Fact Sheet

Israel Biological Overview

Israel Biological Overview

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Background

This page is part of the Israel Country Profile.

In keeping with Israel’s policy of maintaining WMD ambiguity, Israel “has never made a public policy statement on biological weapons (BW)” and is reluctant to participate in regional and international fora on WMD disarmament. 1 Preferring to address disarmament and arms control in a regional context, Israel has not signed the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions (BTWC), and believes that progress in advancing the treaty’s goals in the region would require significantly improved political stability, discourse, and confidence building in the region. 2 However, Israel has taken steps to strengthen its export control regulations on dual-use biotechnologies and is also examining ways to improve security at sensitive Israeli laboratories. 3 In terms of BW research, development, and deployment, Israel maintains reticence and ambiguity about its activities and capabilities. However, Israeli defensive BW research regularly appears in open publications. 4 The U.S. government offers conflicting assessments of Israel’s BW activities. 5 Given the overall scarcity and ambiguity of official assessments and policy statements, reconstructions of Israel’s BW history, status, and capabilities can provide only partial and interpretive depictions.

Introduction

A precarious security environment and a strong science and technology foundation could provide motive and means for Israeli BW. However, the inherent characteristics of biological weapons limit their usefulness to Israel’s military. Most notably, geographic proximity to Israel’s likely state and sub-national adversaries, and the potential infection of Israel’s own population as a “blowback” result, would introduce significant risk to any Israeli BW use. Additionally, Israeli military confrontations generally end within days or weeks, and biological weapons require longer incubation times. 6 Finally, biological attacks often resemble natural outbreaks and cannot be immediately identified as deliberate attacks. Some analysts have noted that the very features diminishing the value of BW in state-to-state conflict may be advantageous in covert operations. 7 Ultimately, official ambiguity and reticence, the vibrant but secretive Israel Institute for Biological Research (IIBR), and a strong industrial biotechnology foundation continue to encourage speculation about the Israeli program ranging “from the mundane to the fantastic.” 8

Capabilities

Israel does not comment on speculation regarding its BW intentions or capabilities. However, Israel openly publishes defensive BW research, and the quality of Israel’s work indicates an advanced national scientific-technical BW research and development infrastructure. 9 Additionally, the Sunday Times in 1998 cited an Israeli military source in reporting that Israeli F-16 crews received training in loading active chemical and biological warheads onto airplanes, suggesting possible Israeli intent to maintain a viable BW delivery capability. 10 In 2008, the U.S. Congressional Research Service denoted Israel’s BW capability as “likely R&D.” 11

Dual Capable Infrastructure

Speculation about Israel’s BW program focuses on IIBR and its staff of “approximately 370 employees, 160 of whom are scientists holding doctorates in biology, biochemistry, biotechnology, analytic, organic and physical chemistry, pharmacology, mathematics, physics and environmental sciences. IIBR’s technical staff consists of 170 certified technicians, representing a broad spectrum of capabilities.” 12 A highly classified defense research center operated and funded by the Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Division of Research, IIBR’s mission statement and broad scientific mandate exemplify the ambiguity of dual use. 13 A database search of IIBR’s publications reveals research on several select agents and toxins, including plague bacterium (Yersinia pestis), typhus bacterium (Rickettsia prowazekii), staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB), rabies, anthrax bacterium (Bacillus anthracis), botulinum bacterium (Clostridium botulinum), botulinum toxin, and Ebola virus. 14 As of 2011, IIBR publications have focused on anthrax bacterium and plague bacterium. 15 Additionally, several other institutions, including Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv University, and Technion also publish select agent research. Israel has not declared any BSL-3 or BSL-4 laboratories. 16

In terms of life science research as a whole, in 2010 Thompson Reuters ranks Israeli research in the top 20 worldwide in biology, biochemistry, molecular biology, genetics, neuroscience, and clinical medicine, with an overall standard comparable with Austria, Belgium, and China. 17 Israel also boasts an impressive industrial biotechnology base. Teva, the world’s largest generic pharmaceutical maker, acquired several biopharmaceuticals companies and announced plans to expand into biogenerics. 18 While Israel’s biotechnology sector remains comparatively small, its strong foundation for growth and business-friendly environment makes it Scientific American’s fifth best country for biotechnology innovation. 19

Strategic and Operational Aspects of Israel’s BW Capabilities

Bibliographical surveys and industry reviews can indicate the sophistication level of Israel’s dual-use bioscience infrastructure and human capital, and can suggest general research priorities. However, they do not directly indicate intent or strategy and cannot indicate operational status. Moreover, they do not include unpublished or classified research. While the Israeli government refuses to comment on BW speculation, most believe that Israel does not maintain an active BW stockpile. 20 However, Israel’s modern and well-funded bioscience infrastructure provides a “breakout” capability. 21 According to a July 2014 Jane’s Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) assessment, “Israel may be able to deploy a BW capability immediately. If no such capability presently exists, an order to proceed would probably take no longer than a few weeks to develop.” Israel’s ability to weaponize biological agents is still unclear, as is the existence of possible delivery systems. 22

History

1948: Ambiguous Early Attitudes and BW Allegations

Israel’s early attitudes toward BW arose from the historical context surrounding the founding of Israel and the personal network of David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founding father and first prime minister. Professor Ernst David Bergmann, an organic chemist, Ephraim Katzir, a chemist and microbiologist, and Aharon Katzir, a biochemist, figured prominently among Ben-Gurion’s scientific advisors on defense matters. 23 The three played central roles in establishing the Science Corps of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), a military R&D branch known by the Hebrew acronym HEMED, and also reinforced Ben-Gurion’s Zionist view that science and technology would provide Israel with the solutions to its unique security problem. 24 This context helps elucidate Ben-Gurion’s 1948 letter to Ehud Avriel, a Jewish Agency European operative, dated shortly before the Israeli declaration of independence. According to Avner Cohen, Ben-Gurion’s written request that Avriel seek out and recruit East European Jewish scientists who could “either increase the capacity to kill masses or to cure masses; both things are important,” indicated a search for BW experts. 25

Cohen also examines historical context to further explore Israel’s early BW outlook. Founded only three years after the end of World War II, both the Zionist ethos and historical memory may have contributed to Israel’s security attitudes at the time. 26 Ben-Gurion firmly believed that small minorities in a hostile environment must protect themselves or face genocide, and that science and technology would provide the foundation for Israeli security. 27 Additionally, every major World War II combatant had a BW program. 28

However, Israel likely envisioned a limited role for BW. By Cohen’s account, Ben-Gurion and his associates viewed the atomic bomb as Israel’s ultimate deterrence weapon, but this capability would take time to develop. And although Israel likely sought a sought a stopgap “doomsday weapon of last resort” for the interim, Israeli leadership recognized that BW did not provide visible, predictable, and immediate results, making biological weapons impractical for many foreseeable scenarios. 29 Senior officials knowledgeable about BW also considered them “morally repugnant.” 30 Thus, Israeli leaders interested in WMD deterrence would have seen greater value in a CW capability, and if Israeli military leaders did seriously consider developing and deploying a BW capacity, they likely would have limited its scope to “dirty trick” operations. 31

By Cohen’s account, however, calls to invest in BW existed as early as February 1948. Alexander Keynan, a graduate student in microbiology and the leader of a small student militia from the pre-medical school of the Hebrew University, lobbied Ben-Gurion to establish a new HEMED unit devoted to BW. Israeli journalist Sara Leibovitz-Dar revealed in 1993 that the establishment of this unit, named HEMED BEIT, caused controversy within HEMED and occurred under conditions of deep ambivalence. 32 Tight secrecy surrounded HEMED BEIT from its inception, and the biological unit was isolated physically and organizationally from the rest of HEMED. All archival materials relating to HEMED BEIT’s activities during the 1948 war remain classified.

Rumors about BW operations in Palestinian villages and towns during the 1948 war and subsequent questions about the scope and scale of HEMED BEIT activities during the war persist to this day. 33 On 23 May 1948, Egyptian soldiers in the Gaza area caught four Israeli soldiers disguised as Arabs near water wells. An Egyptian Ministry of Defense statement dated 29 May 1948 alleged that four “Zionists” had been caught trying to infect artesian wells in Gaza with “the germs of dysentery and typhoid.” Egypt tried, convicted, and executed the four Israelis, while Israel fiercely denied the allegations, calling them “wicked libel” and maintaining that the Israeli soldiers were involved in an intelligence and reconnaissance operation. 34 The issue of Israel’s culpability for this and other potential BW incidents during the Israeli independence movement remains unresolved. 35

1950 to 1990: Post-War Reorganization and Budgetary Limitations

Post-war reorganization significantly impacted Israel’s BW organization. As the military budget shrank between 1950 and 1951, IDF sought to relieve itself of HEMED’s financial burden, potentially indicating that the IDF saw limited operational benefit to HEMED and its BW program and did not consider it a priority asset. HEMED-BEIT became one of several MOD-sponsored civilian research centers. In 1952, this and a chemistry-oriented center merged to form IIBR, inheriting both the leadership and physical infrastructure of HEMED BEIT. 36

Israel’s leadership charged IIBR with maintaining Israel’s CBW infrastructure and human capital — a task they deemed necessary despite reportedly believing that BW did not provide useful weapons, and also did not present a real or imminent existential threat. Cohen asserts that IIBR’s relatively small and stable budget during this time reflects this assessment. 37 Nevertheless, Cohen notes that Bergmann and Keynan likely tried to extend IIBR’s role, envisioning it as a “national science” flagship similar to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the National Institutes of Health. In Cohen’s assessment, their proposal for IIRB to provide defense research while concurrently serving as the nation’s main laboratory for chemistry and biology R&D provided a competing philosophy that fractured MOD unity about IIBR’s mission and role. 38

Since the 1970s, IIBR has increasingly participated in commercial “for profit” unclassified R&D contracts, some of them with non-Israeli entities (such as the U.S. Army). In 1979, responding to financial difficulties, former IIBR director Dr. Israel Hartmann founded a commercial subsidiary, Life Science Research Israel (LSRI), at the IIBR campus to commercialize, market, and promote IIBR products and services. 39 LSRI now represents IIBR in unclassified and commercial collaborations with private and public companies. Overarching secrecy about IIBR’s activities and purpose continued. Nevertheless, Karel Knip’s 1999 bibliographical survey of the IIBR publications reveals that research continued in several sensitive areas from the 1950s to the 1990s. Notably, IIBR investigated plague bacterium, typhus bacterium, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B (SEB), and rabies. Interestingly, the survey revealed no work on botulinum toxin during this time, and no work on anthrax bacterium prior to 1992. 40

1990 to 2000s: The Gulf War and a BW Renaissance

From 1991 to 2001, under the energetic leadership of Dr. Avigdor Shafferman, IIBR enjoyed an unprecedented period of expansion. The 1991 Gulf War awakened Israeli leadership to the country’s vulnerability to Iraq’s WMD. Noting that Iraqi Scud missiles could deliver chemical and biological warheads against Israeli population centers, Israel’s policymakers considered this threat a major national deficiency and made substantial investments to address it. By Cohen’s account, the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s BW program likely motivated the dramatic growth of Israel’s defensive BW infrastructure. 41

Revelations about Iraq’s BW program in the mid-1990’s and reports that Saddam Hussein considered Israel a prime target for his BW agenda prompted further expansion of Israel’s BW infrastructure. 42 In the late 1990s, Israel devoted major new funding to developing an adequate national defense and response capability to the Iraqi CBW threat, as well as to other new bioterrorism threats. IIBR became the primary body responsible for formulating and executing a national strategy for defense against various scenarios of BW threats, and primarily anthrax bacterium. The IIBR campus expanded with new buildings, laboratories, scientific equipment, and staffing increases of roughly 15%. 43

Recent Developments and Current Status


While Israel maintains advanced R&D biodefense, and even possibly BW agent production capabilities, most analysts do not believe Israel maintains active production or stockpiles. In 2007, international media outlets reported that Israel had independently developed an anthrax vaccine during the latter half of the 1990s in response to a perceived Iraqi threat. 44 While the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime removed the Iraq threat, Israeli policymakers remain concerned over the bioterrorism scenarios involving “Islamic terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and Hizbullah.” 45 In 2004, the IDF held clinical anthrax drills in all of Israel’s hospital emergency departments. 46 In 2010 the IDF held a two-day bioterrorism drill, and at the end of 2011 it conducted a series of bioterrorism and radiological terrorism simulations, which displayed Israeli seriousness about its bioterrorism response capabilities. 47

Concerns about bioterrorism have also drawn Israeli attention to issues of laboratory security, illicit procurement, and misuse of dual-use resources. The Import and Export Order of 2004 effectively extends Australia Group restrictions to Israeli commerce. 48 Furthermore, a national project initiated by the Israel National Security Council and the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities formed a special Steering Committee on Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (COBRAT), which recommended strengthened controls and outreach on dual-use Israeli life sciences research. 49 Implicit in the report’s recommendations is the need to maintain academic freedom for Israel’s vibrant and robust bioscience research community, and to raise awareness within this community of the proliferation threat posed by dual-use research. 50

Speculation and fear about potential commandeering of this R&D base for offensive BW continues to this day. 51 However, while Israel’s political and security situation is fluid, its primary security concerns will remain regional. The geographic proximity of Israel’s likeliest adversaries and the risk of “blowback” will continue to factor heavily into any BW decision-making. 52 Israel has not signed the 1972 BTWC and maintains a policy of ambiguity regarding government-sponsored BW R&D, and WMD as a whole. 53 While U.S. intelligence assessments do not mention an Israeli BW program, the Office of Technology Assessment in 1993 listed Israel as a country “generally reported as having [an] undeclared offensive biological warfare [program].” 54 Unofficially, U.S. government officials also privately acknowledge concern over Israel’s speculated biological weapons capabilities, but there is little open-source information to verify these claims. 55

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Glossary

WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
WMD: Typically refers to nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, though there is some debate as to whether chemical weapons qualify as weapons of “mass destruction.”
Biological weapon (BW)
Biological weapons use microorganisms and natural toxins to produce disease in humans, animals, or plants.  Biological weapons can be derived from: bacteria (anthrax, plague, tularemia); viruses (smallpox, viral hemorrhagic fevers); rickettsia (Q fever and epidemic typhus); biological toxins (botulinum toxin, staphylococcus enterotoxin B); and fungi (San Joaquin Valley fever, mycotoxins). These agents can be deployed as biological weapons when paired with a delivery system, such as a missile or aerosol device.
Disarmament
Though there is no agreed-upon legal definition of what disarmament entails within the context of international agreements, a general definition is the process of reducing the quantity and/or capabilities of military weapons and/or military forces.
Arms control
Arms control: Measures, typically bilateral or multilateral, taken to control or reduce weapon systems or armed forces. Such limitations or reductions are typically taken to increase stability between countries, reducing the likelihood or intensity of an arms race. They might affect the size, type, configuration, production, or performance characteristics of a weapon system, or the size, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of armed forces. Arms control measures typically include monitoring and verification provisions, and may also include provisions to increase transparency between the parties. Also see entry for Confidence and Security Building Measures, Transparency Measures.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)
The BTWC: The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BTWC) prohibits the development, production, or stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Countries must destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery within nine months after the entry into force of the convention. The BTWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, and entered into force on March 26, 1975. In 1994, the BTWC member states created the Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a legally binding BTWC Protocol that would help deter violations of the BTWC. The draft protocol outlines a monitoring regime that would require declarations of dual-use activities and facilities, routine visits to declared facilities, and short-notice challenge investigations. For additional information, see the BTWC.
Export control
National laws or international arrangements established to restrict the sale of certain goods to certain countries, or to ensure that safeguards or end-use guarantees are applied to the export and sale of sensitive and dual-use technologies and materials. See entry for Dual-use
Dual-use item
An item that has both civilian and military applications. For example, many of the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical weapons have legitimate civilian industrial uses, such as the production of pesticides or ink for ballpoint pens.
Deployment
The positioning of military forces – conventional and/or nuclear – in conjunction with military planning.
Plague
Plague: The disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis. There are three forms of plague: bubonic plague, pneumonic plague, and septicemic plague. Bubonic plague refers to infection of the lymph nodes by Y. pestis, causing black sores or “buboes,” pneumonic plague refers to infection of the lungs, and septicemic plague refers to infection of the bloodstream. Although no longer a serious public health hazard in the developed world, the bacterium can spread from person-to-person in aerosolized form, and has been investigated as a biological weapon by Japan and the Soviet Union.
Typhus
Epidemic typhus has affected numerous military campaigns, including Napoleon’s invasion of Russia and the Eastern front during WWI. Typhus causes widespread vascular damage, and patients experience flu-like symptoms before the onset of delirium and neurological symptoms. Because typhus is effectively treated by antibiotics, typhus is not considered a particularly significant BW threat.
Anthrax
The common name of the bacterium Bacillus anthracis, as well as the name of the disease it produces.  A predominantly animal disease, anthrax can also infect humans and cause death within days.  B. anthracis bacteria can form hardy spores, making them relatively easy to disseminate.  Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR/Russia have all investigated anthrax as a biological weapon, as did the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo.  Anthrax-laced letters were also used to attack the U.S. Senate and numerous news agencies in September 2001.  There is no vaccine available to the general public, and treatment requires aggressive administration of antibiotics.
Botulinum Toxin
Botulism is caused by exposure to botulinum toxin (a neurotoxin).  Most often caused by eating contaminated foods, botulinum poisoning prevents the human nervous system from transmitting signals, resulting in paralysis, and eventually death by suffocation.  Botulinum toxin is the most toxic known substance. 15,000 times more toxic than VX nerve gas, mere nanograms of botulinum toxin will kill an adult human.  A significant bioweapons concern, botulinum toxin has been investigated as a weapon by Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, Iraq and unsuccessfully by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo. 
Deterrence
The actions of a state or group of states to dissuade a potential adversary from initiating an attack or conflict through the credible threat of retaliation. To be effective, a deterrence strategy should demonstrate to an adversary that the costs of an attack would outweigh any potential gains. See entries for Extended deterrence and nuclear deterrence.
Scud
Scud is the designation for a series of short-range ballistic missiles developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s and transferred to many other countries. Most theater ballistic missiles developed and deployed in countries of proliferation concern, for example Iran and North Korea, are based on the Scud design.
Al-Qaeda or Al-Qa’ida
Al-Qaeda or Al-Qa'ida: A radical Islamist terrorist organization established by Osama bin Laden (now deceased), responsible for a number of attacks in the United States and worldwide, including the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Al-Qa'ida means “the base” in Arabic, and acts as an umbrella organization for a number of terrorist groups around the world. The organization’s current leader is Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Australia Group (AG)
Australia Group (AG): Established in 1985 to limit the spread of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) through export controls on chemical precursors, equipment, agents, and organisms. For additional information, see the Australia Group.
Offensive (research, weapon)
Meant for use in instigating an attack, as opposed to defending against an attack.

Sources

  1. "Biological, Israel: Stated Government Policy," Jane's CBRN Assessments, IHS Global Limited, 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
  2. David Friedman, "Preventing Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation," in Emily B. Landau and Tamar Malz-Ginzurg, eds. "The Obama Vision and Nuclear Disarmament," INSS Memorandum, no. 107, March 2011. Israel's regional outlook towards WMD and arms control was also expressed in: H.E. Mr. Eytan Bentsur, "Israel's Approach to Arms Control and Disarmament," Statement before the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 4 September 1997. A recent report approved by the Israel National Security Council links this regional outlook to Israel's skepticism towards the BTWC: Steering Committee on Issues in Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities and The Israel National Security Council, 2008).
  3. Minister of Industry, Trade and Labor, Import and Export Order (Control of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Exports), 5764-2004, 4 April 2004, unofficial English translation: www.tamas.gov.il, 18 April 2011; and David Friedman, "Israel," in Brian Rappert, ed., Education and Ethics in the Life Sciences: Strengthening the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, (Canberra: The Australian National University Press, 2010), pp. 75-92.
  4. Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, "Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI — Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2005), p. 37.
  5. While the Office of Technology Assessment reported Israel as a country "generally reported as having undeclared biological offensive biological warfare programs," the Central Intelligence Agency generally makes no mention of such programs in unclassified WMD acquisition reports to congress. See: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risk, Report No. OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 65; and Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January - 31 December 2009," 2009.
  6. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 40-42.
  7. Thomas J. Hamilton, "Arab Assails the Idea of Minority Shifts," The New York Times, 24 July 1948.
  8. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 39.
  9. An ISI Web of Knowledge database search for select agent research between 1992 and 2011 found that Israeli research is cited at a rate between British and Japanese research. Citation rate is a commonly used indicator of the quality of scientific publications. Select agents were defined using Appendix B of: Steering Committee on Issues in Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities and The Israel National Security Council, 2008). ISI Database, 19 April 2011.
  10. Uvi Mahnaimi, "Israeli jets equipped for chemical warfare," Sunday Times, 4 October 1998.
  11. Paul Kerr, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends, CRS Report for Congress RL30699 (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, updated 20 February 2008), p. 20.
  12. The Israel Institute for Biological Research, "IIBR-Home," 7 March 2011, www.iibr.gov.il. This constitutes a roughly 15% increase in total staffing since 2004, with the number of technicians rising 70%.
  13. The Israel Institute for Biological Research, "IIBR-Home," 7 March 2011, www.iibr.gov.il.
  14. An ISI Web of Science search reveals that IIBR produced 34 publications on anthrax and 11 on plague since 2000 - a level of activity similar to Yale University, University of Washington, University of California - Berkeley, or Johns Hopkins University. For context, over the same period, the most active anthrax research programs are: U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID, 223 publications), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC, 153 publications), Harvard University (136 publications), the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID, 123 publications), and Institut Pasteur (115 publications). The most active plague research programs are: CDC (90 publications), USAMRIID (58 publications), Institut Pasteur (58 Publications), Colorado State University (43 publications), NIAID (41 publications), the University of Kentucky (43 publications), and Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (32 publications).
  15. Roughly 50% of published IIBR research found by Scopus® concerned anthrax bacterium or plague bacterium.
  16. Federation of American Scientists, "Biosafety Level 3 and Level 4 Labs," 9 March 2011, www.fas.org.
  17. "National Rankings in Molecular Biology and Genetics: 2000-April 30, 2010," 7 March 2011, sciencewatch.com; "National Rankings in Neuroscience & Behavior: January 2000-30 April 2010," 7 March 2011, sciencewatch.com; "National Rankings in Molecular Clinical Medicine: 1999-31 October 2010," 7 March 2011, sciencewatch.com; "National Rankings in Biology & Biochemistry, 1999-31 October 2010," 7 March 2011, sciencewatch.com. Data extracted from the Essential Science Indicators database maintained by Thomson Reuters.
  18. Scientific American, "A Global Biotechnology Perspective," Scientific American Worldview, 2009, p. 43; and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., "BioGenerics — Expanding our Leadership," 9 September 2008, www.tevapharm.com.
  19. Scientific American, "A Global Biotechnology Perspective," Scientific American Worldview, 2010, p. 52.
  20. See, for example: Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, "Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI — Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2005), p. 40; and Paul Kerr, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends, CRS Report for Congress RL30699 (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, updated 20 February 2008), p. 20.
  21. Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, "Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI — Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2005), p. 38.
  22. "Biological, Israel: Key Facts," Jane's CBRN Assessments, IHS Global Limited, 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
  23. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 29-30.
  24. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 28-29.
  25. Ben-Gurion's letter to Avriel, dated 4 March 1948, is cited in Michael Keren, Ben-Gurion and the Intellectuals (Sdeh Boker: The Ben-Gurion Research Center Press, 1988 [in Hebrew]), p. 32.
  26. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 28.
  27. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 29.
  28. Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: Review and Analysis," paper prepared for the 7th International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare, Stockholm, Sweden, June 2001, www.fas.org, accessed 8 March 2011.
  29. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 40-42.
  30. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 42.
  31. Magnus Normark, Anders Lindblad, Anders Norqvist, Björn Sandström, and Louise Waldenström, "Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities," (Umeå: FOI — Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2005), p. 7.
  32. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 30.
  33. The most prominent rumor of alleged BW usage by Israelis during the war of independence occurred just days after the Israeli declaration of independence, on 15 May 1948, in the conquered Arab coastal town of Acre. Dr. Uri Milstein, a controversial Israeli military historian, asserts that a typhoid outbreak resulted from deliberate Israeli contamination of Acre's water supply intended to prevent displaced Arabs from returning to repopulate Acre. According to Avner Cohen, in 1993, a commander Milstein identified for being involved in the Acre operation refused to comment when questioned, instead replying "Why do you look for troubles that took place forty-five years ago? ... What would you gain by publishing it?" Nonetheless, no Palestinian references attribute the outbreak to Israeli foul play, potentially because the "bacteriological warfare" campaign produced limited results, or because the general chaos of invasion precluded Palestinian awareness of the campaign, or because a natural outbreak, and not a BW attack, in fact caused the epidemic. See: Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2001, pp. 31-33. For more information about the questions surrounding HEMED BEIT's potential contributions to the 1948 war, see: Sara Leibovitz-Dar, "Haydakim Besherut Hamedinah" [Microbes in State Service], Hadashot, 13 August 1993, pp. 6-10.
  34. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 32.
  35. For a more complete listing of biological incidents potentially linked to intentional contamination on behalf of the Israeli independence movement, see: W. Seth Carus, Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents Since 1900, (Washington, DC: Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, February 2001 Revision), pp. 87-88.
  36. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 32-33.
  37. Zafrir Rinat, "The Activity of IIBR Focuses on Study of Disease Prevention," Haaretz, 12 December 1997.
  38. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 34.
  39. "Life Science Research Israel," Israel Institute for Biological Research, 19 April 2011, www.iibr.gov.il.
  40. Karel Knip, "Biologie in Ness Ziona," NRC Handelsband (Rotterdam), 27 February 1999, http://retro.nrc.nl, accessed 9 March 2011.
  41. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8 No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), pp. 44-45.
  42. Former UNSCOM executive director Richard Butler revealed in 2000 that Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz told him that Iraq had BW "to deal with the 'Zionist entity"; (see: Etgar Lefkovits, "Iraq Brags of Biological Weapons to 'Deal with Zionist Entity,'" Jerusalem Post, 18 July 2000, p. 1). Also see: Richard Butler, "The Emerging Threat of Iraq and the Crisis of Global Security," Jerusalem Letter No. 437, 1 September 2000, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, www.jcpa.org. For more comprehensive information about Iraq's BW program in the 1990's, see: Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Iraq's Biological Warfare Program: The Past as Future?" in Joshua Lederberg, ed., Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 137-158; Timothy V. McCarthy and Jonathan B. Tucker, "Saddam's Toxic Arsenal: Chemical and Biological Weapons in the Gulf Wars," in Peter Lavoy, et al., eds., Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press, 2000), pp. 47-78; and Milton Leitenberg, "Deadly Unknown About Iraq's Biological Weapons Program," Asian Perspective Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 217-223.
  43. The Israel Institute for Biological Research, "IIBR-Home," 7 March 2011, www.iibr.gov.il. Employment reported on this website constitutes a roughly 15% increase in total staffing since 2004, with the number of technicians rising 70%.
  44. "Controversy Over Secret Anti-Anthrax Trials, Gas Mask Distribution Plague Israeli Passive Defense Efforts," WMD Insights, Issue 18, September 2007, pp. 6-11, www.wmdinsights.com; "Israel developed own anthrax vaccine," Agence France-Presse, 15 May 2007; Dan Williams, "Israel developed version of anthrax vaccine," The China Post, 16 May 2007, www.chinapost.com.tw.
  45. Steering Committee on Issues in Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities and The Israel National Security Council, 2008). Specific scenarios of bioterrorism concern to Israeli policymakers appear on pages 34-36.
  46. Adi Leiba et al., "Lessons Learned from Clinical Anthrax Drills: Evaluation of Knowledge and Preparedness for a Bioterrorist Threat in Israeli Emergency Departments," Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 194-199, 2006.
  47. "Israel conducts large bioterrorism drill," Homeland Security Newswire, 15 January 2010; Yoav Zitun, "Drill to Simulate Biological Terror Attack," Israel News, 28 November 2011, www.ynetnews.com; Yoav Zitun, "IDF Holds Emergency Drills in North, South," Israel News, 5 December 2011, www.ynetnews.com.
  48. David Friedman, "Preventing the Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Situation Overview and Recommendations for Israel," Strategic Assessment, Vol. 7, No. 3, www.inss.org.il.
  49. David Friedman, "Israel Perspective Report," Presentation for the Task Force on the Technical Dimensions of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, 25 October 2010; and Steering Committee on Issues in Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities and The Israel National Security Council, 2008).
  50. Scientific American, "A Global Biotechnology Perspective," Scientific American Worldview, 2009, p. 39.
  51. "Biological, Israel: Key Facts," Jane's CBRN Assessments, IHS Global Limited, 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
  52. David Friedman, "Preventing Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation," in Emily B. Landau and Tamar Malz-Ginzurg, eds. "The Obama Vision and Nuclear Disarmament," INSS Memorandum, no. 107, March 2011; "Biological, Israel: Key Facts," Jane's CBRN Assessments, IHS Global Limited, 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
  53. Avner Cohen, "Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001), p. 45; "Biological, Israel: Key Facts," Jane's CBRN Assessments, IHS Global Limited, 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
  54. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2009," 2009; and U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risk, Report No. OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 65.
  55. Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Intelligence Review Is Softening Some Judgments About Illicit Arms Abroad," The New York Times, 18 November 2003; "Biological, Israel: Key Facts," Jane's CBRN Assessments, IHS Global Limited, 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.

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