulatory and Financial Risk in the Muria Peninsula Nuclear Power Proposal," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 21 December 2009, www.japanfocus.org.
[17] "Transcription of the Statement Given by Indonesia to the BTWC 2007 Meeting of Experts," 20 August 2007, via: www.brad.ac.uk.
[18] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Existing Chemicals Database,” http://webnet.oecd.org.
[19] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD Existing Chemicals Database,” http://webnet.oecd.org.
[20] "Strategic Weapons System, Indonesia," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 8 October 2010.
[21] "Indonesia Legislative Database," United Nations, Accessed 3 August 2011, www.un.org.
[22] "Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Biological Weapons," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 7 July 2010, www.deplu.go.id.
[23] "Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Chemical Weapons," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 7 July 2010, www.deplu.go.id.
[24] Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Regional Workshop Held in Indonesia on Article X and Cooperation in Assistance and Emergency Response," 15 April 2014, www.opcw.org.
[25] Franz-Stefan Gady, “US Clears Sale of Advanced Missiles to Indonesia,” The Diplomat, 18 March 2016, www.thediplomat.com.
[26] Mike Yeo, “Indonesia Strikes $77M Deal for Air-Defense System by Norway’s Kongsberg,” Defense News, 1 November 2017, www.defensenews.com.
[27] "Navy, Indonesia," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 12 January 2011.

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Glossary

Nonproliferation
Nonproliferation: Measures to prevent the spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. See entry for Proliferation.
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was formed during the Cold War as an organization of states that did not seek to formally align themselves with either the United States or the Soviet Union, but sought to remain independent or neutral. NAM identifies the right of independent judgment, the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, and the use of moderation in relations with all big powers as the three basic elements that have influenced its approach. For additional information, see the NAM.
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS)
Non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS): Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NNWS are states that had not detonated a nuclear device prior to 1 January 1967, and who agree in joining the NPT to refrain from pursuing nuclear weapons (that is, all state parties to the NPT other than the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China).
Nuclear energy
Nuclear energy: The energy liberated by a nuclear reaction (fission or fusion), or by radioactive decay.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional organization established on August 8, 1967, whose objectives include the acceleration of economic growth and the promotion of regional peace and stability in Southeast Asia. It was established by five original member countries, but now consists of ten members and two observers. Among other achievements, ASEAN was responsible for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia, created by the Treaty of Bangkok at the Fifth ASEAN Summit in 1995. For additional information, see ASEAN.
Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ)
The Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) prohibits the development, manufacture, acquisition, or testing of nuclear weapons anywhere within the region. It also prohibits the transport of nuclear weapons through the region, as well as the dumping at sea, discharging into the atmosphere, or burying on land of any radioactive material or waste. In addition, the treaty requires all parties to apply International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. For additional information, see the SEANWFZ.
Multilateral
Multilateral: Negotiations, agreements or treaties that are concluded among three or more parties, countries, etc.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The NSG was established in 1975, and its members commit themselves to exporting sensitive nuclear technologies only to countries that adhere to strict non-proliferation standards. For additional information, see the NSG.
Australia Group (AG)
Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
Representatives of 33 states met in Vienna, Austria in July 1996, and established this arrangement intended to contribute to regional and international security by promoting transparency and greater responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. This organization was the successor to the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). See entry for COCOM. For additional information, see the Wassenaar Arrangement.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Dual-use item
An item that has both civilian and military applications. For example, many of the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons have legitimate civilian industrial uses, such as the production of pesticides or ink for ballpoint pens.
UNSC Resolution 1540
Resolution 1540 was passed by the UN Security Council in April 2004, calling on all states to refrain from supporting, by any means, non-state actors who attempt to acquire, use, or transfer chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or their delivery systems. The resolution also called for a Committee to report on the progress of the resolution, asking states to submit reports on steps taken towards conforming to the resolution. In April 2011, the Security Council voted to extend the mandate of the 1540 Committee for an additional 10 years.
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
The PSI: Announced by U.S. President George W. Bush in May 2003, PSI is a U.S.- led effort to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials through the use of information sharing and coordination of diplomatic and military efforts. Members of the initiative share a set of 13 common principles, which guide PSI efforts. For more information, see the PSI.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on 10 December 1982. It entered into force 12 year later on 16 November 1994. The Law of the Sea establishes a comprehensive legal framework to regulate all ocean space, its uses and resources. It contains, among other things, provisions relating to the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, and the high seas. It also provides for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, for marine scientific research, and for the development and transfer of marine technology. For the purposes of nuclear weapon-free-zones, the most important provision of the UNCLOS is the right of innocent passage and freedom of the high seas.
Safeguards
Safeguards: A system of accounting, containment, surveillance, and inspections aimed at verifying that states are in compliance with their treaty obligations concerning the supply, manufacture, and use of civil nuclear materials. The term frequently refers to the safeguards systems maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in all nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. IAEA safeguards aim to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material in a timely manner. However, the term can also refer to, for example, a bilateral agreement between a supplier state and an importer state on the use of a certain nuclear technology.

See entries for Full-scope safeguards, information-driven safeguards, Information Circular 66, and Information Circular 153.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complementary inspection authority to that provided in underlying safeguards agreements. The principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possible undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites, as well as additional authority to use the most advanced technologies during the verification process. See entry for Information Circular 540.
Treaty of Bangkok
Treaty of Bangkok: The Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone prohibits the development, manufacture, acquisition, or testing of nuclear weapons anywhere within the region. It also prohibits the transport of nuclear weapons through the region, as well as the dumping at sea, discharging into the atmosphere, or burying on land of any radioactive material or waste. In addition, the treaty requires all parties to apply International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to all their peaceful nuclear activities. For additional information, see the SEANWFZ.
Entry into force
The moment at which all provisions of a treaty are legally binding on its parties. Every treaty specifies preconditions for its entry into force. For example, the NPT specified that it would enter into force after the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union (the Depository governments) and 40 other countries ratified the treaty, an event that occurred on March 5, 1970. See entries for Signature, Ratification.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
IAEA: Founded in 1957 and based in Vienna, Austria, the IAEA is an autonomous international organization in the United Nations system. The Agency’s mandate is the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, technical assistance in this area, and verification that nuclear materials and technology stay in peaceful use. Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requires non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT to accept safeguards administered by the IAEA. The IAEA consists of three principal organs: the General Conference (of member states); the Board of Governors; and the Secretariat. For additional information, see the IAEA.
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management (JC)
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management opened for signature in 1997 and entered into force in 2001. The Convention aims to achieve and maintain a high level of safety in spent fuel and radioactive waste management; ensure that there are effective defenses against potential hazards during all stages of management of such materials; and prevent accidents with radiological consequences.  For additional information, see the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management.
Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)
The Convention on Nuclear Safety commits states operating nuclear power plants to establish and maintain a regulatory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations. The Convention was adopted in 1994 and obligates parties to carry out comprehensive and systematic safety assessments of installations and ensure that the physical state and operations of installations are in accordance with the requirements of the Convention. For additional information, see the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
The CPPNM: Obliges parties to ensure that during international transport across their territory, or on ships or aircraft under their jurisdiction, civil nuclear materials are protected according to agreed standards. The convention also provides a framework for international cooperation on the protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material, and on the application of criminal sanctions against persons who commit crimes involving nuclear material. The CPPNM opened for signature on 3 March 1980 and entered into force on 8 February 1987. The Amendment to the CPPNM extended the convention’s scope to also cover the physical protection of nuclear material in domestic use, in storage, and during transport, and of nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes, and provided for additional cooperation between states. For additional information, see the CPPNM.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of more than 20% of the isotope U-235. Achieved via the process of enrichment. See entry for enriched uranium.
Nuclear power plant
Nuclear power plant: A facility that generates electricity using a nuclear reactor as its heat source to provide steam to a turbine generator.
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Australia Group (AG)
Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Chemical Weapon (CW)
The CW: The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons defines a chemical weapon as any of the following: 1) a toxic chemical or its precursors; 2) a munition specifically designed to deliver a toxic chemical; or 3) any equipment specifically designed for use with toxic chemicals or munitions. Toxic chemical agents are gaseous, liquid, or solid chemical substances that use their toxic properties to cause death or severe harm to humans, animals, and/or plants. Chemical weapons include blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents, as well as non-lethal incapacitating agents and riot-control agents. Historically, chemical weapons have been the most widely used and widely proliferated weapon of mass destruction.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state. The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997. For additional information, see the CWC.
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
The OPCW: Based in The Hague, the Netherlands, the OPCW is responsible for implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). All countries ratifying the CWC become state parties to the CWC, and make up the membership of the OPCW. The OPCW meets annually, and in special sessions when necessary. For additional information, see the OPCW.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
The MTCR: An informal arrangement established in April 1987 by an association of supplier states concerned about the proliferation of missile equipment and technology relevant to missiles that are capable of carrying a payload over 500 kilograms over a 300-kilometer range. Though originally intended to restrict the proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles, the regime has been expanded to restrict the spread of unmanned aerial vehicles. For additional information, see the MTCR.

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